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THE NEW CENTRAL EUROPE

by Edvard Beneš

THE future organization of Central Europe depends—just as in the last war—upon the final outcome of the present struggle between Germany and Great Britain. Although I have always been convinced of the victory of the Allies, I cannot even today foresee clearly the situation which will develop after the conclusion of the war. For there can be no doubt that developments in Central Europe have by no means reached their culmination, that violent measures will still be resorted to by Germany, that they will exercise a decisive influence upon the Central European situation, and that a new attitude will have to be adopted towards it. In addition, a number of matters which now appear to us to be very important will later undoubtedly assume another character.

For this reason it would be premature to deal with the question of Central Europe in all its details. Hence our considerations regarding the future of Europe must still be of a very general character. We can come to definite conclusions only regarding those questions which today—and in particular in relation to the developments of the last three years—appear to be perfectly clear and indisputable.

Thus the view is almost universally accepted that, in the interest of the independence of the small Central European peoples and of European peace, there must be realized as far as possible the closest degree of co-operation between the small states. I refer particularly to economic collaboration. It will, however, be necessary—as is shown by experience of previous attempts in this direction—to secure enduring agreement and co-operation also regarding questions of a political nature. The present situation of the majority of Central European states, which, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have been forced into collaboration with Germany, does not permit us to consider in detail the degree and character of the future association between them.

As far as Poland and Czechoslovakia are concerned—states which from the very first took part on the side of Great Britain—the situation is fundamentally different. Both this fact, and the common nature of the fates of both peoples as clearly indicated by the course of events, have impelled them to a co-operation, the outer expression of which was the solemn Polish-Czechoslovak declaration of November 11th, 1940, regarding future collaboration between the two peoples.

It would be in the interests of Europe if in the region between Germany and Russia there were created a large political formation of a federative type, powerful from the military point of view, which would yet have great political, economic, and cultural possibilities. Through co-operation between the Poles and the Czechoslovaks there would emerge a political unit with a sufficiently large population, and adequate industrial and economic wealth, a unit which could become an important factor in the post-war political equilibrium of Europe. And even if a number of conditions would have to be complied with for the new entity to be successful and enduring, one must bear in mind that its creation is not only essential but also provides a relatively easily realizable solution of the problem of the new Central European order. The events of the war and in particular the co-operation between the two governments in the territory and in the favorable environment of Great Britain, by themselves make for the gradual elimination of the more detailed difficulties in the way of present and future association.

The common action taken by Czechoslovakia and Poland may today be considered as one of the factors which can affect decisively the development of events in post-war Europe. Naturally, if it comes to a definite agreement and a federal union between Czechoslovakia and Poland it will be necessary to decide the question of the possibility of extending this organism to include also other Central European states. Here we must take account of Hungary, Austria and Rumania, and perhaps of the other small peoples in Central Europe. As far as Austria is concerned we have maintained the view that from the economic, political and cultural standpoint it has always been within the Central European sphere. In considering the ultimate fate of Austria the attitude of the Austrians must be decisive, as they have been deprived of their independence. It will be necessary, however, to allow for the fact that it was precisely the fall of Austria which precipitated the decline in European affairs and enabled Germany to embark upon a victorious war. The further course of events will show to what degree it will be possible to create from the small Czechoslovak-Polish federation a larger Central European federation. It is, however, both necessary, healthy from the point of view of development, and altogether natural, that first of all and as soon as possible there should be created a Polish-Czechoslovak union, which would provide a basis for further Central European federation.

Whether and to what degree there can be created, in addition to a Polish-Czechoslovak federation, and to a possible Central European federation, a further one of other states—such as those of Western Europe, the Balkans, etc.—will depend upon the whole development of European politics and the success of efforts towards federation in other parts of Europe.

Naturally, the presupposition of this new Central Europe will be the re-establishment of legal order in the whole of Europe after this war, and the renewal of respect for international treaties and for all international obligations. The foundation of the new peace in Europe must therefore be provided by moral and material assumptions, which would definitely constitute a condemnation of the totalism of the dictators and their aggressive international policy. An essential condition of a peace based upon really moral principles will be a determined censuring of the barbarity and criminality of the totalitarian régimes, and an actual, and as far as possible general, correction of all the injuries which have been done to individuals and nations, and the political punishment of those who are responsible for this war. It will also be necessary to guarantee human freedom in the national, religious and radical domain, very much more securely, and, finally, to protect the rights of citizens in the sphere of economic and social justice.

Europe and the whole world will finally have to return to some form of collective security. This will be the *material* basis of the new peace. It is too early today to say to what degree the pre-war system as expressed in the League of Nations and the system of collective security can be repeated, supplemented or improved. As victory approaches, and with the development of the events of the war, all these thoughts will mature, and it will then be possible to advance beyond the wide conceptions outlined above and to give them a completely concrete and practical formulation. In this short sketch I have dealt with the question only in the most general terms.

London, England

THE LAST MILE OF APPEASEMENT

A GLANCE AT EASTERN EUROPE IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS LEADING FROM MUNICH TO PRAGUE

by Josef Hanč

THE Austrian and Sudeten issues having been disposed of in 1938, the Chamberlain diplomacy of appeasing the dictators hoped to reap the benefit of its labors in the form of an enduring rapprochement with Germany. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich was to pave the way toward this major objective of British foreign policy. Peace and German friendship was to be bought at the expense of partial curtailment of freedom for the Czechs. Consequently, discussions took place between Chamberlain and Hitler at Munich with a view to capitalizing on what was generally believed to be everybody's victory. These discussions led to the signature of the Anglo-German Declaration of September 30, 1938. The two heads of governments promised one another on behalf of their countries "never to go to war with one another again."

In government circles in London and Paris it was assumed indeed that from this moment on the outstanding issues in eastern Europe would be settled à la Munich, by agreements between the four major powers, with the exclusion of the Soviet Union and the lesser states. It was the kind of policy which Mussolini had in mind, when in 1933 he proposed the Four Power Pact. However, conditions in Europe had changed materially between 1933 and 1938. In 1933 France and England were stronger than Germany and Italy. The Munich meeting demonstrated that in 1938 positions were altered. It was now Germany and Italy that were strong, while England and France had grown relatively weaker. Throughout the Czechoslovak crisis Paris and London actually behaved as if they had already been beaten. Their constant pleas on behalf of peace could not fail to be interpreted by the dictators as a symptom of weakness. Hitler and Mussolini were not unresponsive. They found it to their own advantage to accommodate both

France and England, provided their assumed right to freedom of action in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe were recognized.

Chamberlain was at the time profoundly convinced that world peace had once again been saved by ingenious and honorable diplomacy, but the leaders of Germany saw the situation in a different light. As far as they were concerned it was the superiority of German diplomacy supported by the German Air Force that saved the peace of Europe, for France and England could but submit to the supremacy of force. An inspired article which appeared in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on November 27, 1938, summarized the issue in the following language:

> Germany became aware, and the world with her, of the force which resided in a united German people. The solution of what had been called the Czechoslovak crisis reinforced the German position to an extraordinary degree from the political, economic and strategic points of view. The dangerous Czechoslovak corner thrust into the southeastern flank of the Reich had been eliminated. On the Rhine an insurmountable wall of fortifications had been erected. Even the experts saw that the strategic situation in Europe had been fundamentally reversed. Those who believed that war was inevitable did not consider the strategic conditions alone, yet these were the most important. No increase of armament in England, France, and less so in the United States would be able to overthrow the new situation. The base of food supply for Germany had been widened, and the modification of German relations with the Balkan states would further improve the position. Germany looked towards the east and the southeast. This gave her a very solid foundation which in time might even become enviable. It was not sentiment, emotion or conciliation that set the pace to Europe. All these things failed shockingly. It was the brutal reality, the constraint of being sensible, the weight of crashing facts, which set the pace. Nothing could stop Germany in her march. At Munich it was admitted by implication that Germany, acting in full agreement with Italy, had a definite hegemony in southeastern Europe. France had to realize that the new power factors could not be reversed by alliances. The previous status quo

made room for an entirely different state of things. This had to be irrevocably admitted. Interior decorations and psychological obstacles that prevailed elsewhere prevented other countries from asserting predominant authority and making clear-cut decisions. It devolved therefore upon the courageous and upon those who saw their goal clearly to push forward the evolution of Europe by their own might.

It had become a well-established habit in democratic countries not to take the German press seriously enough. Even the reading of *Mein Kampf* had been regarded as the somewhat luxurious diversion of the over-curious. It was not surprising, therefore, that the real meaning of Munich escaped the notice of western democracies, and that several post-Munich months passed amidst diplomatic squabbles between Paris and Berlin as to exactly what France meant to concede, and what Germany actually conceded to herself.

One of the provisions of the Munich decision concerned the Polish and Hungarian frontiers with Czechoslovakia. "If the revision of these frontiers is not agreed upon by the interested governments themselves within three months," the provision said, "the problem shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the four great powers." The Poles settled their part of the problem without recourse to the four powers, by their own means. At the height of Czechoslovakia's preoccupation with the principal German claims, the Poles sent an ultimatum to Prague and marched their troops into the disputed Teschen region. The Hungarians, on the other hand, requested a four-power settlement after it had become known that no direct agreement could be reached. Hitler, however, brought pressure on Prague and Budapest to avoid a four-power course, and instead to submit to arbitration by the two Axis powers. The arbitration procedure took place in Vienna on November 2, 1938, without consultation of England and France. The omnipresence of France in Europe, insisted upon by M. Coulondre at the Wilhelmstrasse, received thus its first serious challenge. Similarly, Chamberlain's hopes that Munich might be a prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe might find peace, if "the method of consultation shall be the method to deal with any other question that may concern the four powers," received their first setback. England and France were not asked to state their case in connection with the future of the country to which they had offered their guarantees. In consoling the French Ambassador as he protested mildly and informally against this oversight, Hitler told him that all he wanted to do was to avert the peril of a conference which would have placed the four powers in front of two opposing theses. "Whatever was my personal opinion," said Hitler, "I would have to favor the Hungarians and the Poles because of the political ties which united us. Mussolini would have acted similarly. The French and the English would have defended the Czechs for analogous reasons. Thus in three weeks after Munich we would be faced with a conflict which could not be adjusted." In fact, Hitler was telling the French that he would now have none of the limited expansion acceded to at Munich, for he had been placed in a position to practice full freedom of movement.

The way in which the promise of international guarantees to post-Munich Czechoslovakia had been disposed of was another indication how far the Munich scale moved against the western powers. By November 2, all former minorities in Czechoslovakia were incorporated into Germany, Hungary and Poland, including also 800,000 Czechs and over 272,000 Slovaks and Ukrainians. As far as Czechoslovakia was concerned the terms of the Munich settlement were fulfilled. The post-Munich policy of the Prague government was friendly to Germany, so that no reasonable objection could possibly be raised against giving the guarantees full formal effect. When inquiries were made by Czechoslovakia as to the possibility of having the guarantees formally recognized, the Axis was evasive, and as the "Munich spirit"—if there ever was such a thing—was rapidly evaporating, it became openly negative.

On December 6, 1938, Joachim von Ribbentrop went to Paris to sign the Franco-German Declaration of good neighborly relations. The following day he had a short meeting with the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, in the course of which he promised to have the question of the guarantees re-examined. The conversation disclosed, however, that behind the commonplace assurance of mutual good will, the same fundamental differences stood between the two countries which had divided them ever since 1919. According to the German conception the Declaration was strictly bilateral, having nothing to do with France's or Germany's relations with third countries. According to the French, the new diplomatic document had value only in conjunction with other contracts France had with eastern European states. The Munich guarantee to Czechoslovakia was one of these. The French idea of checking the omnipotence of one single European power by the association of all the other powers, in so far as they faced common danger, was once again confronted with the German diplomatic precept of reserving freedom of action in all problems of eastern Europe as the exclusive sphere of its interests. Behind the German conception stood now the might of a country relying on its own strength. Behind the French policy lay the anxiety of a weakened nation seeking reinforcement through what remained of the alliances with her friends. Prior to Munich the French continental system inspired a certain caution in Berlin. After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and with the loosening of Franco-Soviet ties, Berlin diplomacy no longer needed to speak softly. Recollecting the French assurances to Czechoslovakia and comparing them with what France actually did, German diplomacy began to draw a distinction between French words and French capacity to perform. Probably Georges Bonnet was not the right type of man to make the French position unmistakably clear to the Germans. He himself favored avoiding eastern alliances altogether, and his phraseology was ambiguous. But a considerable portion of France opposed complete deviation from the traditional policy.

Von Ribbentrop, on the other hand, gave the Declaration a much more extensive scope, and preferred plain talk. Soon afterward the French Ambassador was told at the German Foreign Office that, given the Reich's material predominance in eastern Europe, its guarantee should be sufficient. The *Frankfurter Zei-*

tung of December 7, 1938, emphasized that the Declaration had full value only if France recognized that Germany's position gave her the right and the duty to carry out a constructive policy in eastern Europe. The *Völkischer Beobachter* of the same date commented upon the presumed Franco-German rapprochement, brought about by the Declaration, by saying that for the first time in history France and Germany had turned their backs on one another. Chancellor Hitler told the western powers in his speech of January 30, 1939, that they had nothing to look for in central and eastern Europe. And, finally, in replying on March 2, 1939, to identical notes presented on February 8 by Sir Neville Henderson and M. Coulondre, the German Foreign Office informed the western powers that their guarantees to Czechoslovakia were actually an attempt at intervention in eastern Europe, and that they would do more harm than good:

> Such an intervention would only aggravate the differences between Czechoslovakia and her neighbors, other than Germany. It might even degenerate into a conflict. The extension of the guarantees would not contribute to the appeasement of the region, but strengthen only unreasonable tendencies as had been done in the past. The German government was aware that in the last analysis the general evolution of eastern Europe belonged in the first place to the sphere of the Reich's essential interests.

The diplomatic battle of the western powers for influence in eastern Europe was thus virtually lost. They could try to regain it, but they would have to use real force.

In the meantime the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky was summoned to Berlin to be acquainted with the conditions of the effective fulfillment of which the German guarantee could eventually be considered. Hitler and von Ribbentrop explained to him that these conditions included full neutrality of Czechoslovakia, conformity of her foreign policy with that of the Reich, with eventual adhesion to the anti-Komintern pact, abandonment of the League of Nations, transfer to Germany of a part of the gold reserve and of foreign exchange, suppression of new industries competing with the industries in the Sudetenland, introduction of the Nürnberg anti-Semitic laws, dismissal of all civil servants against whom Germany might raise objections, granting to the remaining German minority the right of wearing National-Socialist insignia and standards, and reduction of the Czechoslovak army below the ratio of the ceded territories. The Jewish problem was especially accentuated. "Germany seeks to establish a block of anti-Semitic states, and she could not treat as friends any states in which Jews would retain any influence whatever in economic life or in public service."

Among the pretexts on which Germany refused to join the international guarantees were the difficulties between Poland and Hungary on one side, and Czechoslovakia on the other side. This was a tacit confession that the much praised Vienna arbitration award was not, after all, such a master stroke of the Axis diplomacy. The difficulty arose in connection with the status of Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia), a mountainous little province of three-quarters of a million inhabitants, of which more than half were of Ukrainian nationality and belonged to the Greek Catholic Church. The Vienna arbitration gave its capital Užhorod (Ungvar), and its important town Mukačevo (Munkacz) to Hungary on supposedly ethnical grounds, together with most of the province's communications. The rest was literally cut off from the other Czechoslovak provinces and provision had to be made for the local population to get permission from Hungary to reach their homes. Hardly at any time had statesmanship produced such an anomolous economic monstrosity. Common sense would have left Užhorod and the main railway to the province. Hungary was dissatisfied, claiming the whole province on historical and geographic grounds. She was supported throughout the dispute by Italy, which desired to compensate her for her alliance and non-participation in sanctions. Germany favored the ethnographical principle, and was also interested in the province as a corridor to Roumania and the Soviet Ukraine. Poland claimed the territory not for herself, but for Hungary, but hardly from motives of altruism. Her interest was to take it from Czechoslovakia whom she considered too Russophile, and too close to the Soviet borders, and thus to wipe out the little Ukrainian land, the autonomous status of which she disliked, as it might serve as an example and inspiration to her own dissatisfied Ukrainians. For a time the new village capital Hust became the center of National Socialist propaganda which planned to use the Carpathian Ukraine as a sort of Piedmont, around which the forty million Ukrainians of the Soviets and of Poland might rally under German protection.

In Moscow the German scheme of separating 35 million Ukrainians was ridiculed. Joseph Stalin referred to it as a dream of madmen wanting to annex the elephant to the gnat. "If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough strait-jackets for them in our country," said he to the eighteenth congress of the Communist Party. "Imagine: the gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: 'Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you. Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way to live? As I look at you I cannot help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me. Well, so be it: I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories.' "

In January, 1939, Germany decided to abandon her Ukrainian project and to yield to Italy, Hungary and Poland by permitting the seizure of the Slav province by the Magyars at a propitious moment. Colonel Beck and Hungarian Foreign Minister Csaky were informed accordingly on January 7 and 16 in the course of their visits to Chancellor Hitler. Though nothing had been said officially of the reasons for this change, there were certain indications that a total reversal of Berlin's attitude to Moscow was well under way. Moreover it was not admitted that the uncommunicable Carpathian region offered no easy route eastwards. The increased rearmament policy of England and France, together with the growth of anti-appeasement elements, and the yet unsettled Danzig and Corridor issues obliged the mobile National-Socialist political strategy to leave the project in abeyance and turn in other directions.

The winter of 1938-39 demonstrated thus clearly the porous fabric into which the appeasement policy resolved itself. It revealed the house-of-cards nature of both the Munich deal and the Anglo-German and the Franco-German Declarations, and it placed on record the effective transfer of the balance of power from western democracies to the Axis. The wishful thinkers of appeasement believed naively enough that the National Socialist revolution could be stopped where it would suit them. They ignored the fact that once a marching nation had made itself superior in force it would refuse indignantly what it regarded as small concessions. The basic, dynamic, driving nature of National-Socialism escaped them completely. While counting the trees they ignored the vastness of the forest. Having unified the German race the leaders of the Reich substituted for the postulate of limited expansion within ethnical bounds the more extensive policy of expansion within the wider sphere of "living space."

The principal requirements of living space as conceived by the totalitarian powers are security against military threats from land, air and sea, pooling of ever extending economic resources, availability of the growing army of labor and of food supply, and room for colonization. These are the considerations which by their inevitable dynamic and cumulative effect admit no external spatial, geographical, economic, and strategic limits. Security from without automatically calls for assurance of security from within, for the living space becomes of necessity a multi-national territory. Internal security necessitates extensive police and secret service, and since ideas may be sharper than the sword, it is the task of the administration to restrict individual freedom, to place culture under control, and to enforce spiritual and idealogical uniformity. Organized living space differs from organized federations chiefly by the difference in the relationship between its varied peoples. In a federation there is a reasonable degree of equality, in the moral, legal and practical sense. In a "living space" peoples are graded according to the evaluation of their status by the controlling nation. Their own needs, rights and obligations are scaled down accordingly. The *Angriff* of January 31, 1940, simplified this principle by telling its readers that the master race had rights and duties, and its requirements therefore had every preference. "A lower race needs less room, less clothing, less food, and less culture than a higher race."

The first non-Germanic territory to form a part of the "living space" of the rising Reich were Bohemia and Moravia, the two westernmost provinces of former Czechoslovakia. The technique employed in the annexation of their territory was that of an attack from within, just as in the case of Austria. The clock-like precision with which the invasion of Prague was engineered corroborated the view that the final destruction of Czechoslovakia had been planned well ahead, and completely invalidated the theory advanced by Sir Neville Henderson, that Hitler's foreign policy was a work of chance.

Already long before Munich, German propaganda lent an attentive ear to a numerically small group of Slovak separatists, and later on the Slovaks were urged by Vienna radio appeals to sever their relations with Prague. The vigilant German minority at Bratislava and in other Slovak towns helped to incite the local population against the Czechs. Provincial Premier Josef Tiso performed the part played by Seyss-Inquart in Austria. His Roman Catholic Popular Party numbered only one-third of the voters against two-thirds of the Slovaks who fought Separatist tendencies. After being deposed by the Prague government he asked Hitler for protection. On March 14, 1939, the Provincial Diet at Bratislava proclaimed the separation of Slovakia from the rest of the Republic behind closed doors. The same day, March 14, President Emil Hacha was summoned to Berlin to sign on the dotted line the death-warrant of his country. To give it an appearance of legality, a document had been prepared for signature in which Hacha and his Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky "placed the destiny of the Czech people and their land in the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich," and the Fuehrer in turn "decided to take the Czech people under his protection and to assure them autonomous development conforming to their proper character." The two Czech representatives were told that this decision had already been made, and that every resistance would be crushed by the German Air Force and Army surrounding the Czech state. Before Hacha returned to Prague on March 15, the capital was already in German hands. The following night the status of the annexed provinces was made public. Bohemia and Moravia were placed under the Reich protector, who "could change the decree establishing the Protectorate and thereby the nature of the autonomous status of the provinces whenever common interests warranted. He could also issue whatever orders he thought necessary if there existed a danger of procrastination." The government of the Protectorate was reduced to a rubber stamp."

The creation of a separate Slovak state, which on March 18 was placed under German protection, isolated the Carpathian Ukraine completely from Prague. Its Premier, Vološin, proclaimed its independence which was one of the shortest on record. It lasted twenty-four hours. Hungarian troops invaded the little country the following day and re-annexed it to Hungary. Rarely in history had a state been put under the knife in such an arbitrary manner as was Czechoslovakia. At Munich its German-inhabited regions were cut off in the name of the principle of self-determination, but 800,000 Czechs were incorporated into the Reich in defiance of this principle. At the same time Poland liberated 77,000 Poles, but she took also 123,000 Czechs. On November 2, the Vienna award gave 272,000 Slovaks and Ukrainians to Hungary, also in the name of self-determination, and soon afterwards Hungary seized 102,000 more. On March 14, the Slovak province of less than three million was made a separate state, while seven million Czechs were annexed by Germany the following day. At the time of the Munich crisis the separation of Czechs and Germans was insisted upon by Hitler, Henlein and Runciman because of "absolute incompatibility of their character and political systems." In March, 1939, less than six months afterwards, the co-existence of the two peoples was declared by the same German leaders to be not only possible, but perfectly natural and desirable. The solemn word of the four great powers had not turned out to be worth very much. The German soldiers on entering Prague could find no burned houses and maltreated persons of German nationality. The city was hostile but quiet. One might recall the description of Prague given by the German war observer Fontane at the time of the invasion of Bohemia by the Prussians in 1866: "Our flags did not descend to a land of misery and barbarism, but to a smiling garden resembling a park. Everything around us evoked the impression that the inhabitants went around in soft socks, while our Prussian behaviour reminded one too much of cavalry boots and spurs." One might also recall a passage from Goebbel's description of modern propaganda methods: "It is not the business of propaganda to be respectable or mild or tender or humble; its business is to lead to a result."

France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union protested against the seizure of Prague and refused to recognize it *de jure.* Nevertheless certain acts indicated that had Germany stopped there and had she refrained from further territorial designs, the great powers would have acquiesced in the Prague coup. No mention was made of the Czechs, for instance, in the message addressed by the President of the United States to Hitler and Mussolini on April 15, although thirty-one European states were referred to by name. The message proposed that Germany and Italy guarantee the integrity of those states and that the United States would mediate in order to secure similar guarantees for Germany and Italy. The message also suggested that an international conference be called to deal with disarmament and the problem of access to raw materials.

The President's appeal was made three days subsequent to the annexation of Albania to the Italian Empire. On Good Friday, Italian guns shelled the Albanian harbors, King Zog fled the country, and the state that began in 1913 fell into eclipse. A week after the seizure of Prague, on March 22, a note of the nature of an ultimatum was sent by Germany to Lithuania requesting and effecting the return of the Memel territory to the Reich. Mussolini's and Hitler's replies to Roosevelt produced no constructive plan, except that Hitler reiterated Germany's willingness to sign strictly separate non-aggression agreements with those states which cared to. Besides Denmark, only Latvia and Estonia availed themselves of the offer. Europe's mind was no longer on peace through appeasement. The war with Poland loomed on the horizon as the next reality.

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

ORDEAL IN TRANSYLVANIA

by Transylvanus

"An immortal nation has been punished
for the sins of an ephemeral generation."

DURING the first ten months of the second World War, Roumania was a neutral country vying in the observance of rigid rules of conduct with nations near, like Greece, and far, like Holland and Belgium. Spring, anxiously awaited, at last came with its heavy rains, and the dusty roads of the old land of Bessarabia changed once more to their fluid state. Before the Summer sun could bake them into new shape, Roumania was robbed for the third time in her history of her whole Eastern province. What she might have saved from the exaction of the usurper she watched him overtake in three short days in the mire of old roads: men, wagons, guns. Far away, on the highways of Holland and Belgium the tide of war had already overtaken other men, other wagons and other guns, and even proud France had bowed to the conqueror.

Amidst the unprecedented cataclysm whose shadow darkened all of Europe save the immortal beach at Dunkirk, not the flow of blood or the tide of battle, but forces skillfully applied now completed the wreckage of Roumania's structure by the partition of Transylvania through the "arbitration" decision handed down at Vienna on August 30, 1940, by the Foreign Ministers of the Axis states. "This one of Europe's children is being cut in two," wrote R. H. Markham; "the judgment of Solomon has been pronounced, and it is being imposed by force."[1]

This judgment was not meant to be final. It was, in fact, a compromise useful to Germany, but equally unsatisfactory to Roumania and Hungary. Roumania could not willingly consent to the loss of a large mass of her nationals and of a territory that was the very cradle of her people; nor did Hungary renounce her aspirations to reincorporate all the minorities she had lost in 1918 and create a new polyglot state under Budapest rule. As a member of the Axis now, and as an ally of Germany in the first World War, Hungary was and is the beneficiary of the judgment; while Roumania, regardless of her official relationship to the Axis, was and is indubitably the loser. The immediate victoms are "the thirty millions of Roumanians losing many of their vital rights and passing back under the domination of the masters that speak a foreign tongue."[2] It is their fate as human beings that concerns us here, and not the "question" of Transylvania as an apology for the national policy of 20th century Hungary.

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[1] "Transylvania severed by Axis in move to pacify Hungary," *Christian Science Monitor,* September 3, 1940.

I

These Roumanians leave the benevolent rule of a government committed to the welfare of the peasantry as small landowners to return to vengeful feudalism based on the exploitation of a landless peasantry. Until recently, Hungary was a small country of 8,949,000 people. She ranked first in the number of large landowners, "190 families of whom owned 1,234 estates of more than 500 hectares each."[3] Expressed in another way, "295 millionaires faced some 3,700,000 suffering peasant proletarians."[4] The large landowners and the millionaires still constitute today a privileged aristocracy living in luxury and pomp unequaled anywhere in Western Europe. Nor has the peasant class that bears the yoke of servitude a counterpart in any other civilized state.[5]

"Half of the cultivated area of Hungary is worked by the serfs of the large seignorial estates who have no representation in Parliament, no political organization, no press of their own—no one to understand them and speak for them."[6] On the other hand, the Roumanians forced to rejoin these feudal helots had been freed from serfdom ninety years ago, after a great revolution. Twenty years ago they received land from the great (Transylvanian Hungarian) feudal estates. They also acquired the ballot, and came to dominate the politics of their province. Hundreds of schools were built for them and tens of thousands of village boys and girls became educated."[7] All this had happened "under two decades of Roumanian control. The administration was not good. Civil officials were far from exemplary. Confusion abounded; graft was common; bribery an ordinary practice; partisanship was a curse. But in spite of all those sad defects, little men made progress. They lifted up their heads and, though sighing, dared hope for better things."[8]

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[2] *Id.,* "A setback for little men," *C.S.M.,* October 15, 1940.

[3] Malnasi, Odon, "A magyar nemzet őszinte története" (Budapest, May, 1937), p. 205.

[4] *Ibid,* p. 207.

[5] Rusu, J., "The status of peasants in Hungary," *Revue de Transylvanie,* (Cluj, 1938), 73.

[6] Illyes, Gyula, "Pusztak Nepe" (Budapest, 1936), p. 31.

These Roumanian "little men" had many times before 1918 dared lift their heads and hope for better things. Three times they also lifted their fists in popular rebellion against oppression—in 1437, 1514 and 1784. The oppressor was not the Turk, often a scapegoat if never an angel, who had ruled Hungary from 1526 until routed at Zenta in January, 1699, by Prince Eugen of Savoy, but the privileged feudal class of Hungarian latifundiary nobles whose policy was one dictated by self-preservation. Joseph II, the most liberal of the Austrian Hapsburgs that succeeded to Turkish authority over Hungary, twice visited the imperial province of Transylvania to ascertain the state of things. His testimony is therefore authoritative and incontrovertible. This is what he wrote[9] in 1773 to his mother, Maria Theresa, and the Vienna Council of State: "conscience prompts me to point out that this country, Transylvania, is indeed fair and beautiful but in need of urgent help and radical reform, for improvement and half measures no longer avail. The governing classes are full of distrust, suspicion and intrigue. They are interested only in maintaining their privileges, in being unhindered to collect their revenues and in being free to do as they please with their underlings." Again, "The Hungarian nobility dreads nothing more in the world than anything which might lessen their income or restrict their rights

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[7-8] Markham, R. H., "A setback for little men."

[9] Sassu, C., "Autour de la réforme agraire de Transylvanie. Les témoignages d'un empereur autrichien." *Revue de Transylvanie,* Vol. I, no. 4, (Cluj, 1935), p. 429.


Roumanians
Hungarians
Germans
Jews
Other nationalities
100%
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
SIGHET
SATUL MARE
CAREI
BAIA MARE
Năsăud
Simleul Silvaniei
Zalău
ORADEA
DEJ
Gherla
SALONTA
CLUJ
TURDA
Toplița
Gheorghieni
ARAD
Abrud
Aiud
Brad
Blaj
Mediaș
Odorheiu
Miercurea-Ciucului
ALBA IULIA
Sebeș
DEVA
Orăștie
Ocna Sibiului
SIBIU
TIMIȘOARA
LUGOJ
Hunedoara
Hațeg
FAGARAȘ
Tg. Săcuesc
Sf. Gheorghe
BRAȘOV
Caransebeș
Pietroșanii
REȘIȚA
Oravița
Orșova
Someșul
Vișaul
Lăpușul
Crasna
Someșul Mare
Someșul Mic
Crișul Repede
Crișul Negru
Crișul Alb
Mureșul
Târnava Mică
Târnava Mare
Oltul
Bega
Timișul
Bârzava
Sebeșul
Cerna

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA

which they stretch by fair means or foul as far as possible in order to be able to exploit the peasants to the utmost." And again, "These poor Roumanian subjects, without doubt the oldest and most numerous inhabitants of Transylvania, are tortured and maltreated by all, Hungarians and Saxons alike, so much so that one cannot but pity their fate and wonder that there are still so many of them and why they have not all run away."

The imperial treasurer of Transylvania, Count Clary, gives a partial answer to the Emperor's question. "Everything must be attempted," writes he, "to hold the Roumanians who, though the poorest, are nevertheless the most numerous taxpayers in the country."[10]

To be complete the picture of past oppression must include the voice of the feudal nobility of Hungarians, Szeklers and Saxons (German colonists) forming a close "union of the three nations" for the exploitation of the other races living under the "apostolic" crown of St. Stephen. Let us hear, then, what these lords had to say to the Imperial Government at Vienna in behalf of the Roumanians whose self-appointed representatives they were in th Diet or provincial parliament of 1699, the very year that saw the release of Hungary from Turkish oppression: "Far be from us the thought of opposing the decisions of his Imperial Majesty," they protested, "But inasmuch as in this matter (the recognition of the Greek Orthodox religion of the Roumanians) one must not consider religion alone, we have decided to beg you most humbly not to grant this nation (the Roumanians) more freedom than it now enjoys; this would in fact wreak derision, affliction and prejudice on the three nations. Our ancestors never ackowledged the Roumanians and their priests, never incorporated them unto themselves, nor did they accord them equal liberties."[11]

Today the Roumanians are again parted in large numbers from the land where their own religion has always been identified with their nationality. They must return to a régime that has a long record of religious intolerance notwithstanding some contemporary panegyrists. "During the course of the sixteenth century," one of the most recent expositors of the subject writes,[12] "various laws established complete toleration for Calvinism and Lutheranism, Calvinism and Unitarianism were recognized as received religions. In this history of religious freedom in Transylvania, as early and as illustrious as any in Europe, there is no mention of the Greek Orthodox Church by reason of the fact that the Roumanian population had not yet become sufficiently important in the general social picture to receive recognition as a national group." And the author adds, "Many of the Roumanians were communicants of the Uniate, or Greek Catholic Church, and were accordingly reckoned as members of received religions." But he passes over three essential facts: that the Uniate Church dates only from March 20, 1701, or some thirty years after the Compilation referred to; that as a schismatic sect it had then as now but a fraction of the followers of the main church of the Roumanians, the Greek Orthodox Church; and that its founding (by the acceptance of certain points of Catholic dogma, whence the name Uniate, or united with the Church of Rome), far from being an indication of freedom, is the most eloquent proof of oppression. Indeed, the Uniate Church has as its *raison d'être* not the motives found at the basis of all new creeds but the necessity of securing recognition by the State of the belief of its communicants as a first step toward their attaining political and economic equality.

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[10] *Id.*, "Roumanians and Hungarians—Historical premises" (Bucharest, 1940), p. 129.

[11] Dragomir, S., "La Transylvanie roumaine et ses minorités ethniques" (Bucharest, 1934), p. 20.

Nor can the Roumanians now rejoining the "apostolic" Kingdom of Hungary look forward to a sympathetic regard for their language which, no less than their religion, sets them apart from their new rulers. Six years before the wave of liberalism swept over reactionary Europe almost a hundred years ago, the Diet at Cluj, capital of Transylvania, was debating in 1842 the bill that would make Hungarian the official language of the province. There was little doubt among the Hungarian legislators as to the justice of this measure. But there was opposition everywhere else, and one of the ablest voices of protest was that of a member of the privileged Saxon minority, the Lutheran pastor Stephan Ludwig Roth.[13] "In vain the gentlemen of the Diet pretend to give Transylvania an official language obligatory for us all," he declared. "In vain they seek to enact a law to that effect under the illusion that they are performing a praiseworthy task. They err, for Transylvania has no use for a language imposed by the will of the Diet. She has always had a language of her own, a language which all her inhabitants understand. It is neither the German, nor the Hungarian, but the Roumanian, the only one current all over the country." In the symbolism of his calling he admonished: "Give the Roumanians the bread of justice and the cooling drink of humane treatment, respect their dignity as human beings and honor their Christian faith, give them the possibility of an independent life and the means of an education;" and to unhearing ears he gave warning, "Take heed what you do and dare not to throw live coals on dry straw, for he who sows the wind will reap a hurricane." Roth died at Sighisoara before a firing squad of General Bem's Hungarian troops on May 11, 1849.

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[12] Madden, H., "Transylvania; a sub-nation," *The Hungarian Quarterly,* VI (Budapest, 1940), 615.

In September, 1940, in reoccupied Transylvania there were put to death at Zalau seven Roumanians, at Trasnea 66 (including a priest and several women), at Ip 155 (again including women and children), and at Mureseni eleven, among them the teacher and the families of the local priest and of the deacon; and this is but a partial record[14] of the fate now meted out to the little men for whom the clock had been turned back.

It is also the record that caused the great thinker, Leo Tolstoy, to reject an invitation to attend the 1907 World Peace Congress at Budapest on whose organization committee figured the name of Count Apponyi. Wrote Tolstoy: "A peace congress has no value when in its midst its apostles clamor for peace while in their homes they oppress other peoples. What is even more sad, abroad Count

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[13] Lupas, O., "Un martyr transylvain: le pasteur Stephan L. Roth," *Revue de Transylvanie,* V, (Cluj, 1939), 224-30.

[14] *Universul* (daily), Bucharest, No. 337 of December 7, 1940.

Apponyi has the reputation of a pacifist, while in Hungary he denies even the attribute of humans to non-Hungarians."

II

There is one aspect of the Transylvania situation on which there is general agreement. That is the ethnic aspect. Whether under one rule or divided between two régimes, the Transylvanian Roumanians have always constituted the majority of the province's population. We have the testimony of former Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephan Bethlen, as to the situation in 1912: "The Roumanians in Hungary exceed in numbers the Hungarians and all other nationalities in all Transylvania, in three townships of Maramures (now, 1940, ceded to Hungary), in all townships of Salaj county, and the majority of the townships of the counties of Satu Mare, Bihor (partially ceded territory), Arad and especially Caras Severin, and in several townships of Timis and Torontal counties; thus, while not representing more than 16.7% of the total population of Hungary, they predominate in 38% of the territory of the country."[15]

This predominance is traceable to the earliest records of the provincial population. Thus, the first known census, that taken in 1714-16 by the newly-created Uniate Bishopric, placed the Roumanians at 443,020 exclusive of some 3,000 families inhabiting the Barsa region of southern Transylvania. A second statistical report, dated 1733, listed some 441,465 Roumanians exclusive of some 3,500 families in Barsa and 700 families in the district of Ciuc.

A third census, taken by the Uniate Church in 1750, reported an aggregate of 537,722 communicants, exclusive of some 20,000 in Barsa and the priests and their families, numbering about 10,600.

The first lay enumeration was that taken under the direction of Baron Buccow, commander-in-chief of the imperial forces in Transylvania. This was a careful count that enlisted the assistance of the whole financial administration of the province and took two years to complete, from 1760 to 1762. It included for the first time the Barsa region, or some 400 localities, in addition to those reported in 1750, and listed the Roumanians at 777,170.

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[15] Grof Bethlen, Istvan, *Az olahok birtokvasarlasai az utolso ot evben* (Budapest, 1912), p. 3.

The next census, that of 1786, revised in 1787, merely reported the total population of the province, or 1,577,515 souls. With the aid of contemporary ecclesiastical enumerations of the various denominations the following conservative figures may be offered:

Roumanians	1,048,416	66.5%
Hungarians	341,058	21.6%
Saxons	188,041	11.7%

For the nineteenth century era beginning with the establishment of the dual régime in Austria-Hungary and the incorporation of Transylvania into Hungary, the official Hungarian figures must be accepted with certain reservations, in view of the fact that "from the early 30's right on until 1918 successive Hungarian governments strained every nerve to achieve complete Magyarization and that the whole apparatus of Government was placed at the service of this idea."[16] With these reservations in mind, we quote[17] the data available for the *whole* of Hungary, Transylvania included:

Year	Hungarians	Roumanians
1869	6,156,421	2,470,069
1880	6,445,487	2,405,085
1890	7,426,730	2,591,905
1900	8,679,014	2,785,265
1910	10,050,575	2,949,032

For the last year above given, the figures relating to Transylvania alone[18] show:

Roumanians	2,830,040	53.76%
Hungarians	1,664,296	21.62
Germans	565,116	10.74
Others	204,150	3.88
Total	5,263,602	100.00

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[16] R. W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty revision and the Hungarian frontiers* (London, 1934), p. 24.

These figures apply to the territory of the province reunited with Roumania by the unanimous vote of the provincial assembly of Transylvania, December 1, 1918, and confirmed by the Trianon Treaty and are, therefore, directly comparable with the findings of the Roumanian general census of 1930. This last enumeration was carried out scientifically and painstakingly by the Government Statistical Office in conjunction with the Demographic Institution endowed at Bucharest by the Rockefeller Foundation, and its findings have since been published in considerable detail. The actual 1930 count[19] of the Transylvania population shows:

Roumanians	3,208,767	57.82%
Hungarians	1,353,288	24.38
Germans	544,278	9.81
Jews	178,810	3.22
Others	264,663	4.77
Total	5,549,806	100.00

and calls attention to the fact that the Jewish population is recorded separately instead of being included in the Hungarian figures, as in 1910; that many Roumanians who, because they also spoke Hungarian, had been listed as such are listed under their true nationality now; and that a considerable part of Hungarian officialdom living in Transylvania in 1918 had chosen to move to Hungary after the cession of the province to Roumania.

"Since 1918," writes Professor Philip E. Mosely, "the Hungarian claim to Transylvania has perforce rested on historical, geographic, strategic and economic—and not ethnic—arguments, for Roumania's ethnic claim to the region is certainly stronger now than it was in 1918."[20]

This is true also of the separate parts of Transylvania now divided between Roumanian and Hungarian rule. The Roumanian

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[17] *Ibid*, p. 26.

[18] Dr. S. Manuila, *Aspects démographiques de la Transylvanie* (Bucharest, 1938), pp. 70-71.

[19] *Id.*, pp. 72-73.

[20] Mosely, "Transylvania partitioned," *Foreign Affairs*, XIX (October, 1940), 273-44.

majority remains undisputed in both sections, witness the following officially confirmed figures:[21]

	Roumanian Transylvania		Ceded Transylvania	
Roumanians	2,036,000	64.4%	1,171,000	49.07%
Hungarians	442,000	14.0	910,692	38.16
Germans	475,000	15.0	68,264	2.86
Others	209,000	6.6	236,030	9.91
Total	3,162,000	100.0	2,385,987	100.0

If history is an indication, the Roumanians in ceded Transylvania may be expected to continue to resist the attempts of any minority, however "well connected" financially and politically, to restrain them from regulating their life and organizing their government in accordance with the ideals for which they have long suffered. The fate not of little Transylvania, but of the whole world is at this time in flux. One can only surmise into what final shape national frontiers will freeze, once the heat of the present conflict abates. But one can venture to predict with reasonable assurance that, save for the possibility of relapse into a dark age through destruction and exhaustion, no settlement will stand if it fails "to safeguard and assure all peoples a place among nations and accord them the freest opportunity of autonomous government."[22]

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[21] Figures as of December 29, 1930. Figures revised as of 1940 on the basis of current vital statistics show for ceded Transylvania 1,304,903 (50.2%) Roumanians and 978,074 (37.1%) Hungarians.

[22] President Wilson, Message to Congress, Jan 8, 1918, point X.

AUSTRIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KINGDOM OF GREECE

by Friedrich Engel-Janosi

AFTER the first quarter of the eighteenth century the relationship between Austria and Turkey slowly began to change. For the two centuries preceding, as is well known, the monarchy of the Hapsburgs had performed the highly important task of protecting Central and Western Europe and European culture against the heavy attacks of the Turks; but when, in the eighteenth century, the Turks finally abandoned the offensive, the idea began to gain ground in Austria that this same Ottoman Empire, now inoffensive, was after all the best of all possible neighbors in the Near East. This belief was further strengthened as the Austrians perceived that the desire of Russia for the straits of Constantinople was still keen: thus, only the maintenance of Turkey might prevent the outbreak of a fatal struggle between Austria and Russia, the heirs presumptive of the Ottoman Empire. This new attitude toward Turkey assumed various shapes: now that she had ceased to be Austria's mortal foe, there arose an interest in and sympathy for the intellectual life of the Turks—as evidence of which we may note the new studies undertaken in the Oriental Academy of Vienna, and the career of the Austrian Hammer-Pyrgstall. The latter, as historian of the Ottoman Empire, became to many Europeans (particularly to Goethe and Rueckert) their intermediary with the East, the interpreter of Oriental wisdom and poetry.

When, in the third decade of the nineteenth century, the Greeks began their war of independence against the Turks, Metternich believed that it was to his best interests to maintain Turkey as an embodiment of legitimacy—that legitimacy on which he had based his political system for Europe, and especially for Central Europe. It was in this section that he was most interested and which he thought to be in particular danger from new events.

To Metternich, this War of Independence was a Greek rebellion. Later, however, this attitude underwent change as three European powers, England, France and Russia, the so-called "protecting powers," acknowledged Greece as an independent state and gave her a king.

In following the military and political events of these times it is impossible to overlook the intellectual movement, known as Philhellenism, which greatly influenced them. The Greek cause was synonymous with freedom and culture; modern Greeks were considered as direct descendants of Epaminondas and Xenophon: and it was from the royal family best known for their ardent Philhellenism that the three protecting powers decided to choose the new king of Greece. They offered the throne to the brother of King Louis of Bavaria. He declined the post, however, feeling that he lacked the requisite qualities,[1] and Louis then suggested his second son Otto in the brother's stead. At first the chances of Otto's election seemed negligible; but after Leopold of Koburg refused the crown, and Capodistrias, whom the Greeks had chosen as President, was murdered, the three powers, in 1832, finally agreed upon Otto as king.

From the beginning of his reign there were complaints among the Greeks (endorsed also by neutral observers[2]) that the Bavarians felt themselves to be masters of Greece, and behaved as such. In the first years particularly Louis was attacked by the Athens press which charged him with attempting to rule Greece from Munich, and the English minister himself, up until 1840, recognized a continuous danger in this connection. It had been necessary at the beginning to establish a regency in Athens, since Otto was a minor when he was sent to Greece in 1833. Louis considered himself entitled, even obliged, to take charge of this interim council, and he appointed Bavarians who, as members of this regency, directed the affairs of Greece for two and a half years, while continuing to regard themselves as subjects of Louis of Bavaria. In the course of this period, Louis recalled several members of the original group and supplanted them by others. The head of this regency was Count Armansperg. Since he had been somewhat suspected of liberalism in Bavaria, Louis had felt himself entitled to demand that Armansperg formally asknowledge the conditions under which Louis was willing to install him; but this the count refused to do,[3] and went to Athens free of commitments. Yet, in general, the ties between the members of the regency and their Bavarian king were of the closest. At the time when misunderstandings within this body in Athens were at their climax, both factions appealed to the judgment of Louis, addressing him as their "august monarch,"[4] and Rudhart, who succeeded Armansperg, in summarizing to Otto his political advices for Greece, speaks of the devotion "for you, the son of my king,"[5] that prompted this sort of political testament for Otto.

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[1] The article is based on Count Prokesch-Osten's private papers which are preserved in the archive of the family of Prokesch-Scheinitz in Gmunden, Upper Austria (they will be hereafter cited as A.P.); the papers of the Geheimes Haus- Hof-und Staatsarchiv in Vienna will be cited as St. A.; those of the Public Record Office in London as R. O. A part of the correspondence of Prokesch during the years in question has been published: (a) *Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten. Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich* (Wien, 1881). It will be cited as: *Briefwechsel.* (b) *Briefwechsel zwischen Erzherzog Johann von Oesterreich und Anton Graf von Prokesch-Osten* (Stuttgart, 1898). Cited as *Johann.* (c) The diaries have been published for the years 1830-1834: *Aus den Tagebüchern des Grafen Prokesch von Osten. 1830-1834* (Wien, 1909), as *Tgb.* Of these publications the correspondence with Archduke Johann is reproduced almost *in toto:* the two others only very incompletely.—*Berichte der Französischen Gesandtschaft in München, 1814-1848*, ed. by A. Chroust, II, 209, 215.

[2] cf. diaries of Franz Grillparzer on his journey to Constantinople and Athens in autumn 1843, *Gesamtausgabe,* ed. by A. Sauer, *Tagebücher,* V, 63.

This King Louis, to whose artistic and archaeological interests Munich owed her unique position among Germany's famous cities, and to whom, in large part, Munich and Bavaria were indebted for a new intellectual life, possessed several peculiar traits which have not yet been adequately interpreted. It is particularly as a political figure that he seems to us most enigmatical. How could his behavior in European affairs after the Congress of Vienna be explained? Had he given up all hope or desire of playing a leading role in German policy? But on one point at least concerning his ideas on the future of Greece, his thinking seems to have been clear. His mind was filled with the conviction of the greatness of Greece: "With poetic fancy he envisaged his son as already head of a powerful state triumphing over the ruins of the Ottoman Empire once again raising up the Cross where, so long, it had been proscribed."[6] The ideas of Louis concerning the destiny of Greece were also shared by France; they prevailed, from time to time, at the Chancery of State in Vienna. Thus the really vital question concerned the ways and means by which shares in the Turkish inheritance might fall to the heirs. Not less important was the choice of a moment for action.

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[3] Soeltl, I. M. v., *Ludwig I. von Bayern und Graf Armansperg* (1886), 48; Chroust, *loc. cit.* III, 83.

[4] *Tgb.*, 237 ff.

[5] Enclosed to Prokesch (cited as Pr.) XI/28/37, St. A.

There is no question but that Louis undertook, on several occasions, to interfere directly in Greek affairs; clear evidence of this is found in the fragments of his correspondence which have previously been published or studied.[7] Of a rather negative nature are his repeated warnings to Otto "not to bavarianize the Greeks, but to rule them through, and according to, their own national character." He also interfered positively, with his admonitions against the dangers that would be involved if freedom of the press should be allowed in Greece, and with his advice on the balancing of the Greek budget. Again, he urged, without suggesting how this might be accomplished,[8] that Greece be kept independent of the great powers, especially of France. But he does not seem to have felt it inconsistent with this insistence on the independence of Greece, to ask Count Armansperg to communicate the details of the Greek budget to him, or to ask Otto to hear him, his father, before coming to a decision on the Greek constitution.[9] And his counsel to Otto on the necessity of consulting Baron de Prokesch (the then Austrian Minister to Greece) were so peremptory in tone that Prokesch himself thought it advisable to gloss over them.[10] Particularly insistent were Louis' warnings against the introduction of a constitution in Greece: "No nation, for ages, has been less suited for it. This is to the best interests of Hellas."[11]

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[6] Chroust, *loc. cit.* III, 71.

[7] Trost, L., *König Ludwig I. in seinen Briefen an seinen Sohn König Otto von Griechenland* (1891), Soeltl, *loc. cit.*, Corti E. C., *Ludwig I. von Bayern* (Muenchen, 1937). No complete publication of this correspondence has been made.

[8] Corti, *loc. cit.*, 390.

[9] Soeltl, *loc. cit.*, 52, 57 ff.

[10] Pr. VI/6/35, St. A.

As a matter of fact, the content of these fatherly counsels went no farther than the three protecting powers themselves felt able to go. But this advice of Louis is not to be interpreted by "reasons of state." In the dealings of the King of Bavaria with the King of Greece there was involved something outside the realm of the usual "political influences" that have to be regularly taken into account. Bavaria, as a state, had no interest whatsoever in extending its influence in Greece or in supporting what had been called "the Bavarian experiment." The extraneous factor depended on the particular personality of Louis himself and on his relationship with Otto. Thus when it was learned, for example, that King Louis was planning to visit his son in the spring of 1836, there was apprehension among most of the diplomats in Athens—an apprehension which, as events were to show, was not justified. Indeed, the danger of regular Bavarian influence upon Greece was less menacing than others. None the less it is clear that a Bavarian "camarilla" existed in Athens.

In the period after the Congress of Vienna Russia and England were rivals for the predominant influence in the Levant. Since the problems of Greece were considered a part of the Oriental Question, the reverberations of this rivalry were clearly felt in Greece. Lyons, the British Minister in Athens since 1835, whose opinions Palmerston shared to a large degree, is said to have stated his position to his Prussian colleague in the following terms: "Greece really independent is nonsense. Greece is Russian or English; as she ought not to be Russian, she must be English . . . England's part is settled in these words; and, be sure, she will perform it and smash all impediments which she may encounter on her way. This is not a question of Tory or Whig; it is a British problem." In one of his reports he puts the question squarely: "Should the western powers yield the palm of constancy at last to Russia?"[12] In the face of these forces it was the mission of the Greek dynasty to achieve a "real independence" for the country. The question was: Could the young king prove equal to this formidable task?

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[11] Trost, *loc. cit.*, 51.
[12] Pr. II/12/39; St.A.; III/8/37, R.O.

Different opinions on Otto were expressed by the British Minister. In the beginning we find expressions of confidence on his part: "I think he will succeed, and I know no other man who would have a chance of success."[13] Later, however, he offered him constant opposition, and his criticism was often harsh. Otto's besetting sin, according to Lyons, was "his want of resolution to look a difficulty in the face, and this leads him to make all sorts of excuses and shifts to put off the discussions of all matters, however important, which are not agreeable." The Austrian Minister, during the first years of his residence in Athens, complained of the "apathy" ("die Unlust") of the king, and thought this constituted a real danger for the future of the monarchy. During the same period, however, he also expressed high esteem for Otto's individuality, and this favorable judgment gained strength as time went on. "My greatest hope is the king. I shall certainly not say that his personality is without insufficiencies, but I believe that he has thought aright on the main conditions for the maintenance of his monarchy and has character enough to keep his convictions."[14] Finally, we may note the reactions of the Austrian Archduke John who spent the last months of 1837 travelling in Greece. He went there on no political mission—indeed he was in opposition to the Vienna government and was considered to be something of a liberal; thus it is quite possible that his judgment was formed without bias. He perceived in the king a lack of passion, and the inability to survey the problems of the government as a whole, or to come to a final decision. He agreed that Otto was a hard worker and possessed of the best intentions, but he concluded that the King of Greece was better suited to be a scholar—or, perhaps, the director of a Chancery.[15]

The earlier sceptical attitude of Metternich toward Greece had still not greatly changed: "Greece was but fit to be dissolved into

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[13] VI/28/35; XII/7/37; III/30/40, R.O.
[14] III/2, 8/37, St.A.
[15] *Johann*, 253 ff.

'capitanates' under the protection of great powers," he wrote in the beginning of 1833—a suggestion even more extreme than that of the Russian program, which involved the establishment of *hospodars* in Greece. A year later he spoke of Greece as "this country condemned to life."[16] But when the King of Bavaria, changing his German policy, appealed to Austria to help him maintain his son in Greece,[17] Metternich agreed to give Austrian support to Greece. He entrusted Prokesch with this mission, and on December 13, 1834, the Austrian representative arrived in Athens—in that land of Greece to which once he had thought to conduct Napoleon's son as king. Metternich's choice was not mere chance.

Prokesch was born in Graz, the capital of Styria, on December 10, 1795,[18] of a lower middle class family—his father was an Austrian official—who had originated in a region of Southern Moravia in which the population was strongly blended with German and Czech elements. The name itself is Slavic. During the Napoleonic wars Prokesch had shared in the feeling of Pan-germanism, but his feelings thereafter became definitely pro-Austrian and continued, with increasing intensity, in this same direction throughout his mature life. His intellectual development was greatly influenced by German classicism and he particularly admired Herder and Schiller. When, in 1822, he visited Weimar and was kindly received by Schiller's widow, he felt, he said, like a child of the house; during the same visit, he also had a long conversation with Goethe who had a liking for a certain type of Austrian officer. While he was in the military service of Austria, Prokesch had written several works on modern military history, and the brilliant style of these had gained him fame; indeed, during his lifetime Prokesch remained in close touch with intellectual currents, in which he was greatly interested and to which he was greatly susceptible. Metternich himself was impressed by the writings of the young officer. A lover of good style, he showed his appreciation of this in the case of Prokesch, just as he also did for Gentz and Huebner.

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[16] Bibl, V., *Metternich in neuer Beleuchtung* (Wien, 1928), 357; *Tgb.* 227

[17] Bibl, *loc. cit.*, 393, 395, 398; *Tgb.* 199.

[18] cf. my *Jugendzeit des Grafen Prokesch von Osten, 1795-1834* (Innsbruck, 1938),

The wave of Philhellenism had by now reached Viennese society. Even members of the Austrian court, as for example the Archduchess Sophy,[19] were carried along by it, in spite of the Chancellor's political attitude. Among the most ardent Philhellenes was Prokesch himself. Like so many among the Austrian intellectual classes, he was particularly impressed by the figure of Lord Byron, and by the part which the Englishman had played in the liberation of the Greeks. Prokesch indeed rather fancied himself as a nature somewhat akin to that of the poet. Longing for the opportunity of helping the Greeks, Prokesch had already asked to be transferred to the Austrian navy, which was just then being built up under the command of two Italian officers, Paulucci and Dandolo, from the remnants of the Venetian navy. Like so many others, he, too, thought that in the deeds which had been performed for the Greek cause ever since Ypsilanti one could see the struggle for the inalienable eternal rights of man. For him, too, the verse of Tastu's "L'enfant de Canaris" rang true: "Foi! liberté! patrie! Les Hellènes vaincus, votre cause est flêtrie." As the friend of Franz Schubert he may well have remembered the lines of Wilhelm Mueller who had written the lyrics for many of the most beautiful of Schubert's songs: "Ohne die Freiheit, was wärest du, Hellas? Ohne dich, Hellas was wäre die Welt?" Prokesch once confessed that during these years the sound of beautiful music in his ears inevitably filled him with such a vehement longing for Greece that he could not refrain from tears.[20] He shared the belief that classic antiquity was the eternal prototype of man and art. In the summer of 1824 he started on an Austrian ship for a long journey in the Levant. In September he wrote from the Gulf of Lepanto to the historian Julius Schneller, his teacher and friend: "This country could and must be the origin of all that is greatest and best and finest than man could achieve." Five weeks later, having visited the spot "ubi Troia fuit,'" he wrote: "I felt as if I had nothing more left to see on earth."[21]

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[19] Pr. Diary (cited as D.) V/10/30. A.P.
[20] *D.* I/11/23, A.P.
[21] *Jugendzeit,* 50.

Any optimism he had felt for the Greek people as a whole diminished in the course of his travels. As early as September of this year, 1824, he had noted in his diary: "I would give my soul for the rebirth of Greece, but I hope very little from this nation, which is on the same level as the Turks—perhaps on a lower one. All that has been done has been accomplished by the few. Nevertheless I know that improvement is to be reached only by independence—by it alone."[22] Thus it was to the leaders that he looked for the "rebirth"; and his greatest disillusionment came when he met these leaders. For he perceived them given up to mutual intrigues, incapable of energetic action or of basic ideas for improvement. They had no aspiration higher than that of attempting to make a bare copy of western civilization for Greece, whereas Prokesch, the pupil of Herder, envisioned the cultivation of original institutions of slow growth. Disappointed and disgusted Prokesch once exclaimed that he hated all the leaders of modern Greece.[23] On another occasion he spoke of Greece as country where only the dead were alive. In many ways his disillusion parallels that of so many Europeans who had come here to fight for the Greek cause. Logically enough, this change of attitude implied also a different opinion of the "Terrible Turks." Though Prokesch could not fail to admit their barbarism, still he was somewhat impressed by their character as a whole; he particularly notes their dignity and reliability. And so, in another letter to the same Schneller, he writes, less than a year after he had arrived at the Gulf of Lepanto: "one could not possibly come to Greece with warmer feelings than mine; one can not be readier than I now am to condemn the Greeks utterly."[24] Nevertheless, he helped them personally whenever possible: on the occasion of the exchange of prisoners between the Greeks and the Egyptians in the spring of 1828, Prokesch was able to rescue many more of the Greeks than anyone had thought possible, and the Greeks never forgot this successful feat. He continued till Christmas 1829 his travels throughout the Levant, studying conditions on which he reported to his government. "Even the complete independence of Greece, if indeed this exists," he wrote,[24a] "would be but a weak guaranty. Greece will provide only a battlefield for her protecting powers." When Prokesch returned to Vienna, everybody considered him the best authority on Oriental questions.

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[22] *D.* IX/16/24, A.P.

[23] *Jugendzeit,* 54.-cf. in Appendix the characterizations of Gura and Kolokotronis.

[24] *Jugendzeit,* 58.

The career of Prokesch was threatened from the summer of 1830 by his intimate friendship with the Duke of Reichstadt, the son of Napoleon (his friend "for life—but for a great life"). Such intimacy with the son of the greatest enemy of Austria must inevitably bring upon him the disfavor of Metternich. Prokesch, however, scorned such practical considerations, exalted as he was by his feelings for the son of the Emperor of the French. But Reichstadt died in the summer of 1832, whereupon Metternich said: "The duke is dead; my previous reasons exist no longer." And Prokesch's career became possible again: on July 29, 1833, he was appointed Austrian minister to Greece.[25] Prokesch, the officer, had a liking for bold deeds, but he had not yet proved that he had the will for struggle. He had hitherto succeeded on occasions in persuading, but not yet in subduing. The success which had come to him thus far was justly earned, but not more.

On his arrival in Athens he found a great crisis within the regency; the British representative has written of his first reactions: "Colonel Prokesch gave the regency the most friendly assurances on his arrival, but he seems to be disappointed by his first view of Greek affairs."[26] And soon there appeared his own reports on the endless intrigues that were fomented in the country by the foreigners, and especially by the Bavarians.[27] Count Armansperg, who was at the head of the regency, was under constant attack by the other members of that group. Prokesch, however, and with him most of the diplomatic corps, was convinced that the Count was the only man capable of being head of the cabinet. For some time the Count's fate seemed to hang in the balance. In the middle of May Louis sent a special envoy to advise his son to put Prokesch at the head of Greek affairs if Armansperg should go. But when told of this by the envoy himself Prokesch refused to consider such a proposal.[28] But after a council lasting several days, Otto declared that the Count, whose energy and great admistrative gifts could not be denied even by his enemies, should stay in Athens. He was thereupon promoted to the post of Chancellor of Greece. With this the crisis seemed to be over. Prokesch reports in his diary that he sees no seeds of revolution in the country, though elements of disorder were everywhere to be found.[29]

[24a] To Gentz VII/3/28, St.A.

[25] Metternich's proposal: V/12/33.

[26] 1/24/35, R.O.

[27] V/8/35, St.A.

For the moment, calm prevailed within the regency, but there was another center of discord: the diplomatic corps at the court of King Otto had a well deserved reputation for the state of relationships existing among its members. "Every single diplomat in Athens possesses the particular gift of enjoying the worst relations with all his colleagues," wrote the Russian von Meyendorff, and we have a similar comment on the part of a French observer.[30] The Russian Minister to Athens was constantly suspected (and sometimes convicted) of plots against the monarchy and the independence of Greece, carried on under the cover of the common religion shared by him country and Greece. But it was perhaps the British Minister of whom the others were most unanimous in their disapproval: all were frightened of what they called his "fureur." Metternich's comment concerning him is, if anything, an understatement: "A man like Lyons, as an instrument of Palmerston, rushes through the world like a bull, and one must avoid bulls."[31] Lyons, in turn, gives his picture of the other diplomats: for several years he continued to make rather unfavorable comments about Prokesch, resuming these in October 1837: he sketches the Austrian Minister as constantly going back and forth between the house of Count Armansperg and that of Mr. Kobell (another member of the regency) with his arms full of portfolios and papers. Again, Prokesch is represented as using the first person, in referring to governmental activity, and he recalls the epithet "remuant" which the French minister had applied to Prokesch. In another passage from Lyons' reports, we are told of an incident occurring when he had been invited to Prokesch's house for dinner. Immediately upon his arrival, Prokesch started to inform him, at the top of his voice, that any Greek picked up off the road would prove a better Chancellor than was Lyons' friend Armansperg. Later Prokesch suddenly attempted to cultivate cordial relationships with Lyons.[32] It was, perhaps, impossible for any real understanding to exist between the British officer of Her Majesty's Navy, and this fanciful Austrian ex-Philhellene—who, perhaps, just as he had once done in the case of Reichstadt, was again seeing himself in the role of Schiller's Marquis Posa, having taken too seriously some of the remarks or letters of King Louis.

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[28] *D.* V. 22, 24/35, A.P.; VI/6/35, St.A.

[29] *Briefwechsel,* II, 156; XI/30/35.

[30] Meyendorff, P. V.,*Politischer u. privater Briefwechsel,* ed. by O. I. Hoetzsch (Berlin, 1923), 229, 263; M. Thouvene, *La Grèce du Roi Othon* (Paris, 1890), 5, 7.

[31] *Briefwechsel,* II, 223; X/24/41.

With regard to the French Ministry in Athens, Piscatory (the second to be sent to Greece), who had fought by the side of the boldest captains in the War of Deliverance in 1824,[33] was an enthusiastic Philhellene. He nurtured the two dreams of France's great destiny in the Near East and of the Greek political and cultural mission, the "great plan" of Greece. But such ideas had their dangers in 1840, when his collaborator, the cool and clever Thouvenel, made it clear that he was a Frenchman first of all, and only secondly a Philhellene. Moreover, concerning the aims of France, Thouvenel insisted on a more realistic French policy in Athens. We have a statement of his, written after three years spent in the capital, in which he feels forced to confess that Greece had been only a poetic illusion for France; the country itself was not worth a serious issue with England in its behalf.[34]

As for the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, there were no differences whatsoever in regard to Greek policy, or even Oriental policy in general. For a time Prokesch alone represented Prussia as well as Austria in the Greek capital. When, in 1838, Brassier de St. Simon was appointed Prussian Minister, the same excellent relationship continued to exist between the two governments, but between their representatives in Athens a series of conflicts arose; perhaps the fanciful king of Prussia—in some regards, the counterpart of Louis of Bavaria, was somewhat responsible for this. Moved by an antiquarian interest in classical scholarship, he felt a special concern for the "basileus" and his destiny. At any rate, he is said to have had particular confidence in Brassier. The sarcastic remarks of the two colleagues in Athens foreshadow that later feud, more famous, that was to go on for years in Frankfort between Prokesch and that other representative of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck. Filled with suspicion of his colleague upon whom Lyons also looked as "a dangerous man," Prokesch found means, as he himself admits, to glance over some of Brassier's reports. "This painful moment unveiled the tricks of this evil man." The rivalry in Athens ended with the triumph of the Austrian.[35]

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[32] X/31/37; Vi/3/40, R.O.
[33] Guizot F., *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps,* VI (1864), 260.
[34] Thouvenel, *loc. cit.,* 160, 183, 215.

Prokesch had begun to be aware that Count Armansperg, within a few months after his promotion to the Chancellorship, was leaning on England for support in his policy, and was making preparations to have a constitution introduced. This constitutional program, of which Lyons was the leading agent, was opposed by the representatives of the states of the Holy Alliance. But, as Prokesch realized, if Lyons were overcome, this might lead to the predominance of Russian influence in Greece. In 1836 the king was away in Munich, and Armansperg seemed omnipotent in Greece. But the moment Otto returned—indeed even before he disembarked from the British frigate on which he was travelling—he dismissed Armansperg, whom he replaced by von Runhart. This was, again, a Bavarian official: " a typical Bavarian old-fashioned liberal." He called on Prokesch and the Austrian was not at all enthusiastic about him on their first meeting. But a few weeks later he notes: "I am beginning to believe in him." Lyons, however, was completely opposed to him, objecting that it was his aim "to establish and eternalize a Bavarian domination" in Greece.[36] Everything seemed to serve to increase the tension between England and Austria in Athens. Palmerston took sides against Rudhart and Prokesch in favor of Lyons, agreeing with the latter that Rudhart's attitude toward him was "extraordinary and unbecoming."[37] Lyons thought that Rudhart's administration was creating a unanimous feeling of hostility against Austria. Prokesch's efforts to support the new Prime Minister could meet with no great success. Rudhart was a liberal bureaucrat with scholarly interests and the best intentions. For historical research on the history of Bavarian diets he was excellently fitted, but as Minister of Greece he succeeded only in concentrating upon himself the hatred of all Greek factions, and in alienating the king's affections by his habit of constantly offering unsolicited advice. What little support he received from the eastern powers was far outweighed by the opposition of the western powers. When he sent to Metternich for aid, England entered a strong complaint that this would not be to the interests of Prokesch who was aspiring to "a paramount and exclusive influence, nay even (to) the direction of affairs in Greece." Accordingly, in order to avoid an issue, the Austrian chancellor instructed his minister: "Do not interfere. If you are asked, give the advice that your conscience shall dictate."[38] Now that Metternich had failed him, Rudhart had also to face the fact that Otto's enthusiasm was fast waning: the Greek king had a dream of building up "Greater Greece," of entering Constantinople, and he could hardly use for his purpose a Bavarian minister who hesitated at any action, and who suspiciously weighed every word. Moreover, Otto would hardly be willing to break with England in order to support Rudhart's principles. Thus the Bavarian met with complete failure, and only a few months after his dismissal he died, broken by shame and fear at having disgraced "his king," Louis of Bavaria.

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[35] Pr. to Ottenfels II/12/42, Schreiben an Verschiedene, A.P.; *Briefwechsel* II, 275 f.; S. Eardley-Wilmot, *Life of Vice-Admiral Edmund Lord Lyons* (London, 1898), 94

[36] III/8/37, R.O.

Prokesch, while not adopting the doctrine of the Tyrolean scholar Fallmeyer, that the modern Greeks were all descendants of Slavs, still was keenly aware of the diverse ethnological elements that made up the people of modern Greece.[39] He states for example that the inhabitants of the isles of Hydria, Spezzia and Samos, who had played such a decisive part in the War of Deliverance, were almost exclusively Albanian; he felt strongly that there was lacking in Greece a unifying bond in matters ethical, intellectual and economic. He begins his memoir written in the autumn of 1837 for the Archduke John: "Greece, from the point of view of her population, forms no organic body," and, particularly for this reason, he was convinced that in the building up of a genuine state, a strong monarchy had a special importance for Greece.[40] This could well have met with the approval of Metternich, but Prokesch was able to enlist no practical support. For the Austrian Chancellor was convinced that the main political interests of his country were not in Greece but in Western and Central Europe. He was content so long as there was no shift in Eastern Europe in favor of Russia, so long as nothing occurred in Greece that might provide a pretext for interference on the part of his dangerous rival.

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[37] XII/27/37, R.O.
[38] X/11 enclosed to X/31/37, R.O., Instruction to Athens V.27/37 St.A.

At the time of Rudhart's dismissal, Prokesch feared that a revolution in Greece might be imminent if the Eastern powers were not prepared to oppose the Western influences that were working toward the introduction of a constitution—thereby weakening a monarchy and a government that was already far too weak. His fears were not realized. The king managed for a while to govern by himself, surrounding himself with Greek ministers with no personal importance or influence of their own. The two Greek statesmen who did possess strong personalities and undoubtedly political power were Kolettes, then Minister to Paris, and Mavrocordatos, then Minister to London. So, for a while, just as Otto had always wanted it, every action in Greece depended on his will. "The King is completely alone," notes Prokesch, "the secretaries of the state are less his advisers than instruments of his will."[41]

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[39] Pr. to Kopitar, V/6/38, National Bibliothek, Wien.

[40] I only hint at the question whether the Greek church could have exercised an analogous influence; but the king was a catholic.

[41] *Briefwechsel,* II, 176 f.; X/12/38 to Ottenfels, in Schreiben an Verschiedene, A.P.

But the English party had never ceased its activity in the interests of establishing a constitution and now it intensified the attack. Palmerston told the Greek Minister to London (1839) "to tell his master that until he granted a constitution, he never would have a moment's peace."[42] Lyons, in his audience with Otto, spoke with a vehemence that impressed the King; and the British Minister made several pointed references to the blockade against Naples by means of which England had succeeded in imposing her will. Indeed, Otto did not dare any longer to see the representatives of France, Russia or Austria, though he managed to keep in indirect contact with Prokesch by means of Schmalz, the former Bavarian general who had entered the service of Greece.[43] In the meantime Prokesch did all within his power to bring about an intervention of the Holy Alliance in favor of the Greek monarch,[44] but without success. He was aware also of Otto's financial dependence upon England, but he felt that if he could offer him effective support, Otto would follow his advice. Prokesch left for Vienna to consult Metternich, and on December 15, 1839, the two conferred on Greek affairs. A part of the conversation that ensued between them is given below. Prokesch having said that he believed that within the next century none of the principal European states would disappear except Turkey, Metternich rejoined:

> But she will disappear; my plan is fixed; Constantinople must become Greek.
>
> Prokesch: Then all the country between Athens and Constantinople will also become Greek.
>
> Metternich: All the regions where the Greek language predominates. Athens must be transplanted to Constantinople.
>
> Prokesch: This is what the King is hoping for and he trusts in us. I would not take this hope from him, or diminish it. Therefore, I have always told him: "grow strong in yourself; form a genuine nucleus; this is the surest way to attain Constantinople."
>
> Metternich: You have done absolutely right. I accept the

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[42] Bell, H. C. F., *Lord Palmerston,* I (London, 1936), 222.

[43] XI/14/38, to Ottenfels, Schreiben an Verschiedene, A.P.

[44] II/12/39, St.A.

> King as you describe him, on your own responsibility. Everyone else's opinion was against him, and I shared this for a long time. But now I have given this up, according to your word, and I shall support him everywhere.
>
> Prokesch: Your Highness will not go wrong in doing this. Do but help him: do support him. The Austrian Minister can have the most favorable position in the country. It depends on you.
>
> Metternich: I had rather expected that events would work out as they have. I did not align myself with the coalition (i.e. of the European powers) because I thought: I want the inheritance for myself.

At that point the Chancellor passed on to another subject, the political errors committed by the Russians, and he made no further mention of Greece or of Prokesch's plea for help. It was almost evident that Metternich had the idea that, one day, a Greater Greece would prove Austria's ally against Russia. But this day, apparently, was still a long way off. It was not yet necessary to make plans for the realization of such a plan, for Metternich offered Prokesch no indications as to how this "Greater Greece" was to be shaped. To him as to the English the best tactics seemed simply to maintain Turkey, as long as it remained possible to do so. Prokesch, too, shared Metternich's idea of the final destiny of Greece,[46] yet the notes in which he sets down his ideas on the subject have the same vagueness that characterizes the statements of Metternich. The point he stresses most, perhaps, is that Greece, growing stronger by degrees, must be really independent, and especially independent of Russia.

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(To be concluded)

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[45] *Briefwechsel,* II, 182 ff.

[46] Nachlass Pr., Fasc. 26, St.A.

TWILIGHT OR DAWN FOR THE SMALL NATIONS?

by Otakar Odložilík

The protagonists of the present war are writing one of the darkest pages in the history of the small nations of Europe. In this respect the present conflagration differs considerably from the first World War. It is not forgotten that several small countries participated in the struggle of 1914-1918 and made contributions to final victory which were in many cases out of all proportion to their size and strength. Serbia and Belgium were, during the first days of the war in 1914, exposed to the overwhelming attack of forces exceeding in number their armies, and after heroic resistance they passed into the hands of the enemy. The position of the Poles was by no means simple. In 1914 they were living in three states of which two, Germany and Austria-Hungary, were allies on one side, the third, Russia, on the other. None of these three powers favored Polish national interests. Moreover Polish territory was for several years one of the principal battlefields of the war and was devastated by armies on the move both east and west. Some of the peoples in Austria-Hungary were in a similar situation. Their sons were called to arms by imperial decrees and forced to participate in a war which was not their own. Czech, Slovak, Roumanian and Yugoslav soldiers from various parts of the Hapsburg monarchy knew quite well that the enemy trenches were defended either by their kinsmen or by peoples with whom they sympathized and from whom they expected eventual liberation. It is hardly possible to think of a more painful situation than that of many members of the Austro-Hungarian army, commanded, as they were, to use their arms against an opponent who was, potentially at least, their natural ally.

But if we compare the present plight of small peoples throughout Europe with their situation twenty-five years ago we may notice some great differences. In 1914-1918 many small countries were allowed to maintain their neutrality. Some of them even acted as mediators and greatly profited from the increased volume of trade with neighboring belligerent nations. At present there has hardly been a country, no matter how small, left in peace and unexposed sooner or later to aggression. Even countries which have not yet been drawn into the maelstrom have been in various ways affected. None of them can act with complete freedom or resist successfully diplomatic and economic pressure. Thus far they have received very little recognition for all the concessions or services which—often against their will—they have had to render to their more powerful neighbors. Only Hungary has been given a share in the division of spoil in return for her subservience to the totalitarian powers. Bulgaria, after a bitter lesson from the last war, maintained as long as she was able a policy of delicate balance between alignment with the Axis and periodical manifestations of good will to Soviet Russia. She seemed for a while to profit from this policy by regaining from Roumania the territory of Dobrudja. But she has finally found that engulfment in the German Reich was only postponed. And in Hungary rejoicing at her territorial gains has continuously been tempered by uncertainty as to the price which she may some day soon be asked to pay for the diplomatic pressure of the Axis powers on Roumania.

A common fate and common misery have welded the small European nations into a family more effectively and in a far shorter time than widely publicized meetings in Geneva or international conferences of which there were many between 1918 and 1938. Col. Beck's most unfortunate decision to aggravate by excessive demands the position of Czechoslovakia in the days of the Munich crisis seems very remote today and almost incomprehensible. Early in 1939 the commander-in-chief of the Esthonian army delivered a speech in Warsaw in which compliments to his Polish hosts alternated with derogatory references to the Czechoslovak army. The absorption of Esthonia by Soviet Russia in the summer of 1940 transformed this pompous speech into a document of unparalleled shortsightedness. From the seeds of discord which the enemies of Czechoslovakia had sown in that country there grew up after Munich only a temporary estrangement of the Slovaks from the Czechs. It soon became obvious that the "independence" which was granted to the Slovaks was but a hollow mockery and in many ways resembled the "liberties" which they had suffered in Hungary. The original scheme to win over the Slovaks by discriminating between them and the Czechs and to secure their spontaneous collaboration in the German *Lebensraum* was soon abandoned. Some of the trappings of independence which were left to Slovakia in order to differentiate the well-behaved Slovaks from the obstinate Czechs in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, have long ceased to be realities. The difference between various measures which were introduced in the Czechoslovak territory after its disruption is mostly formal and yet very significant. In Bohemia and Moravia these measures have been simply introduced by the German Protector, whereas in Slovakia every attempt has been made to give the people the impression that every new decree proceeded from the free will of the president and his ministers. The desire for liberation and reunion has grown on both sides along parallel lines and has become a new factor in Czechoslovak history. A sympathetic understanding for the catastrophes and disasters that have overtaken other small countries has replaced the shortsighted selfishness of which there have been many sad examples in earlier periods. The privilege of sending congratulatory telegrams to aggressors has been left to the ruling caste in Hungary and its agile spokesmen. But the darker the present days, the greater the hope for a united front of the small nations after the collapse of the aggressive and destructive powers.

There is no unanimity between the great powers as to the future of small countries. On the side of the totalitarian régimes there is an obvious tendency toward creation of large political and economic units and toward the incorporation by force of small nations into such blocs. If this is accomplished there will be in such blocs no room for the great variety which has until now characterized European history. In a Europe thus organized small countries will be confronted with the choice between destruction or renunciation of their sacred rights to freedom of thought and action. Their natural resources, the property of individuals and of communities, will be pooled with those of the dominant race and freely used to support its political designs and military campaigns. The intellectual life of annexed countries will be brought into harmony with the same principles to which the whole realm of intellectual activity has been subjected in the home of the conqueror. Free thinkers, free writers, a free press will disappear from those highly centralized areas, and people of different race, creed and historical tradition will be taught how to conform their views to the official pattern. But in one direction no restriction will be imposed by the new master: writers of the conquered country will be free to denounce its past and its national heroes. Nobody will suppress admiration for the energies and talents of the dominant race; nobody will impose limits upon gratitude to the conqueror for his decision to take from the shoulders of their countrymen the burden of responsibility and independence. This will be the glorious new freedom.

The tendency toward the absorption of smaller nations by their powerful neighbors and the effort to reduce citizens of formerly independent countries to the position of helots runs counter to the general trend of European life in the past. The political as well as cultural history of that cradle of our Western civilization has amply shown that small nations lived there from time immemorial side by side with the more populous units. Years of struggle and danger for the weaker have alternated with periods of harmonious and constructive collaboration between the strong and the weak. Small countries are like pebbles between larger stones and have their position and function in the edifice of European life. They may be easily converted by pressure from their mighty neighbors into elements of instability, but in normal times they act as mediators and links between different types of civilization. Direct contact between two great nations would cause permanent friction; a neutral zone between them, consisting of smaller countries, provides for gradual transition and facilitates the mutually profitable exchange of ideas and values.

Small countries have contributed in large measure to the formation of programs and ideas which from Europe have radiated to all parts of the world. There is no doubt that our civilization has been built throughout centuries both by large and small racial groups. It is now their common property and heritage and they should all be equally interested in the preservation of all its constructive elements as well as in its continued development. Intellectual life would be impoverished by the elimination of small nations from direct and free participation and by suppression of such foci of learning and art as Amsterdam, Brussels, Prague, Warsaw, Copenhagen, Oslo and similar centers of illumination.

There is a certain difference between small and large countries with regard to political independence. Very few small nations—if any at all—have been able to preserve their liberty throughout the ages by their own strength alone. The medieval kingdom of Bohemia was incorporated at the dawn of the modern era into the system of Hapsburg domains and reappeared on the postwar map of Europe in a slightly different shape as Czechoslovakia. Poland was partitioned at the end of the eighteenth century between Prussia, Russia and Austria and was reunited after the first World War. Serbia was for several centuries a Turkish province. In the nineteenth century it regained its independence and in 1918 became the nucleus of the present kingdom of Yugoslavia. Finland has changed masters several times, and in our days it has been able to preserve the independence of its reduced territory only with heroic sacrifices.

It is true that in various periods of history small European countries participated in diplomatic actions or in military campaigns and that the decision in favor of one or the other of the contesting powers often depended on the attitude and support of the smaller nation. In the fifteenth century the Czech Hussites protected successfully the kingdom of Bohemia for fourteen years against crusading hosts from all parts of Western Europe. During the Thirty Years' War Sweden, led by its king Gustavus Adolphus and his counsellors, became a leading power on the

Protestant side and expanded far beyond its natural frontier. In 1914 the Belgian army checked the German advance and made easier the concentration of French forces. Small countries have therefore their place in the political as well as military history of the world, sometimes, relative to their size, more prominent than that of their more powerful neighbors.

But it is only just to say that in the political arena small nations have achieved less than in the realm of the spirit and of culture. In those spheres creative power and education count more than numbers, force or technological superiority and equipment. Prominent personalities and progressive groups in small countries have, as a rule, been less exposed to various kinds of pressure than similar groups in the leading states of the world. Voltaire had extensive correspondence with prominent rulers of his age but he preferred to live in small independent or semi-independent principalities in order to be able to escape from an arbitrary government and its agents. He wrote that "a man of letters must live in a free country or reconcile himself to being a slave." He knew from his wide experience that there is less freedom in highly centralized large states than in small countries which neither plan aggression nor prepare for it. It is doubtful whether Goethe would have arrived at his concept of universal culture if he had lived in militaristic Prussia and not in Weimar, the capital of one of the smaller German duchies.

Many other examples could be adduced to show that in small but independent countries the genius and the ideas of prominent thinkers and writers can develop freely into perfect forms and influence the life of present and future generations. Ancient Greece lived long and vigorously in art, literature and philosophy even after she was completely overshadowed by the political and military supremacy of Rome. Medieval Bohemia, the country of John Hus and Comenius, played a leading role in the religious and intellectual struggles of Europe which preceded or accompanied the Protestant Reformation. The names of Erasmus of Rotterdam, of Hugo Grotius, of Rembrandt and Franz Hals are familiar even to those who forget the stories of the heroic struggle of the Netherlands with Spain or the account of the Dutch supremacy on the seas in the seventeenth century. Small, mountainous Switzerland cultivated the spirit of toleration in those very times when differences in creed or opinion were considered sufficient reason for oppression or persecution—in those times of intolerance which unfortunately are now coming back in so many parts of the world.

There are many more illustrations of our thesis. It is well known that Norway in the period of her political union with Sweden in the nineteenth century gave to the world writers of international reputation, the dramatist Henryk Ibsen and the novelist Bjornstjerne Bjornson. Polish historians have shown that the year of the last partition of Poland coincides also with the beginning of moral recovery and of national regeneration. Polish writers from the "period of subjection," Mickiewicz, Sienkiewicz, Reymont, Wyspianski rival in fame her generals, Kosciuszko and Pulaski, heroes of her struggle for independence, in whose worship their own land and this country have been united. Throughout centuries of subjection to the Turks the Balkan peoples struggled for the preservation of their Christian civilization and clung tenaciously to the memory of their political independence. In that period "splendid ballads unsurpassed in Europe for directness and imagination" were composed by anonymous poets. They were recited to the accompaniment of native musical instruments and thus handed down from generation to generation. A parallel to Serbian popular poetry may be seen in *Kalevala,* the Finnish national epic which lived on the lips of the peasants during the period of Finland's union with Sweden and later with Russia. Quite correctly the Latvian minister to the United States pointed out the ancient character of the Latvian and Lithuanian languages and their close relation to the Sanscrit. They are a symbol of the uninterrupted connection of the two countries with the ancient inhabitants of the Baltic shores and of the continuity of their intellectual life. Peasant art, embroidery and pottery from various regions of the Carpathians offer evidence that the Slovaks, the Ruthenes and the Roumanians, even under systematic pressure from the Magyars or from the Turks, were able to maintain their individuality until the days of national revival and liberation. Without these and similar contributions the totality of European culture would not be nearly so multiform and colorful as we know it today.

The difficulties with which small countries are faced nowadays are various both as to their origin and as to their character. Nobody can shut his eyes to the endless suffering of all those who have been driven from their homes and are forced to live in constant distress and fear. In most European countries today people look with anxiety to the coming months with all the dire consequences which shortage of food and fuel may bring. It is impossible to forget or minimize the heavy loss of life the small nations have suffered, both those which have participated in the war and those which have been taken under "protection." But for the future of our Western civilization the most ominous sign of the times is the strong and growing tendency to eliminate small nations as independent entities, to absorb them into larger units, to suppress any variety of political opinion or of artistic expression. Not only the formation of large political or economic blocs but enforced uniformity of intellectual life—if it indeed can be called intellectual—on the very well known current model, is apparently to be one of the most prominent features of the new system, of the "new Europe."

Geographical conformation as well as history show us clearly that Europe was predestined to be the home of both large and small nations. The fate of the whole continent has always depended on the harmonious collaboration of the two groups. For its preservation large countries were mostly responsible because they held key positions and were able either to nip local disputes in the bud or magnify them into a general conflict. In most cases the rivalry of great states, their aggressive and expansionist policy, has upset the balance of power and plunged the continent into long and devastating wars. The formation of a small number of large blocs cannot therefore guarantee permanent peace. It would wipe out many neutral zones and leave on the scene the chief rivals. It would eliminate potential mediators and provide for no other arbiter in controversies except the preponderance of arms and brute force.

The subjugation of small peoples with their individual forms of life and of historical development cannot be considered a step toward consolidation and pacification of the continent of Europe. It would be a break in the long tradition, a profound change which would not have been brought about by common consent or by voluntary agreement of all concerned, but by force and under circumstances which the victims of aggression could never forget. The history of America presents a unique example of peaceful amalgamation of peoples of various races and creeds and of their integration into a powerful political body. In the desire to unite in the same spirit and ideals vast areas between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans there was no difference between the first settlers and their descendants. There is, however, an abysmal difference between spontaneous coalescence such as has taken place in America and a unification by force of arms as is in process on the continent of Europe today. Those who do not see this difference and are ready to accept the "new Europe" as an equal partner with America in political, economic and intellectual life fail to see the fundamental difference. They are comparing things which are not comparable.

It is to the interest of the undisturbed development of Western culture that the small European nations be restored to their previous status of freedom. Thus only can they reassume their functions and appear again as constructive factors and supporters of the stability of European life. It would be disastrous if the traditional equilibrium between the large and the small racial groups were to be upset and replaced permanently or even for a long period by the domination of three or four powerful units over the rest. Not only in nature but also in the world of the mind variety is the spice of life. Uniformity and monotony must be considered the principal obstacle in the way of any free exchange of ideas and values as well as of human progress. The future of our civilization would be indeed very dark if the harmonious and voluntary collaboration of both large and small nations in the preservation of the highest human values were not restored.

The real new Europe which must grow up from the upheavals and suffering of individuals as well as of national groups cannot rest on any other basis than that which corresponds to the geographical character of the continent, the ethnic variety of its inhabitants and the trend of its history. This new Europe must be a free Europe. To its organization, economic recovery and protection against the recurrence of chaos large and small countries will have to contribute each in proportion to its strength and capacity. In that new world there must prevail the variety, the spontaneity and free exchange of ideas by which large and small nations have been able in the past to make literary, artistic and religious contributions to our Christian civilization and to the progress of mankind everywhere. These high qualities are now in eclipse. These days of our years are darker than ever before, but in the history of the human spirit as in nature it is darkest before the dawn. For the small nations of Europe the new dawn must soon break.

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GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS OF GALICIA

by Samuel Koenig

PART of the Polish territory recently annexed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been known as Galicia. Although quite unknown in the Western World, the territory has a long and interesting history and has played an important rôle in the political and economic life of Central Europe. Moreover, constituting as it does one of the links between Western and Eastern Europe, it is destined to be a factor of importance in the peace settlements of the present was as well as in any future conflicts that may arise in Central Europe. It is the purpose of this paper to present a brief description of this little known country and its people.

One of the interesting points regarding the territory under consideration is its name. Since the name, or rather names, applied to it reflects to an extent the course of the country's history, it may be worth considering in some detail.

Probably few sections of the world have been called by such a variety of names as this Central European region. Each epoch, each period, indeed, practically every change in the history of the country has brought with it a new name. Moreover, several names have been applied to it simultaneously by different national elements or political parties in the country, for reasons of their own, adding to the existing confusion. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that even historians, political scientists, and geographers, when coming to deal with this region, find themselves in a great quandary.

Galicia is the Latinized name of Halicz,[1] a Ruthenian principality dating back to the 11th century. It was when Prince Wolodomyrko, in the 12th century, made the town of Halicz—at present an obscure little town—the residence of the ruling princes, that the country came to be called after its capital Halicz (Galicia).[2] As the country originally constituted an integral part of the great Kiev State, Ruś, it sometimes, in contradistinction to it, was referred to as Little Russia ("Russia Mynor").[3]

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[1] Throughout, place names are given in their Polish form and spelling, except in the case of names, like Cracow, known in their English form.

Again, when Galicia became a province of Poland in the 14th century the country was officially called "Ruskie Województwo" (Ruthenian Palatinate). Among the people, however, it was known as "Ruś Czerwona" (Red Ruthenia), a name also used by a Polish chronicler ,who refers to it as "Russia Rubra."[4] As to the derivation of "Red Ruthenia" authorities differ substantially. One sees the origin of the name in the reddish tint of the soil of the country,[5] and another derives the term from a "reddish blondness" of the inhabitants of the region.[6] Others still[7] trace the name to the most important fortifiied city of Galicia, the castles and fortresses of which were built of red bricks and hence called "Czerweń" (red). From this city, the exact location of which is now a matter of dispute, the whole region, they maintain, received its name, the "Czerwenian Cities," and subsequently "Red Ruthenia."

Although, as we have seen, the name of Halicz (Galicia) dates back to the infancy of the state, it was hardly used by either ruler or people in early days. The only recorded official use of the term in those days is in connection with the Hungarian kings who, due to periodic and temporary occupations of the region, were fond of adding to their other titles "Rex Galiciae."[8] Thus, it was not until the country came under Austrian rule (1772) as the kingdom of "Galicia and Lodomeria" that the term Galicia came into general and exclusive use. The Austrians referred to it as "Galizien," the Poles as "Galicya," and the Ukrainians as "Haliczyna."

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[2] Hruschewskyj, M., *Geschichte der Ukraine,* Vol. 1, p. 106.

[3] *Ibid,* I, 1.

[4] Tomaschiwskyj, S., "Die Weltpolitische Bedeutung Galiziens." *Weltkultur und Weltpolitik* No. 1 (München, 1915), p. 17.

[5] Habdank-Dunikowski, E., "Das Land," *Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort and Bild,* Vol. XIX (Wien, 1898), p. 60.

[6] Ripley, W. Z., *The Races of Europe* (New York, 1899), p. 346.

[7] Tomaschiwskyj, *op. cit.,* p. 17; Felinsky, M., *The Ukrainians in Poland* (London, 1931, p. 9.

[8] Hruschewskyj, *op. cit.,* I, 106.

The term Galicia as applied by Austria to its new crownland was quite erroneous and misleading. "Galicia" may be properly applied only to that section of the former Austrian province, which, as we have seen, once constituted the principality of Halicz, namely its eastern part lying roughly between the Zbrucz and the San rivers. To extend this name to include also its western part, a purely Polish region, was a very obvious historical and political mistake. It created a source of endless struggles between the two nationalities living there which time only intensified. Yet this is what Austria, partly unaware of the graveness of her error, did for the sake of "unity" of her dominions. She joined parts and eventually the whole section of southern Little Poland, namely, the Duchy of Cracow and two Silesian Duchies, Oświęcim and Zator, with historic Galicia, and named all this Galicia. A distinction was then made between Eastern and Western Galicia, but this was of an administrative nature only. The whole conglomeration of different territories was fused into one, creating the imposing "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria with the Grand Duchy of Cracow, Oświęcim and Zator"—the full official name of the crownland.[9]

A word must be said about the term "Lodomeria" which one finds linked to Galicia, lest the reader remain puzzled as to its place and meaning. Nothing but the desire of the Austrian emperors to extend their titles as far as possible could justify its inclusion. To be sure, the annexed province of Galicia did include a small fraction of the historical Principality of Wladimir, or Wołyń, (in Latin Lodomeria) to the north, but the fraction was so insignificant a part of that extensive territory and was so unrecognizably merged with Galicia, that hardly a person living in the country knew what section was meant by it or where it was located. A famous geographer, traveling in the country in the middle of the past century, reports that "Nobody here knew anyabout the kingdom of Lodomeria, nay, nobody so much as knew its name and some officers of Lemberg thought that Bukowina had once been called so, and others imagined it to signify Cracow." But this, he adds, enabled the Austrian emperor to "avail himself of the opportunity to add the stately title of King of Lodomeria to his other denominations; which title is not the less fine sounding that no creature in Austria knows in what region of the globe this fabulous kingdom lies."[10]

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[9] Tomaschiwskyj, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

At the conclusion of the World War, Galicia experienced new changes in its name. The Ukrainians succeeded in 1918 in establishing in that section an independent state, proclaiming a "West-Ukrainian Peoples' Republic." Although this republic lasted but a few months, the name of "Western Ukraine" has since been applied to it exclusively and emphatically by the Ukrainians. The Poles, on the other hand, to signify the Polish character of the province, which was now recognized as belonging to the Polish Republic, have extended the name of "Małopolska" (Little Poland) to include also Eastern Galicia, calling the whole territory "Małopolska." Finally with the occupation of the territory by Russia in 1939, the province was merged with Ukraine, becoming an integral part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine.

II.

As already intimated, owing to its geographical position as a natural link between Eastern and Western Europe, Galicia has since earliest times exercised an important influence upon the political life of Eastern Europe. "Galicia," says one authority, "is not, from the geographical point of view, a unit, yet it possesses certain peculiarities, which put it in a special, almost exceptional position on the borderline of Eastern and Western Europe.[11] It is the Carpathian Mountains stretching all along its southern boundary, which lend it that peculiarity. Thanks to this great natural barrier, the country has hardly been influenced by, or played any role in, the life of Southern or Western Europe, though it has had a very significant part in that of Eastern Europe. Owing to the Carpathians the country was allowed to develop in only one direction—towards the north, and was prevented from expanding southward. At the same time, however, these mountains served as a protective wall against encroachments from the south.

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[10] Kohl, J. G., *Austria* (London, 1844), pp. 470-71.

While the Carpathian mountain range served as a protection from invasion from the south, its open, unobstructed access in all other directions, especially on the east and west, made the country a desirable possession, and, consequently, an international battlefield and a bone of contention among warring empires. Consequently, it is easy to see why the region should have had as chequered a history as it did. From 1087 to 1387 it formed an autonomous Ruthenian principality; from 1387 to 1772 it constituted a Polish province; from 1772 to 1918 it was an Austrian crownland; from 1918 to 1939 it formed a part of Poland; and in 1939 it was annexed by Russia.

As intimated above, the term Galicia should properly be applied only to that part of the territory which during Austrian rule was commonly referred to as Eastern Galicia, and it is only with this section that we are here concerned. While an Austrian province this section, as we have seen, included roughly the territory between the rivers Zbrucz and San, an area of about 55,000 square kilometers. On the west the San River divided it from so-called Western Galicia; on the east it bordered on Russia and Rumania, on the north on Russia, and on the south on Hungary. When constituting part of Poland it included the three voyevodships (counties) of Lwów, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol ,which correspond approximately to the territory recently incorporated by the U.S.S.R. into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Geographically, Galicia is a continuation of the Baltic Plains which form the watershed between the Baltic and Black Sea. It may be divided into the following main geographical regions: (1) the Carpathian mountains in the south (2) the San-Bug plain in the north (3) the plateau regions of Podole and Pokucie in the east, and (4) the Dniester plain, separating the plateaus from the highlands, in the south. The term "Karpaty" (Carpathians), it is

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[21] Tomaschiwskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

noteworthy, is practically never used by the natives. These refer to them as simply the mountains (*hory*).

Although, as already pointed out, it was originally a purely Ukrainian province, Galicia has been for many years a bi-national country, with a strong mixture of national minorities. Its early incorporation into Poland and the steady influx of Poles and other peoples have changed its original ethnic character. Today the country stands out, ethnically speaking, as one of the most heterogeneous territories of Europe.

Prior to its first annexation by Poland in the 14th century, the boundaries between the Ukrainians and the neighboring Poles seem to have been quite definitely established. Roughly speaking, the now accepted ethnographical boundary line of the San River may be considered as having constituted also the dividing line between the Polish and Ukrainian tribes early in their history, although the exact boundaries of the Ukrainian territory probably extended then much farther west, reaching the Wislok River in the south and across the Wisloka River in the north, thus leaving quite an insignificant part of Galicia as a purely Polish section.[12]

The original boundary line has now no geographical significance, but the great impassable, primeval forests along the Wislok River constituted in those days a natural line dividing the Eastern from the Western Slavs.[13] With the occupation of Galicia by the Poles, however, the boundary line was gradually pushed back in the north by colonizing Poles until it reached the San River.[14] In the south, on the other hand, the Ukrainians pressed even farther west than the original boundary, crossing the Poprad River.[15] This southern extension of the Ukrainians became in time largely a mixed Polish-Ukrainian section, but it left a westerly projection, the Lemki Country (Lemkiwszczyna), inhabited, as it still is, by a great Ukrainian majority. The Ukrainian territory west of the San, having been completely occupied by the Poles, came to be looked upon as an integral part of Little Poland, and even the most extreme Ukrainian nationalists have been forced to recognize this fact, claiming that the Polish Ukrainian boundary line coincides roughly with the San River.[16]

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[12] Czoernig, K., *Ethnographie der Österreichischen Monarchie* (Wien, 1857), Vol. I, p. 17.

[13] Tomaschiwskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[14] Czoernig, K., *op. cit.*, I. 17.

[15] Tomaschiwskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

According to the 1921 official Polish census[17] the three voyevodships of Lwów, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol, namely, what has been called Eastern Galicia, had a population of 5,485,725. This number represents a substantial decrease, due to the effects of the World War, from 5,946,315 recorded in 1910,[18] but by 1931 it had increased to 6,209,662.[19] The Ukrainians and Poles, as we have seen, make up the bulk of the population. Besides these two principal nationalities, certain national minorities, among which the Jews are the most numerous, are found in this country. The question as to the relative number of Ukrainians and Poles in this Ireland of Eastern Europe, as it has been called, is a most difficult one to answer. Since the struggle of the two nationalities for the possession of the country centers mainly around their relative numerical strength, each party seeks to make as good a showing as possible. The impartial inquirer thus finds it hard to get at the facts and can arrive at a fair estimate only after a most careful examination of the statistical material.

Since differences between the Ukrainians and Poles are both religious and linguistic, both of these characteristics have been employed as criteria by the official censuses at different times. Not only do the figures usually show a bias in favor of the Poles, but the criteria themselves prove inadequate, since religion and language do not always coincide, as a considerable number of Roman Catholics speak Ukrainian and many Greek Catholics speak Polish. An added difficulty, especially in Austrian times, was the fact that Yiddish, the language of the important Jewish minority, was not considered as a language, and hence over half a million Jews were counted as Poles, or occasionally as Ukrainians, depending upon their choice. On the whole, however, the criterion of religion is probably the most correct as well as the most commonly used.

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[16] Revyuk, E. *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine* (New York, 1931), p. 488.

[17] Glówny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Rocznik Statystyki* (Warszawa, 1927), pp. 11-12.

[18] Glówny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Miesięcznik Statystyczny* (Warszawa, 1922), Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 54.

[19] Glówny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludności z Dnia 9 Grudnia,* 1931, p. 4.

In the middle of the last century (1859) the number of Ukrainians in Galicia, i.e., Eastern Galicia, was 2,077,112.[20] By 1880 the number had increased to 2,439,057, constituting 63.42 percent of the total population, while the Poles numbered 852,629, or 32.17 percent. Beginning with 1880, however, the proportion of Ukrainians showed a steady decline. The greatest decline is to be noted in the years 1901-1910 when the percentage of Ukrainians fell almost a whole point, while that of the Poles rose two whole points. This was due mainly to the fact that while the wave of emigration among the Ukrainians was at its highest, the Poles not only hardly emigrated, but actually immigrated from Małopolska, or Western Galicia, partially displacing the Ukrainians.

The years following the World War are marked by a still further relative decline of the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia and a proportionate increase of Poles. According to Polish sources[22] there were in 1921, 2,610,182 Ukrainians and 1,903,480 Poles, the proportions being respectively 53.6 percent and 39.1 percent. Excluding the Polish districts west of the San, these sources maintain, there were 2,399,337 (56.6 percent) Ukrainians as against 1,237,965 (29.7 percent) Poles. On the other hand, Ukrainian authorities insist that these figures are a deliberate exaggeration, one of them[23] claiming the number of Ukrainians to be 3,400,000 and another[24] 3,422,050.

In the face of the unreliability of both Polish and Ukrainian sources as regards the relative numbers of Ukrainians and Poles in Eastern Galicia, the only recourse seems to be to follow the esti-

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[20] Krajowe Biuro Statystyczne, *Podręcznik Statystyki Galicyi* (Lwów, 1913), Vol. IX, p. 8.

[21] *Galitsie un ir Bafelkerung* (Warszawa, 1923), p. 23.

[22] Cf. Felinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-28.

[23] Zaloziecky, W. R., Ukraine," *Staatslexikon* (Freiburg, i. B., 1932), Vol. V, p. 472.

[24] Paneyko, B., "Galicia and the Polish Ukrainian Problem," *Slavonic and Eastern European Review*, Vol. X, p. 583.


POLAND
GALICIA
WESTERN
EASTERN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CARPATHIA
U.S.S.R.
RUMANIA
Tarnopol
Stanisławów
Lwów
PODOLE
POKUCIE
Gdańsk
Kartuzy
Kościerzyna
Chojnice
Starogard
Gniew
Tuchola
Swiecie
Grudziądz
Sepolno
Wyrzysk
Bydgoszcz
Chełmno
Lubawa
Wąbrzezno
Brodnica
Działdowo
Przasnysz
Chodzież
Szubin
Toruń
Rypin
Mława
Inowrocław
Wągrowiec
Znin
Oborniki
Lipno
Sierpc
Ciechanów
Maków
Ostrołęka
Łomża
Mogilno
Strzelno
Nieszawa
Poznań
Gniezno
Płock
Płońsk
Pułtusk
Ostrów
Włocławek
Gostynin
Września
Środa
Słupca
Konin
Koło
Kutno
Sochaczew
Radzymin
Węgrów
Sokołów
Kościan
Jarocin
Leczyca
Łowicz
Błonie
Warszawa
Mińsk Mazow.
Siedlce
Leszno
Koźmin
Pleszew
Gostyń
Krotoszyn
Kalisz
Turek
Łódź
Brzeziny
Skierniewice
Grójec
Rawicz
Ostrów
Odolanów
Ostrzeszów
Sieradz
Łask
Rawa
Garwolin
Łuków
Radzyń
Kępno
Wieluń
Piotrków
Opoczno
Radom
Kozienice
Lubartów
Włodawa
Puławy
Lublin
Chełm
Konskie
Iłża
Radomsko
Kielce
Opatów
Janów
Krasnystaw
Częstochowa
Włoszczowa
Jędrzejów
Sandomierz
Tarnobrzeg
Zamość
Hrubieszów
Lubliniec
Tarnowskie Góry
Zawiercie
Stopnica
Nisko
Biłgoraj
Tomaszów
Świętochłowice
Katowice
Będzin
Olkusz
Miechów
Pińczów
Mielec
Kolbuszowa
Rybnik
Pszczyna
Chrzanów
Dąbrowa
Łańcut
Lubaczów
Rawa Ruska
Oświęcim
Kraków
Wieliczka
Bochnia
Tarnów
Ropczyce
Rzeszów
Przeworsk
Jarosław
Jaworów
Żółkiew
Bielsko
Biała
Wadowice
Myślenice
Brzesko
Pilzno
Strzyżów
Cieszyn
Maków
Limanowa
Jasło
Krosno
Brzozów
Przemyśl
Mościska
Gródek Jagiel
Żywiec
Nowy Sącz
Gorlice
Grybów
Dobromil
Rudki
Bóbrka
Nowy Targ
Sanok
Sambor
Lesko
Stary Sambor
Drohobycz
Stryj
Żydaczów
Rohatyn
Turka
Skole
Dolina
Kałusz
Stanisławów
Bohorodczany
Tłumacz
Horodenka
Nadwórna
Kołomyja
Śniatyn
Kosów
Brzeżany
Podhajce
Buczacz
Czortków
Trembowla
Kopyczyńce
Borszczów
Zaleszczyki
Skałat
Zbaraż
Złoczów
Zborów
Przemyślany
Kamionka Str.
Radziechów
Brody
Krzemieniec
Sokal
Horochów
Dubno
Zdołbunów
Włodzimierz
Łuck
Równe
Kostopol
Kowel
Luboml
Sarny
Kamień Koszyrski
Stolin
Pińsk
Łuniniec
Brześć n/Bugiem
Kobryń
Drohiczyn
Konstantynów
Biała Podlaska
Prużana
Kossów
Bielsk
Białystok
Wysokie Mazow.
Wołkowysk
Słonim
Baranowicze
Nieśwież
Nowogródek
Stołpce
Szczuczyn
Grodno
Sokółka
Kolno
Szczuczyn
Augustów
Suwałki
Lida
Wołożyn
Oszmiana
Mołodeczno
Wilno-Troki
Wilejka
Święciany
Postawy
Brasław

BOUNDARY OF POLAND
BOUNDARY OF GALICIA
APPROXIMATE ETHNIC BOUNDARY
BOUNDARY OF VOYEVODSHIPS

LICIA AS PART OF POLAND (1918-1939)

1:5.000.000

50 0 50 100 150 km.

mates given by neutral sources.[25] According to these we may assume that the Ukrainians number, in round figures, over 3,000,000, constituting a majority of over 60 percent of the total population, and the Poles, about 1,500,000, making up approximately 27 percent. Aside from these two major groups, there are about 600,000 (11%) Jews and approximately 40,000 (0.75%) of other nationalities. The Poles do not inhabit any one compact area but are scattered throughout the province, forming little islands among the Ukrainian population. These islands are especially large in the neighborhood of the larger cities such as Lwów and Tarnopol, where the Polish element dominates the population. Lwów, the capital and largest city of the whole province, has a Polish majority of 63.7 percent and Tarnopol in the extreme east, 66.4 percent.[26] The Ukrainian urban population sinks to insignificance, when we consider that the Jews form a very substantial part of the inhabitants of the towns, especially the larger cities. In general, then, we may say that the Polish element is concentrated in and around the cities, forming together with the Jews the great bulk of the urban population, while the Ukrainians constitute the principal rural element. The highest percentage of Ukrainians occurs in the Carpathians and the sub-Carpathian or plateau regions. These regions show a Ukrainian majority of from 75 to 90 percent.[27]

The Jews, who, as noted above, constitute about 11 percent of the population, reside mainly in the cities and towns, making up on the average 36 percent of the total urban population.[28] Living largely from trade and industry, they play the part of middle-men in the country.[29] There is also a small group of Karaites, a semi-Jewish sect, numbering a few hundred, who came from the Crimea centuries ago, and are settled mainly in and around the town of Halicz. They disregard altogether the Talmudic laws, observing only those of the Bible, have their own synagogues, and refuse to intermarry with either Jew or Gentile. Amongst themselves they speak the Tartar language; otherwise they are Ukrainian.[30] They are not considered Jews, but are treated rather as an integral part of the non-Jewish community. Their main occupation is farming. Due to their refusal to intermarry, they are fast approaching complete extinction.

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[28] Temperley, H. W. V., (Ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), VI, 267, 270; *Meyers Lexikon,* 7th ed., (Leipzig, 1924-1933). Ergänzungen, IV, 1358.

The Germans constitute at present a negligible element in the population. Their settlement in Galicia dates back to the thirteenth century. Forced to emigrate on account of political and economic conditions, they settled at first in the west, and spread from there eastward.[31] During the following centuries they steadily diminished in numbers. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, however, when German immigration into Galicia was encouraged by the Austrian emperor Joseph II, they increased considerably for a time, but soon began to decline again. Although they played a very significant rôle in the economic and cultural life of the country in the early days,[32] their influence at present is hardly noticeable. Only the Protestants among them have to some extent preserved their German character, those of the Catholic faith having been completely assimilated among the Poles or Ukrainians.[33] In Eastern Galicia they are settled mainly at the foot of the Carpathians, especially near the city of Kołomyja, where they form two large colonies. Their main occupation is farming and cattle-raising.[34]

Very similar to the status of the Germans is that of the few Armenian colonies. They began to immigrate into the country in

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[26] Krysiński, A., *Ludnośc Polska a Mniejszości w Polsce, w Spisów, Ludności, 1921 i 1931* (Warszawa, 1933), p. 15.

[27] Rudnitzky, S., *Ukraine, the Land and its People* (Jersey City, 1915), p. 131.

[28] Skierko, A. "The Jews in Poland," *Polish Encyclopedia* (Geneva, 1921-1922), II, 913-914.

[29] Kreppel, J., *Juden und Judentum von Heute* (Zürich-Wien-Leipzig, 1925), p. 554.

[30] Herzberg-Fränkel, L. "Die Juden," *Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild* (Wien, 1898, XIX, 486-27.

[31] Kaindl, R. F., *Geschichte der Deutschen in den Karpatenländern* (Gotha, 1907-11), I, 98.

[32] *Ibid.*, I, 117-119.

[33] German, L., "Die deutsche Colonisation" *Österrereichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild* (Wien, 1898), XIX, 472.

[34] *Idem.*

the 11th century, after the destruction of their state[35] and have for centuries been leaders in trade and commerce. Forming at first compact settlements, which clung firmly to all national traditions and customs, they have in the course of time, like the Germans, become completely Polonized or Ruthenized, preserving only their peculiar physical features and the Armenian religious rite. At present they are concentrated mostly in the southeastern portion of the country, namely, in the Pokucie region, and are chiefly engaged in petty trade, in handicraft, and to some extent in agriculture.

New Haven, Connecticut

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[34] Banse, E. *Lexikon der Geographie* (Leipzig, 1933), I, 471.

[35] Boloz, A. J., "Die Armenier," *Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild* (Wien, 1898), XIX, 445.

SALVAGE FOR A FOURTH AUSTRIA

by Ernst Karl Winter

Austria is still a somewhat ambiguous entity. This is one of the reasons why Austrians both at home and abroad are still "between the fronts." They do not want to make common cause with the "Prussians," but they are thus far not accepted as one of the allies of Great Britain. The ambiguity of the Austrian problem has its deep historic reasons. They are indicated by the fact that Austrians in the space of a single generation have had to experience in reality three different Austrias: the pre-war constitutional Hapsburg monarchy, or Greater Austria, the post-war democratic republic of the nine federal 'lands', or Little Austria, and the authoritarian state under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. These historic facts must be reckoned with if and when there eventuates a "fourth" Austria after this war.[1]

There will be certain achievements of all three Austrias to be preserved in a fourth and there will be certain of their errors to be eliminated. As far as the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is concerned it was both its foreign policy and its internal national policy which led to the two world wars. There will be no return either to the one, because the Axis of today is already the final development of the Triple Alliance of 1882, nor to the other, because the new order of protectorates, established in cooperation with a quasi-independent Hungarian government, is nothing else than the logical eventuation of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. We may therefore correctly say that both the foreign and the national policy of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy are still alive and effective, albeit distorted and deteriorated, yet structurally identical with pre-war policies. Consequently, one of the tasks ahead for all Austrians both at home and abroad is to revise their historic views in these two respects and to understand in all its implications that Greater Austria's foreign and national policy from 1867 to 1914 was an egregious and fateful blunder, the legitimate offspring of which is in fact Hitler's "new order."

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[1] I have discussed various aspects of this problem in the following articles: "The Rise and Fall of Austrian Labor," *Social Research,* VI (1939), 316-350; "Austria, Guilt and Virtue," *ibid.,* VII (1940), 480-495; VIII (1941), 106-125 "Austria in Exile," *New Europe,* I (1940-41), 17-18; "The Future of Austria," *The Tablet,* London, CLXXVI (1940), 465-467.

The imperialism of Greater Austria is dead, but the social policy of the Austrian half of the monarchy, including its deliberate democratization by universal suffrage (1907), remains a great achievement worthy to be compared with the progressivism of Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain. Its high level has not been reached in all of the other democracies and its memory will most certainly play an important role in times to come. This social legislation, in effect also through both phases of post-war Austria, though weakened by the semi-Fascism of the third, represents not only the most powerful factor of continuity and a legacy to any fourth Austria, but it is also one of Austria's lasting contributions to the other democracies and the whole world.

Concerning the second Austria, the democratic republic, 1918 to 1933, there could be no possible revival of the Greater German ideology, unfortunately shared by all three political parties at the hour of birth of this new state. It may most accurately be described as an act of desperation after the breakdown of the Empire rather than the product of political vision. Nor can there be any return to the resentment which the governments of republican Austria, leftist or rightist, frequently showed toward Prague and the Little Entente. Both the Greater German ideology (*Grossdeutschtum*) and the anti-Czech resentment were the heritage of pre-war imperialism which was proportionately more burdensome for post-war Little Austria as she was unable to measure up to the imperialistic tradition of Greater Austria in any other respect, territory, wealth, or political prestige. This Greater Austrian atavism in the foreign and national policy of Little Austria was certainly an anachronism, but unfortunately there were some other still more fateful consequences of the catastrophic changes that have supervened from the pre-war to the developed post-war status of Austria. The most fateful of these consequences was the "party metaphysics" represented by the two big parties and their ideologies, Scholasticism (Seipel) and Marxism (Bauer and Renner), bearing within it the seeds of totalitarianism. One may understand this factor also as an heritage of pre-war Austria, because the structure of both parties in fact originated in the pre-war struggle to broaden the franchise and its final accomplishment. But in pre-war Austria there was an effective check upon any excessive development of a totalitarian tendency—the monarchy. Looking at the post-war scene we must either conclude that it was an error to eliminate the monarchy as a natural balance-wheel or, if it had to be eliminated, that the parties should not have continued to play their old game according to the old rules, depending upon a non-existent monarchy to protect the state and its interests. It was not democracy which failed in post-war Austria, rather failure may be attributed to the fact that the parties had eliminated the balance-wheel, the monarchy, without readjusting political weights and counterweights and "demonarchizing" themselves. Democracy, indeed, as a concept, can be salvaged for the fourth Austria from the wreckage of the past. There are certain ideas of the democratic republic which will endure: the constitutional cooperation between majority and minority (Kelsen), the social legislation based upon pre-war experience, the elements of peasant democracy, founded in ancient tradition in the Alpine 'lands', and last but not least the labor movement, culminating in the municipal administration of Vienna (Breitner). In all these respects the fifteen years of the Austrian democratic republic will be not only psychologically unforgettable for both the Austrian workers and peasants, but will also represent a pattern which Austria has proudly contributed to democracy throughout the world.

The thought of many Austrians is arrested at the point of emphasizing that the third Austria, the authoritarian state of 1933 to 1938, was an error in every respect, of which nothing is worth preserving. And in reality it has disappeared never to return. There can be no return whatsoever to its semi-Fascism, built around the naively accepted supremacy of a clerico-bourgeois pseudo-élite, to the "Patriotic Front," modeled upon the Italian and German pattern, nor to the "corporative system" which nobody really understood. But there are nevertheless achievements of this last phase of independent Austria which should be preserved if there is to be a fourth Austria. First among these is the idea of Austrian liberty and independence, which in fact puts an end to any unrealistic dreams, Greater Austrian or Greater German. In addition to this positive concept for whose explicit formulation the third Austria is to be thanked, some of its political and social techniques are worth serious consideration. As a prominent example we may cite the fact that the idea of the authority of the state was absent in the antecedent democratic republic. In times of crisis it is a mighty force, preservative and creative alike. Again, the idea of cooperation between capital and labor, the ideological root of the so-called Corporativism, through misinterpreted by the totalitarian systems, may be one of the visions which will really count in building up a new civilization after cooperation in war may alone have saved the fundamentals of the old one.

This analysis of the three Austrias existing for the sake of a fourth emphasizes the historic reorientation which is the presupposition for the restoration of Austria. The basic requisite for this reorientation is the knowledge that pre-war Austria in her foreign and national policy from 1867 to 1914 was sadly ill-advised and that her errors were fundamental causes of two world wars, and that Austria has to emancipate herself completely from that tradition. A fourth Austria will become a political reality only if she re-enlists as an active ally of Great Britain and the democracies, provided that this alliance is conceived ideologically, and Austria, both government and people, understands completely the false positions of the past.

There must then be a geographical reorientation which will teach Austria where she will belong in a new Europe. If there is a *tabula rasa* historically, the Austrians, so long as they are without a government of their own, will understand that their cause will be best promoted by the two governments in exile, the Czechoslovak and the Polish, as they themselves have already realized that the fall of Prague and Warsaw were the direct and inevitable consequences of the fall of Vienna. By the Czechoslovak-Polish agreement of November 11, 1940, the two governments invited the peoples between the three seas, the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas, formerly organized in thirteen independent states, but now under the yoke of the three historic aggressors, Germany, Russia and Italy, to join a regional block which would be organized by sovereign nations within the framework of the new European community. The geographical reorientation for Austria cannot do otherwise than recognize that an independent and free Austria, enjoying her national sovereignty like any other European nation, does not belong to Germany, but to this regional block of the eastern, northeastern, and southeastern part of Central Europe.

To emphasize that this will be no return to the past will be in Austria's best interest. In order to achieve this federative union, primarily with the Czechoslovaks and Magyars in the incorrectly-called Danube basin, but finally also with the other peoples in the Southeast, the East and the Northeast, the future Austria must put aside any secondary question which endangers the reintegration of this whole region. In this view the Hapsburg question, today a sentimental issue rather than a political actuality, must yield to the realism of Austro-Czechoslovak-Hungarian cooperation. The injection of the Hapsburg question into this problem would render any union more difficult, while on the other hand the acceptance of a democratic constitution according to the American pattern, excluding any dynastic ambitions among all the nations in question, would obviously facilitate the accomplishment of federalization. The Hapsburg question concerns not only six to seven million Austrians, but all Succession States of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, if not the whole of Europe. Every historically minded Austrian knows that 'Hapsburg' symbolizes 600 years of Austrian greatness, but also that from 1848 and still more from 1867, 'Hapsburg' represents an inexcusable failure to cope with the greatest pre-war chance to mould and weld together a dozen smaller nations into a model federative union which would probably have prevented the eruption of the two World Wars. For these two reasons, the positive and the negative influence of the Hapsburg dynasty upon Austria, every Austrian who wants to preserve the best values of the past for the future has to solve the Hapsburg problem for himself. The most enlightened Czechoslovaks and Magyars have participated in such efforts at solution. All the great Czechoslovaks from Palacký and Haxlíček to Kramář and Masaryk passed through an Austrian phase of thinking which was at the same time implicity monarchistic in intent. "If the Austrian monarchy did not exist, it would have to be created in the interest of Europe and humanity," Palacký wrote to the German Parliament at Frankfort-am-Main in 1848. However, his last word on this subject in 1865 was: "We have existed before Austria and we shall exist after her." This psychological process which Masaryk called "de-Austrianization" has also been experienced, as far as the Hapsburg question is concerned, by three generations of Austrians, although more retardedly than the Czechoslovaks. Politically the thinkers and leaders who will count in a new Austria will be those who have compelted this process of "de-Hapsburgization," knowing full well that the second World War cannot result in the restoration of the Hapsburgs nor in the establishment of any other type of metaphysical leadership, even when disguised as the continuance of an enlightened tradition.

But there is for many Austrians another and a weightier question: Whether the adherence to a regional block, the majority of whose population is non-German, does not involve the extinction of those values of Austrian culture which we and the world enjoy most. The roots of this cultural spirit in Viennese music, the theatre, statesmanship, medicine, the press, finance, trade, craftsmanship, were manifold. Above all there was the intimate contact with nearly all European nations, not only with the Germans of all stems, but also the Italians, Spaniards, French, all of the Slavonic peoples, the Magyars, the non-Slavic Balkan peoples, the Turks and beyond them the Orient. These contacts would be permanently preserved in a new Europe organized regionally. A second and third factor, partly mutually supporting, partly in competition with each other, have been the two widely spread national groups, the Eastern Germans and the Jews, which have found in Vienna their natural center and carrefour. It was probably the greatest achievement of pre-war Austria that these two groups were harmonized. Their very harmony was a vital component of Austrian culture. Now, after National Socialism has destroyed the basis of the two groups as groups, partially eradicating them, partly filling them with unprecedented hatred for each other, no one can say whether they will survive or not and what role they might play when a New Europe comes into being. But if they have any future at all they will in all probability again gravitate towards Vienna which will once more protect, assimilate and harmonize them.

Finally, there was a fourth component of Austrian culture, represented by the geographical line Vienna-Munich-Cologne, or in other words the Catholic-Southwestern-German component, of which Beethoven may be regarded as a symbol. There are Austrians who believe in the politically architectonic function of this component, precisely because of its homogeneity in religion, language and culture. But although this line was a cultural reality for a thousand years, it never produced a state of its own. Confronted with the alternative either of joining the regional block of the Eastern peoples and abandoning perhaps some elements of her cultural position, or of preserving the latter and joining Germany or a German federation, Austria would have to choose the first path. The mere life of a people, its independence, protected by its own strength combined with that of its neighbors, would be of greater importance than luxury culture could possibly be. But it is to be hoped that Europe may find again an organization sufficiently flexible so that economic life, political independence and military security, three considerations which urge Austria to join the Eastern block, may be harmonized with the cultural and spiritual predispositions, of which some impel Austria to maintain close contact with the Catholic Southern and Western German countries.

Only a federative organization can settle the problems of national boundaries and national minorities. The regional organization would settle many of them, such as those of the German-speaking minorities spread out among the other peoples, or of the Czechs in Vienna and the Slovenes in Carinthia. But some other problems could be settled only by a congruent European order, for instance those of the Sorbs in Lusatia, the Southern Tyrolese, or the Slovenes in Venetia. Some burning question may be on the boundary line between the two kinds of organization, as, for instance, the matter of outlets to the sea if a state touches two regional groups. But from the viewpoint of Austria, the first victim of German expansion, there is only one persistent problem, namely to understand that there is no European organization ideal enough to overcome completely certain natural advantages in numbers and geographical position enjoyed by the larger nations. Consequently these natural advantages must be counterbalanced by a regional organization of Europe. Only within such a framework may the smaller nations be safe from aggression.

New School for Social Research

UKRAINIAN SOCIOLOGY: ITS DEVELOPMENT TO 1914*

by Yaroslav Chyz and J. S. Roucek

AT THE beginning of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian people, who "from the Wislok to the Kuban and from the Pripet to the Black Sea . . . constitute a uniform anthropological type,"[1] were divided under two empires. The eastern, greater, part of Ukraine, after more than a century of semi-independence as the Cossack Republic, had, by 1775, been definitely incorporated into the Russian state as the South Russian Provinces. The western part, taken over by Austria-Hungary after the first and third partitions of Poland, was known as the province of Galicia, and the province of Bukowina was added after a successful war with Turkey.[2]

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*In writing this article the following works have been mainly consulted:
Mykyta Y. Shapoval "Soudobá ukrajinská sociologická myšlenka a prace" (Contemporary Ukrainian Sociological Thought and Work), *Sociologická Revue*, 1930, Vol. I, Nos. 1-2, pp. 101-106; 1931, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 195-202, 492-497; 1932, Vol. III, Nos. 3-4, pp. 293-7; 1933, Vol. IV, Nos. 2-3, pp. 189-195; 1934, Vol. V, Nos. 1-3, pp. 70-75 (Brno, Czechoslovakia).

Same Author: "Soziologie der Ukraine," *Kölner Vierteljahrhefte für Soziologie*, 1925, I-II (Köln, Germany).

Dmitro Chizhevsky, *Narysy z istoryi filosofyi na Ukrayini* (Essays on the history of philosophy in Ukraine), (Prague, 1931), pp. 162-164.

Dmitro Doroshenko, *Ohlad Ukrayinskoyi Istoriografji* (Outline of Ukrainian historiography), (Prague, 1932) passim.

Same author: "Entwicklung and Errungenschaften der ukrainischen wissenschaftlichen Forschungstaetigkeit in den letzten fuenfzig Jahren," *Mitteilungen des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institutes in Berlin*, April, 1927, pp. 1-10.

Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, *Pochatky Hromadianstwa* (The Origins of Community Movements), (Prague-Vienna, 1921), pp. 301-306.

Ukrainska Zahalna Encyklopedia (Ukrainian General Encyclopedia), Ridna Shkola publ. (Lwów-Stanislavov-Kolomea, 1934).

[1] J. F. Klein "Ukraine," *Encyclopedia Americana* (New York-Chicago, 1932). Vol. XXVII, p. 258.

[2] For historical background see: M. Hrushewski *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of Ukraine-Rus), Vol. I-IX (Lwów, Kiev, 1904-1928).—O. Y. Efimenko, *Istoriya ukrainskoho naroda* (History of Ukrainian people), Ukrainian edition by the Ukrainian governmental (Soviet) press (Charkov, 1922).—Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, Alfred A. Knopf (New York, 1926).—D. D. Mirsky, *Russia, a Social History*, A. A. Knopf (New York, 1931).—Stephen Rudnicky, *Ukraine, the land and its people*, Ukrainian Alliance in America (New York, 1918).—Marie S. Gambal, *Our Ukrainian Background*, Ukrainian Workingmen's Association (Scranton, 1936).—D. Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton, Canada, 1939).

In both parts the Ukrainian upper classes had already become completely Russianized or Polonized. This process of denationalization was extending also into the ranks of the less prosperous educated classes. In Russia the old name of Ukraine was replaced by "Little Russia." The local name of "Roosin" (Ruthenus, der Ruthene, Ruthenian) was in official use in Austria-Hungary. Pseudo-scientific theories were being spun to prove that Ukrainians were but a tribe, and the Ukrainian language but a dialect of the Russian or the Polish tongues.

The great nationalist revival, which at the turn of the nineteenth century affected the oppressed nationalities of eastern and southeastern Europe, did not miss Ukraine. Following the usual pattern of such movements Ukrainian scientists began to take interest in the language, history, folk lore, folk art, and political and social status of their nationality. They started to collect ethnological material, folk songs, historical documents and other data in order to disprove the contentions that they were Russians or Poles. This development of nationalism stimulated the beginnings of Ukrainian sociology.

The first workers in that field found material in the ancient chronicles of the Rus period and in the memoirs and the chronicles of the Cossack period of Ukrainian history. In the last decades of the eighteenth century some representatives of the upper classes had already written a few general works on Ukrainian history. The most interesting of these are *Notes on Little Russia, its People and Achievements* (St. Petersburg, 1798), by Jacob M. Markovich (1776-1804). This study has chapters, for instance, on "The past and present Civic Order of Little Russia" and on "National Characteristics of the Little Russians". It can be considered as the first attempt in more strictly sociological research in Ukraine.

Collecting, interpreting and editing old historical documents and studying Ukrainian folk poetry was the chief preoccupation of the earliest Ukrainian sociologists. They were greatly influenced by the ideas of Johann G. Herder (1744-1803), as expressed in such of his works as *Die Stimmen der Völker in Liedern* (Leipzig,

1778) and *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit,* (1774). Most prominent among these Ukrainian sociologists were Michael Maksimovich (1805-1873) who published several collections of Ukrainian folk songs, Osip Bodiansky (1808-1876), the editor of numerous Ukrainian historical documents and professor of Slavonic languages at the University of Moscow, and Ismail Sreznewsky (1812-1880) a historian, philologist and collector of folk songs.

In the Austrian province of Galicia the Ukrainian national revival began in the early thirties of the nineteenth century with the work of M. Shashkevich (1811-1843), the priest-poet, J. Wahilevich (1811-1866), poet and journalist, and Jacob Holowatski (1814-1888), author of articles on language and politics and collector of songs. W. Podolinski (1815-1876) was important for propagating the ideology for an independent Ukrainian state instead of simple cultural autonomy of Ukrainians living within other states.

This sketchy ethnological, historical and linguistic research furnished some factual basis for romanticism in Ukrainian literature and resulted in a more scientific approach to current political and social problems. This was accomplished mainly by a circle of writers, poets, ethnologists and historians who organized in Kiev in 1847, the short-lived, secret Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. The initial aim of the Brotherhood was to secure the abolition of serfdom and to establish a democratic federation of Slavic, including Ukrainian, nationalities. The Brotherhood was discovered by the Russian police and its members jailed or exiled. Nevertheless some of them continued their scientific activities in their respective fields. The most prominent among them, outside of the poet Taras Shevchenko, were the historian Nicholas Kostomarov and the poet, historian and literary historian Pantaleymon Kulish. Some of their writings contain interesting sociological ideas.

N. Kostomarov (1817-1885) published in 1861, in the Ukrainian monthly Magazine *Osnova* (The Foundation), published in

St. Petersburg in 1861-62, his famed work "Two Russian Nationalities" in which he tried to explain the causes of social processes, especially those which influenced the rise of the Ukrainian and Russian nationalities. He grouped these factors into two categories: the geographic, e.g. climate and soil, and the historical, in which he included the socio-psychological elements and some cultural products such as literature. He indicates, although not very clearly, that the inner human forces (biological factors) are also of importance, as they influence the ability and the character of the people. The geographical factors are of the greatest importance for the foundation of nationality. According to Kostomarov a nationality changing its geographical location and coming under the influence of some other surroundings may become quite a different nationality. The historical forces and the struggle of human groups influence also the formation of local nationalistic differences.

Kostomarov came to the conclusion that because of the historical factors the Russians are materialistic, have a poor imagination and many prejudices, favor collectivism and are slaves of the state and of uniformity. On the other hand the historical and geographic factors, he contended, influenced the Ukrainians to become idealists, individualists, and religious, but able to form a state and to create beautiful songs. His conclusions can hardly be called scientific, but they were so well written and typified so well the "wishful thinking" of his period, that they became the "ABC of Ukrainian nationalism" between 1860 and 1870. In fact even today they form the basis of the less critical discussions on Ukrainian nationalism. The real contribution of Kostomarov are his historical works[3] and the fact that he threw light on the symbolic character of the folk poetry and its social significance.

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[3] *Knyhy Bytiya Ukrainskoho Narodu* (The Genesis of the Ukrainian People), (Kiev, 1847); "Mysli o Federativnom Nachale v Drevney Rusi" (Notions about the Federative Principle in the ancient Rus), *Osnova* 1861, Vol. I (St. Petersburg). "Cherty Narodnoy Yuzhnorusskoy Istorii" (Characteristics of the South Russian Folk History), *Ibid.* "Ukraina" (Ukraine) *Kolokol* 1860 (London). "Ruina" (The Ruin), *Viestnik Evropy* 1879-80, (St. Petersburg). *Sieverno-Russkie Narodopravstva* (North-Russian Democracies), St. Petersburg, 1863. "Ob Istoricheskom Znachenii Yuzhnorusskago Piesnotvorchestva." (The historical significance of the South Russian Folk Poetry), *Besieda* (St. Petersburg, 1872).

Like Kostomarov, P. Kulish (1819-1897), a poet, historian and literary historian was an ideologist of the Ukrainian romantic nationalism. He was interested in the social task of literature and tried to establish, on a moral basis, the types of city and village people. In the later period of his life he began to expound the importance of aristocracy as a state building class.[4]

The writings of Kostomarov and Kulish, although dealing chiefly with history and literary history, contain many attempts to explain historical events on a sociological basis, mostly in order to disprove the contentions of Russian writers who at that time maintained that there was no Ukrainian nationality and no Ukrainian language.

The linguistic end of the argument was taken up on the Ukrainian side by several scientists, the most prominent among whom was Alexander Potebnia (1836-1891), professor at the University of Kharkov. He published in 1862 his famous work *The Mind and Language* in which he laid the foundation for the socio-psychological research of poetry and language. In his subsequent works, especially in *Language and Nationality* (1895), he described the substance and the social significance of words, legends, poetry, and science. He saw three elements in the word: the sound as its outer form, the picture as its inner content, and the meaning. According to Potebnia the mechanism of thinking is as follows: the writer or artist selects his idea (x) from the whole mass of his impressions (A) in the form of a picture (a). The reader or observer percepts first the picture (a) takes it into his mass of impressions (A) and this acceptance creates a certain idea (x). Thus the dynamics of creation (x-A-a) function in an order contrary to the dynamics of reception. The same pertains to the word and to the ideas created by it in the minds of listeners and readers. Every language presents some closed system of consciousness because its words possess individual and specific symbolicism; their inner content has been created in accord with the special consciousness of their creators and users. The language and the functional thinking are closely interconnected; the thought is reproduced by means of words that in turn create the ideas in the minds of the listeners and readers. The wealth of the language of the individual means the wealth of ideas and vice versa.

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[4] Works: "Istoriya Ukrainy od naydavniyshikh chasiv" (History of Ukraine from the most ancient times) *Osnova,* 1861, Vol. IX (St. Petersburg). "Khmelnićcina" (The Khmelnicky Period), *Ibid.* Vol. III. "Vihovschina" (The Vihovsky Period), *Ibid.* Vol. XI-XII. *Istoriya Vozsoyedineniya Rusi* (The History of the Reuniting of Rus), 3 vol. (St. Petersburg, 1873-77). "Kozaki w Otnoshenii k Obschestvu i Gosudarstvu" (Relation of Cossacks to Society and the State) *Russkiy Archiv,* 1877.

Potebnia's teachings, though obviously rich in scientific content, are hard to understand. His reputation became established only after his death and it is only now that he has come to be widely known in Ukraine and in Russia. His contributions are now appreciated as most original, although unknown in Western countries. He belongs to the school of V. Humboldt, Lazarus, Steinthal, etc. The sociologist interested in language and literature as a creation of social processes and as one of their factors cannot disregard his contributions.

Vladimir Antonovich (1834-1909), a historian, anthropologist and archeologist was active in Kiev. Born into a Polonized Ukrainian family, Antonovich "returned to the nationality of his ancestors." This fact was responsible to a great extent for his deep interest in concepts of "nation" and "nationality"; he had to explain to himself, to his friends and to his enemies the ideological basis of his "return" which he did in his famous "Confession," printed in *Osnova* (Vol. III, 1862). In his later works[5] he created a theory of the Ukrainian social process in order to explain "the fundamental idea" of Ukrainian history. He was interested in the masses as the bearers of social processes, in the social structures and in the socio-psychological types. The factors that form nationality, according to him, are physical, anthropological, geographic, territorial and those historical ones which influence the mode of life. The reciprocal influence of these factors on human activity results, he maintains, in socio-historical processes which create a distinct cultural or nationality type.

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[5] "O Proiskhozhdenii Kozachestva" (The Origins of the Cossacks), *Archiv Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii* 1863, Vol. II (Kiev); "O Gorodakh v Yugo-Zapadnom Kraye" (The Cities in the South-West of Russia), *Ibid.* 1869, Vol. I; "O Khrestianakh v Yugo Zapadnoy Rossii, 1700-1798" (Peasants in Southwestern Russia, 1700-1798), *Ibid.* 1870, Vol. VI, 2; "O Koldovstvie v Yugo-Zapadnoy Rusi" (Witchcraft in Southwestern Russia), *Trudy Yugo-Zap. Otdiela Geograf. Obschestva,* 1877, Vol. I, 2. (Kiev); *Besidy pro Chasy Kozacki na Ukraini* (Discourses on the Cossack Period in Ukraine), (Czernowitz, 1895). *The Three National Types* (1833).

Antonovich defines nationality as a "totality of characteristics by which one group of people differs from various other groups." He divides these characteristics into two classes: (1) those inborn, dependent on race and on the influence of geography, and (2) those acquired by education and appearing in the historical evolution of the social culture. The inborn characteristics are the object of anthropology and should be studied on the basis of the anatomy and physiology of the people. The acquired characteristics develop historically on the basis of inborn characteristics and are studied by history.

In his "Autobiographical Notes"[6] Antonovich considers that human personality is composed seventy-five percent of heredity, five to ten percent of education or the formulation of ideas on the basis of past experiences and fifteen percent of the physiological and psychological contributions of the individual himself. Though lacking scientific proof, these ideas of Antonovich are interesting and important because they were formulated before the theories of reflexes, of inborn and acquired characteristics had been developed.

Antonovich attempted to apply his theories to the national characteristics of the Russians, Poles and Ukrainians. In his article, "The Three National Types,' he contends that "the nervous system of the Muscovites (Russians) is not very receptive," for which reason they are not very sensitive to the other impressions. The Poles, according to Antonovich, are very sensitive and their reaction begins immediately after irritation: theirs is the true sanguinistic type. The Ukrainians are also sensitive to impressions, but their reactions appear after a long time; they are melancholics. On this basis Antonovich characterizes Russians as absolutists who surrender their personal freedom to autocracy, Poles as aristocrats who base their freedom on the slavery of others, and the Ukrainians as democrats who value the fundamental ideas about the union of equal and free people.

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[6] "Awtobiohrafichni Zapysky," *Literaturno-Naukovyj Vistnyk,* 1908, Vol. IX. (Lw6w)

Antonovich's scheme is a more elaborate repetition of Kostomarov's theory about the absolutism of the Russians, the aristocraticism of the Poles and democratism of the Ukrainians (Cossacks). Although scientifically still weak, it is a step forward in comparison with Kostomarov. Antonovich explained the three elements which form personality, the inborn characteristics, environment and personal development, but he was still dominated by the concept of "instincts' and concluded that the Ukrainian people had "no instinct for the creation of a state."

Nevertheless he brought out many fruitful ideas, explained in an original way the historical evolution of the Ukrainian nation and become the founder of modern Ukrainian scientific historiography.

Mikhaylo Drahomanov (1841-1895) is the real founder of the sociological school among the students of social life in Ukraine. He laid the foundations for a sociological method in historiography in his "Problem of the Historical Significance of the Roman Empire and Tacitus" (Kiev, 1869) and in the "Foundations and Tasks of a Scientific Ancient History" (Kiev, 1873). In recognition of the importance of these works he was appointed professor of history at the University of Kiev and received a scholarship for study abroad. He never returned from his self-imposed exile, to which he resigned himself after the use of the Ukrainian language was outlawed in schools and in print by a Ukase of the Tsar in 1876. He died as professor at the University of Sofia in Bulgaria.

Drahomanov's chief work was the study of Ukrainian nationality as seen in its folk poetry, history and social structure in relation to world history. He contended that for the purpose of practical politics it is necessary to know history, just as the physician must know the physiology of man. He states that "instead of instincts, traditions and habits we must base our politics on research about the individual characteristics of those political objects about which we are talking."[7] Emphasizing the objective method of research, Drahomanov opposed the contemporary Russian school of "subjective sociology." He also disagreed with Marxism, recognizing in it its metaphysical characteristics (called "Engelsism"). He put up against them his "scientifico-social tendency" which takes into account numerous factors in social processes. According to Drahomanov the history of a nation is determined primarily by geographical, economic, cultural and moral factors. Social ideas, especially when they reflect correctly human needs and even religions, are also important moving forces of history. He showed the influence of the mistaken theories of Rousseau upon the French Revolution and claimed that real progress can come only through those scientific and political ideas which are based exclusively on facts and reality.

It is impossible to repeat the whole wealth of sociological ideas of Drahomanov. There is a marked similarity between his influence and that of T. G. Masaryk. Neither presented any sociological system but both analyzed the historical processes from the realistic standpoint, trying to ascertain the widest possible basis of facts. This realism permeates all works of Drahomanov and all his theories regarding social sciences, social structure, genetic sociology, and various factors of social processes. His sociological and political writings contributed to the movement for the freedom of Ukraine; they dealt with all important political, social and cultural questions of his time. Despite his exile, Drahomanov stimulated the newest period of cultural and political upheaval in Ukraine and thus influenced the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1920. His main idea that no rational social activity (politics, education, economics, literature, etc.) can get along without the sociological approach is splendidly demonstrated in all his works[8] and up to the present day forms the basis of the activities of his followers in various fields of scientific and political work.

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[7] *Istoricheskaya Polscha i Velikorusskaya Demokratiya* (Historical Poland and the Great-Russian Democracy), (Geneva, 1882).

[8] More important works of Drahomanov are: Drahomanov-Antonovich, *Istoricheskiya Piesni Malorusskago Naroda* (Historical Songs of the Ukrainian People), 2 vol. (Kiev, 1874-75).—M. Drahomanov, *Politychni Pisni Ukrainskoho Naroda XVIII i XIX wiku* (Political Songs of the Ukrainian People in XVIII and XIX Century), (Geneva, 1885).—

Drahomanov's studies of Ukrainian folks songs induced several other young scientists of that time to study sociologically other manifestations of Ukrainian folk lore. Nicholas Sumtzov, Professor at Kharkov University, investigated the survivals of communal marriage in Ukrainian wedding rites,[9] while Nicholas Chernishov (1860-1888) studied the curious custom of Monday-holiday for brides, and the bachelor groups in the province of Podolia.[10] The most prominent among these socio-ethnologists was Fedir (Theodore) Wowk (Volkov), (1847-1918), whose studies on Ukrainian marriage ceremonies and customs[11] constitute a notable contribution to the genetic sociology of the Ukrainian people. His "Studies in Ukrainian Ethnology" are a classic in that field.

A leading Ukrainian economist, Nicholas I. Ziber (1841-1888) explained the theories of socialist materialism ("Ricardo and Marx," "The Economic Theory of Marx," "The Ricardo Theory of Capital") and at the same time did considerable research work into the beginnings of organized life, government, family life, ownership and formulation of classes in primitive and peasant groups . His works[12] are a very important contribution to genetic sociology, and still retain their high scientific value.

"Wostochnaya Politika Germanii i Obrusenie" (The Eastern Policy of Germany and Russification), *Viestnik Evropy,* 1872, Vol. 2-5 (St. Petersburg).—"Novokeltskoye i Provansalskoye Dvizhenie" (Neo-Celtic and Provençal Movements), *Viestnik Evropy* 1875, August-September.—*Opyt Ukrainskoy Politiko-Socialnoy Programmy* (Outline of a Ukrainian Politico-Social Program), (Geneva, 1884).—"Chudacki Dumky pro Ukrainsku Nacionalnu Sprawu" (Odd Notions about the Ukrainian National Problem) and "Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu" (Letters to the Ukrainians on the Dniepr), *Narod,* 1890-1893 (Lwów).—Article on "Ukraine" in Elisée Reclus *Nouvelle Géographic Universelle,* Vol. V (London, 1880). Some of the above and other political writings of Drahomanov have been published in *Sobraniye Politicheskich Sochineniy M. P. Dragomanova* (Collection of Political Writings on M. P. Drahomanov), 2 Vol. Société Nouvelle de Librairie et d'Edition (Paris, 1905-6).

[9] "Dosvietki i Posidielki" (All-night Parties and Prolonged Visits), *Kievskaya Starina,* 1886, III (Kiev).

[10] "Opyt Istolkovania Obychaya "Ponedilkuvannia" (Attempt to explain the custom of "Monday-holiday"), *Kievskaya Starina,* 1887, IV.—"Paruboctvo kak osobaya gruppa v malorusskom selskom obschestvie" (Bachelorhood as a separate group in the Ukrainian village society), *Ibid.,* 1887, VIII.

[11] "Rites et usages nuptiaux en Ukraine," *L'Anthropologie,* 1891, II, III, IV, 1892, V, Paris.

[12] "Esche o bratstvakh" (On Brotherhoods), *Slovo,* 1891, I. *Ocherki Pervobytnoy Ekonomicheskoy Kultury* (Outline of Primitive Economic Culture), 1883.

Serhiy Podolinsky (1850-1891) was, like Ziber, a co-worker of Drahomanov. He wrote the first Ukrainian text-book on social hygiene, short pamphlets "On Poverty," "The Steam Engine," and conceived an interesting theory on conserving the energy of the sun by human labor. The theory was rejected by Engels, although Marx seemed to have been interested in it.[13]

In Galicia Drahomanov's influence prompted his disciples and followers to similar studies but mostly in the field of history, literary history, and practical politics. Nevertheless his genial pupil Ivan Franko (1856-1916), a poet, novelist, ethnologist, historian and literary historian, devoted some of his studies to subjects closely related to sociology.[14]

The influence of Marx upon Ukrainian students of political, social and economic phenomena begins after Ziber's death. They begin to take a deeper interest in social research concerning the origins of work, production, and economic conditions in general. Mikhaylo Tuhan Baranovsky (1865-1919) and Bohdan Kistikovsky (1868-1920) began their activities as Marxists but later preferred the pluralistic conception in explaining social processes.

M. Baranovsky evolved a theory of a special type of socialism based on social and ethical ideas. He also wrote several highly valued works on political economy.[15]

B. Kistiakovsky's works[16] deal with the methodology of the fundamental concepts of sociology and jurisprudence and of organization of those sciences.

Alexander Stronin (1827-1889) and Leon Mechnik(ov) (1838-1888) built their sociological theories independently from the influence of Drahomanov and Marx. Stronin created a mechanical theory of society applying the rules of mechanics to the social processes.[17] L. Mechnik stressed the importance of great rivers upon the development of culture.[18]

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[13] *Zhyttia i Zdorovia Ludey na Ukraini* (Life and Health of the People in Ukraine), (Geneva, 1878). "Le Socialisme et l'Unité des Forces Physiques," *La Revue Socialiste,* 1880, 8, Paris.

[14] *Scho Take Postup* (What Is Human Progress), (Lwów, 1900). *Panschina ta ii Skasowanie 1848 r.* (Serfdom and Its Abolition in 1848), (Lwów, 1898).

[15] "Znachenie Ekonomicheskago Faktora v Istorii" (The Significance of the Economic Factor in History) *Mir Bozhiy,* 1895, XII.—"Teoreticheskiya Osnovy Marksizma" (Theoretical Foundations of Marxism), *Ibid.* 1904. *Osnowy Politicheskoy Ekonomii* (Fundamentals of Political Economy), (St. Petersburg, 1909).—*Socialnya Osnovy Kooperacii* (Social Background of the Cooperative Movement), *Slovo,* 1921.

[16] *Gesellschaft und Eizelwesen* (Berlin, 1899). *Socialnya Nauki i Prawo* (Social Sciences and the Law), (Moscow, 1916). *Pravo i Nauka o Pravie* (The Law and Jurisprudence), Yaroslav, 1917.

The publications of the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Association of Lwów, especially those of its Statistical and Legal sections, contain many interesting sociological studies. Stanislav Dnistryansky's "Man and His Needs in the Legal System" (1899) attempts to analyze human needs from the legal standpoint. His article, "Customary Law and Social Ties," published in *The Legal and Economic Journal* of the T. Shevchenko Association (Vol. III, 1902) describes the social genesis of Law. A study on "Nationality and Statistics" in the periodical of the Statistical Section of the above Association contains a theory of nationality and an outline of methodology for the study of social phenomena. Dr. Vasyl Paneyko's "Rationalism and Realism in the Concept of Social Phenomena" and his "Notes on History and Theory of Statistics," as well as Volodimir Okhrimovich's valuable study on "Nationality Statistics in Galicia," appeared in the same periodical. Vjacheslav Budzynovsky's "*Land Owned by Peasants*" (Lwów, 1901) presents an exhaustive analysis of the relations between the small farmers and big landowners, and Volodymir Starosolsky's "Contribution to the Theory of Sociology" in the periodical of the Statistical Section of the Shevchenko Association (1902) formulated the tasks, the methods and the border line of sociology. Both Budzynowsky and Starosolsky were under the influence of Drahomanov.

A very interesting and complete system of sociology was presented by Timofiy Osadchiy (1860-1920) in his *Social Existence.*[19] He was acquainted with the works of Spencer, Giddings, Ward, E. Durkheim and Gumplowicz. He was a pluralist in his understanding of social factors, giving preference to the development of consciousness as the fundamental factor; according to him, to know society meant to know its social forces. Osadchiy mentioned the biological, the geographic and cosmic needs, the growth of population, literature, and the psychic factors as the main social forces. He divided them into two groups: natural conditions and the characteristics of man. The factors condition the actions of the people "with iron necessity" and thus produce social processes. Psychic factors are also ruled by the law of causation. Every social creation is the result of the action of objective forces.

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[17] *Politicheskaya Nauka* (Political Science), (St. Petersburg, 1872). *Istorya Obschestvennosti* (The History of Society), (1886).

[18] *La civilisation et les grands fleuves historiques* (Paris, 1889).

[19] *Obschestvenniy Byt* (Moscow, 1901-1902). *Ukrainske selanstvo ta yoho istorichna dola* (Ukrainian peasantry and their Historical Destiny), (Kiev, 1911).

Osadchiy maintains that the present classes of society developed genetically. He divides them into two groups: (1) those who do not participate directly in production (officials, priests, military) and (2) those who participate in production. The second group consists of employers (capitalists, manufacturers, merchants, landowners, peasants and artisans who hire help), peasants working their land without hired help, and the propertyless class, the workers of all classes who hire themselves. Each class performs a useful social function but snobbishness and selfishness have created the tragedy of the lower classes (poverty, cultural backwardness, social ignorance and its results).

Looking for remedies of the social ills Osodchiy rejected the theories of social reform of Fourrier, Owen, Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Robertus, Lasalle, Marx, Fichte, J. S. Mill, Henry George, Wallace and others, and came to the conclusion that they all are utopians because they do not take into account the slow movement of social evolution. Osadchiy believed in slow progress which ultimately would result in socialism. Though his freedom of expression was somewhat cramped under the Tsarist regime, the incisive statement of the problems and the clarity of his language make his writings of supreme importance for the student of social thought in Eastern Europe.

The work of Osadchiy culminates the sociological thinking in

Ukraine in the pre-war period. The immediate years before the World War together with the years of the great upheaval, the Revolution and the post-war years constitute a new period of constructive research in the field of sociology in Ukraine.

SHARON, PENNSYLVANIA
HOFSTRA COLLEGE

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE POLISH PEASANT IN RECENT LITERATURE

There is hardly one of the fierce problems of Central and Eastern Europe pushed by the present war into the focus of world attention upon whose 19th century background light is not shed by Stefan Kieniewicz's scholarly yet arresting biography of the Galician prince, Adam Sapieha,[1] 1828-1903.

The work illumines with especial clarity the problem of the adjustment of Poland's aristocracy to a changing society. Prince Adam's frustations, like his successes, were those not only of himself alone but of his class in general and the record of these is a revelation of the hard roads "good lords" have to travel in order to exert what Tarnowski calls the "complete and positive influence" society expects today from men of proud and ancient lineage.

The first thing one notes in the chronicle of Prince Adam's ancestors with which Kieniewicz introduces his work is the striking similarity of the vicissitudes experienced by the family in the past to those they are suffering today. In almost every generation the Sapiehas were obliged to seek refuge abroad in order to escape some terror at home. In 1769 the Joseph Sapiehas fled from their Ukrainian estate of Teofilpol after the Confederation of Bar. In 1831, Prince Leon, Adam's father, had to flee after the November uprising and fifteen years later was all but driven out again by the Tarnów *jacquerie*. Adam himself was forced to take flight after 1863. Flight to the west and a term of exile was apparently the rule for the whole family.

The sequel to exile in the past was almost always return and rehabilitation. Joseph went back and his wife Teofila established anew a Polish court in the *Kresy*.[2] Leon went back and with the aid of his wife's resources rebuilt the Sapieha fortune. Adam went back and dedicated his life to the restoration of his family, provinces and nation to wealth and power. After every flight the Sapiehas returned, to take up the patriarchal life of their ancestors where they had left it. Even Prince Adam, whom his fellow magnates called "Red," went back to resume the responsibilities and obligations of a great lord. Kieniewicz's work has a peculiar timeliness today for the reason that "sequel to flight" is again a living problem for the Sapiehas and their class. Prince Adam's own descendants are exiles in the United States and others of the aristocracy have found a haven here and in England. The question is already pertinent whether they will return after serving their sentence of exile, or whether this time other hands than theirs will take up the task, in a different way, of preserving and restoring the Polish nation.

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[1] *Adam Sapieha*, Lwów, 1939, Ossolineum.

[2] *Kresy*, the eastern border of Poland.

In the 19th century the responsibility for discharging this duty lay squarely on the shoulders of men like Prince Adam. Adam Sapieha himself did not shirk his duty. Inoculated at an early age with the virus of patriotism, first by his mother, Jadwiga Zamoyska, later in Paris by his uncle Adam Czartoryski, he had only to make a choice of the method by which to make patriotism effective. There were two methods to choose from: revolution and organic work. Trained by his father, who believed progress lay in wiping the words 'Poland' and 'Ojczyzna' from the dictionary for a while and working under every government "for moral and material development," Prince Adam chose organic work. Like his father he cooperated sincerely with the Hapsburgs and was rewarded by seeing his native province of Galicia flourish and prosper and become the very hearthstone of renewed Polishness. Success crowned his efforts though he did not know it: he was one of the unsung creators of Reborn Poland.

If Sapieha had been as successful in harmonizing relationships within the Galician organism as he was in rebuilding its structure outwardly, Reborn Poland might have escaped the terrible fate of being a house divided against itself. Here, however, Prince Adam experienced the blankest frustration. Though he tried for thirty years, he could make no headway toward a solution of the Ukrainian problem.

Sapieha's attitude toward the "Rusini," as he called the people we know as Ukrainians, was identical with that of enlightened planters in our own South toward their slaves. He was kind to them, he built Greek Catholic churches for them, and he saw to it that they were protected against their own inefficiency. The race as a whole he regarded as part of the Polish race, like the Mazovians, the Tatra mountaineers or the Kashubians. The rich folk past of Ukraine, which Polish Romantic poets extolled, he held to be Zamoyski, the head of the famous Agricultural Society in nineteenth century Congress Poland, he desired earnestly to see the part of the general Polish folk past. The notion that the "Rusini" were a separate nation, a theory which gained momentum after the Slavonic Congress of 1848, Sapieha considered fantastic. In common with all the Poles of Galicia he looked upon slogans of Ukrainian nationalism as simply new ways of phrasing the old Hapsburg motto, "Divide et impera." "If the Poles can convince the people of Ruś that they are friendly to the development of the Ukrainian nationality as such, that very act will mark the beginning of different relations in Ruś," wrote one of Sapieha's many Ukrainian friends in a letter to his son Leon.

This one thing Sapieha could not do, because he was not, of course, friendly to Ukrainian national development. He worked with the "Rusini," to harmonize their relations with his fellow Poles, as our missionaries a hundred years ago worked with the "heathen," feeling himself "called," as it were, to the task. The consequence was that all his efforts proved vain. Sapieha's own class regarded him more or less of a traitor while the Ukrainian nationalists spurned his "Greek gifts" and ostracized any of their race who cooperated with this "Lechish prince." His failure, thanks to the inexorable law of cause and effect, is one of the reasons why the old post-exile formula of the Sapiehas, "return and rehabilitation" may not, in our day, prove valid.

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[3] *Ojczyzna,* Fatherland.

[4] *lud Polski,* the Polish folk.

Many foresee Poland's restoration accomplished this time not by the Sapiehas and the other great lords but by the *lud Polski,*[4] an element historically regarded as outside the bounds of the *szlachecka republika*[5] through which the *naród Polski*[6] made itself articulate. They discern in the widespread revolt against the urban and the cerebral which is one aspect of the present conflict a process of equilibration, long overdue, by which the village will at last be freed and the peasant at last be aroused to consciousness of his cultural, as hitherto only of his biologic, worth.

One of the great movements in Reborn Poland (1919-1939) was that carried forward by sociologists, liberal writers and teachers toward the goal of integrating the folk within the national edifice as a stratum equal to any other and second in importance to none. The revised conception of Poland's popular mass, as least seventy percent of which was agricultural, ruled out the old romanticization of the peasant and his lot which reached its apogee in Reymont's *Chłopi (The Peasants)*. Idolatry of the peasant was felt to be a hangover from the period of national captivity and a dangerous indulgence for a state that needed the strong peasant back as bulwark to insure its freedom.

The first step in helping to create a worthy self-conscious folk stratum, sociologists believed, was to survey the past of Poland's folk population, and this Alexander Swiętochowski did in his two volume *Historja chłopów (History of the Peasants)*, which appeared in 1925, exactly a year after Reymont's epic was crowned with the Nobel Prize. The next step was to investigate the present. It quickly became clear, as this was undertaken, that the problem of the Polish folk was much larger than that simply of the peasantry, that it was, to be precise, the problem of the Polish village, of which only one element is the peasant, and the Jewish businessman, the village laborer and the *dwór,*[7] equally important elements whose relationship to the peasant would likewise require study.

It was decided, in order to form an up-to-date picture of Polish village economy, to go to the village itself. In 1922 the

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[5] *szlachecka republika,* the gentry republic.

[6] *Polski naród,* the Polish nation, in its mystical sense.

Polish Sociological Institute of Poznań, headed by Professor Florian Znaniecki, pioneered in this field by holding a contest among working men for life histories. The contest resulted in the documentary *Życiorys własny robotnika (Autobiography of a Laborer)*. Subsequently the same technique was used by the late Ludwik Krzywicki, director of the Institute of Social Economy, to assemble a mass of peasant life histories, the sixty-one most illuminating of which were published in two large volumes as *Pamiętniki chłopów (Memoirs of Peasants,* 1935 and 1936).

Next the Institute of Rural Sociology inaugurated a third project of peasant autobiographies *(Życiorysy włościan)*, 1937) and an even more revealing volume containing the lives of a country teacher, a country doctor, a number of country gentry, a village official, and the like *(Życiorysy inteligentów,* 1938). Last of all the State Institute for Rural Culture secured, by offering prizes, the autobiographies of more than 1500 young people between the ages of fifteen and thirty and published the most valuable of these, together with deductions arrived at by the editor, Józef Chałasiński, a student of Professor Znaniecki, on the basis of them all, in the splendid *Młode pokolenie chłopów (The Young Generation of Peasants,* 4 vols., 1938).

When *Pamiętniki chłopów* appeared, it was named by the readers of an important literary journal the most significant and at the same time the most interesting book of 1936. The autobiographies in this, as in all the surveys listed above, especially in the last of them all, *Młode pokolenie,* are intensely interesting. Of some, particularly those from the non-Polish villagers of the *Kresy,* it may truly be said that if plain human documents are ever literature, these undeniably are. If Polish literature had been allowed to flow on in an uninterrupted stream, there is no question but that these and similar life stories would have fertilized the stream, perhaps to as rich a degree, though differently, as the ballads and songs of the folk fertilized Polish Romanticism in the early 19th century. If, moreover, Polish corporate life had been permitted to march uninterruptedly forward, such findings as

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[1] *dwór,* manor—a symbol of the Polish landowner.

these works contain would certainly have enabled the state to improve enormously the lot of the villager.

No one in Reborn Poland had a more honorable or more consistent record of service in the cause of creating a stable, self-respecting folk element within the Polish state than the celebrated novelist Marja Dąbrowska. Her *Rozdroże (The Crossroads)*, which created a commotion when it appeared in 1937 far out of proportion to its modest size, is an excellent short survey of the whole peasant problem. It was inspired by two other works on the same theme: Władysław Grabski's *Idea Polski (The Concept "Poland,"* 1935), and Stanisław Miłkowski's *Walka o nową Polskę (The Struggle for a New Poland*, 1936).

The two books, though written by men of widely divergent points of view, were in agreement in their conclusions. Grabski approached the problem as a *ziemianin*[8] and an economist. Like Karol Brzostowski in the early 19th century, he believed in work as the foundation of "man's welfare and happiness." Like Andrew quality of Poland's agriculture improved. He was a reformer, but a conservative. Miłkowski, on the other hand, was a radical. He believed in reform under the slogan of "A new Poland, of the folk and for the folk!" Yet the conclusion reached by both Grabski and Miłkowski was that

> . . . a certain *szlachetczyzna (gentry-ness)* permeates the fabric of contemporary Poland, appearing now in one form, now in another, so that not only the proper development of Poland as a social organism, a nation and a state is hindered, but as a matter of fact any possible development in these directions is blocked.

Dąbrowska herself, though not one given to idealizing the peasant, believed, as she stated in *Rozdroże*, that "at this juncture Poland has nothing more valuable and nothing more pregnant for the future than her peasants, and that in their hands and in no others' is the measure of that future."

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[8] *ziemianin*, a country squire.

> "Peasant civilization," she concludes, "has for long periods been hidden and, so to say, on the defensive. Now, however, . . . the peasant constitutes a civilizing element of such inherent creative power as has fertilized the Polish nation previously only in the most dynamic era of its history, namely the Piast."[9]

Equally concerned with Dąbrowska over the long withdrawal of village influence from general Polish culture was Jan Wiktor. In free Poland's final years Wiktor travelled everywhere in the realm, from prehistoric Biskupin in Pomorze to Podhale, looking for traces of ancient rites and customs and for signs of village renaissance. He tells in *Błogosławiony chleb czarnej ziemi (The Blessed Bread of the Black Earth,* 1939) how he found the young peasant hungry for education, but not for the kind he got in the conventional schools. He wanted what the admirable Folk University at Gać Przeworska[10] had to offer, the kind of schooling he could link with his own experience. Wiktor discovered that the village youth was moved much less by Reymont than by Hamsun. Hamsun's exaltation of Nature and of the Earth together with his nostalgia for primitive civilization struck a responsive chord in his heart and awakened faith in a peasant future. "Where there is a Polish plow, there Poland is!" Wiktor heard them saying in the villages.

No journal of the 1930's in Free Poland was more hospitable to serious articles[11] on the peasant problem than *Marchołt* under the distinguished editorship of Stfan Kołaczkowski. Desiring earnestly to see the peasant fully integrated within the national fabric, *Marchołt* battled earnestly toward that end. When Kołaczkowski died last year, as a result of concentration camp tortures, he saw the peasant left, as Price Adam Sapieha was left when he died, "with only hope." But the plow was still in Polish hands and the new Poland is with him who holds that plow.

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[9] Piast himself, the legendary founder of the dynasty, was a wheelwright.

[10] For an account of this institution, see Jerzy Ostrowski, "Chrzestňi," *Prosto z Mostu,* Warsaw, No. 4, 1938. For an account of peasant-*pan* cooperation to the advantage of both, see Stanisław Piasecki's article in the same journal, No. 44, 1937, Przykład Leszczkowa."

[11] A selected list of such articles is appended to this paper.

ARTICLES IN *MARCHOŁT* ON PEASANT ISSUES

Dąbrowska, Marja, "Od wioseczki do wioseczki," *Marchołt*, II, Apr. 1936, pp. 331-352.

["From hamlet to hamlet," a description of small farming in the voivody of Łódź, as Dąborwska observed it.]

Kołaczkowski, Stefan, "Sprawy niecierpiące zwłoki," *Marchołt*, II, Apr. 1936, pp. 412-425.

["Matters that Cannot Wait."]

Krzywicki, "Sprawy wiejskie," *Marchołt*, II, Apr. 1936, pp. 396-411.

["Village Matters."]

Makarewicz, Tadeusz, "Frontem do wsi," *Marchołt*, I, July 1935, pp. 752-755.

"With Front toward the Village," a review of periodical literature on the peasant.]

Mleczko, Franciszek, "Którędy drogą?" *Marchołt*, II, July 1936, pp. 720-726.

["By which Road?"]

Radwan, Władysław, "Konferencja w sprawie kultury wsi," *Marchołt*, II, July 1936, pp. 712-720.

["A Conference on Village Culture."]

Spytkowski, Józef, "Szkola na wsi a życie," *Marchołt*, II, Oct. 1935, pp. 161-164.

["The Village School and Life."]

Spytkowski, Józef, "Gloryfikacja nędzy," *Marchołt*, III, Apr. 1937, pp. 417-427.

["Glorification of Need," a review of several of the many novels and short stories recently published that deal with the village. For a partial, but representative, list of the works published in the '30's that fall in this category, see the following selected list.]

Suski, Augustyn, "Listy ze wsi," *Marchołt*, II, Oct. 1935, pp. 155-161.

["Letters from the Village."]

Szymczak, Franciszek, "Tydzień życia wielkopolskiej wsi," *Marchołt*, II, Apr. 1936, pp. 534-539.

Tymieniecki, Kazimierz, "Wieś czy miasto," *Marchołt*, IV, Oct. 1937, pp. 48-55.

["Village or Town," a discussion of the use of the word "chłop," for more of which see *Marchołt*, IV, Apr. 1938, p. 327, note, and the following:]

Tymieniecki, Kazimierz, "Dynamizm słów a rzecywistość wiejska," *Marchołt*, IV, pp. 521-524.

["The Dynamism of Words and Village Actuality."]

A SELECTED LIST OF FICTION ON THE VILLAGE

Balicki, Stefan, *Czerw,* [*The Maggot*], 1938.

Burek, Wincenty, *Droga przez wieś* [*The Highway through the village*], 1937 [Short stories.]

Kędziora, Juljusz, *Marcyna,* Vol. I, *Tatusiówá chałupa* [*Marcyna,* Vol. I, *The Paternal Hut*], 1937.

Kowalski, Władysław, *Rodzina Mianowskich,* [*The Mianowski Family*], 2 vols., 1938.

Kruczkowski, Leon, *Pawie pióra* [*The Peacock Feather*], 1935.

Kurek, Jalu, *Grypa szaleje w Naprawie,* [*Influenza Rages in Naprawa*], 1935.

Morton, Józef, *Spowiedź,* [*Confession*], 1937.

Morton, Józef, *Wawrzek syn Wawrzyńca* [*Larry, Son of Laurence*], 1939.

Piętak, Stanisław, *Białowiejskie noce* [*Bialoviezian Nights*], 1939.

Niećko, Józef, *W chłopski świat,* [*Into a Peasant World*], 1938.

Wasilewska, Wanda, *Ziemia w jarzmie* [*The Soil in Bondage*], 1938.

Wiktor, Jan, *Orka na ugorzu* [*Fallow Lands*], 1932.

Columbia University ARTHUR P. COLEMAN.

DOCUMENTS

THE CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH AGREEMENT

As a manifestation of the new spirit among the leaders of two formerly independent Central European states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, representatives of these two nations issued a joint statement at a Press conference held at the British Ministry of Information on November 11, 1940. Dr. Hubert Ripka, State Secretary in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. Stanislas Stronski, Polish Minister of Information, made mutually complementary expositions of the declaration, emphasizing their hope that it might be but the first step in a longer process of close and cordial collaboration for the recovery and stabilization of Central Europe. Speaking for the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Peake expressed the satisfaction with which His Majesty's government welcomed this spontaneous concert of aims and action on the part of the two Central European peoples.

The text of the joint declaration, dated Nov. 11, 1940, is as follows:

The Polish Government and the Provisional Czechoslovak Government have decided to issue the following statement:

I

Imbued with an inflexible faith that the heroic struggle now being waged by Great Britain, together with her Allies, against German tyranny will end in the final defeat of the forces of evil and destruction, and

Animated by the profound conviction that the future order of the world must be based on the co-operation of all elements which recognize the principle of freedom and justice, as constituting the moral foundation of all our common civilisation,

The two Governments consider it imperative to declare solemnly even now that Poland and Czechoslovakia, closing once and for all the period of past recriminations and disputes, and taking into consideration the community of their fundamental interests, are determined, on the conclusion of this war, to enter as independent and sovereign States into a closer political and economic association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe and a guarantee of its stability. Moreover, both Governments express the hope that in this co-operation, based on respect for the freedom of nations, the principles of democracy and the dignity of man, they will also be joined by other countries in that part of the European continent. The two Governments are resolved already now to co-operate closely for the defence of their common interest and for the preparation of the future association of the two countries.

II

The two Governments also stigmatise in the gravest terms the cynical farce which the leaders of Nazi Germany are endeavouring to stage by proclaiming themselves the builders of a New European Order. The hyprocisy of these assertions is most clearly revealed in the light of German endeavours aiming at the complete destruction of our two ancient nations, which have contributed so greatly to human civilisation. The violence and cruelty to which our two nations are being subjected, the expulsions of the native populations from immense areas of its secular homelands, the banishing of hundreds of thousands of men and women to the interior of Germany as forced labour, mass executions and deportations to concentration camps, the plundering of public and private property, the extermination of the intellectual class and of all manifestations of cultural life, the spoliation of the treasures of science and art and the persecution of all religious beliefs—are unparalleled in all human history. They offer a striking example of the spirit and methods of the Germanic New Order.

The two Governments address this burning appeal to all free peoples immune from the German terror, that in the measure of their strength they should help the nations allied in the struggle for the freedom of all nations to achieve the speediest possible deliverance of the world from its present monstrous nightmare.

POLISH MANIFESTO OF FREEDOM

The following document has been sent to the JOURNAL by a colleague in an American university and is reproduced here without comment in the form in which it reached the Editor.

(Translator's note—The following manifesto is being circulated in the Polish territories occupied by the Nazi and the Soviet authorities. It expresses the views and program of the underground movement in Poland and is at the same time a document of the vitality of this movement. It is the most important political document which has come out of the occupied Polish territories.)

After reading pass to
a friend

Guard it from the eyes of
spies and provocateurs

MANIFESTO OF FREEDOM

After twenty years of independent political existence, Poland has fallen victim to the imperialism and unprecedented aggression of Nazi Germany.

At the moment of the most difficult trial, the fate of Poland was burdened fatally by errors in foreign policy, by infiltration into the country of reactionary ideologies, by the existing regime of government, by neglects in the economic and social fields, and by a policy of oppression of national minorities. During the first twenty years of her independent existence, Poland did not carry out the obligations assumed in the period of the struggle for freedom to the masses of the working people, which have been deprived of any influence on the fate of the country.

The chief aim of the regime in power had been to make itself permanent, and to oppose any expression of the independent political aspirations of the masses of the people. The regime in power had betrayed the tradition of the struggle for Independence and had accepted a reactionary fascist ideology. The standard slogan of Hitlerism—anti-semitism—became the bridge between the regime in power and the nationalist fascist groups.

In these circumstances Poland was unable to withstand the pressure of invasion, in spite of the resolute will to resist which permeated the masses of the people. The territory of the Republic has been occupied by foreign armies bringing violence and injustices. Poland, however, has not lost her independence as long as the struggle continues.

Europe has been thrown into the abyss of war, the first act of which was the sacrifices of blood made by Poland. Nazi Germany has imposed this war upon the world, in the name of her imperialist aspirations, which conflict with the imperial interests of England and France. Besides its imperialist character, this war has, however, still another aspect: it is a war between Hitlerism and democracy, between totalitarianism, barbarism, cultural and moral savagery and the ideas of Freedom and Justice. Such is the meaning of the present war, as understood by the masses of the working people of oppressed Poland as well as of England and France.

In this war the Union of Socialist Soviet Russia, in spite of the slogans of the struggle against fascism and Hitlerism she had pronounced to the very last moment, co-operates actively with Nazi Germany. The entry of the Soviet army into Polish territory in agreement with Germany, and at the moment of the severest struggles against the Nazi invasion, has completely ended the possibility of resisting Germany. In her foreign policy, the U.S.S.R. practices Nazi methods of pressure and aggression against weaker nations; internally it practices terrorism against the Socialist movement. Thus the U.S.S.R. has betrayed the hope which the masses of the people have attached to her policy, expecting her to be the natural ally in the struggle against Fascism and Hitlerism.

Hitlerism must be defeated in this war; however, the victory of the allies should not imply the hegemony of one group of nations over others. From the chaos of the war, there must arise a New Europe, organized on the principles of political freedom and social justice. Such a Europe is the desire of millions of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, as well as of the soldiers who fight on all fronts.

Poland, in spite of military defeat, continues to fight. On Polish lands the people carry on a daily heroic struggle against the occupants, preparing themselves for the moment in which the final battle will take place. In the West the Polish army fights in co-operation with the armies of France and England.

Appealing to the masses of the working people of Poland to hold out in the struggle until final victory, we carry on the tradition of the heroic struggles for independence and social justice: beginning with the insurrection of Kosciuszko through the manifesto of the Democratic Society, the Revolution of 1848, the insurrection of 1863, the underground struggle of the fighters for Independence and Socialism, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in 1905, the armed act of the Polish legions, the sacrifices of the working masses in 1920, thousands of sacrifices of blood and privation by the working people in town and country struggling for democracy against the dark forces of reaction in an independent Poland, up to the unyielding defense of their country by the Polish peasants and workers during the tragic days of September, 1939.

In order that the sacrifice of blood so freely given through many years should not again be in vain, we formulate the aims of our struggle as follows:

1. The chief aim of the struggle of the Polish working masses is the reconstruction of the full political freedom and independence of Poland, and the basing of her existence on the principles of democracy and social justice.

2. In the New Poland there must be secured the decisive influence on the fate of the country of the masses of the people: the peasants, the workers, and the intellectuals. The political constitution and the social and economic structure of Poland must once and forever preclude the possibility of the existence of privileged social groups which strive to seize political power and economic supremacy.

3. The political constitution of Poland must be based on the principles of political democracy guaranteed by: a democratic representation of the people elected on the basis of equal, secret, universal, direct and proportional suffrage; responsibility of the government before Parliament; independence of the Courts of Justice; extensive democratic self-government; freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of association; and personal immunity of the citizens.

Under these conditions the political and social aspirations of the working masses will find their expression in the emergence of a workers and peasants government, endowed with the confidence of the people and representing the interest of all men and labor.

4. The influence of big capitalist and landlord groups on the fate of Poland must be removed through the abolition of large landed estates by means of carrying out of a thorough and immediate agrarian reform, through socialization or through subjection to strict social control of the credit system and of large-scale industrial establishments, and through abolition of monopolistic organizations such as cartels, syndicates, etc.; and through support of small-scale agriculture, of the co-operative movement, and protection of small business men.

5. The military forces of Poland must be based on democratic organization which precludes any caste systems.

6. All nationalities living in Poland must be guaranteed full political, economic and cultural equality. Race doctrines and anti-semitism must be eliminated from public life in Poland.

7. Universal and free education must be provided for all citizens, particularly for the children of peasants and workers.

8. The freedom of science and of religions must be guaranteed.

9. All citizens of the New Poland must be guaranteed the right to work, the protection of labor and health. It is necessary to expand social insurance on the basis of democratic self-government.

10. The foreign policy of Poland must be based on full co-operation and mutual understanding with all free peoples of the world, and particularly with the nations with which Poland has to live in good neighborly relations.

The struggle for such a Poland is a struggle for Freedom, Justice and Peace. The struggle for such a Poland is a struggle for Socialism. In this struggle the masses of the working people are not isolated. It coincides with the struggle of the masses of the working people of the whole world against totalitarianism which brings to the people of Europe chains and destruction. Fighting for the Freedom of Poland, we fight for the fate of all oppressed nations. We fight under the noble slogan: "For Our Freedom and Yours!"

For the independent Polish People's Republic!

For Democracy and Social Justice!

For the emancipation of the working people of town and country!

For the international solidarity of the working people!

"FREEDOM"
Executive Committee

February 1, 1940

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION

The following communication, describing the constitution of the American Committee on European Reconstruction, has been sent to the JOURNAL by Professor E. K. Winter, Because of the deep interest already evident in the possibilities of the Europe that is to come out of the present war the Editors are glad to give publicity to this comprehensive effort.

During the summer of 1940 a group of Austrians, Czechoslovaks and Poles in this country constituted the "American Committee on European Reconstruction," issuing an appeal (August 1, 1940) which invited all European groups to organize a common front against totalitarianism. Mr. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, at that time in the United States, wrote to the new committee (August 2): "We exiles living in London are much interested in your efforts in trying to accomplish what Europe should have done and America can do." The then Polish Ambassador, Count George Potocki, followed with a similar letter (August 19), approving the idea of cooperation among the three groups. The ACER is constituted in three sections of which the following persons are the leaders: Austrian section: Hermann Mark, former Professor at the University of Vienna; Victor F. J. Tlach, former Austrian Consul-General at Cleveland, Ohio; Ernst Karl Winter, former Vice-Mayor of Vienna. Czechoslovak section: Rev. Daniel Bella, Port Chester, N. Y.; Joseph L. Hromádka, Professor of Theology at the Hus Faculty, Prague, now at Princeton Theological Seminary; Jaroslav J. Zmrhal, Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council of America at Chicago. Polish section: Theodore Abel, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University; Roman Michalowski, former Counsellor of the Polish Embassy at London and Tokyo; Stefan de Ropp, former Commissioner-General of the Polish Pavilion at the New York World's Fair. Among the sponsors of the ACER are the following: S.L.M. Barlow, George Gordon Battle, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Horace M. Kallen, Chester B. Kerr, Ludwik Kryzanowski, Emil Lengyel, Lewis Mumford, Otakar Odložilík, Arthur Upham Pope, Harry Scherman, Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy, James T. Shotwell, Miss Dorothy Thompson, Mrs. Joseph Urban. The *New York Times* of October 18, 1940 carried a story on the constitution of the Committee.

The greatest moral success of the basic idea that has given rise to the ACER thus far is the Czechoslovak-Polish agreement on November 11, 1940, in which all the smaller peoples between Germany, Russia and Italy are invited to form a regional block within the wider European framework. The Polish group of the

ACER has begun to publish a new monthly, *New Europe* (first issue Dec. 1, 1940), to which all the other groups are contributing their shares. The Austrian group has organized discussions on Central Europe with the following program from January to March 1941: Czechoslovakia, Mr. Arne Laurin; Austria, Professor E. K. Winter; Hungary, Professor Rustem Vambery; Yugoslavia, Mr. Ivan Modercin; the Balkans, Professor Ernst Jackh; Germany, Professor F. W. Foerster; Czechoslovak ideology, Professor J. L. Hromádka; Czechoslovak history, Professor Otakar Odložilík. There is, in addition, a research group in which Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians participate, apart from the Central and Eastern European groups. In the meantime a number of similar projects and actions have emerged like the plan of Alvarez del Vayo for a joint committee of all European groups, the German Council for Liberty and Federation, and many other tendencies of "European reconstruction." The anonymous German-American Hans Schmidt, known by his essay "Germany—the voice from within" in *Harpers* of June, 1940, was the first to advocate a "National Committee in Exile, or a League for European Reconstruction" from the viewpoint of the German exiles. He presents these ideas in a letter to the *New York Times* of September 8, 1940.

In a course organized by Professor Hans Simons of the New School for Social Research in New York, on "Muted Europe—1941," from February to May, 1941, the attempt is made to amalgamate the two aspects and groups in a lecture course of fifteen weeks. The introductory lecture was given by Professor Hans Kohn, and was to be followed to reports on France by Robert de Saint Jean, Poland by Stefan de Ropp, Norway by Bjarne Braatoy, the Netherlands by Adriaan J. Barnouw, Belgium by Frans Van Cauwelaert, Czechoslovakia by Josef Hanč, Austria by Franz Klein, Spain Enrique Ramos, Italy by Enzo Tagliacozzo, Germany by Hans Schmidt.

The future will show whether this synthesis is only that of a survey or indeed the first intellectual steps toward European reconstruction.

E. K. WINTER.

REVIEWS

Doroshenko, D., *History of the Ukraine;* translated from the Ukrainian and abridged by Hanna Chikalenko-Keller; edited, with introduction by G. W. Simpson—Pp. 686. The Institute Press, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.

This is a translation and abridgement of the two-volume work of Professor Doroshenko published at Warsaw 1932-33, and is doubtless intended for the very considerable Ukrainian colony in western Canada. Professor Doroshenko has attempted an almost super-human task—to reduce to manageable proportions the history of the Ukraine in all its parts and ramifications. This is the more difficult as the writer approaches modern times and as the country is torn apart, its history tends to degenerate into one of purely local or antiquarian interest.

Indeed it is on this question of sectionalism that the Ukrainian national historians of the school of Hrushevskii (of which Doroshenko is one) part company with Russian scholars. The latter in stressing the original meaning of "Ukraine," namely, that of borderland, emphasize the local or sectional character of its history, claiming that it is but one part at times severed from the parent stem of the history of "all the Russias." Indeed the Muscovite Tsars by assuming the title of "all the Russias" have always emphasized that their dominion extended over all Russians. The two currents of Russian history which ran together down to the Mongol conquest, thereafter diverged. The fate of the western and south-western parts of the Russian land was thenceforth bound up with the non-Russian lands to the west and southwest—Poland, Lithuania, Austria-Hungary, Rumania. The Russians in this new setting become a buffer between the Poles and the Tartars of the Crimea and their allies, the Turks. To fulfill this function there is called into existence the special type of frontier guard—the Cossack, and ultimately there emerges the Cossack state which played so dramatic a part not only in the relations of the Christian powers with Turkey and the Crimea but in the struggle between Poland and Moscow in the seventeenth century. This is the time of Cossack greatness—of Bogdan Khmelnitskii and Mazeppa who tried to set up an independent Ukraine and failed. Thenceforth, the Ukraine was severed into two parts and was divided between Poland and Russia, till the final partition of Poland brought all of the Ukrainian lands (except Galicia) within the Russian orbit.

The incorporation of the Ukraine in Russia had important consequences of other than a political nature. The Ukraine and particularly its natural political center Kiev served as a bridge by which the culture of western Europe was transmitted to Moscow at a time when there was no other contact. This brought the gradual introduction of western manners, western education, and western (i.e., scholastic) philosophy during the course of the seventeenth century. The formation of the Uniate Church by transferring the ecclesiastical allegiance of the orthodox in the Polish-Lithuanian state to Rome enormously accelerated this trend. The impact of this movement had completely transformed Russia even before the accession of Peter. With Peter, the Baltic was opened as a "window on Europe" and the importance of the Ukraine declined both culturally and politically. It became a mere section of the Russian Empire to be exploited primarily in the interests of the now dominant Great Russian ruling class.

If any criticism might be offered, it is that there has been little emphasis on the economic role played by the Ukraine in modern Russia—no mention of the *Krivoi Rog* iron deposits, of the Donets coal measures, of its agricultural resources, and its industries. From the standpoint of the student of European history this is of enormous importance. Hitler's aspirations for a new *Drang nach Osten* are well known and these resources will doubtless determine the fate of the Ukraine. In this coming struggle for control of the Ukraine, he will doubtless lay hold of every available weapon. Not the least important is the cultural affinity of the Ukraine with Central Europe, its long political connection with Poland and Austria and the natural antipathy between Ukrainian and Great Russian.

University of Oklahoma STUART R. TOMPKINS.

TOMPKINS, S. R., *Russia Through the Ages*. Two inset maps and illustrations. New York. Prentice-Hall, 1940. Pp. XXI & 799.

The writing of a one-volume history of a country as complex as Russia of which the origins, culture and institutions have their roots deep in the past is a laborious and rather complicated task. Such a work must be broad in its scope and emphasis must necessarily be placed on territorial expansion, on political and institutional development and, in the case of Russia, on the policies of the Tsars, for they exercised a personal domination over the Russian nation longer than in most European countries.

Within these limits, Professor Tompkins has produced a highly commendable volume, of sound scholarship and based upon extensive use of Russian sources. It is a complete survey from the early days to the settlement with Finland of March 12, 1940. Many features are also included which will facilitate the study of Russian history such as: a glossary of Russian historical terms; a chronological table of Russian history; a fifty-page bibliography, including recent important monographs and articles, and a satisfactory index.

Specifically, better balance would have resulted if the development of the Near East from the Greek revolt to the Crimean War had received a fuller treatment. Recent research has indicated that the Crimean War was primarily a phase of the Near Eastern rivalry between England and Russia; that it was the first contest of those two powers over the preservation or destruction of the Turkish Empire. The chapter on Russian expansion in Asia is an excellent summary; although the section on Central Asia would have benefited by the use of the three volumes of Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii* (History of the Conquest of Central Asia).

University of Colorado JAMES G. ALLEN.

ANASTASOFF, CHRIST, *The Tragic Peninsula.* St. Louis, Blackwell Wielandy, 1938. Pp. 369

The Tragic Peninsula is a history of the Macedonian movement for independence since 1878. Written by an author of Macedonian extraction, it would seem to give promise of giving us a genuine history of a significant Balkan movement which certainly deserves to be studied and to be understood. Only partially, however, does Mr. Anastasoff justify this hope. In a volume of twenty-nine chapters, he does tell us of the early traditions of the IMRO, or International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, of its preliminary and definite organization, and the general and specific workings of the IMRO. Incidentally, Mr. Anastasoff carries this part of his story down to and including the assassination of King Alexander of Jugoslavia in October 1934, an event concerning which the author is not particularly unhappy. But the story of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization belongs to that wider series of developments enshrouded in the diplomatic history of Europe since the Berlin Congress of 1878 and to the general history of the Balkan Peninsula. Unfortunately in dealing with this wider drama Mr. Anastasoff writes as though the general history was determined by the IMRO and more or less centered in it. Unfortunately, too, he is always and everywhere the special pleader. This is not sober history—it is propaganda. The Macedonian problem still calls for its historian.

The book includes 10 black and white maps, most of which are not well executed, and there are some thirty-six illustrations. The research bibliography with which the author concludes leaves out a number of significant volumes.

Miami University HARRY N. HOWARD.

SFORZA, COUNT CARLO, *Fifty Years of War and Diplomacy in the Balkans: Pashich and the Union of the Yugoslavs.* Translated by J. G. Clemenceau Le Clercq. New York, Columbia, 1940. Pp. 195.

Count Carlo Sforza has written a most interesting volume about his friend, Nikola Pashich, the grand old man of Serbia and of Jugoslavia in the immediate post-World War period. Moreover, he has woven the biography of Pashich into the story of the Union of the Yugoslavs. Sforza, whose diplomatic career brought him into close contact both with Paschich and the Yugoslavs, gives something of the early career of Pashich, of the setting and atmosphere into which he was born, of his training at Zurich, of his trials and tribulations until he came to the office of premier of Serbia. His chapters dealing with the period from 1908-09 to the outbreak of the World War and the war itself are of especial interest and significance. Sforza, of course, does not accept the legend of the fiendish Serbian politician who deliberately plunged the world into war merely in order to achieve Serbian national aspirations. Moreover, the author indicates that Pashich, far from being the narrow-minded and bigoted Serbian nationalist he has been accused of being, had a version of Yugoslav unity *per se*. It is because of these interpretations of the career of Nikola Pashich, given by a distinguished Italian who had an appreciation of that career and its political significance in southeastern Europe, that the present volume is of especial interest.

There is an index and a good chronological table to conclude the book.

Miami University HARRY N. HOWARD.

STOJANOVIĆ, MIHAILO D., *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878*. Cambridge: at The University Press. New York: Macmillan. 1939. Pp. xi+296. $3.00.

This treatise is an expansion of a doctoral thesis submitted originally at the University of London in 1930 under the title "Serbia in International Politics, 1875-1878." In its present form it has been expanded into a general detailed discussion, and presents a European viewpoint rather than the interests of merely a single power. The thesis of 1930 was based on materials hitherto unpublished in the Austrian, British and Serbian archives, the papers of Sir Austen Henry Layard (the British representative at Constantinople, 1877-1880), and the archives of the Russian embassy in London. In recent years the contents of some of these documents have been published in the works of R. W. Seton-Watson, David Harris and Humphrey Sumner.

The eleven chapters of the book have rather conventional titles: The Great Powers and the Balkans before 1875; The Surrender of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Andrassy Note, The Berlin Memorandum and the Reichstadt Agreement; The Serbo-Turkish War; The Constantinople Conference; The Russo-Turkish War; The Armistice of Adrianople; The Treaty of San Stefano; The Revision of the Treaty of San Stefano; The Congress of Berlin.

One purpose of the book is to show that the main factors that determined the grouping of the powers in 1914 were already in existence in 1875-1878. Bismarck, although trying to maintain the Imperial Alliance (Germany, Austria, Russia) supported Austria, which opposed Russia and caused the latter to look to France and form the Dual Alliance, which Great Britain entered in 1907.

Austria, thinking of her own national heterogeneity, tried to maintain Turkey and prevent consideration of the common interests of the Balkan nationalities. But in 1912 the Balkan alliance was formed to the injury of Turkey and Austria, both of which crumbled in 1918. England, although trying to prevent the dissolution of Turkey at the Congress of Berlin, succeeded in breaking up the Imperial Alliance, which decreased Germany's leadership in Europe.

The style is compact, but the reader gains a clear picture of the exceedingly complex trend of events and the conflicting interests of the Near Eastern and great powers. There are vivid presentations of Austria's desire to settle Balkan affairs to the exclusion of Russian influence, of Russia's hope of overshadowing Austria, of Bismarck's preference for Austria and his antagonism to Gortchakov, of Disraeli's vacillating policies, of the disagreements of Salisbury and the British cabinet with Disraeli, of Andrassy's duplicity, of Shouvakov's superiority to Gortchakov, of how the power politics of each of the great powers took precedence over consideration for the Turks and the interests of the other Balkan peoples. The author, a Serbian, never betrays his nationalist inclinations. He presents a detached, straightforward account. The book is to be recommended as the best general account on the subject. There is an excellent index. At times, however, neither it nor the text enables the lay reader to identify some of the actors mentioned, e.g., Jomini, p. 22; Calice, p. 139. The western rendition of Belgrade is used in all cases except one (p. 14), when "Biograd" appears. However, these *minutiae* are not meant to detract from the general excellence of the book.

University of Colorado C. C. ECKHARDT

SCHMITT, BERNADOTTE E., *The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909*, Cambridge, at the University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1937. Pp. 255. $3.00.

Professor Schmitt's story of the Bosnian crisis is perhaps as perfect an example as we have of the monograph on diplomatic history, neatly bounded by specific dates on the one hand, by entire reliance upon the official documents on the other. The limitations, acknowledged by the author, are self-evident: insufficient treatment of the basic forces behind the diplomacy and scant consideration of related problems conditioning Europe's power politics of the time. Even thus simplified the task was no simple one. With admirable clarity the author unravels not only the question of Serbia which, because of its threat of European conflict, has engaged the attention of most historians, but also the related questions of Bulgaria and of Turkey, not adequately treated before. Unfortunately we do not yet have the Russian, French or Italian documents on the period, but it is doubtful if they would change the picture any more than does the Serbian archive material used by M. Ninčić in his subsequently published work on the same crisis[1], though Ninčić does give the previously unknown terms of the Serbian-Montenegrin alliance of October, 1908. One crucial document, Isvolski's report on the Buchlau conversations, was withheld from Mr. Schmitt by a last minute decision of the Soviet authorities.

The author ventures considered opinions where he thinks the weight of evidence sufficient. His severe characterization of Italian policy as "a disgusting shuffling between the two groups" seems justified. Tittoni certainly played square with no one. Grey, whose game was not on a much higher plane despite his moral tone, is given not wholly deserved credit for preserving peace. The controversial German note of March 21, 1909, is carefully considered: it was an ultimatum in tone and was intended as such. Some points are left uncertain, e.g. that of Bulgarian complicity in the double violation of the Berlin treaty. Aehrenthal and Ferdinand were surely acting according to a plan pre-arranged even in its details, though the conclusive proof is still lacking. Isvolski, told of this plan at Buchlau, included Bulgarian independence in the draft treaty with Turkey by which he hoped to open the Straits to Russian warships. The Isvolski-Aehrenthal feud is given due prominence, the former condemned for his bungling, the latter admired for playing his superior hand in a way which produced a prestige victory for himself if but a Pyrrhic one for his country.

There is little research left to be done on this question. Mr. Schmitt's well constructed account gives a classic picture of the old "prestige" diplomacy at its worst, grappling with the crisis which more than any other was a dress rehearsal for 1914, and "solving" it by methods which made it almost certain that a similar pattern of events in the future could have no peaceful solution.

Council on Foreign Relations
New York City JOHN C. CAMPBELL.

STRONG, DAVID F., *Austria. October, 1918-March, 1919. Transition from Empire to Republic*. New York; Columbia University Press, 1939. Pp. 329.

The subject of this study on post-war Austria is "those important first months of adjustment and attempted reconstruction . . . which historically are the key to the events that followed." It must be acknowledged that Strong's book presents a fine and, on the whole, objective piece of contemporary history. By far the most valuable of the seven chapters appear to be those based on the rcords of the Hoover War Library of Stanford University. These chapters are based on food, economic adjustment, and the armistice issues. Even students of this particular period of European history, otherwise well acquainted with the literature will find here much additional and original information until now unpublished. And even apart from these sections, the work stands as an amazingly accurate report of those crucial and history-making days in Central Europe when the 700-year-old Habsburg monarchy fell to pieces, and the socalled succession states emerged.

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[1] Momtchilo Nintchitch, *La Crise bosniaque*, 1908-1909, *et les puissances européenes*, 2 vols., Paris, Alfred Costes, 1937.

The present work deals with but one of these: the German-Austrian Republic, doomed to a short life of exactly twenty years. Although no attempt has been made to write a history of Austria during the war, nevertheless the author describes some aspects of military and economic warfare, the fateful last days of the Habsburgs—especially the background and implications of the Imperial Manifesto of October 16, 1918—the uncertain birth of the democratic republic, and its first halting steps. Here he uses some judgment, historical vision, a well-advised selection of sources, and comprehensive and measured language. The description of hunger and cold-ridden Vienna are so vivid that one is surprised to learn that Strong himself never set eyes on those tragic scenes.

But there are certain more or less important details in which Strong has gone astray, which may be pointed out here. For instance, he erroneously believes that the pre-war Austrian farmers were mainly tenants, which was true only of Hungary and part of Galicia; that the largest Austrian enterprise was state-owned when it really belonged to the "Escomptgesellschaft"—a private bank; that the veteran editorialist Austerlitz belonged to the younger radicals; and the staunch proletarian Minister of Interior, Eldersch, has to be adorned with the degree of "Doctor." He overrates, not as a source, but as a representative mouthpiece of public opinion, the "Volkswirt." He errs in spelling the name of its associate editor as "Feder," instead of "Federn," as it should be. Like many who had to deal with him personally, the author is all but hypnotized by Otto Bauer, the Foreign Secretary and left-wing socialist, and this goes far beyond the aforementioned petty errors. This spell-bound admiration blinds him to the merits of such right-wing labor leaders as Renner, whom he knows only as Chancellor, Seitz, and the trade-unions. Consequently, he utterly misjudges the positive elements contributed by them to Austrian republican reconstruction, their reasonable labor laws, and the accomplishments of the Vienna municipal administration, which are more ironically featured in the closing chapter on "Party Conflict." These are the definitely weak portions of Strong's study. The last words of his otherwise excellent book "Finis Austriae" makes me wonder if future peace-makers should not read this work for an opposite reason. Many of the issues raised and ably commented upon by him are very much alive today, especially the relief problem of war-stricken areas, and, most of all, the question of federation versus national states.

New York City FREDERIC ROGERS.

ALMOND, NINA, AND LUTZ, RALPH H., edd., *The Treaty of St. Germain. A documentary history of its territorial and political clauses with a survey of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference.* ("Hoover War Library Publications," No. 5.) Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1935. Pp. xxx+712. $6.00.

For those seeking to understand Central European affairs during the past two decades a knowledge of the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain is a *sine qua non.* And probably no other single book better reveals the forces and counterforces which were locked in the struggle to determine the fate of Central Europe at the Paris Peace Conference than this volume, which sets forth by means of documents the evolution of the territorial and political clauses which are contained in the preamble and articles 1-117 of the Treaty of St. Germain. Included are 348 documents, selected from thirty-five different sources dealing with the treaty. Since a large number of these documents were originally in foreign languages, and since many of them had not before been printed or published, the volume provides American students with invaluable material which would not otherwise be generally available.

Unfortunately, even for the editors the minutes of most of the meetings of the Council of Four were "not available for citation." They have sought to fill the gap by using an index to the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Four and by using some "subsidiary documents" and "statements of men important in affairs of the Peace Conference." With respect to the other agencies of the Conference, however, the editors were more fortunate, so that the volume contains extracts from the minutes of the Council of Ten, the Council of Five, the Council of the Heads of Delegations, the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Council of Ambassadors. Included also are excerpts from the reports of commissions which investigated some of the problems connected with the treaty, the several drafts of the treaty itself, the criticisms and counterproposals of the Austrian delegations, and the replies of the Allied and Associated Powers. These documents clearly reveal the conflicting national viewpoints and national aspirations with respect to Central Europe, and foreshadow possible conflicts to come. Noteworthy, in the light of subsequent events, is Austria's protest against the inclusion of the Sudeten Germans in the new republic of Czechoslovakia, and her warning of "the troubles that will inevitably result [for Europe] from this offense against the most sacred rights of a nation" (p. 77).

The editors have done a good job. Their selection of documents seems good, and their organization of the material is convenient and logical. Furthermore, without injecting themselves unnecessarily into the volume, they have provided adequate introductory, critical, and bibliographical notes. They have equipped the book with a number of useful maps. Students of Central European affairs are indebted to them.

Indiana University F. LEE BENNS.

Reddaway, W. F., *Problems of the Baltic,* Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: Macmillan. 1940. Pp. 120, 1 map. $1.25.

One of several small volumes appearing in a series edited by Ernest Barker under the general title *Current Problems,* this work is certainly *multum in parvo.* Mr. Reddaway treads surely along the coast of the Baltic, illuminating the intricacies of Baltic ethnography, economics and politics with historical knowledge and penetrating understanding. As is quite natural most of his attention is paid to developments since 1918, but the relevance of previous events is opportunely emphasized. The author's praise of the energy, integrity and progressiveness of all the small peoples of the Eastern Baltic coast is high and he has no difficulty in justifying his opinion. He might have given more attention to a delineation of the shortcomings of Polish diplomacy in the years since 1934. It would be ungrateful to the gallantry of the Polish people to omit to remark that Poland had been badly led in some very important respects. The fundamental Baltic problem, clearly made at every opportunity, is the struggle for dominance, latent or active, between Russia and Germany. Mr. Reddaway is not quite clear as to whether an *entente* between these two great powers can be enduring. On p. 111 he points out that the nineteenth century showed that it "might be lasting." But on p. 113 he says: "German autocracy in the western Baltic and Russian in the eastern, both detested by all the inhabitants except their own nations, can hardly prove enduring," which implies that it is not a practicable arrangement. It is hard to believe that he makes much distinction between nineteenth century Russia or indeed Germany and the present autocratic states. In this connection it should be remarked that the book was written before it became clear how thoroughly Russia was planning to denationalize these Baltic lands. The plan seems to be that Soviet Russia shall be *Russian* clear to the cost. Her position *vis à vis* Germany will then be much stronger than at present. If she has time to accomplish that Russianization, a long-enduring *entente* wilh Germany may be not only possible but inevitable. The background for consideration of these eventualities is finely laid by this attractive and satisfying little book.

University of Colorado S. H. Thomson.

Wolfers, Arnold, *Britain and France between two Wars. Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles.* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1940. Pp. 467.

This is a solid and scholarly book, based upon a mass of material, which includes especially French and British parliamentary documents and the League statesmen. The bibliography is not less than 34 pages in length and it will be of great use to scholars, no less than the excellent chronology of all the essential papers, as well as a long series of memoirs, addresses and books by European diplomatic events dealing with Britain, France and Europe in general from 1919 to 1939.

As to content, the book may be qualified as a scientific thesis discussing the post-war "peace strategy" of Europe on the basis of French and British foreign policy. Apparently the author is more jurist than historian, and therefore his book presents an over-formalized picture of events and forces at work in Europe. The affirmation, for instance, that France and Britain were following a conflicting "peace strategy," since France tried to organize preponderant force and prepare coercive measures, and Britain was engaged in establishing a better balance of power and in applying methods of conciliation and appeasement, leaves the reader in doubt as to the author's comprehension of basic international realities.

This basic thesis can be discussed as far as the conflict between French and British peace strategies may be considered a major source of European troubles. To the practical diplomat such an assumption seems to be highly exaggerated, since the "conflicting" peace strategy did not prevent continuous cooperation between the "conflicting powers," not only in regard to Western Europe but also in regard to Germany and Central Europe, as the Munich policy and the common post-Munich action, both diplomatic and military, shows. To base the diplomatic history of post-war Europe upon the Franco-British controversy over Germany and Central Europe is an optical error proceeding especially from an erroneous estimate of the German post-war position in Europe. The author is convinced that Germany was "entitled to find her place among the great Western powers and become an element of stability and order in Central Europe" at the cost of new Central European powers, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. As a German Swiss and a former Director of the "Hochschule für Politik" in Berlin, Mr. Wolfers clearly exaggerates the assumption that the outstanding condition for peace in Europe is that the "German problem" be solved, and that the best solution would be an agreement between Britain, France, Italy ,and Germany on the extent of their respective power and positions in the East and West. Such an agreement would eliminate causes of unrest not only on the Rhine but also on the Vistula, the Danube, and in the Mediterranean.

If all the author's researches lead only to such a conclusion, it must be said that it is rather discouraging to the impartial student of European political development. At any rate, it is inadequate to any consideration of peace terms to be formulated at the end of the present war. It does not correspond to an exact appreciation of post-war Central Europe as an independent factor in the European balance of power. According to the author, the recently new Central Europe was an artificial creation of France and her ill-conceived foreign policy. "Her policy," he states, "in a sense evolved in a vicious circle. Because she wanted to weaken Germany and hedge her in she helped Poland and Czechoslovakia to obtain territory transgressing the German ethnic borders, backed their resistance to German demands for adjustment, and used them as allies in building up defenses against Germany." "Thereby she intensified the tension on Germany's eastern borders and hastened the moment when her entanglements in the East would draw her into a struggle that would endanger her security."

But it is inexact to consider the political independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia as transgressing the German ethnic borders, and to speak of the pan-German expansion to the Southeast as just German demands for adjustment. It is also inexact to minimize the military importance of those two countries for France because of the fact that the French had no free access to them across the remilitarized Germany. On the contrary, Poland and Czechoslovakia by themselves formed a formidable strategic barrier against Germany, provided they be united and backed by a French offensive strength in the West. Equally wrong is the author's whole concept of the new Central Europe as an area without political stability or economic prosperity and unable to resist Germany's *Drang nach Osten.* It proceeds from his pro-German idea of Central Europe as a neutralised economic *Lebensraum* for "German energies." From this point of view, Mr. Wolfers tries to justify the Austrian Anschluss, invoking, among other unconvincing reasons, the principle of self-determination. The same principle could be applied to the German part of Switzerland. To declare the Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak alliances "the most stable and unquestioned facts of European politics," up until the September crisis of 1938, is an error of the author, overlooking the fact that the international position of both Poland and Czechoslovakia has been connected with the whole of the post-war system established in Central and Eastern Europe. The mistake of Mr. Wolfers consists in his assumption that Germany should be "satisfied" through "peaceful" territorial changes, carried on by a Four-Power Pact, and that in such a way "the injustice and instability of the post-war arrangements in Central Europe" would be repaired. It has long been a German assumption that the Central European states should "make an effort to negotiate adjustments with Germany rather than to take upon themselves the responsibility for a policy of fanatical defense of the status quo which disrupted the League and poisoned relations between the powers of Europe." What poisoned the relations was the Hitlerian militarism and the Nazi world policy, and it is very strange that this real cause of present European troubles is absolutely overlooked by Mr. Wolfers. To think seriously that political and economic negotiations between Poland and Czechoslovakia and their dissatisfied neighbors, particularly before Hitler came onto the scene, might have led to a more stable order in Central Europe than the one established in 1919, appears naive ingenuity if one remembers the Machiavellian Hungarian revisionists. The comparison between the "new states" of Central Europe and Switzerland or Holland is, after May, 1940, a telling argument against Mr. Wolfers' theory, which is very similar to the pan-German *"raisonnement"* without any foundation in the post-war realities. Poland and Czechoslovakia with 50 million inhabitants, situated in the "danger zone" of Europe cannot be put on the same level as Switzerland. Both countries became "liabilities rather than assets" not because of their own weakness but because of the betrayal of the French diplomacy after Barthou and of the British business-like "appeasement" policy, rightly condemned by the author himself (p. 271).

The explanation of the Czechoslovak crises should be confronted with that given by the British independent authors, like Seton-Watson *(Munich and the Dictators)* in order to judge Mr. Wolfers' reliability and impartiality. This matter, however, cannot be discussed in a short review like this.

Notwithstanding these critical remarks, the scientific value of this book should be recognized. It consists in a careful survey of the concepts and courses of action taken by Britain and France in European foreign affairs between two wars. The survey is based chiefly upon the parliamentary statements of the Governments and is presented in the political and juridical discussion of the themes connected with the main problems. The discussion is limited to political ideas and traditions, and therefore the internal and psychological forces are omitted. However, the principal weakness of this honest and methodical book seems to be the erroneous concept of the post-war diplomatic history as a "conflicting" peace strategy of France and Britain on one side, and on the other, the omission from the picture of the pan-Germanic war and revolutionary action affecting not only Central Europe but the whole of Europe and of the world.

California Institute of Technology VLASTIMIL KYBAL.

MUNK, FRANK, *The Economics of Force*. New York: George W. Stewart, 1940. Pp. xiv+15+254. $2.00.

In this modest volume, we are given a clear, forceful, reasonably restrained, and in the reviewer's opinion fundamentally sound, portrayal of the present world situation. The central thought is "revolution" in our West European civilization, a transformation or a struggle to transform life from an economy of welfare to an economy of force, the former coupled with the democratic politics of representative institutions, the latter with the politics of absolute dictatorship. It is a book which any believer in the liberal political-economic order, or specifically any believer in human freedom as a moral or political principle, would wish to be read as widely and as immediately as possible, particularly in the United States—if any of the remaining appeasers, or mere ostriches, or doubters as to the imminence of total and absolute revolution, completely suppressing the individual as an entity and all voluntary associative life, are open to reason and permeable to facts. The author, a Czech, now a Lecturer in Economics at Reed College, we are told, "served his country in many capacities, including membership on the permanent Committee of Economic Planning," and "is an expert in management, distribution, marketing, and consumption." In any case, he is shown by the book itself to have excellent equipment in knowledge, scholarship and literary ability for writing it.

The problem is rather more one of politics than one of economics, and "the political economy of power" would have been a more descriptive title. For the essence of the new European regime of fascist Nazism now engaged in total war for world domination, is the complete subordination of economics, as the term has hitherto been understood in our civilization, to the pure *Machtpolitik* of political gangsters. On the other hand, without detracting anything from the merit of the book, in its actual character and purpose, an economist reviewer may be allowed the observation that it makes no attempt to give any profound analysis of the problems of economic policy involved in the perpetuation or development of economic freedom, for itself or as basic to other freedoms. Such an analysis would find freedom rather than welfare the central principle of liberal political economy. And while our author has recognized shortcomings of the liberal system as it existed in fact (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) this discussion is rather conventional and even superficial. However all this is really beside the point. The author has made good his case that unless totalitarianism is defeated by military action and prevented from becoming the "wave of the future," any consideration of these other questions will be postponed to some future historical epoch, "when and if" another series of world revolutions, *against* intolerable tyranny, may lead to reopening them.

University of Chicago FRANK H. KNIGHT.

KRÁL, JOSEF, *Československá filosofie* (Czechoslovak Philosophy). Prague: Melantrich, 1937. Pp. xii+338.

That specialization should be supplemented by integration has been implicitly recognized by the appearance of such periodicals as *The Journal of the History of Ideas*. The recognition of this need has produced several excellent works in Czechoslovakia such as *Československá Vlastivěda*, a series of monumental volumes covering all aspects of Czechoslovakia's cultural and physical existence; *Pedagogická Encyclopedie*, one of the finest encyclopedias of "education" in any language, and others. Probably one of the outstanding contributions of this kind, by one man, is the present work, written by a sociologist of Prague University. For reasons unknown the title is entirely misleading. The book covers not only the whole field of Czechoslovak philosophy, but also the following fields: noetics, logic, ethics, psychology, esthetics, the philosophy of religion, pedagogy and sociology, the German philosophy in Czechoslovakia and the Slav philosophy in Czechoslovakia. Obviously, it does not include all of what we call "Social Science" in America, since human geography, abnormal psychology, and political science have been omitted. Yet it deals with all the fields of knowledge which are considered "respectable" in Central European universities. Thus the other fields of human knowledge appear here under more dignified names. History, for instance, here appears in a chapter entitled "The Spirit of Czech Philosophy."

From one point of view, there is really no work which can compete with Král's volume, or which has put so much learning into so few pages. The bibliographies are carefully classified, though one wishes that the author had also included the names of the publishers. But from the point of view of "impartial" scholarship Král is to be quite severely criticized for something which is typical of Central European scholarship. His own approach, his own "school" receives too much emphasis, although strictly speaking, there is really no "school" of Král—only an approach. In short, Král's emphasis on the "empiric" approach in sociology, something akin to the approach of the Chicago "school" of Sociology, is extremely critical of the "school" of Bláha at Brno, whose emphasis on the need for "values" in sociology is similar to the approach of Sorokin and Ellwood in this country.

But this tendency of the author to overemphasize his "school" and to underestimate other "schools" does not prevent us from believing that this work is really indispensable for the comprehension of Czechoslovakia's productive scholarship in the past and in her twenty years of independent existence. It is written in Czech and hence inaccessible to scholars unfamiliar with that language. But anyone investigating Czechoslovakia's cultural contributions would make an effort to have the work at least abstracted for him.

Hofstra College JOSEPH S. ROUCEK.

BRISTOL, HELEN O., *After Thirty Years, Poland Revisited.* Rutland, Vermont: House of Tuttle, 1939. Pp. 224. $2.50.

Anonymous, *My Name is Million.* New York, Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 268. $2.50.

In the first of these books we share a peaceful excursion to Poland in the summer of 1935; in the second, we take a distressingly vivid part in a chaotic flight from the terrors of Nazi invasion. Mrs. Bristol, a native Pole married to an American, has an artist's eye and a poet's style, combined with an astute perception of both individual and national character. The student of nationalities will wish that she had presented at greater length her objective views on the peculiar Polish temperament in relation to that of its neighbors. The lover of localities and customs will be charmed with her nostalgic descriptions of both.

The anonymous English author of *My Name is Million* presents the catastrophe which we sensed impending in Mrs. Bristol's peaceful summer. This is a book of frightfulness stoically sustained by the class with which the author, through marriage and perhaps natural inclination, is identified—the landed gentry and the officers of the Polish army, whose motto is *noblesse oblige* but whose methods and equipment are pathetically inadequate in the face of mechanized war. To this author the peasant, obstinate and shifty, seems a hindrance to effective national organization rather than the ultimate repository of true Polish culture, as Mrs. Bristol sees him. Again, in contrast to Mrs. Bristol's views, the Poles are represented as trusting the English to keep their word. In both books the Russians are considered as a recurring scourge which must be borne with Slavic fatalism and recovered from with what the native Pole calls Polish vanity and the Englishwoman considers magnificent pride.

My Name is Million is a dramatic, evidently important document of civilian war suffering. Certain biases of the author must be taken into account in evaluating her always intelligent observations of political transformation.

R. V. T.

FODOR, M. W., *The Revolution is On.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940. Pp. xv+239. Introduction by Dorothy Thompson.

BENES, EDUARD, *Democracy Today and Tomorrow.* New York: Macmillan, 1939. Pp. xiv+244. $3.00.

The French Revolution has become an indispensable starting-point for interpreting the modern world. Both authors are indebted to it. Against a vivid background of his experiences during the invasion of the Lowlands and France last spring, Fodor advances the idea that movements now in progress are a continuation of the French Revolution. The latter had released the energies of a portion of the middle class while the masses had inherited only insecurity. Now the proletariat are rising in a new social revolution, which, like the other revolution, has fallen into the hands of international gangsters. This is only temporary; but the author leaves us groping as to the future of such a movement. He tells us only that we cannot expect a return to the old way of life. Although Mr. Fodor is doubtless busy as a correspondent, the reader deserves some comments upon how this war, viewed as a social revolution, will end ultimately; what the peace aims must be in so complicated a settlement; and, in particular, what are the implications for the domestic and foreign policies of those democracies which also have a lower middle class. Both the book and the introduction by Dorothy Thompson make highly interesting reading.

Democracy Today and Tomorrow is a confession of faith. Dr. Beneš is indebted to the theological method no less than to the French Revolution. The Renaissance, Reformation and French Revolution were great milestones in the march of democracy. The Versailles Treaty, he believes, in spite of its faults, marked a further triumph for nationalism and democracy by destroying absolutist empires in central and eastern Europe and establishing the democratic principle of national self-determination. That this system was destroyed was due to the lack of experience with democratic methods, the rise of communism, fascism, and unfortunate foreign policies on the part of the older democracies. Democracy is due for a categorical triumph, however, for history is nothing but the struggle between forces for freedom and other forces which rest upon suppression. "Dictatorship is always a temporary regime," arising in times of crisis and always casting civilization upon a higher level of democracy. This is an "abstract sociological and political law of evolution.' (p. 192). This book is in the tradition of Mill, Dicey, Freeman and Bryce.

University of Colorado CLAY P. MALICK.

SHORTER NOTICES

KOHN, HANS, *Not by Arms Alone*, Harvard University Press, 1940, Pp. 161. $1.75.

This is a collection of unrelated essays, most of which have appeared elsewhere. One chapter, in two parts, "The Problem of Central Europe," is of some interest to readers of this journal. No original thought or interpretation is presented in these pleasantly written essays. Here and there the informed reader may question the conventional conclusions of the author. For instance to say (p. 48), that "the Hapsburg empire was disintegrated by the struggle of the nationalities" is to fail to credit the Hapsburg policies with their due and very easily assessable share in that disintegration. The statement (p. 62) that "the policy of the great kings and dukes in the Danubian area in the fourteenth century followed parallel lines, all founded upon the consciousness of the essential unity of this area" is to forget the very close ties between Bohemia and Hungary on the one hand and Poland, Italy and the German princes to the north on the other. The second part of this chapter, "Czech Democracy," is written with zest, but contains some statements that are perhaps too sweeping. "The Hussites were in no way modern men," as if nationalism were not a dominant modern characteristic (p. 76); "The Hussite Revolution not only started the Protestant Reformation . . ." (*ibid.*), as if there were any organic connection at all between the two movements, are cases in point. But in general this chapter is entertaining.

S. H. T.

LIAS, GODFREY, *Beneš of Czechoslovakia*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1940. Pp. 303. 8/6.

The author, an active journalist who was at Geneva for some time during Beneš' prominence there, writes a sympathetic study of the former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and President. The book is undocumented and shows no familiarity with Czechoslovakia or the real problems of Central Europe beyond what one might expect of a practicising journalist. There are faults of organization. There are unnecessary digressions and the reader will be annoyed to have to jump blithely from 1915 to 1938 and back again on several occasions. It is not yet time for a definitive biography of a statesman who is still relatively young. Furthermore sympathy is not quite enough equipment to justify the writing of the life of a statesman who is so typically Czech as Beneš. The traditions, political, social and religious, which lie behind the man are, in the long run, more significant for an understanding of his work than his years of activity as Foreign Minister and President. Mr. Lias betrays no familiarity with these traditions, nor does he anywhere attack the problem as to why Beneš so truly represents the Czech nation. It will take more than sympathetic journalism to answer that question.

S. H. T.

Kybal, Vlastimil, *Czechoslovak Independence,* College Press, Los Angeles City College, 1940. Pp. 29.

The William Henry Snyder Lectureship for 1940. Dr. Kybal, former Czechoslovak Minister to Italy, Spain and Brazil, presents the case for Czechoslovak democratic tradition, emphasizing the continuity of that tradition and its importance for the healthy development of all the lesser peoples of Europe.

Strauss-Hupé, Robert, *The Russo-German Riddle: Rivals or Partners?,* University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939. Pp. 17. $.20.

Delivered on Nov. 15, 1939, this Howard Crawley Lecture contains much careful and acute analysis of forces felt at that time. The scene has changed greatly since then, but the riddle is still unanswered.

Pamphlets on World Affairs, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 15 cents each.

No. 5 Julian Huxley, *'Race' in Europe,* 1939, Pp. 32.
No. 6 G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *The Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles,* 1939. Pp. 40.
No. 8 R. R. Kuczynski, *'Living Space' and Population Problems,* 1939. Pp. 31.
No. 10 C. A. Macartney, *The Danube Basin,* Third, corrected ed. 1940. Pp. 32.
No. 14 J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Germany's Eastern Policy,* Third ed., 1940. Pp. 39.
No. 15 R. Birley, *Czechoslovakia,* 1939. Pp. 32.
No. 34 Barbara Ward, *Russian Foreign Policy,* 1940. Pp. 32.

Published originally in England by the Oxford University Press under the general title: Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, at threepence each, this series which has already reached about 40 titles, is well conceived, in general authoritatively edited and in every respect timely. It is obviously a part of Britain's war effort and might be expected to be colored by that circumstance. Yet for the most part they offer an objective, close-to-the-ground presentation of problems uppermost in the public mind, American as well as British. Macartney's pamphlet, *The Danube Basin,* is especially focussed upon the effect of recent German expansion in that area. He suggests briefly the conditions of the post-war settlement which made possible the easy economic and political expansion of Nazi Germany. He makes no attempt to forecast the future of this region, but he does suggest several interesting solutions which may finally resolve the age-old problem of Central Europe. E. J. W.

Miss Ward's pamphlet on *Russian Foreign Policy* is an excellent interpretative survey from Brest-Litovsk to 1940. Russia's desire for security is presented as explaining the abandonment of the world revolution, the negotiation of non-aggression pacts and Russia's entry into the League. This latter policy, one of co-operation with the West, was discarded after the Western powers sacrificed Czechoslovakia, without consulting Russia and regardless of Russia's obvious desire to maintain treaty obligations. An isolated Russia then turned toward Hitler's Germany. The statement that "no state can escape its own geography" is deduced from a remark by Mussolini in 1924. This only emphasizes the principle that foreign policy is conducted solely in national self-interest. One cannot help thinking that perhaps Stalin may not believe these maxims, as he is apparently abetting Hitler's expansion in the Balkans—towards the Dardanelles.

J. G. A.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE*

Arady, Charles. "A Strong Hungary—European Interest." *Danubian Rev.* VIII (1940), 3:1-3.

Asztalos, Niccolo. "Transilvania ed Ungheria nel passato." *Corvina* II (1939), 453-463.

Bosnyák, Zoltán. "A harmadik zsidótörveny és a házasság" [The Third Hungarian Jewish Law and Marriage]. *Egyedül Vagyunk* III (1940), 8-14. Discussion of the Second Hungarian Jewish Law, Paragraph IV of the Act of 1939, and a detailed description of the question of intermarriage between Christions and Jews in Hungary.

Çabej, Eqrem. "Volkstum und Volksname der Albaner." *Leipziger Vierteljahrschrift f. Südosteuropa* IV (1940), 78-96.

c.d. "La ricostruzione economica della Rutenia ciscarpatica." *Corvina* II (1939), 801-804.

Csáky, Imre. "Europa gazdasági jövője és Magyarország" [The Economic Future of Europe and Hungary]. *Magyar Külpolitika* XXI (1940), 8:1-3. The new economic order of Europe may assure a leading position for Hungary in South-Eastern Europe.

Djordjevitch, Jovan. "Vers l'Etat fédéral en Yougoslavie." *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* XXXIII (1940), 412-418.

Drucker, Peter F. "Germany's Plans for Europe." *Harpers,* November, 1940, 597-604.

Eckhardt, Tibor. "The Problem of the Middle Danube Basin." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 3-23.

Ernyei, Caspar. "The Spirit of Transylvania." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 224-234.

Fall, Andrew. "Why Hungary Is Entitled to Demand the Restoration of Transylvania." *Danubian Rev.* VIII (1940), 2:5-20.

Féja, Géza. "Hungary and East Central Europe." *Danubian Rev.* VIII (1940), 1:5-18.

Fest, Alexander. "Medieval Contacts between England and Hungary." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 252-264.

Frey, Andrew. "Danubian Chronicle." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 172-194.

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Frey, Andrew. "A Danubian Chronicle." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 554-567.

Gál, Stephen. "Kossuth, America, and the Danubian Confederation." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 417-433.

Gogolák, Louis. "Edward Benesh." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 24-35.

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*The Editor is indebted to Mr. Joseph Szentkirályi of Columbia University for the compilation of most of this bibliography, and particularly for the translation and abstracting of the articles in Magyar.

Gogolák, Lodovico. "Nuove tendenze nella politica sociale ungherese." *Corvina* II (1939), 637-647.

Gogolák, Louis. "La politique tchèque dans la première guerre mondiale." *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* XXXIII (1940), 241-251.

Gunda, Béla. "The Wanderers of Carpathian Europe." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 449-457.

Hajdu, Gabor. "Megvalosult-e a román egység 'Nagyromániában' "? [Did the National Unity Materialize in Great Rumania?] *Egyedül Vagyunk* III (1940), 8:24-28. There are great linguistic, racial and political differences between the Rumanians of Transylvania and those of the Regat. These differences still exist and national unity cannot materialize.

Jócsik, Lajos. "Magyarország és Kelet-Europa" [Hungary and Eastern Europe]. *Az Ország Utja* IV (1940), 228-232. The conclusion is that Hungary stands on the border-line between Western and Eastern Europe geographically, politically, historically, economically and ethnically.

Jócsik, Louis. "Slovakia's Financial Troubles." *Danubian Rev.* VII (1940), 12:9-13.

Kállay, Nicholas. "The Problems of the Great Plain." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 265-275.

Kapp, A. " 'Böhmische' Handwerker und Handler in Leipzig und auf den Leipziger Messen." *Zft. f. sudetendeutsche Geschichte* IV (1940), 92-97.

Kerék, Michael. "Agricultural Land Reform in Hungary." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 471-480.

Lengyel, Thomas. "In the 'Fifties: Hungarian Emigrants in London." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 458-570.

Marcovitch, Lazare. "La réforme électorale en Yougoslavie." *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie,* March, 1940.

Marriott, Sir John. "Central Europe and the Near East." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 95-99.

Mosca, Rodolfo. "L'Italia e la questione dell'Ungheria Occidentale." *Corvina* II (1939), 380-389, 560-577, 622-631.

Nosz, Gyula. "Nemzetiség és felekezet a mai Szlovákiában" [Nationality and Religion in Slovakia Today]. *Egyedül Vagyunk* III (1940), 4:10-21.

Panaitescu, P. P. "Die Entwicklung der rumänischen Staatenbildung." *Leipziger Vierteljahrschrift f. Südosteuropa* IV (1940), 26-37.

Póka-Pivny, Béla. "War Aims and the Danubian Area." *Danubian Rev.* VII (1940), 9:10-14.

Pongrácz, Kalman. "Gróf Teleki Pál nemzetiségpolitikaja" [Count Paul Teleki's Nationality Policy]. *Külügyi Szemle* XVII (1940), 375-379. Count Teleki set himself the task to build up a new, modern conception of nationality policy in Hungary. Due to an unsettled interational situation only the preliminary work has been done in this direction but the Hungarian Premier's policy is centered around the basic idea that the Magyars and other nationalities living in the Carpathian basin must get together because they are destined to walk the same road in history.

Prokopy, Imre. "A szerb-horvát kiegyezés után" [After the Serb-Croat Agreement]. *Magyar Szemle* XXXVIII (1940), 142-151. Reviews the results and consequences of the Serb-Croat agreement, August 26, 1939.

Révay, Giuseppe. "La lotta contro il deserto (con 8 illustrazioni)." *Corvina* II (1939), 751-767.

Rézler, Julius. "The Hungarian Manufacturing Industry." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 322-335.

Rubletzky, Géza. "The Southern Dobrudja Question." *Danubian Rev.* VIII (1940), 2:26-30.

Stark, Jean. "La réconstruction de la Subcarpathie." *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* XXXIII (1940), 352-358.

Szász, Zsombor. "Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference." *Danubian Rev.* VIII (1940), 5:12-21.

Szász, Zsombor. "National Autonomies in Transylvania." *Hungarian Qy.* VI (1940), 53-64.

Szekfü, Gyula. "A legujabb nemzetiségi töovényjavaslau" [The Latest Nationality Law Proposal]. *Magyar Szemle* XXXIX (194), 1-10. The Hungarian Nazi Party introduced a nationality bill in the Hungarian Parliament last year which proposed radical changes not only in the status of the nationalities in Hungary but also in the constitution of the country. Szekfü, the most eminent Hungarian historian, reviews the proposal and refuses it as unhistorical and not in keeping with Hungarian national interests.

Tőrök, Árpád. "Europa megszervezése" [The Organization of Europe]. *Magyar Szemle* XXXVIII (1940), 136-142. Discusses the different plans for the reorganization of Europe and world peace: Union now, United States of Europe and Pan-Europe. Concludes with the words of Paul Guggenheim who said that every war contributed something to the development of international law and through that to world peace.

Treitinger, Otto. "Vom oströmischen Staats- und Reichsgedanken." *Leipziger Vierteljahrschrift f. Südostreuropa* IV (1940), 1-26.

Vájlok, Sándor. "A szlovák önállóság kezdetei" [The Beginnings of Slovak Independence]. *Magyar Szemle* XXXVIII (1940), 11-17. The separatist movement of the Slovaks of Hungary started in the forties of the last century. In the beginning it worked only for autonomy within the Dual Monarchy but as it did not meet with the understanding of either the Austrians or the Hungarians, complete independence was set as the goal of the movement.

Weiss-Nägel, Anton. "Die Aufbaukräfte des slowakischen Volkscharakters." *Leipziger Vierteljahrschrift f. Sudosteuropa* IV (1940), 37-63.

Wostry, Wilhelm. "Volksdeutsche Geschichtsbetrachtung." *Zft. f. sudetendeutsche Geschichte* IV (1940), 1-24.

Wesselényi, Miklós. "A második világháboru okai" [Causes of the Second World War]. *Külügyi Szemle* XVII (1940), 484-494. Concludes with the statement that the question of the causes of the second World War finds its answer in the history of the past twenty years.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Most of these titles will be reviewed in early numbers of the JOURNAL.

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Anderson, E. N., *Nationalism & the Cultural Crisis in Prussia*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1939.

Auernheimer, Raoul, *Prince Metternich, Statesman and Lover*, New York, Alliance Book Corp., 1940, $3.50.

Ball, M. Margaret, *Post-War German-Austrian Relations*, Stanford Univ. Press, 1937, $4.00.

Beller, E. A., *Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years War*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1940. Pp. 49. 24 plates. $10.00.

Birdsall, Paul, *Versailles Twenty Years After*, New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, $3.00.

Bloom, Solomon F., *The World of Nations*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1941, $2.50.

Borkenau, F., *The Totalitarian Enemy*, London, Faber & Faber, 1940, 10s, 6d.

Carr, E. H., *International Relations Since the Peace Conference*, New York, Macmillan, 1937, $2.75.

Curtiss, John S., *Church and State in Russia*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1940, $4.00.

Edwards, L. F., *Danube Stream*, Toronto, Saunders, $3.50.

Einzig, Paul, *World Finance*, Oxford Univ. Press, $4.00.

Ford, Guy Stanton, ed., *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, Univ. of Minnesota Press, $3.50.

Fraenkel, Ernst, *The Dual State*, Oxford Univ. Press, $3.00.

Geshkoff, T. I., *Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in South Eastern Europe*, Columbia Univ. Press, $3.00.

Harris, David, *Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78*, Stanford Univ. Press, 1936, $4.00.

Helmreich, Ernst Christian, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-13*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1938, $5.00.

Hitchcock, Edward, *I Built a Temple for Peace*, New York, Harpers, 1940, $3.50.

Hungarian Economic Year Book 1939-40, Columbia Univ. Press, 1940, $5.00.

Kerner, Robert J., ed., *Czechoslovakia*, Univ. of California Press, 1940, $5.00.

Manning, C. A. W., *Peaceful Change*, New York, Macmillan, $2.50.

McInnis, Edgar, *The War: First Year*, Oxford Univ. Press, $1.50.

Paneth, Philip, *Czechs against Germans*, Toronto, Nicholson & Watson, 1939, $2.50.

Pfitzner, Joseph, *Sudetendeutsche Geschichte*, Reichenberg, 1937.

Potocek, Cyril, *Cyril and Methodius*, New York, Kenedy & Sons, $2.00.

Price, M. P., *Hitler's War & Eastern Europe*, New York, Macmillan, 1940, $1.25.

Raupach, Hans, *Der Tchechische Frühnationalismus,* Essener Verlagsanstalt 1939..

Selver, Paul, *Masaryk,* Toronto, Saunders, 1940, $6.00.

Shotwell, J. T., *What Germany Forgot,* New York, Macmillan, $1.50.

Stolper, Gustav, *German Economy,* New York, Reynal-Hitchcock, $3.00.

Watson, Francis, *Wallenstein,* New York, Appleton-Century, $4.00.

Winter, Eduard, *Tausend Jahre Geisteskampf,* Prague, 1938.

Witt, Kurt, *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftspolitik der Tschechoslowakei,* Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1938. RM 15.50.

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THE FUTURE OF DANUBIA

by Oscar Jászi

IN speaking of Danubia we have in mind the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy plus the Balkans, to which a certain unity is given by the mighty river which enriches the transportation facilities of most of these countries, and by the integrating force of German civilization. This region is characterized by a certain backwardness in its economic and cultural structure, although it has held some advanced posts of Western capitalism. Indeed, as Metternich said: "The Balkans begin with the Viennese *Landstrasse*." Another dominant trait of these countries is the abundance of different nationality groups which have not yet found either stable ethnological or political frontiers. Danubia was the danger zone of Europe from which both the first and the second World War originated, not in the sense that it initiated them, but by constituting through continuous nationality rivalries and the intrigues of small sovereigns that powder keg which the vicious strategy of the neighboring imperialistic systems could always bring to explosion.

This Danubia, as the brilliant French writer, François Delaisi, diagnosed it in his book on *Les Deux Europes* (Paris, 1929)—when it had become evident that the panacea of the League of Nations did not work—is the most important segment of a larger territory of an analogous economic, social, and moral structure. He asserted in this work that, roughly speaking, the territory between Germany and Russia, including the Danubian succession states, the Balkans, Poland, and the Baltic States, constitute a different type of civilization from that of Western Europe, based on a backward agricultural production, an unorganized working class, and a usurious capitalism. And he added that if the agriculture of this anachronistic region could be organized, it would create for the West far more advantageous markets than their remote colonies could give. The modernization of these one hundred million people just liberated through the War from their ancient bondage could become the cornerstone of a new European civilization, and eliminate the chief causes of tension in Europe.

A few years before the appearance of this book of Delaisi, the same truth was emphasized by a young Czech friend of mine. After having returned from the United States, imbued with her spirit, into his newly liberated fatherland, he wrote me the following enthusiastic prophecy:

> "We admit the fact that there is a hatred and ill-will between the individual nations, but we are professing a daring theory contrary to all the past experiences of the nations of Central Europe. . . . We are realizing, in an increasing degree, that there is between Germany and Russia a submerged, distinct human individuality, almost a nation, which is called the peasant. This man has been so far only a passive tool of other peoples' ambitions, and his exposed situation, between the cultured European centers and the Asiatic winds, has prevented him from developing his personality and from organizing his own society. But today conditions are for him much more favorable than they ever were in the past, and after many centuries of hardships and stress, he has now a chance to breathe freely, to improve his own status, to give education to his children. . . ."

My friend, himself of peasant origin, expressed the hope that the liberated peasants of the danger zone would create democratic federations among themselves; a Danubian, a Balkanic, a Baltic, and perhaps a Ukrainian federation, which would put an end to the prevailing balance of power system. And he concluded: "Such democratic federations would mean the isolation of the great capitalistic states which, without vassals and exploited colonies, could not uphold their traditional diplomatic rivalries and militaristic intrigues."

The ideas of the Frenchman and the hope of the Czech were not new. Three generations ago, after the suppression of Hungarian independence by the Hapsburgs and the Czar, Louis Kossuth, the leader of the Hungarian revolution, wrote the following message from his exile:

> "Any state of the lower Danube, should it even be successful in rallying around itself all its racial brethren now belonging to other states, could be, at best, only a state of second rank, the independence of which would be continuously menaced and inevitably subjected to foreign influences. However, if the Magyars, the Southern Slavs, and the Rumanians would accept this plan (of confederation), they would together become a wealthy, powerful state of the first rank, with 30,000,000 inhabitants, which would have a heavy weight in the scales of Europe . . . Unity, concord, fraternity between Magyars, Slavs and Rumanians! This is my most ardent wish, my most sincere advice!"

The only possible solution of the problems of Danubia was here clearly proclaimed. A federal structure combined with a complete cultural and administrative autonomy of the variegated national minorities living in the danger zone would be the only device which could guarantee free development and peaceful coöperation to all the national groups involved.

II

After the World War, the leading statesmen of the victorious Entente had no conception of the fundamental nature of this problem. Their only concern was how to keep humiliated Germany subservient. The liberation of the various nationality groups was carried out on the basis of power politics, establishing artificial frontiers, new strategic lines, new dominant and subjected national groups, new chattels and pawns in the imperialistic game. Instead of furthering the beginnings of a new democratic life, the conservative statesmen of Europe supported the former oligarchies. The Russian, the Hungarian, the Austrian, and later the Spanish counter-revolutions found mighty protectors, and the beginnings of the new dictatorships were heartily welcomed in many influential circles. Mr. Chamberlain pressed the Duce to his breast, and princes, generals, Junkers, and captains of industry applauded the Führer. The promised land reform was frustrated or carried out in a hasty and unorganized way so that masses of the peasants often succumbed under the burden of their new debts.

The result of all this was that the causes of the World War were not eliminated, they were even aggravated in the two decades of the so-called "peace" under the auspices of the League of Nations. The new national minorities created by the peace treaties were not the humble and often uncultivated masses of the pre-War period, but consisted partly of Germans and Hungarians, who, for centuries, had been accustomed to domination and who found their role as second-rank citizens unbearable. The pressure of the large feudal estates increased, due to the fact that the trans-Atlantic emigration was practically stopped. The safety-valve of Southeastern Europe which had protected it from social revolutions was clogged, and a growing militarism and police force and an army of spies were necessary to keep the masses quiet. In Germany the ruling classes, chiefly responsible for the War, the Junkers, the leaders of heavy industry, and the old generals, were not eliminated, but very soon began to undermine the economic and moral structure of a timid and inexperienced republic.

This growing tension created new causes of war; the impracticability of the financial arrangements of the peace treaties began to paralyze the economic life of the whole continent. To get the necessary financial resources and to prepare for the new war, which the defeated states longed for and of which the victors were afraid, most of Europe embarked on a policy of economic autarchy, sacrificing entirely the interests of consumers to those of army and bureaucracy. Under the pressure of these economic and political hardships, the former almost religious faith in democracy was shattered. Most of the states assumed the form of military dictatorships, and they became diplomatic hunting grounds of armed oligarchies. The Russian revolution with the ruthless extermination of the upper and middle classes created a fear complex of tremendous magnitude. As a reaction to the Bolshevik experiment, Fascism and National Socialism came into existence. Though they rose to power with the connivance of the capitalistic classes, they very soon assumed independent revolutionary features. The class war inside of the countries was repressed by the new "more dignified" doctrines of racial and international struggle between superior and inferior races and between the Haves and the Have-nots.

This atmosphere of embittered class, race, and state struggles completely demolished the moral unity of Europe. In spite of many wars and inner conflicts, Europe had always accepted the community of certain ideals, deeply rooted in the Graeco-Roman Natural Law, in the moral standards of Christianity, and in the Human Rights of the American and French Revolutions. Now, for the first time, these ideas were not only repudiated, but ridiculed. "We spit on freedom" became the political philosophy of Bolsheviks, Fascists, and Nazis. The doctrine of the sanctity of treaties was supplanted by the "scrap of paper" theory. Force and ruse became the only means of national policy unhidden by the hypocrisies of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. And though Western Europe nominally maintained the former standards, yet the cynical disregard of the fundamental aims of the League of Nations was widely practiced by English and French statesmen, who used the idealistic conception of President Wilson as a screen to hide their power interests. This attitude, combined with a declamatory and impotent pacifism, fostered a spirit of decadence and defeatism which would not give any moral counterpoise to the crudely simplified slogans of Fascism and Bolshevism. And when China, Ethiopia, Austria, and Czechoslovakia were sold, with solemn formalities, to the aggressors, Hitler felt that the day had come for the final realization of his dreams, and for the complete subjection of the whole of Europe.

Much of the rest of the story is known. We stand again before a turning point not only in the fate of Danubia, but of the whole world. The issue now depends exclusively, *though not finally,* on the outcome of this war.

III

In case of a German-Russian victory, Danubia would become a condominium of two partners—at least until the final clash between them comes. Russia would rule supreme over the Baltic coast, White Russia, the Ukraine, northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Bulgaria with the Dobrudja; Germany would build up her Central European Empire in the Danubian countries and in the Balkans, with an ample share in the former English Dominions and Colonies. Under this hypothesis, England and France would become second rank powers, as have present day Spain or Sweden, once the leaders of an imperialistic system. The small states of Danubia would become vassals of the two giants, economically, politically, and morally, utterly *gleichgeschaltet* under what they call now the system of "socialism of nations." Because, as Herr Robert Ley, the Labor Front leader, modestly announced, "It is the fate of every single German to belong to a high race. A lower race needs less room, less food, less culture, than a higher race. The German cannot live under the same conditions as the Pole and the Jew." To make this splendid utopia complete, we must not forget that the Duce surely would receive, as a junior partner, the dregs of the German victory.

In the case of a democratic victory, three different solutions can be imagined for the Danubian countries. One would be the restoration of the national frontiers which existed before the attack of Hitler. This position will probably be taken by all the governments in exile which already are asserting that the restitution of the *status quo ante* frontiers is absolutely necessary for a healthy new order in the Danube basin. To make these claims more palatable they usually combine them with the demand for a general European federation. However, the idea of such a federation is so vague and uncertain, whereas the desire for the old frontiers is so strong and passionate, that this plan would not mean more than restoration of the chaotic situation before the World War under the auspices of a second League of Nations or of an impotent "European federation" fighting desperately for a new system of security against humiliated Germany. One cannot see how under such a system the inherent economic and political nationalisms of the various states could be eliminated.

By those envisaging the manifest difficulties of such a solution a second plan is advocated in the form of the restitution of the former Hapsburg monarchy, as the only possible bulwark against the reawakening of the Prussian militarism. The former monarchy plus Bavaria would constitute the surest defence against new German ambitions. The promoters of this plan speak very little of the Hapsburgs but are emphatic in pleading for a democratic federation of the Danubian countries. Of course they assert at the same time that only the Hapsburg monarchy with its prestige of many centuries could accomplish this enormous task. All the conservative influence of the West and especially the Roman Catholic Church would be enthusiastic supporters of this "Danubian Federation" and they hope that such a Catholic Union with a small sprinkling of Protestantism and of the Greek Oriental religion (they would be magnanimous enough to give complete "independence" to Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece) would give a solid moral and political unity to this anti-German coalition.

It cannot be doubted that a federation under Hapsburg leadership could not guarantee peace in Danubia. None of the nations in question would accept voluntarily the restoration of the Hapsburgs. The majority of the Hungarian peasantry and middle class have not forgotten the tragic fight of Louis Kossuth against Hapsburg absolutism and his dethronization of the Hapsburgs is still a living symbol in the country which year by year pays homage to the thirteen revolutionary generals cruelly executed by Francis Joseph at Arad. This feeling was widespread not only among rebels and radicals. The great conservative statesman, a strong opponent of Kossuth, Count Stephen Széchenyi, called the gallows in his diary "the pillars of Francis Joseph."

The attitude of the other nationality groups would be no more friendly toward the Hapsburgs. The Yugoslav tribes regarded the dynasty as the chief obstacle to their unification, and the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which gave the spark to the first World War, has not become a factor of reconciliation between the Hapsburgs and the Southern Slavs. The hatred of the Czechs and of the Western Slovaks toward the destroyers of Czech independence is generally known. The Rumanians bitterly remember that their leaders in their fight of emancipation, instigated against the Magyars by Vienna, were later cynically abandoned by the Hapsburgs. And all the progressives in the monarchy felt with A. Fischhof, one of the Austrian leaders of 1848, that the Bach system of Hapsburg absolutism was "a standing army of soldiers, a sitting army of bureaucrats, a kneeling army of priests, and a creeping army of denunciators."

Above all, the system of feudalism which was one of the chief causes of the disintegration of the former monarchy was a creation of the Hapsburgs to the detriment of the native peasantry. The only element in the planned federation which would sincerely welcome the return of the Hapsburgs would be the lay and ecclesiastical magnates, with their enormous *latifundia* poisoning the life and the morals of the landless millions of the peasantry, and the few remnants of the imperial army and bureaucracy. Feudalism, clericalism, and bureauracy would try to regain the political and moral hegemony which they enjoyed in the old monarchy.

With such forces in operation the new "federation" would return to a kind of Dualism under the domination of the German and Magyar upper classes—manifestly an impossible political and social structure after the experiences of two decades during which all the nations concerned built up their own nation-states, and during which the Austrian, the Czech, and for a brief period the Hungarian proletariat became a leading element in their states until they were crushed by the forces of international Fascism. The proletariat of the former monarchy has a keen remembrance of the fact that the bloody régime of Dollfuss and his clerical corporative system found a warm protector in Archduke Otto and it was the Dollfuss system which began a widely spread propaganda for the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria.[1]

Who would believe that the new social forces would tolerate a régime which already before the World War was repudiated by the more advanced nationality groups of the monarchy? And who would seriously believe that something like a genuine federal structure could be created without the liquidation of the feudal system in the various countries, particularly in Hungary? Who could imagine that the Hapsburgs would destroy intentionally a system which would be the only genuine supporter of their restoration? It is also evident that only Germany utterly dismembered and dominated by foreign forces of occupation would suffer such an artificial construction in a time when German national consciousness has reached its climax.

IV

Just the opposite is the conception of the third plan which, since the time of A. Fischhof, Palacký, and Kossuth, has always been in the mind of liberal and progressive intellectuals: to build up a democratic federal structure among those small nations which are incapable of true independence between the millstones of German and Russian imperialism. However, the prerequisite of such a plan would be a genuine Bill of Rights, complete national autonomy for all the minority groups inside of the various states, the final elimination of the feudal estates, and the creation of a progressive and cooperative peasantry which alone could eliminate the problem of over-population and slow starvation.

This is a really gigantic task which most people will regard as purely utopian. After long centuries of mutual distrust and enmity under which the nations of the Danube and the Balkans have lived, who would give guidance and support to the popular forces which are mostly inexperienced in democracy, under feudal, military, or plutocratic yokes? Yet this problem must be solved if we wish to put an end to Danubian anarchy, and if we wish to build up a real bulwark against new imperialistic aggressions.

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[1] See my article on "Neglected Aspects of the Danubian Drama" in *The Slavonic and East European Review,* London, July, 1935.

Therefore it is evident that such a new order could function only under the protection of the leading democratic powers which in their own interest and from the point of view of a genuine humanitarianism would give disinterested help to these small peoples. Only the leading democratic nations could give, in the difficult transitory period, military protection to the Danubian Federation which would be menaced by the continuous intrigues of the defeated imperialistic powers. And only these democratic powers could lend capital and expert knowledge for the economic and above all for the agricultural reconstruction of the backward countries.

Here, however, we face a new difficulty. A purely European federal structure, without the participation of the United States, would be unable to accomplish this fundamental historical task. It would be unable to do so because the strong feudal and conservative influences of England, the leading state of such a federation, would very soon counterbalance the influence of English liberals and laborites. Post-war experiences have fully demonstrated that the Runciman type of statesmanship is not an isolated page in English diplomatic history. Furthermore, England after her exhausting struggle could hardly possess the spirit of objectivity and impartiality which would be absolutely necessary for the work of reconstruction. Very soon the English Tories would become the main supporters of conservative and reactionary interests, the more so as a new wave of Bolshevik propaganda in Europe would seem to be then unavoidable. Finally, Western European democracies, thoroughly exhausted by the catastrophies of the war, in a state of latent famine amidst their ruins, could not have either the spirit, the capital or the technical experts for the main task of a Danubian reconstruction.

These considerations lead us to the conclusion that an exclusively European federal structure would have neither the spirit nor the power to appear as a real force in saving our civilization. The argument of Clarence K. Streit seems irrefutable: that in the nucleus of the future world order a decisive hegemony of the United States would be imperative because only she has a great traditional experience in federalism, only she would be sufficiently detached from the old diplomatic and imperialistic game, only she would have the necessary capital and will to organize the economic forces of Danubia.

However, a Danubian federation under the protection and leadership of a democratic world union (of which it would become a full-fledged member after the democratic spirit and the economic reconstruction have achieved their ends, as we can reasonably hope, during the lifetime of one single generation) could not solve the problem of a permanent peace. The great question will still remain: What should be done with Germany after her defeat and military humiliation? Will the tragedy not repeat itself and will not the Prussian spirit of conquest reassert itself, plunging the world into a new catastrophe? *Without the whole-hearted cooperation of Germany the whole problem is in the long run insoluble* due to the enormous economic and technical preponderance of Germany in Central Europe. The disregard of this central fact was one of the chief causes of the failure of the peace treaties of 1919 and 1920. As a matter of fact the victory of the post-war economic nationalism was the more startling as the achievements of the economic unification before the World War were already of an imposing magnitude:

> "The interference of frontiers and tariffs," wrote Professor Keynes in his prophetic book on *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920), "was reduced to a minimum, and not far short of three hundred millions of people lived within the three empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The various currencies, which were all maintained on a stable basis in relation to gold and to one another, facilitated the easy flow of capital and of trade to an extent the full value of which we only realize now when we are deprived of its advantage. Over this great area there was an almost absolute security of property and of person."

This tendency towards economic unification far transcended national frontiers and the leading role of Germany (though of course she had "no place under the sun!") was overwhelming.

> "Germany was the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; she was the second best customer of Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark; and the third best customer of France. She was the largest source of supply to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium and France."

The cooperation of such a gigantic economic power must naturally continuously grow in Central Europe should normality of conditions be achieved.

This question must be answered without hatred or false sentimentalism. Both those who favor and support an outright punitive expedition against Germany and those who advocate a naïve humanitarianism following the slogan, "Feed them well and treat them decently and all will be peacefully settled," are hopeless utopians. One should not forget that Hitler and Nazism are not simply consequences of the injustices of the peace treaties, but that they are, as Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster has often and forcefully demonstrated,[2] the continuation of the spirit, the ethics, and the tactics of a long Prussian evolution. Hitler is the real executor of the will of Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and of Kaiser Wilhelm II. This spirit has been not only the spirit of the army and of the bureaucracy but it has permeated all Prussian society and later the greater part of the German people. Nationalistic aggression has had a leadership consisting of many million people, beginning with the generals and high officials and extending down to the small bourgeoisie and intellectuals. In order to get rid of this spirit even a military occupation of Germany for two generations would not suffice. Of course, it would be inevitable that the Democratic Federal Union would make it clear that any recurrence of Prussian militarism would not be tolerated, and an overwhelming military power would be established which would immediately crush all open or secret endeavors to restore the Prussian military machine. It would also be a false sentimentalism to deny the necessity that the most outstanding general staff of the Nazi system must be put on a carefully selected list and that the participation of such men in the new Germany should not be tolerated. Those who have committed criminal actions should be punished and even if necessary their own concentration camps must be continued against the fanatics of the former system, of course not in the spirit of abject Nazi brutality, but as a kind of *custodia dura,* but *honesta,* making it impossible for them to again raise their heads until the necessary reforms are carried out.

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[2] Recently in his *Europe and the German Question,* New York, 1940.

However this would not be a real solution to the problem of a durable European peace. I speak intentionally only of a German danger because one can take it for granted that a new régime in Italy would become, even purely from the point of view of egotistic Italian interest, an ardent supporter of a Danubian Federation. It is also highly probable that Russia will be so busy with her economic and social reconstruction and the digestion of a part of her booty which the new world order would be compelled to acknowledge that she would have no possibilities or even the will to attack the West, except with propaganda, against which the only real remedy would be the new economic and political system.

V

Until the nature of the German dilemma is clarified there is no possibility of finding an adequate solution of this problem without which a third world war would become inevitable. There is only one man in German political literature who has offered a thorough-going historical and sociological analysis in explanation of the particularity of the German evolution. This man was Constantin Frantz, the great political and philosophic opponent of Fürst von Bismarck.

After the constitution of the Reich of Bismarck, Constantin Frantz was of the opinion that the creative work of the Prussian statesman was a failure which could have only a transitory importance:

> ". . . out of the barracks of Berlin originated the New Reich. Instead of constituting the last bulwark of the European peace, it has become the foundation stone of the European war system. . . Of course we have acquired that glory through the fact that all the peoples study our military institutions and Krupp has become an international firm. Were this the world mission of Germany happily we would be at our goal. If, on the contrary, the German world mission is to be the base of a European federation, we are now driven into a course of action which will bring us farther and farther from such a goal. . . . The tyrannical maxim, *oderint dum metuant,* could one day give rise to a great coalition against the new Reich—it could never acquire one single true friend . . ."[3]

In a series of important works Constantin Frantz expressed the opinion that Bismarck misunderstood the essence and the possibilities of German evolution when he tried to imitate the strongly centralized and militarized nation-states of the West. Frantz was convinced that the German task was quite a different one. As German unification came late at a time when the many small nations surrounding Germany had already achieved their full national consciousness, and when Germany could not take a role in colonial imperalism, the very existence of a prosperous Germany was inseparably connected with a hearty cooperation with the surrounding non-German peoples. The right interpretation of German history points in the same direction. *The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation* was not a senseless chimera, as some shortsighted historians affirm, but it expressed the only natural and rational tendency of the German future: to become the focus in a Central European Federation and ultimately the nucleus of a European Federation. It is manifest that Germany as an old type nation-state could not accomplish this mission because every step towards economic and cultural expansion would lead it into conflict with the growing nationalism of the smaller states, though such a peaceful expansion would be of the utmost benefit to the surrounding small states. But it is in the very nature of the Western nation-state that every expansion will assume a militaristic and imperialistic color, making a fruitful and peaceful exchange of goods and ideas impossible.

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[3] Quoted by Foerster, *Europa und die Deutsche Frage,* (2 ed. Luzern, 1937), pp. 85-86. The German original of this book and its recent English translation are not identical. The German version contains more material.

With prophetic eyes Constantin Frantz predicted that the nation-state type of sovereignty will come to an end or destroy our civilization. The present nation-state European society must yield to a federal structure, and to create an international cooperation of such a type would be the mission of Germany because of her late entrance into European civilization, because of her geographic position, and because of the efficiency of her civilization which for centuries constituted the point of radiation for the adjacent Danubian and Balkan peoples. This mission in its very nature cannot be realized by means of the usual *Machtpolitik,* but only by means of spontaneous federal cooperation in which the peaceful growth of all national cultures would be guaranteed.

With an astonishing clarity of vision he foretold all the dangers of the excess of the nationality principle when its beneficial forces are not regulated by an adequate federal structure:

> "A glance at the map shows that to make the nationality principle the norm of state formation would mean a general upheaval and in spite of it a strict national demarcation of frontiers should remain in most cases an impossibility. I go even further: it must even be recognized as desirable that political and ethnological frontiers should not coincide in many cases. . . Of course a reasonable polity must take the nationalities into account as far as possible, but also the nationalities must understand that they do not exist alone in the world and that their most important aims of existence are determined only to a small extent by their nationality—nay, that their aims point decidedly beyond it. Or would the Swiss citizens of the Romance languages feel themselves better off if they were to belong to France or Italy? This may be the opinion of France and Italy but the Swiss citizens cannot be persuaded of this."[4]

Therefore the Germany of the future has only the alternative of becoming either the nation of "international reformation" (as she used in the past to be the beginner of the church reformation) assuming the initiative in the field of federalism, or of becoming a dreaded and hated militaristic nation-state for the subjugation of the surrounding weaker national units. Constantin Frantz reproached Bismarck with having made an erroneous start in expelling millions and millions of German co-nationals from the old Reich, and assuming a hostile attitude towards the surrounding national groups. So strong was Constantin Frantz's conviction of the impossibility and the final danger of the Bismarckian conception that already in 1875 he published a *Manifesto for the Foundation of a Federative Party* which would have combatted militarism, centralization, finance capitalism, and materialism.[5]

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[4] *Die Weltpolitik, unter besondere Bezugnahme auf Deutschland,* Chemnitz 1882, Part I, p. 153.

Though the result of this manifesto was a complete failure, Constantin Frantz never abandoned his conception. Viewing it in the light of the experiences of three generations, one feels that there was a considerable amount of truth in the argument of the prophet in spite of the fact that his criticism against the work of Bismarck was unrealistic. Witnessing the enormous difficulties in the creation of a federal structure even now in the middle of the twentieth century, the accusation against the iron chancellor that he did not create a universal federation with imperial Austria and the many dozens of German antiquated minuscule states, was unhistorical. Nevertheless his argument proved to be valid. The German "barracks state" has become increasingly a force of military expansion due to the fact that the federation created by Bismarck was not a true federation but the oligarchic rule of Prussian militarism, bureaucracy, and of the *Staatsraison* à la Hegel.

It is also evident that no *Machtpolitik* of the victorious democracies would be able in the long run to exclude Germany from her natural leading role in Central European cooperation. *The burning problems of the Danube and of the Balkans cannot be solved without the cooperation of an enlightened and friendly*

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[5] For the details of this plan see *Weltpolitik,* Part III, p. 201 ff.

Germany. But is there a possibility of replacing the Reich of Bismarck and the super-Reich of Adolf Hitler with a type of federation which Constantin Frantz had in mind? All those who answer this question in the negative assert, whether they know it or not, that the present system of power politics (that is, the continuation of the European war) is inevitable.

Those who maintain the possibility of such a solution must combine the idealism of Frantz with a much sterner realism and must say that after the hoped-for victory of the democracies, the following principles should be accepted and effectuated in accordance with our previous analysis:

(1) The establishment of the nucleus of a democratic federal union sufficiently strong to crush any tendencies of a renewed German militarism.

(2) The creation of a Danubian and Balkan federation (possibly two separate federations) under the leadership of the federal union of the victorious powers which would carry out with unhesitating energy the process of political democratization, the expropriation of the feudal classes, and the creation of a modern cooperative peasant economy.

(3) The building of a truly democratic German federation with the preclusion of the artificial superiority of the Prussian structure by the expropriation of the East Elbian estates, and by reforming the Weimar federal structure through the elimination of its centralizing tendencies, and by creating as many autonomous units as are necessary for the elimination of Prussian supremacy. Something in this line was tried by the Weimar Republic, but its unfortunate centralizing tendencies ultimately frustrated the very idea. Prussian militarism and Marxian Socialism worked as unintentional allies against the decentralization of the state and the building up of a new German spirit. Those better acquainted with German historical evolution and traditional cultural background than this writer could surely construct a scheme in which Prussia would not enter the federation as a single centralized state, but would be divided into several

independent units which could be reasonably assumed not to follow the Prussian spirit.

Some of my readers will object that I seem to advise here the method of Hitler in demolishing Czechoslovak and Yugoslav unity by the creation of artificial smaller units like Slovakia or Croatia. To which my answer is this: I advise just the opposite—the creation of a true Federal Union in which all the historical parts of Germany could freely assert their local opinion without sacrificing the national unity of the whole. If for instance, the Rhineland, only superficially Prussianized, should form a state in the German Union, it would not impair the growth of the German nation; on the contrary, it would contribute to its cultural and economic wealth. Under this hypothesis the future of Austria could be decided by a free plebiscite as to whether she wished to enter into the German Federation or into the Danubian Federation.

(4) It must be made clear that all these measures are not intended to isolate or weaken Germany, but that her economic and cultural cooperation with the Danubian Federation and other countries should be encouraged in the spirit of free trade. And the German people should be convinced that restoring peace and democracy in Germany along with a full Bill of Rights, not only on paper, but in reality, would result in the German Federation becoming an integral and equal member of the general Democratic Union.

(5) This Union must regard as its main duty the inculcation of the spirit of national toleration by examples and even if necessary by the coercive action of a Federal Tribunal in those countries in which the poisoned atmosphere of the past has created hatred and tension. As it was stated in a memorandum of a group of Germans, Italians, Hungarians, and Jugoslavs:

> "It is obvious that any lasting settlement, even one based on federal principle, requires *a complete change of mentality,* especially among the nations of the historical trouble zone of Europe. The people of this area must be brought to realize that

their future depends upon the acceptance and fullest application of the following fundamental principles:

> All individuals and nationalities must be freed from the tyranny of the totalitarian states; nationality, like religion, should be recognized as a matter of individual conscience and fully respected as such; all boastfulness or slander of one national group against another should be regarded as an act of moral depravity; any attempt at de-nationalization of a people should be condemned as a kind of neo-cannibalism; the very idea of ruling and second rank nations should be discarded as the notion of a narrow-minded oligarchy; the social and economic foundation for higher spiritual freedom must be established; and any plan for a future federalism must be tested against the criterion of whether or not it really guarantees the freedom and self-development of all the peoples involved.

"We, Germans, Italians, Slavs, Hungarians, and Rumanians by nationality or origin have had the inspiring experience that our common stand for cultural, political and moral values unites us infinitely more than difference in language, race, or nationality can ever divide us. In fact, those differences have only served as an additional incentive for common constructive work. On the basis of this experience we feel all the more the obligation to do everything in our power, directly or indirectly, to promote the idea of a democratic federalism as the only possible basis for the preservation of humanity and culture in Europe. . . . *Racial and national tolerance* is the demand of our times."[6]

(6) The sheer enumeration of the main necessities for the creation of a new life and order in Danubia will show its enormous difficulties. Yet the greatest among them has not even been mentioned. The success or the failure of this plan depends upon the possibility that the new democratic federal structure can really produce a sufficient number of enlightened and energetic

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[6] This manifesto, which was the common work of men of different national groups as above mentioned, citizens or future citizens of this country, has found in principle a very favorable reception by many members of their respective nationalities. However the document was never published because of the fact that a concentrated action in minor details was until now impossible between men living in different parts of the U. S. and lacking the means of a central organization.

men, different from the old diplomatic and bureaucratic staff of Europe, who would devote themselves to the task in the spirit of an apostolate, free from narrow class and national interests. It is manifest that the Nazi system and spirit could only be overcome by a new system and spirit which could rival it in faith, conviction and determination. Pure bureaucrats or diplomats of the traditional school cannot even understand the goal.

If one realizes all these difficulties of the task before us, he cannot wonder that most people will regard the plan developed on these pages as hopelessly utopian. It may be so. But a last sincere and resolute effort is the demand of the hour. We live in a period when only a "utopian" exertion of mental and moral energy can help. It should not be forgotten that Hitler is very near to realizing his own utopia with all the ruthlessness of his imperialistic will and his uncanny imagination.

He has restored the unity of Europe which has been lost since the downfall of the Roman Empire. Of course this unity by now is purely militaristic, mechanical, immoral, and is carried out by mechanized armies and fifth columns and all the paraphernalia of the philosophy of Machiavelli and Hegel. Those who despise and ridicule the unity achieved by the German conquest are right. Yet there is no reason to believe that this unity must necessarily remain of this character. Enormous new forces may come into operation after the demolition of antiquated frontiers, tariff barriers, and local patriotisms. These new forces can result in the negation of the whole Nazi philosophy and ethics. Out of the despotism of Louis XIV grew the French Revolution and nineteenth century liberalism, and Russian Czarism prepared the way for Bolshevism.

We have every reason to hate Nazism both in its aims and means, and to regard a possible German peace as the greatest tragedy of mankind. Yet the brutalities and demoniacal cunning of the Nazis have made the rigid structure of national sovereignties fluid. After the war a new start must be made in order to continue the life of the world. The air is full of unheard-of possibilities for economic and political reforms. A second French

Revolution may come on an enormous scale. Or the old theory and practice of the tyrannicides may return and open the road to a new era.

The revolutionary trend of Nazism is inevitable. Therefore if Western democracies cannot produce anything else than the restoration of the old frontiers, new custom barriers, new restrictions of a bureaucratic "planned economy" (to the delight of bashful Marxists), and the reconstruction of the diplomatic and professional impotence of a new League of Nations, it is evident that such a reactionary utopia will not solve anything and that the "World Spirit" will march again towards a new Hitler.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN JUGOSLAVIA

by Dinko Tomašić

I

THE main difficulties with which Jugoslavia had to cope throughout the years of its existence arose primarily out of the lack of a unifying ideology and a unifying political party. There was an ideology which was responsible for the formation of Jugoslavia as a Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes but its unifying power failed. It was the "Jugoslav Idea," formulated by the Croatian intelligentsia in the revolutionary days of 1848 and later, particularly during the course of the World War of 1914-1918.

The Croatians formulated this ideology because they never succeeded in uniting all Croatian regions under one administration within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Their internal autonomy in the Hungarian part of the Empire was limited only to a part of the Croatian lands and was constantly infringed upon by Magyars.[1] The Croatians devised the "Jugoslav Idea" as a means of emancipating themselves from the Austro-Hungarian rulers. In accordance with this ideology all South Slavs, including Croatians, Serbs, Slovenes and Bulgarians, should unite into one Federal Union in order to protect themselves against the pressure of the German "Drang nach Osten."

In the beginning of the World War of 1914-1918 there was formed a "Jugoslav Committee" composed of the outstanding Croatian, Serb, and Slovene political emigrés from Austria-Hungary. This committee established close relations with the government of Serbia which had already emigrated. The result of this collaboration between the Jugoslav Committee and the Serbian government was the Corfu Declaration of 1917. This Declaration emanated from the "Jugoslav Idea" and provided for the establishment of a common state of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes, to be founded on the principles of democratic parliamentarism and forbidding the dominance of any one of these national groups over the others. This is, in essence, how the kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes was formed in 1918. However, in the course of the first few years of the common life of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes in one state, the "Jugoslav Idea" was discredited as a unifying ideology because it was perverted by the ruling group of Serbia into a means of keeping the power concentrated exclusively in its own hands. The Croatians, Slovenes and even the Serbs of former Austria-Hungary felt that they did not get the share in power which they might have had if the principle of equality of the three peoples had been carried out.

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[1] Croatia as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had its own House of Representatives, and was autonomous in the fields of education, religion, justice, and "internal administration."

Once this unifying ideology failed, the Democratic Party, which was its main champion, quickly disintegrated and split into the two groups of which it was originally composed: one from Serbia and one from the regions which formerly were a part of Austria-Hungary. The group from Serbia retained its old name, the Democratic Party, and the other faction became known as the Independent Democratic Party. The Independent Democratic Party, however, refused to give up the "Jugoslav Idea," but its strength as a unifying party greatly diminished because its Croatian and Slovene adherents gradually dropped out. The Croatians and Slovenes who were discouraged because of the failure of the "Jugoslav Idea" joined those political parties which emphasized separate Croatian and Slovene national programs. As a protest against what they thought to be an unfair deal on the part of the Serbian ruling group, the Croatians for about fifteen years refused to take part in the Belgrade parliament and in the government. Such a situation left the Serbian parties in full control of the State. The Slovene parties supported the Serbian parties in power, but accepted a secondary role.

Dissatisfaction with the rule of the Serbian parties was rapidly growing in Croatian regions. Practically all Croatian classes, groups and factions joined the Croatian Peasant Party, which became the protagonist in the fight against the Belgrade régime and the sponsor of the reorganization of the State in the form of a federation.[2]

II

The Croatian Peasant Party was founded in 1905 by a few Croatian intellectuals and peasants. Antun Radić who formulated its ideology was trained in the social sciences and especially in ethnology. He had made a thorough study of the native culture, institutions, and philosophy of life of the Croatian and other Slav peasants in the Balkans. Radić's idea was that in a country mainly composed of peasants these should acquire the decisive, if not exclusive, influence on vital questions which concerned the life of the community. If peasants could be organized and educated politically, he believed they could easily take the power from the lawyers, priests, bureaucrats, and remnants of the former nobility who controlled Croatia in those days.

According to Antun Radić, once the peasantry was in power it would bring significant changes in the existing attitudes and views of life which were being forced upon it by a ruling group completely absorbed by Western Civilization and far removed from the people. This foreign civilization overemphasized the material and the technological side of life at the expense of all human values. Radić believed that the dignity of man suffers most in this civilization because man is no longer regarded as a human being. This is due to the great stress placed upon the outward and superficial, impersonal and mechanical way of living characteristic of Western Civilization. He maintained that a change in these attitudes will take place once the peasantry is enabled to contribute its share to a new social order. Radić firmly believed in a pacifistic world community which would guarantee the rights of man as man, regardless of his class, creed, race or nationality, a world that would make it possible for all peoples to fulfill their creative functions in peace and to collaborate in building a better and more humane society.[3]

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[2] Dinko Tomašić, "Peasants and Propaganda in Croatia," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, July, 1937.

These ideas appealed to Croatian peasants mainly for two reasons. First, the dignity and the self-respect of the peasant was strengthened by the role assigned to the peasantry in the world which was to come. Second, Croatia, as a part of Austria-Hungary, was numerically and economically dominated by aliens far stronger than Croatia could ever hope to be; there was, therefore, no hope for freedom and emancipation from an alien rule unless the whole world was organized on a new basis.

In his writings Antun Radić also emphasized the fact that Croatians were a branch of a great Slav tree. His ideal was a world based on the brotherhood of man and permeated with a sense of humanity, and he believed that it was characteristic of the Slavs and all peasant peoples to live in accordance with this ideal. In the writings of the Russians like Tolstoi, Dostojevski and others, he found evidence of his convictions. These ideas appealed equally to Serb and Slovene peasants. Such an ideology could thus easily have become the foundation for Jugoslav unity, if it had not been resisted by the Serbian ruling group which saw in the Croatian Peasant Party the main threat to its unlimited power.

Radić's ideas did not remain latent. A long period of propaganda, organizational and educational work of more than thirty years when Croatia was part of Austria-Hungary and, later, Jugoslavia, finally bore fruit. The considerable lack of social and economic differentiation in Croatia's villages helped to form in each village a nucleus of politically conscious and energetic peasants who knew "what was what" and who led the rest of the village peasants in all political and cultural activities.

Such a stable political organization spread throughout the Croatian villages and gradually broke the resistance of the Catholic clergy and of the bourgeois parties. The success of the Peasant Party was remarkable. From 3 deputies elected to the Croatian

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[3] A Bonifačić, "Antoine et Etienne Radić," *Le Monde Slave,* Mars 1938 (Paris.) P. Preradović. *Die Kroaten and Ihre Bauernbewegung.* (Wien 1940). Dinko Tomašić, "The Sociological Thought of Antun Radić," *World Peace,* (Zagreb 1940). Dinko Tomašić, "Sociology in Yugoslavia," *The American Journal of Sociology,* (July 1941).

Sabor (the House of Representatives) in 1906 it swelled to 70 deputies elected to the Belgrade Skupština (Parliament) in 1924. By 1933 almost 90% of the voters in the Croatian regions openly registered their votes for the Croatian Peasant Party in spite of the tremendous pressure employed against it by the Belgrade régime. Of course such an unusual success could not be achieved by the Croatian Peasant Party alone. It was helped by the general political conditions within Jugoslavia which favored such a development.

III

As soon as Jugoslavia was established in 1918, Aleksander Karagjorgjević, as a regent for his father King Peter, who was still alive, took control of the affairs of the State. It seems that Aleksander's idea was to eliminate from any influence on state affairs all strong personalities with a national reputation so that his personal rule might be undisturbed. This was not easy because the political parties in Serbia and the political parties in Croatia were led by people of great prestige and long political records. Aleksander tried to break the parties from within by playing the leaders against each other. His first attack was directed against the Serb Radical Party. This was the party in power led by Nikola Pašić, veteran political leader in Serbia, who had helped the Karagjorgjevićs to take the throne and who successfully led Serbia on the side of the Allies in the course of the World War of 1914-1918. Because of the great authority Nikola Pašić enjoyed in the Serb Radical Party, Aleksander was not successful in his attempt to disintegrate it while Pašić was still alive. But after the death of Pašić, a few outstanding people in the party were competing for leadership and the task of Aleksander was much easier. He simply would pick out one among them, whom he considered the most manageable, entrusting him with the premiership, and thus impose him on the Serb Radical Party as its leader. In spite of the recurrent political crises and changes in the government, Aleksander was able to name the man he wanted as premier in a number of different cabinets.

The reaction among all the political personalities who had any following among the people was strongly against such a tendency to break down free political life in Jugoslavia and to destroy even the remnants of the parliamentary régime. In the meantime the Croatian Peasant Party had decided to take a more active part in the political life of Jugoslavia and had sent its deputies to the Belgrade Parliament. As a reaction against Aleksander's despotic tendencies, a common political opposition bloc was formed between the Croatian Peasant Party and the Independent Democratic Party, and was called the Peasant Democratic Coalition. This bloc was joined by the Democratic Party and supported also by the Serb Agrarian Party. The Democratic and the Serb Agrarian Parties were opposition parties in Serbia, while the Serb Radical Party was the one in power. All of the opposition parties combined to form a majority in the Belgrade Parliament. According to all parliamentary rules, such a coalition of the opposition parties should have been called in by the king to form the government. Instead, King Aleksander openly told Ljubomir Davidović, the chief of the Democratic Party, that "such a coalition will never be allowed to take the power," and persuaded him to break with the Peasant Democratic Coalition and join the Serb Radical Party to form a new government. This was because King Aleksander feared the great authority enjoyed by Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party and because he did not care to deal with the unpliable character of Svetozar Pribičević, the leader of the Independent Democratic Party.

The Peasant Democratic Coalition reacted to such a trend of affairs by means of parliamentary obstruction. The mutual accusations and recriminations between the two political groups came to a climax when a member of the Serb Radical Party, Puniša Račić, shot to death, in the midst of a parliamentary session, some leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party. Stjepan Radić, the president of the party, was fatally wounded and died a few months later. Some people who knew Aleksander intimately believe that this was exactly what Aleksander wanted; that is, he wanted to have the internal situation become so disorganized and "menacing to the integrity of the state" that he would have a good excuse to formally proclaim his personal rule. They say that he was also systematically and purposefully eliminating from political life all strong personalities.[4] That is, in fact, what he achieved. After a few formal talks with the leaders of the opposition, he abolished the parliamentary régime, suppressed freedom of speech and other civil liberties, and decreed the dissolution of all the political parties which did not willingly accept his dictatorship. Radić was dead. Dr. Maček, who succeeded him in the leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party and some other Croatian Peasant Party leaders, were sent to prison. Svetozar Pribičević was interned in a village where he became ill. He was then forced to leave the country and died as a political emigré.

A reign of terror followed the establishment of Aleksander's dictatorial régime. In the name of "Jugoslav unity" many political trials were staged. Aleksander organized a special court for the "Defense of the Realm" to deal with these cases. Political leaders and youths were sentenced to death and imprisoned. In the villages the gendarmes applied the law by killing, beating and mistreating the peasants.[5]

All these events encouraged two extremist ideologies to take hold of the masses and to endanger the existence of the state. These two threatening and mutually exclusive political philosophies were represented by the theory of the "Great Serbia" on the one hand, and by the idea of the "Independent Croatia" on the other.

IV

The idea of a "Great Serbia" was the expression of Serb imperialism. Its origin lay in the foundation of the Serb state at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This state was born out of an uprising against Turkish domination, and ever since that time it displayed a tendency to take the former place of Turkey in the Balkans. A few successful wars against the Turks helped Serbia to expand territorially and to arouse the hope of the South Slavs under Austro-Hungarian rule that the day of their liberation was drawing near. Because Serbia was on the side of the Allies during the World War of 1914-1918 while Croatia was a part of Austria-Hungary, Serbia was enabled to take the leading part in the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes. However, after the formation of the new kingdom the ruling group of Serbia was unable to change its ideology to meet the new situation; instead, it ruled the country as a kind of extended Serbia[6] and as if it were composed primarily of Serbians. The cultural and political aspirations and the economic interests of the Croatians and of the Slovenes were often disregarded. The rulers often ignored even the economic and political interests of the Serbs outside of Serbia proper. All key positions in the state administration, in the army and in diplomacy were in the hands of the ruling class of Serbia; the taxes were unequally distributed, bearing heavily on Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina;[7] the construction of the railroads and other means of communications, the opening of the mines, the building of state-owned factories, the organization of the hypotary and agrarian credit banks controlled by the state—all these works in the public construction program were planned primarily to benefit Serbia.[8] Everything was strongly centralized in the hands of the ruling group at Belgrade. The former autonomies enjoyed by the provinces under the Austro-Hungarian administration were abolished, so that not only the economic and political life, but also the cultural life in all the provinces were rigidly controlled from Belgrade by a handful of Serbian politicians. This was all in the name of the "Jugoslav unity," but in fact it was done in order to strengthen the control of those in power and to enable them to derive the exclusive benefit of their power. This trend was emphasized during the dictatorial régimes because of the lack of public control and criticism, due, in turn, to the suppression of civil liberties. It is easy to see how such a policy could provoke certain political tendencies to develop in the opposite direction.

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[4] See Svetozar Pribičević's own account of his personal experience with King Aleksander described in his book: *La Dictature du Roi Aleksandre,* (Paris, 1933).

[5] According to some estimates, in the few years of Alexander's dictatorship, about 60 persons were sentenced to death, about 200 were killed in prison or died in clashes with gendarmes, and about 20,000 were sentenced to prison exclusively for political reasons.

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[6] Dinko Tomašić, "Constitutional Changes in Jugoslavia," *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1940. See also Dinko Tomašić, "Sociology in Jugoslavia," *op. cit.*

[7] The part of Jugoslavia which formally belonged to Hungary.

[8] R. Bićanić, *Ekonomska Podloga Hrvatskoga Pitanja* (Zagreb, 1939).

A great many Croatians accepted the emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian rule and the formation of the kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes with great enthusiasm, believing sincerely in the promises of absolute equality as far as sharing power was concerned. The disappointment which followed when the trend of affairs took on a different aspect strengthened the cause of those who sponsored the idea of a separate and independent Croatia.

Croatian nationalism was ideologically formulated in the course of the second part of the nineteenth century. It was a reaction both against the Austro-Hungarian domination and against the awakening Serb nationalism which threatened the integrity of the Croatian lands. The ideology of Croatian nationalism was first formulated by Antun Starčević, a Croatian intellectual born in Lika, a part of Croatia in which the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic populations are approximately equal in number. The religious antagonism in this part of Croatia took the form of a sharp national antagonism—when the Eastern Orthodox accepted the ideology of Serb nationalism and the Roman Catholics took the ideology of Croatian nationalism. These religious and national conflicts in the Dinaric regions took the uncomprising form of the former clan hatreds and blood feuds.[9]

Antun Starčević, a liberal, based his ideology of Croatian nationalism mainly on the ideas of the French Revolution,[10] believing not only in national but also in religious and cultural freedom and in the humanitarian principles of personal relationships. His party was called the Party of Rights, and it propagated the idea of complete emancipation of Croatia from Austro-Hungarian rule based on the historical rights of Croatia. But because this party had its origin in religious differences, the parish priests and the conservative middle classes soon took the upper hand, emphasizing more and more the party's anti-Serb character. When the tension between Austria and Serbia developed after the advent of the Karagjorgjević dynasty to the throne of Serbia and especially during the Balkan wars and the World War, this party became definitely pro-Austrian.

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[9] Regarding the cultural background of the Serbo-Croatian controversy see my discussion in the articles in the *Political Science Quarterly* and in the *American Journal of Sociology,* cited above.

[10] Dinko Tomašić, "Les Idées de la Révolution Française et le Développement Politique Croate," *L'Eveil des Peuples,* (Paris, 1939).

Antun Starčević had long been dead, and the leadership of the Party of Rights was entrusted to the hands of Dr. J. Frank, a Zagreb lawyer. Many liberal people left the party and Frank's faction became known as "Frankovci" (Frankists), the name which in Croatia became the symbol for everything that was most reactionary in political, economic and cultural life. When the World War was over and Croatia broke its ties with Austria-Hungary in order to join a common state with the Serbs and Slovenes, the "Frankovci" disbanded. But as soon as trouble was first experienced by the Croatians at the hands of the Serbian rulers in the new state, the old hatreds came to the fore and "Frankovci" became active once again. By now Dr. Frank was no longer alive, and the outstanding figure in the "Frankovci" group became another Zagreb lawyer, also from Lika, Dr. Ante Pavelić. This group, however, never became numerically strong and it recruited its members from among the small merchants, artisans and middle class youths in a few Croatian towns, particularly Zagreb. A small number of parish priests and some village "kulaks" in the Dinaric regions of Croatia also supported this party, but it failed to gain any mass following mainly because in the meantime the Croatian Peasant Party, which was backed by the peasantry, lower income strata in the towns, and intelligentsia, succeeded in taking control of all political life in Croatian regions.

However, the "iron hand" policy undertaken against Croatians under the dictatorship of King Aleksander favored the growth of Pavelić's followers who sponsored terroristic and underground activities as the only means of fighting the dictatorship and freeing Croatia. A terroristic organization called "Ustaši" (the uprisers) was organized. Pavelić with a group of his collaborators emigrated to Italy and some of the other "Ustaši" emigrated to Hungary, Austria and Germany with the avowed purpose of undermining Jugoslavia's dictatorship by terroristic acts which might eventually lead to the emancipation of Croatia from the rule of Belgrade.

Fascist Italy was always distrustful of Jugoslavia with its growing strength and influence in the Balkans and in world affairs, as a member of the Little Entente and an ally of France. The dismemberment of Jugoslavia was therefore within the scope of Italy's ambitious plans to dominate the Balkans and the Danubian regions. Therefore Mussolini's government gave its full support to Pavelić and his terrorists, a collaboration which revealed its first fruits in the assassination of King Aleksander in 1934 at Marseilles.

Nazi Germany at first refused to collaborate with the Croatian terrorists. Nazi leaders believed in the possibility of winning over Serb leaders by promising them the leadership of the Balkans and the expansion to the Aegean Sea at the expense of Greece. To control the port of Salonica had long been the aim of many imperialistically-minded Serbs. The Nazis found among the Serbs some people who gladly accepted such propositions because they gratified the old Serb dream of a "Great Serbia." It was Premier Stojadinović, an outstanding member of the Serb Radical Party, who was chosen and entrusted with the task. Stojadinović did not wait long to begin the organization of his "Green Shirts" who acknowledged him their "vodja" (Führer).[11] It seems, however, that he made the mistake of becoming too much of a menace to the authority and power of Prince Paul, the Regent who succeeded the late King Aleksander in the name of the King's son Peter II.

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[11] The government of Serbia which was formed after the Nazi invasion of Jugoslavia is composed mainly of followers of Stojadinović and members of a Serb pro-Nazi organization called *Zbor.* All the members of this cabinet were outstanding political personalities in Jugoslavia and had served as ministers in previous Jugoslav cabinets.

Paul, like Aleksander, believed in the old Serb tradition of concentrating the entire power exclusively in the hands of the royal court, sharing it only with a few political leaders of the King's choice. Some people believed that Prince Paul himself was ambitious to usurp the royal crown. He was therefore forced to eliminate Stojadinović as a possible barrier to his ambitions, but this left Prince Paul with no support from any strong Serb group. In fact, Paul, who had spent most of his life outside of Jugoslavia, was disliked by many people in Serbia who believed he was too "westernized," too "pro-Catholic," and that he did not have much in common with the Serb people. Thus, being left without strong support in Serbia, Prince Paul turned to the Croatians for help.

The Croatian Peasant Party led by Dr. Maček was uninformed about his real intentions. But the Croatian Peasant Party gladly accepted his offer of a solution for Serbo-Croatian controversy. Thus an agreement between Croatians and Serbs was achieved, and an autonomous Banovia Croatia established, the Croatians also taking part in the Belgrade government, with Dr. Maček as Vice-Premier. The Croatians, however, were unable to wield any influence in the foreign policy of Jugoslavia or in the army. No diplomatic post was given to the Croatian Peasant Party. Both the army and the diplomatic service were reserved by Prince Paul exclusively for himself and those whom he considered to be loyal to him personally.

V

As far as Serb members of this Serbo-Croatian government were concerned, they formed the majority in the cabinet (10 out of 17 members) and controlled the key posts such as the Premiership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Premier, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and some other key Cabinet members belonged to that group of Serb politicians from the Serb Radical Party who were left from the cabinet of Stojadinović and who believed in cooperating with Nazi Germany in order to expand

Serb domination over the Balkans. The Serb Agrarian Party and the Independent Democratic Party which were definitely anti-German had only one representative each in the Cabinet. Dr. Maček and four other Croatian members of this government were primarily concerned with strengthening Croatia's position within Jugoslavia and in keeping Jugoslavia out of war. The Peasant Party of Croatia had always been a pacifist party, and, in addition, everyone in Croatia was aware that a war against Germany would bring Pavelić and his terrorists into power. Pavelić and his "Frankovci," with the help of the Nazis would suppress the Croatian Peasant Party and persecute its followers. Had it not been for Hitler's insisting that Jugoslavia sign the Tripartite Pact, this policy of neutrality might have succeeded.

The signing of the Tripartite Pact was a chance for the anti-German and anti-Paul factions among Serb military and political circles to overthrow the government by force, knowing that they would have the support of a part of public opinion in their country and of America and Great Britain. The overthrow of the government was hailed also by those Serbian politicians who never acquiesced in the autonomy of Croatia and who, like the late King Aleksander, believed only in a strongly centralized state, dominated exclusively by Serbians from Belgrade. This is why the main concern of Croatians, as a result of this *coup d'état,* was over their autonomy. In the history of Serbia, which has never been ruled democratically, the opposition had often resorted to the *coup d'état* as the only means of gaining power.[12] In a state, therefore, in which the *coup d'état* is a tradition, no autonomy is safe. In fact, there were some members in the revolutionary cabinet who were known to be unfriendly to Croatia's autonomy. These were the only reasons why Peasant Party leaders asked for guarantees before they formally accepted collaboration with the new government, and not because the government was anti-German. The Croatian Peasant Party had always been anti-German and "pan-Slav" in its international orientation. The principal demand of the Croatian Peasant Party leaders was that the King's power be limited in view of the fact that it was just this unlimited power of the king in Serbia and Jugoslavia which provoked internal disorders and constantly threatened the stability and integrity of the state.

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[12] Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovica,* Vol. 2, (Belgrade, 1931).

The war was inevitable as soon as the pro-Hitler Serbian group was no longer in power in Jugoslavia, and Hitler took his other choice of keeping his hold over that part of the Balkans. This second choice of Hitler was Pavelić and his "Frankovci" group of terrorists who thought that Hitler's help came as a good opportunity to counterbalance the demands of Mussolini. It is believed that Pavelić promised Mussolini some parts of the Croatian territory on the Adriatic Coast in return for the latter's help in bringing about an independent Croatia. It will now be Pavelić's task to give Mussolini as little as possible, with the help of Hitler. Unless Pavelić succeeds in this he will soon be deserted by his own followers.[13]

VI

The position of the Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Moslems and their role in the internal and international policies of Jugoslavia remains to be explained.[14] These groups were relatively small in number, but were significant inasmuch as they sided with or opposed the groups which struggled for power. The Slovenes are the smallest of the three leading groups of Jugoslavia (Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes) numbering only about one million.[15] But because of the controversy between Croatians and Serbs they took a very active part in Jugoslavia's affairs. As a rule they were on the side of the Serbian ruling group. Theirs was an opportunist attitude. The Serbian ruling group never feared the Slovenes as it did the Croatians. This was because the

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[13] The latest news confirms this view. Pavelić not only has had to cede to Italy a large part of Croatia's territory but he has been forced to accept an Italian prince as a puppet king and to give so many other political, military and economic concessions to Italy that there is nothing left of the so-called "independence" of Croatia.

[14] Only Slav groups are considered in this article. Non-Slav minorities such as Germans, Hungarians, and Albanians did not play a significant role in the struggle for power in Jugoslavia except that the Serbian ruling group by using pressure was always successful in winning over a large number of voters from these groups.

[15] There are about four million Croatians and six million Serbs in Jugoslavia.

Slovenes failed to develop their national and political consciousness as much as did the Croatians, and because of the readiness of Slovene political leaders to submit to Serbian dominance and take as much from it as they could.

There were two principal political orientations among the Slovenes: one clerical and one liberal. The liberal Slovene political orientation was based on the "Jugoslav Idea" which for the Slovenes meant a share in the power, corresponding in amount to their cultural and numerical strength. In the beginning this was a strong group organized first within the Democratic Party and later within the Independent Democratic Party. But when the "Jugoslav Idea" experienced its setbacks the Slovene liberals lost most of their followers and the Slovene People's Party took the lead, headed by the Catholic Clergy of Slovenia. Father Korošec as the chief of the party held office in many Belgrade governments. He was one of the chief appeasers and advisers of Prince Paul. With him Father Korošec shared a dread of "bolshevism" and was willing to enter into any combination which would eliminate the possibility of Jugoslavia's closer collaboration with Soviet Russia. Like many other Catholics he was interested in the mission of the Catholic Church in the Orthodox Balkans, and was not unwilling to collaborate with Italy in this respect. As Minister of the Interior of Jugoslavia he induced Prince Paul and Premier Stojadinović to conclude a concordat with the Vatican. Stojadinović expected that in this way the Catholic Church would support his government in introducing the fascist system into Jugoslavia.[16]

All Slovenes, however, feared German domination because the Germans declared the Slovenes to be definitely a part of the German people ("Volksraum"). This was the main reason that the Slovenes led by Father Kulovec (the chief of the party after the death of Korošec), accepted a post in the revolutionary anti-German government, which led to the war with Germany. Father Kulovec died in the first bombing of Belgrade.

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[16] The Concordat was never ratified because of the strong opposition of the Serb Orthodox Church which, with the support of the political opposition groups, organized large public demonstrations in Belgrade and other Serb towns.

Moslems of Bosnia and Herzegovina were divided in their attitudes towards the controversy between the Croatians and Serbs. Some were pro-Croatian and some were pro-Serb, but all of them were mainly interested in controlling Bosnia and Herzegovina. They expected to obtain such control if they would side with the group in power. This is why their policy, like that of the Slovenes, was mainly opportunist, and they took part in almost all governments regardless of the political orientation of the leading party in power. The Moslem party was known as the Jugoslav Moslem Organization.

Most of the Montenegrins accepted the Serb national ideology, but they resented the policy of Belgrade régimes which almost completely neglected Montenegro, in spite of the fact that Montenegro was economically the least developed part of Jugoslavia. The Serbian ruling group had maintained that they were justified in helping Serbia primarily as a region which had suffered in the last war and was economically backward. But their actions in the case of Montenegro proved that they were merely using such reasoning as an excuse to benefit Serbia at the expense of the other parts of the country. This is why some friends of the former dynasty of Montenegro and Italian fascist leaders thought they might induce some Montenegrins to support a separatist movement for an "Independent Montenegro." Most of the dissatisfied Montenegrins, however, reacted in favor of communism rather than fascism because of Montenegro's traditional sympathy for, and friendship with, Russia.

The Macedonians in Jugoslavia were never allowed to form a party or a movement of their own because the official attitude of the Serbian ruling group was that Macedonia and Macedonians did not exist. They were considered "South Serbians" and were allowed, and some time even forced, to join the existing Serb political parties. But the young Macedonian intelligentsia, together with Macedonian craftsmen and merchants in the Macedonian small towns were not willing to accept an inferior position within the State. Some of them hoped for an autonomous Macedonia within Jugoslavia similar to the antonomous Croatia. Others turned toward communism or fascism, expecting liberation through revolution or the help of a victorious fascism in Europe. This pro-fascist group was also pro-Bulgarian, while the other two groups emphasized the Macedonian national consciousness, and were in favor of a federative arrangement within Jugoslavia or within a larger federal union which would also include Jugoslavia and Bulgaria.

VII

In spite of the divergencies of opinion and differences in ideologies within Jugoslavia, the country was definitely on the way toward solving its internal problems. A plan was under way by which Jugoslavia would develop into a Federal Union and by which all of its peoples would share an equal part in the power and responsibility of the government. In addition, the danger of a German invasion was uniting the people in their effort to resist, and, if necessary to fight. The explanation of the quick military débâcle of Jugoslavia does not lie, therefore, in "fifth column" activities. Such a swift breakdown is explained only as a result of poor military preparation and the inability of the Jugoslav Army Command to mobilize a sufficient number of troops necessary for a successful resistance to an invader.[17]

The army in Serbia had a long tradition of military successes, but the army here was also instrumental in gaining and maintaining power for the ruling groups. Each ruler was safe as long as he enjoyed the support of army leaders. As a result, two particularly significant circumstances developed in connection with the army leadership of Jugoslavia. First, the army leaders were frequently replaced to correspond with changes in the personnel of the ruling group. Each ruling clique wanted to be sure of the support of the army. Second, the political importance of the army prevented any criticism of its leaders and any inquiry into its functioning. Regardless of what the conditions were in the army ranks, how poorly equipped and badly administered the army was, it was the patriotic duty of everyone to refer to it as "our heroic army." No shadow of criticism was allowed to show its head. The frequent changes in army leadership and the lack of public control and censure were mainly responsible for the poor equipment of the Jugoslav army and its inability to mobilize sufficient manpower for effective resistance.

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[17] This view was recently officially confirmed in a declaration of the Jugoslav government-in-exile.

The potential strength of the Jugoslav Army was estimated at about 1,500,000 men, but it seems that when Germany attacked the actual mobilized force numbered less than 500,000, an extremely low number for a frontier of approximately 1,500 miles. The inability to mobilize was not only due to the lack of equipment, but it was due also to poor organization of the military administration. A few months after France declared war on Germany a mobilization was ordered in Jugoslavia. This attempt to mobilize failed completely. There was almost total confusion and contradiction in the orders of local and of superior commands. The lack of elementary necessities such as tents, covers, boots, and uniforms was so great, and the confusion as to where to report was such that many potential soldiers were forced to return home. The mobilization orders had to be withdrawn. In the following year not much could be accomplished because Prince Paul was primarily interested in replacing commanders to suit his personal aspirations.

The army leaders who seized the power as a result of the overthrow of Prince Paul had every intention of reorganizing the army so that it might effectively resist aggression, but they had very little opportunity to accomplish this task. They could not possibly repair in less than two weeks' time the damage done by years of mismanagement and misuse of power.

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ITALY WITHIN THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE
(1882-1915)

by Leo J. Wollemborg

It has been correctly stated that in the history of the Triple Alliance we may trace the whole Italian foreign policy from the unification with Rome as capital to the intervention in the World War.

As a matter of fact, the conclusion of the alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary was the first effective step of the new Italy in the international field; and for more than thirty years (1882-1915) the "Triplice" was to remain the cornerstone of Italy's international status. Thus the alliance can be said to have watched over and fostered the slow rise and the delicate process of acclimitation among the Great Powers of Italy, the last one of them to grow up and join the others.

I

Italy had barely reached her national unity and her freedom of action was still considerably hampered by the natural difficulties of her internal reorganization and by some international liabilities of the "Risorgimento" (such as the Roman Question and "Irredentismo"), when she was confronted with the arduous problems arising from the growing activity of the Great European Powers in the Mediterranean basin. She thought it advisable to adopt a non-committal and waiting policy of "a free hand"; and she held to such a course throughout the Eastern European crisis of 1876-1878, carefully declining to take sides. This policy might perhaps have succeeded for a much stronger Power than Italy, but for the latter it led to isolation and to impotence, the other Powers becoming accustomed to proceed without even asking Italy's advice.

With clean and "free" hands Italy had gone to the Congress of Berlin in 1878. With clean and empty hands she had come back from that imposing gathering of diplomats "where everybody was telling everybody else to take something which belonged to somebody else." When the Congress was over, England had got Cyprus and had checkmated the Russian advance towards the Mediterranean; Austria-Hungary was to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina; even Russia retained a few gains in the Balkans and in Asia Minor; France had the encouragement of Germany and the assent of England for an eventual occupation of Tunisia, which Italy, on her side, considered a natural field of expansion since a large Italian colony had already settled in that country opposite Sicily.

At the Congress, no consideration at all had been given to Italy's interests in the Mediterranean, a vital area for her. Indeed she had not been able even to raise the question of the Italians still living under Hapsburg rule. Meanwhile, her relations with Austria-Hungary did not improve, as irredentist manifestations for "Trent and Trieste" were going on throughout the peninsula. Her relations with France, whose attitude towards Italy had already indicated how bitterly she regretted the aid granted by Napoleon III in the building-up of this new Mediterranean Power, grew worse as the question of Tunis was coming more and more to the fore.

Isolated between two powerful neighbors, both unfriendly towards her, Italy was endangered and helpless, as she was forced to realize most bitterly when France actually took possession of Tunis (April-May 1881). This momentous event emphasized in Italy's eyes the necessity of a new policy and aroused throughout the country a violent anti-French reaction. It became the immediate determinant of the Triple Alliance.

Other factors, of course, had been pushing Italy in that direction. Considerations of prestige played their part, in that the association with the Central Empires was looked upon as a sort of sanction of Italy's rank and position as a Great Power. So did considerations of internal policy, in that the Italian dynasty looked at the Monarchies of Germany and Austria-Hungary for support against the radical and republican agitation—the latter being, of course, thoroughly sympathetic toward France and strongly blended with anti-Austrian "Irredentismo." So did the Roman Question, a matter in which the French had often threatened to interfere, while the Italians were determined to consider their relations with the Pope as a purely internal affair. But it was the French occupation of Tunisia that unchained an irresistible movement of Italian public opinion in favor of an agreement with the group of conservative Powers led by Bismarckian Germany. The traditional feelings of sympathy for France were now overcome as was the aversion to an alliance with the "hereditary" Austrian enemy, against whom generations of Italians had fought for their freedom and independence and who still ruled over the "unredeemed" Italians of Trent and Trieste. Not only had Bismarck intimated that the way to Berlin lay through Vienna; not only did the era of the Risorgimento appear to be over, as the European situation compelled at least an adjournment of the irredentist claims; but the Italians themselves had come to realize that an alliance was the best and perhaps the only way of maintaining peaceful relations with the Hapsburg Monarchy—and, after Tunis, good relations with Austria appeared "the indispensable condition" for restoring Italy's freedom of action and enabling her to carry out "a conclusive and effective policy."

In itself, Italy's decision indicated that she was willing to drop much that in recent times had caused Bismarck's irritation and distrust. It indicated that the irredentist agitation would be not only disavowed but opposed and condemned; that any thought of concluding with Russia an entente directed against Austria had been given up; it even indicated that Italy no longer expected to make use of the proposed alliance against France in Tunisia—since both Austria and Germany had stressed that they wanted anything but the antagonizing of French colonial expansion.

In such circumstances, the new partner could not be unwelcome to the Germans and Austrians. Bismarck's chief concern was to guarantee his Austrian ally against an Italo-Russian combination and to prevent Italy from joining a Franco-Russian alliance against the Central Powers. Italian active coöperation against France, though not wholly negligible, was considered doubtful and anyway of secondary importance; Italy's benevolent neutrality, on the contrary, might play a very important role, by allowing Austria to launch all her forces against Russia and also by "fixing" on the Alpine front part of the French army. Finally, both Germans and Austrians were interested in strengthening the position of the Italian Dynasty as against the republican and radical elements.

Italy's initial proposal for a treaty of territorial guarantee was rejected, because it would have involved a direct underwriting of the possession of Rome—a commitment hardly palatable to Austria and even less so to Bismarck who was now eager, out of considerations of internal policy, for good relations with the Pope. In fact, the same Bismarck who a few years before, at the height of his *Kulturkampf*, had complained that by the Law of Guarantee of 1871 the Italians had "wrapped the Pope in cotton-wool" so that nobody could get at him, now thought of forcing upon Italy a settlement of the Roman Question agreeable to the Pope. But the attempt to introduce the question of the relations between the Quirinal and the Vatican into the negotiations for the Triple Alliance drew from the Italian Government a sharp and unambiguous reply. Said King Humbert: "We are and intend to remain masters in our own home." A few days later (January 10, 1882) a note sent to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin stated "that no Italian Government, no matter to what party it belonged, could ever tolerate the slightest foreign interference in a question which Italy is firmly determined to regard as of a strictly internal nature and as relevant to the national sovereignty." And to emphasize such a stand, a resumé of the note was, "by indiscretion," published by the newspaper *Il Secolo* of Milan.

A treaty of neutrality was also considered; but unfavorable developments in the relations with Russia inclined Bismarck to put more store by a speedy conclusion of the negotiations with Italy. He admitted that, from the Italian point of view, a mere neutrality treaty would not be enough; and suggested a defensive alliance against a French aggression.

Such was the course which led to the birth of the Triple Alliance, a typical conservative guarantee for the maintenance of peace and general security, for the strengthening of social and political order inside the contracting Monarchies—as we read in the preamble of the treaty. In general, the three Powers promised each other peace and friendship and that they would enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of them. Moreover, they engaged to exchange ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which might arise, and they promised mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

Specifically, the treaty itself bound Germany and Austria-Hungary to support Italy, and Italy to support Germany, against an aggression by France. Should any one of the three contracting Powers be forced to declare war upon any other Great Power, the other two were to observe at least a friendly neutrality. Finally, all three Powers were pledged to active coöperation against any attack by a coalition of two or more Great Powers—that is, of course, against a Franco-Russian aggression, since a declaration, appended to the treaty by request of the Italian Government, formally excluded the possibility that its stipulations might be directed against Great Britain.[1]

From the Italian standpoint, the treaty embodied most of the advantages of a territorial guarantee, without the drawbacks such a formula would have implied. Protection against a direct attack by France had been secured; nor were the correlative obligations of Italy to be considered as onerous. By its very existence, the alliance was an effective check on dangerous developments in Italo-Austrian relations; and, even though the treaty itself did not actually mention Rome, it amounted to an informal guarantee against foreign interference in the Roman Question. At the same time, the dropping of an explicit formula of territorial guarantee spared Italy a formal renouncement of all irredentist hopes, a moral gain which was not devoid of practical importance. In fact, it has been pointed out that, had the Triple Alliance expressly embodied a territorial guarantee, Italy could not have asked, in 1914-1915, for the cession of Italian territories of the Hapsburg Monarchy as a compensation for Austrian acquisitions in the Balkans—a negotiation which actually provided the "diplomatic bridge" to Italy's intervention in the World War.

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[1] First Treaty of the Triple Alliance, signed at Vienna on May 20, 1882, to be binding for five years.

On the other hand, the international situation of 1882 and Italy's position of inferiority in soliciting and negotiating the alliance were obviously responsible for the fact that this first treaty did not embody any protection for, or specific mention of, the Italian interests in the Mediterranean or in Southeastern Europe.

II

Five years later, when the treaty was due for renewal, the situation was rather different. The embittered antagonism between Austria and Russia in the Balkans and the deterioration, once more, of relations between Germany and France in spite of Bismarck's conciliatory policy, revived Germany's nightmare of a two-front war and consequently increased the importance of the Italian alliance. At the same time, the sharpened rivalry with France and Russia in the Mediterranean and in the colonial fields of Africa and Asia caused England to set a greater value on the traditional friendship with Italy, which opportunely provided an indirect link with the Central Powers.

According to the stipulations of the new treaty of 1887, no action was to be undertaken by Austria in the Balkans without previous consultation with Italy; and compensations were promised to Italy, should the Hapsburg Monarchy make fresh gains in the Balkan peninsula. Germany, on her side, formally guaranteed the Mediterranean equilibrium by pledging her support against any further expansion by France in North Africa.[2]

At the same time, Italy's position in the Mediterranean itself, as well as in the Near East, was strengthened in a very effective way by a series of agreements which gave some concrete shape to that friendship with England which for Italy represented the natural complement of her alliance with the Central Powers.[3]

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[2] Second treaty of the Triple Alliance, signed at Berlin on February 20, 1887.

Thus a favorable combination of circumstances afforded Italy the opportunity to bring close to perfection the system of the "Triplice." In the general picture of European alliances and alignments, Italy had now a much more important and prominent place; and the protection she had secured for her interests went far beyond the territorial borders of the Kingdom. However, there is no evidence of any sweeping change in the nature or in the general trend of the Italian alliance with the Central Powers. To be sure, the provisions for common action by the allies were considerably enlarged and strengthened, both in the political and in the military field.[4] To be sure, beside the basic principle of the maintenance of the *status quo,* the principle of the preservation of equilibrium and that of compensations received some consideration.[5] But, despite certain appearances, which might justify to some extent France's apprehension and reactions, the Alliance remained fundamentally a defensive one.

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[3] (a) Exchange of notes between Italy and Great Britain on February 12, 1887, to which Austria-Hungary acceded on March 24. The fundamental principle involved was the maintenance of the *status quo* "on the shores of the Euxine, the Aegean, the Adriatic and on the northern coast of Africa;" specifically, Italy offered to support English policy in Egypt in return for an English promise to support Italian policy in North Africa and especially in Libya. (b) Exchange of notes between Austria-Hungary, Great Britain and Italy on December 12, 1887. These notes reaffirmed once more the principle of the maintenance of the *status quo* and specifically referred to "certain special dangers by which the state of things established by the treaties and the interests of the three powers in the East may be menaced and the course which should be pursued if those dangers should arise." That is to say, the three contracting Powers agreed to support Turkey in maintaining her sovereign rights in Bulgaria and her rights over the Straits, as well as to protect the independence and the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Should Turkey herself act against those principles, by complicity with or connivance in the undertakings of any third Power, the three Powers agreed to occupy parts of the Ottoman territory in order to enforce respect for the principles laid down.

Let us also recall the exchange of notes between Italy and Spain on May 4, 1887, which embodied a reaffirmation of the principle of the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the obligation by Spain not to enter into any agreement with France that, with special reference to North Africa, might run counter to the interests of Italy, Germany or Austria-Hungary. Finally, in May, 1888, Italy was to accede to the defensive alliance concluded five years earlier between Austria-Hungary and Rumania.

All these agreements were, of course, sponsored by Bismarck and are a typical expression of the policy of the great Chancellor, aimed at preserving peace and at checkmating France and Russia in the Mediterranean and in the Near East, without directly committing Germany herself.

[4] Let us recall the technical agreement for the transportation of six Italian army corps on the Rhine front, in the event of a common war against France (January-April, 1888).

[5] Along the same lines, Italy was to obtain, at the third renewal of the treaty in 1891, a further extension of the German obligation concerning North Africa: should the two Powers recognize that the maintenance of the *status quo* in Libya or in Tunisia had become impossible, Germany was to "support Italy in any action in the form of occupation or other taking of guarantee that the latter should undertake in these same regions."

The most conclusive proof of such an assertion we can find in the fact that during the next years (1887-1890)—when Italo-German relations were closest, the whole Triple Alliance at its best and the general situation perhaps more favorable than ever for such an enterprise—neither Germany nor Italy thought seriously of forcing war upon France.

We can find as well the best evidence of the peculiar character and of the limits of the Triple Alliance in the events of the years which immediately followed the "dropping" of Bismarck. At that time, the German failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance, the beginning of Germany's "Weltpolitik" and its first repercussions on the relations with England, started a new period in European politics: the crisis of the old alliances was already on its way and the newly emerged rivalries had not yet crystallized into new alignments of Powers.

Italy's position was directly affected by such a period of instability, of dynamism and uneasiness. Germany on land and Britain on the sea were still the guiding lights of Italian policy, but they no longer shone side by side in the European constellation. And the more unstable Anglo-German relations became, the more uncomfortable and even increasingly isolated Italy felt.

Early after 1890, while Italy's friends seemed unable to reach any solid agreement, Franco-Russian collaboration loomed larger and larger on the international horizon. Soon the consequences were evident in those Mediterranean and Colonial sectors where Crispi had already complained of the growing activity of France's policy (of which Bizerte's fortifications appeared to the Italian Premier one of the most concrete and threatening expressions). Later on (1895-1896), Crispi himself, who had become involved in a far-reaching policy of expansion in Ethiopia and was con-

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But here again, any aggressive purpose appears to be excluded both by the careful wording of the stipulation ("mature examination of the situation" and "a formal and previous agreement" are required) and by the renewed statement that the interests to be protected were interests "of equilibrium and of legitimate compensation."

fronted with the violent hostility of France backed by Russia, tried to enlist the diplomatic support of Germany and the assistance of Great Britain. But he did not succeed in either: Germany and England, distrusting each other, were likewise reluctant to endanger, for the sake of interests not directly concerning them, their relations with the new Franco-Russian combination. Later in that same year 1896, that same desire not to antagonize France and Russia was to underlie Germany's refusal to renew the declaration which formally excluded the applicability against Great Britain of the "casus foederis" of the Triple Alliance. The effect of such a declaration, as already pointed out, was, in fact, to designate the Franco-Russian group as the only combination of Powers against which the Triple Alliance, as a whole, could be directed. Let us also remember that, in its reply to the German refusal, the Italian Government made it plain that, should Great Britain join France in an alliance against the Central Empires, Italy, on account of her geographical situation, "would not be able, under any circumstances, to participate with her allies in a struggle against such a coalition of the two strongest sea-Powers in the world." Evidently the Italians were more farsighted than the people in the Wilhelmstrasse, for whom, in 1896, "the possibility of a common action by England and Russia, or by England and France, was outside the limits of human anticipation."

III

For the time being, however, the Franco-Russian alliance still worked as an anti-British, at least as much as an anti-German tool. To undermine England's position and to disrupt the Bismarckian system were then the parallel aims of the policy of France and of Russia as well. Italy was the obvious target of such a policy, since she appeared as the weakest and most exposed flank of the Triple Alliance and at the same time she was the connecting link between the Continental League of the Central Powers and the Mediterranean Coalition centered on Great Britain.

Thus France's policy, which, as already pointed out, was active against Italy in Ethopia, was largely responsible as well for the strain on Italian economy[6], and was also trying more subtle methods of creating difficulties for, and bringing pressure on, the Italian Government. The French, for instance, were encouraging Pope Leo XIII's hopes of an international intervention in the Roman Question, and at the same time were favoring republican propaganda in Italy.

As a matter of fact, the French themselves openly linked their attacks upon the Italian position to Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance. There was some truth, then, in Crispi's contention that Germany and Austria-Hungary really ought to regard any effort to weaken or curb Italy as directed against the Triple Alliance as a whole, and should act accordingly. And when Berlin replied by reminding Crispi that the Triple Alliance was "an insurance company, not a business concern for making gains," the retort really seems to be, in some cases at least, somewhat beside the point. The Germans were undoubtedly more justified when they said that, owing to the changes in the international situation, they no longer were in a position to risk a blunt *démarche* in Paris for Italy's sake; but such an explanation, of course, could hardly satisfy the Italians or dispel their doubts of the value of the alliance. Indeed "a treaty of alliance, although concluded in order to prevent war, really loses most of its value whenever it shows itself unable to secure in peace-time the interests of the contracting parties"—as Crispi himself wrote to the Italian ambassador in Berlin, a few days before that battle at Adua which was to lead to his final fall from power and put an end to his African dream.

Crispi's successors turned to a policy of retrenchment and "peaceful seclusion." Under the circumstances it was probably the wisest course, but it could hardly prevent new developments in the Balkans and in Africa from emphasizing Italy's difficult position and the crisis of her alliance with the Central Powers. In the Balkans, Austria and Russia reached a direct entente from which Italy was excluded (1897). In Africa, England and

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[6] Since 1888 a tariff war was in full swing between the two countries.

France clashed at Fashoda, but agreed afterwards on a division of spheres of influence by which Italy's aspirations in the hinterland of Libya were directly affected and against which the Italian Government once more appealed in vain to Berlin (1899).

By the end of the century, the situation was pretty clear. Italy could still, of course, count on German and Austrian support against a French attack—an eventuality, by the way, which was then becoming increasingly remote; but, in every other respect, the policy of the Central Empires went its own way, ignoring and sometimes directly injuring Italy's position and interests. Britain, on her side badly involved in the Boer war, was tasting the ashes of "splendid isolation"; and the rapidly changing European atmosphere, the shifting alignments of the Powers, only made Italy's position more precarious, at least as long as she exclusively stuck to her old connections. When even the preservation of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans appeared to be endangered, Italian statesmen felt compelled to look for complementary guarantees.

A new agreement with Austria-Hungary, with the limited aim of securing Italy's interests at least on the opposite shores of Albania, was the only opportunity the Balkan situation could afford at that time. By an exchange of notes (December 20, 1900, and February 9, 1901) Italy and Austria-Hungary agreed to maintain the *status quo* in Albania as long as possible; should some changes, however, prove necessary, the principle of autonomy was to be favored. In general, the two Powers pledged themselves to consult each other concerning the ways and means of conciliating and protecting their respective interests. Those principles had been verbally agreed upon by the Italian and Austrian Foreign Ministers Visconti Venosta and Goluchowsky, during their meeting at Monza, in November, 1897.

In the Mediterranean, on the other hand, the circumstances were favorable to the starting of a much broader action, the ultimate goal of which was to be a readjustment of Italy's system of international obligations to meet the requirements of the new European situation. The immediate aim, however, was to protect, by means of a direct entente with France, Italy's interests in the Mediterranean, for the support of which Rome apparently could no longer rely upon the alliance with Germany or the friendship of England.

France, on her side, took a long step by dropping her pretension that an open break of the Triple Alliance should be the preliminary condition of any reconciliation with Italy. French policy, personified now by Delcassé and Barrère, had come to realize that the "neutralization" of the Triple Alliance could best be achieved through a *rapprochement* with Italy, beginning with a friendly settlement of those Mediterranean questions which had played such an important role in estranging the two countries; as Delcassé put it, the idea was "to make friends with Italy in the Mediterranean in order to be friends with her in Europe."

The end of the economic war by the conclusion of a trade treaty (November 1898) and the anti-clerical policy adopted by the French Government after 1899 paved the way for the political *rapprochement*, and the results were not slow in coming. The first step was an agreement by which France and Italy recognized their respective interests in Morocco and in Libya; and soon the entente between the two countries was extended to include a mutual obligation to observe neutrality, should either of them be attacked by, or compelled by "a direct provocation" to declare war against, a third Power.[7]

Those agreements have been sharply criticized as incompatible with the Italian obligations towards Germany, and the accusations of duplicity has been levelled at Italian diplomacy. I think, however, that the Italian pledge to France may well be considered as consistent with a strictly defensive interpretation of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. This treaty, in fact, called for Italian help to Germany only if the latter, "without direct provocation on her part," should be attacked by France; and this was exactly the case which fell outside the scope of the Italian agreement with France. It has been said that, the conception of "direct provocation" being indefinite and elastic, it all depended on how Italy would choose to interpret it. That may be true, but since the same formula already existed in the treaty of the Triple Alliance, what elasticity there was in Italy's position and obligations toward her allies had been inherent in that treaty and was not a fresh consequence of the Italian pledge to France. Moreover, Italian statesmen were careful to reserve expressly, in their agreement with France, the right to decide whether an incident, which France considered a "direct provocation," would really be such as to involve Italian neutrality. In conclusion, the agreements of 1902 did not impair Italy's freedom to carry out her obligations under the Triple Alliance, while they gave France the formal assurance that—as Delcassé was to declare to the French Chamber of Deputies on July 3, 1902,—"Italy would not become, under any circumstances, the instrument or an auxiliary of an aggression against France."

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[7] The terms of the Franco-Italian agreements were embodied in the letters exchanged by the French Ambassador Barrère and the Italian Foreign Ministers Visconti Venosta and Prinetti, respectively in December 1900 and July 1902.

Delcassé's statement was merely the echo of the words that the Italian Foregn Minister, Prinetti, had pronounced about a month earlier (May 23) before the Italian Parliament. Recalling similar declarations on the part of Austrian and German statesmen, Prinetti had reaffirmed that the Triple Alliance, on account of its "sincerely and uniquely pacific object," did not prevent any of the allies from concluding agreements with other Powers. "But," he had added, "I want today to affirm something more. The Triple Alliance, not embodying anything aggressive against France, directly or indirectly, anything threatening her tranquillity and security, cannot be in any way an obstacle to the maintenance and the development of cordial relations with the Latin sister, with whom we are and intend to remain friends" . . .

There—in those public and explicit assurances, in that formal confirmation of the newly reestablished friendship with France and of its compatibility with the defensive alliance with the Central Empires—there lay, even more than in the actual terms of the Franco-Italian agreements, the significance of the new departure, the indication of the different place and role the Triple Alliance was henceforth to be given in the practice of Italian policy. But, here again, Italy's allies could hardly complain. After all, they had merely been taken at their word. Ever since the time when the "Triplice" was being negotiated, and with some deviations only during Bismarck's last years, Berlin and Vienna had insisted upon the strictly conservative character of the alliance and particularly upon a policy of good relations with France so long as the latter did not take clearly aggressive steps. On this ground, they had refused even their diplomatic assistance when Italy's own security did not appear directly threatened. Moreover, both Germans and Austrians had, without Italy's participation, readily entered into reinsurance treaties and other agreements which affected questions coming under the stipulations of the Triple Alliance. Not only the Balkan agreement concluded between Austria and Russia in 1897, but also Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia (June 1887) is a case in point. Now, after the turn of the century, Italy, too, gave up her "triplicist chastity": following the example of her allies, she concluded outside agreements and reinsurance treaties which, without affecting the essential and original defensive kernel of the Triple Alliance, would strengthen her general position and provide for a more effective protection of some of her special interests.

Thus when considered, as they should be, as a "counterpart" of the Triple Alliance, the Italian agreements with France are but the formal expression of Italy's permanent interest in the European equilibrium: a basic principle of Italian policy that Visconti Venosta had enounced early after 1870 when he said that "Italy would have neither strength nor future in a Europe whose balance was broken."

While faithfully reflecting the changes wrought in the European constellation during the last decade of the century, the Franco-Italian agreements seem also to have made allowance for the development of most trends which were to take definite shape in later years. Actually, they enabled Italy to assume, between the two opposite blocs of Powers that were already forming in Europe, a balanced position of equidistance. This was, indeed, quite a valuable position, as clearly proved during the troubled years from Tripoli to Serajevo; a position which eventually was responsible for Italy's facing the Great Conflagration with unimpaired possibilities and a choice of ways open to her.

IV

As a matter of fact, during the next decade the task of holding the balance even between alliances and friendships was not destined to be an easy one. Quite careful handling of Italy's international relations, as well as a certain studied indifference to domestic public opinion, was required of the Italian Government, since often the feelings of the Italian people and the course of events were concurrently driving the country to a final rupture of the links with the Central Empires.

There was an early and lively awakening of the irredentist agitation for "Trent and Trieste"; and the tension was increased by the biased proceedings of the Austrian Government against the Italians living within the Hapsburg Monarchy. Some appeasement had hardly been carried out, at least as far as the two Governments were concerned, when Italy's anxieties were aroused by the increasing activity and influence of Austrian policy in Southeastern Europe: there an important element of equilibrium, at least from the Italian point of view, had been dangerously weakened since Russia had put the Balkans "on ice" and turned her attention to the Near East. And last but not least, let us recall that the closer the new Anglo-French friendship grew, the more evident became the negative influence which such a new trend of British policy was exerting on Italo-German relations. In other words, the growing Anglo-German antagonism tended to loosen Italy's links with the Central Empires and to lead Italy to some *tours de valse,* swinging her far from her allies. Bülow once compared the Triple Alliance to a happy marriage in which, he said, the husband (Germany) should not get angry right away if his wife (Italy) takes just an innocent *tour de valse* with another partner.

At the Algeciras Conference, for instance, where the Moroccan question brought the two opposite blocs face to face, Italy was confronted with a very ticklish situation. She was still the ally of Germany, and, at the same time, she was specifically bound to support France's policy in Morocco. She strove for mediation; as a whole, however, her attitude couldn't help but be deeply affected by the strongly anti-German stand taken by England.

Yet no one among the partners of the "Triplice" thought it advisable to raise the question of a modification and much less of a recission of their link. The Alliance was still considered to be a factor making for stability and equilibrium in Europe and to be a valuable guarantee of peace between the two neighbors, Rome and Vienna, which, in the nature of things, were bound to be "allies or enemies."

Thus in 1907 the Alliance was once more tacitly renewed.[8] At the same time, the Italian and Austrian Governments were able to carry out some concordant efforts, which succeeded at least in concealing the most evident cracks in the Alliance. The irredentist agitation lost some of its vigor. In the Balkans—to which Russia, after her Far Eastern defeats, was again shifting her political centre of gravity—the situation seemed to hint at an Italo-Russian collaboration and, possibly, at a larger agreement among Russia, Austria and Italy.

But this was the very moment and the Balkans the very ground that Austria chose for a quick move: the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of the annexation was to destroy forever the dream of a Great Serbia and to secure Austria's own position against the national movements of the Balkan peoples emboldened by the growing decay of the Turkish Empire. The Austrian plan was not unknown to European diplomacy; nor could the annexation bring about any significant change in the actual position, since the treaty of Berlin (1878) had already enabled Austria-Hungary to occupy and carry on the administration of those two Turkish provinces. As a matter of fact, Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, had just negotiated with Aehrenthal, his Austrian colleague, Russia's assent to the annexation in return for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships.

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[8] It had already been agreed in 1891 that the treaty, at that time renewed for six years, was to be automatically extended for another six-year period if it were not denounced before the end of the fifth year; and the same provision had been embodied in the renewed treaty of 1902.

But when Austria, sooner perhaps than Isvolsky had expected, bluntly proclaimed the annexation (October 6, 1908), stupefaction and indignation were aroused in Serbia and Russia, where nothing was known of the preliminary negotiations. On the other hand, Isvolsky's hopes of securing some compensation in the Straits' question were wrecked by the English attitude, amounting at least to a temporary veto. Isvolsky then declared that Aehrenthal had deceived him, and in order to restore his shattered prestige, tried to summon Austria before a European Conference. But Aehrenthal managed to frustrate such a proposal and asked for a flat acknowledgment of the *fait accompli.*

Thanks to Germany's unconditional support, Austria's action could be brought to a successful end; but the consequences of the "Bosnian crisis" were bound to affect so deeply the relations of the Hapsburg Monarchy with both Serbia and Russia that, from this time on, the chances of a peaceful settlement in the Balkans were reduced virtually to nothing.

In Italy too, the events of October 1908 were bitterly resented. The Italian Foreign Minister, Tittoni, had been "surprised" by Aehrenthal in about the same way that Isvolsky had been; his first move had been an attempt to justify the Austrian action, with some rather unwise hints of possible compensation for Italy. But public opinion was immediately aroused; and the reaction grew more violent, both against Austria and against the Minister, when the attitude of Vienna destroyed the illusions raised by Tittoni's imprudent words and made it clear that no concessions were to be expected in the burning question of the Italians still living under the rule of the Hapsburgs.[9] Throughout the peninsula and in the Italian Parliament, the Government was attacked as unable to prevent or to meet the situation; and the Triple Alliance itself was sharply critized as calling for the sacrifice of Italy's most cherished aspirations while failing to protect, against the Austrian ally itself, the interests and even the dignity of Italy.

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[9] Austria was only to give up the rights, granted her by the Treaty of Berlin, to maintain garrisons in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar (the narrow strip of Turkish territory still separating Serbia from Montenegro) and to exercise police-power in the Montenegrin waters.

As a matter of fact, the crisis of 1908 put a gravestone over the last chances to make the idea and the policy of the "Triplice" fruitful and popular among the Italians, and thus represented an irreparable fracture of the moral frame of the alliance. More than that, the consciousness was spreading throughout the peninsula that the last round in the deadly struggle with Austria-Hungary was but a matter of time, in fact, of a short time.

It should be recalled at this point that, on the Austrian side, the influence of two successive Foreign Ministers, Count Goluchowsky and Count Aehrenthal, was just strong enough to counterbalance the party, powerful at the court, as well as in the army, which openly advocated a "preventive aggression" against Italy. The dreadful earthquake of Messina in 1908 and, later on, the Italian expedition in Libya were eagerly pointed out by that party as the most favorable "opportunities" for getting rid, once and for all, of the "unfaithful ally" in whom they saw the "enemy of tomorrow" . . . It must also be kept in mind that, since 1904, Austria-Hungary had concluded with Russia a secret agreement, the aim of which was to secure Russian neutrality should Austria become involved in a war against Italy. To complete the picture, let us recall that the German Government had already made it clear that, of course, it would do everything in its power to prevent an armed clash between Austria and Italy; but should Vienna, nevertheless, come to such a decision, Berlin would not be in a position to restrain the "necessary" Austrian ally from carrying it out.

At first sight, the maintenance of the Triple Alliance under such circumstances may well appear incomprehensible and even absurd. But again one has only to look at the contemporary documents to see how, after its twenty-five years of existence, the Alliance had come to be regarded as "a fixed pole of European politics," and how anxious everybody was lest its disappearance upset the delicate balance of war and peace. For Italy, whose position aptly symbolized that delicate situation of international equilibrium, a formal breaking of the Alliance could but appear "a leap in the dark"; and the only practical course open to the Italian Government was a cautious policy aimed at gradually reestablishing normal relations with the Austrian neighbor.

At the same time, new agreements with both Austria and Russia were being considered by the Italian Government as insurance against new "surprises" in the Balkans. The new exchange of notes between Italy and Austria was little more than a "definition" of the Balkan stipulations of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, while the Italo-Russian agreement was a significant symptom of the fact that even in the Balkans Italy was finding it more expedient, and sometimes necessary, to collaborate with the Powers of the Triple Entente rather than with the Central Empires. The Italo-Russian agreement, as a matter of fact, was not confined to the Balkan peninsula, since the two Powers pledged themselves to adopt a benevolent attitude, Italy toward Russia's interests in the Straits' Question, and Russia toward Italy's interests in Libya.[10] From this point of view, the so-called "Treaty

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[10] The entente with Russia—embodied in an exchange of letters between the two Foreign Ministers, Isvolsky and Tittoni—was entered into at Racconigi, near Turin, where the Tsar and the King of Italy met on October 24, 1909, and is therefore known as the "Treaty of Racconigi"; the basis of the agreement, however, had been laid down by Isvolsky and Tittoni during their meeting at Desio, in September, 1908. Concerning the Balkans, Russia and Italy agreed to support the preservation of the *status quo* and, should this prove impossible, the principle of nationality, that is to say, the "development of the Balkan States, to the exclusion of any foreign domination"; should Russia and Italy wish to make agreements concerning the European East with a third Power, beyond those existing at this time, each of them was to do it only with the participation of the other.

The exchange of notes between Italy and Austria-Hungary took place on November 30 and December 15, 1909. It reaffirmed once more the general principles laid down by article VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance as regards the maintenance of the *status quo* and the policy of the two Powers in the Balkans (see above p. 172 ff.); specifically, it dealt with the situation of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar after Austria's renunciation of her right to garrison this territory. Moreover, it pledged each of the two Powers not to conclude with a third Power any agreement concerning the Balkans without the participation of the other on a footing of absolute equality. The content and the contemporaneous negotiations of those two agreements has been branded as a manifestation of extreme duplicity on the part of the Italian negotiators. To a certain extent, I am inclined to take the same view, though it might also be said that, after all, Italy was merely being compelled to follow the example of the others. Secret reinsurance treaties certainly did not lack illustrious precedents; and concerning the Balkans, Austria and Russia had concluded between themselves secret agreements and bargains (such as the entente of 1897, the so-called Mürzteg agree-of Racconigi" occurred as the last step of the long, careful reparation Italian diplomacy had carried out during the preceding twenty-five years, in order to secure from the Powers the acknowledgment of Italy's priority on the North African shores between Tunisia and Egypt.[11]

Meanwhile, the behavior of the Turkish Government had made clear enough the difficulty of any peaceful expansion of Italian influence in those regions. On the other hand, the progressive settlement, in favor of England, France and Spain, of the other problems concerning the Mediterranean shores of Africa, made it urgent for Italy to realize her own matured mortgage in Libya, lest somebody else step in and Tripoli become a second Tunis. Actually, as soon as it appeared certain that a French protectorate would be established over Morocco as the outcome of the Agadir crisis (summer 1911), Italy went to Tripoli.

V

As a matter of fact, no one among the Great Powers of the two rival groups—with the possible exception of Russia—looked favorably upon Italy's action in Libya. In France, many were still hostile to any strengthening of Italy's position in the Mediterranean and particularly disturbed by her settling down on the

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ment of 1903, the Buchlau bargain of 1908) which, at least on the part of Austria, were directly contrary to her existing obligations toward Italy.

As to the political significance of those agreements, I would say it has often been exaggerated. The Italo-Austrian exchange of notes was really little more than a confirmation of existing stipulations. And the Italo-Russian agreement, on its side, undoubtedly casts interesting light on the further weakening of the Triple Alliance and on the *rapprochement* between Italy and another member of the Triple Entente; but none of its provisions can be said to introduce new or sensational elements. The principle of the national development of the Balkan peoples had always been prominent in Italian policy—incidentally, it had been expressly mentioned, at least in connection with Albania, in the Italo-Austrian exchange of notes of 1900/1901 (see above p. 178); the principle of Italo-Russian collaboration in the Balkans had been frequently advocated in recent years and had sometimes received practical application; and, finally, the clauses concerning Libya and the Straits could only be considered interesting steps but by no means decisive factors for securing the success of Italian and Russian aspirations in those regions.

[11] Italy's special interests in Libya had been recognized by Germany as early as 1887 and 1891 (Second and Third Treaty of the Triple Alliance); by France, in the agreements of 1900/1902; by Austria-Hungary, through a declaration appended in 1902 to the treaty of the Triple Alliance; by Great Britain, who already had more than once expressed her sympathy for the Italian aspirations, through an exchange of notes which had taken place in March 1902.

Tunisian border. Great Britain feared unfavorable repercussions in the Islamic world and could not welcome an eventual strengthening of the "Triplice" on the sea. Austria was suspicious of any Italian move and particularly anxious lest the Italian action spread to the Balkans. Germany too was distrubed, for she had become too interested in the Turkish Empire, both from the political and from the economic standpoint. Nevertheless, no one among these Powers dared offer open opposition, knowing well the risk of throwing Italy into the arms of the rival group.

But, as the conquest of the Libyan coast-line went quickly on and was followed by the occupation of a group of Aegean Islands (Rhodes and the so-called Dodecanese), the evident strengthening of Italy's position and prestige as a Mediterranean Power began to arouse a growing concern in France and England, accustomed for so long a time to share unchallenged domination over that sea. For the first time, people began to wonder whether Italian policy would continue to follow in the wake of the British fleet, or whether Italy would use her strengthened Mediterranean position against England and France. After all, Italy might forget Trent and Trieste for broader horizons, cease to be a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance and decidedly cast in her lot with Germany, in return for a promise of active support against the Franco-British hegemony in the Mediterranean. The reaction was quick. In the French Chamber of Deputies a stronger fleet was advocated; at the same time, the British Admiralty pointed out the danger of leaving Italy in possession of the Aegean Islands; and both London and Paris warned that they would not allow Italy permanent occupation of those islands "even at the cost of a war."[12]

For a while, even the developments in the Balkans seemed to indicate that Italy was becoming more and more estranged from the Mediterranean Powers, and that collaboration with the Central Empires was again coming to the fore for the Italian statesmen. The Balkan League (Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro) had taken advantage of the situation created by the Libyan war to fight Turkey and redeem the last Balkan provinces from the Ottoman rule; and the swift victories scored by the Balkan States and their subsequent conflict over the spoils had again brought face to face the two opposite groups of Powers. In the Albanian question, Italy and Austria-Hungary, casting aside, for a time, their Adriatic rivalry, worked together along the lines laid down in their agreement of 1900-1901. The creation of the new Albanian State was sanctioned by the Powers; and the concordant action of the Triple Alliance scored a success by blocking the efforts of France and Russia, sometimes backed by England, to gain for Serbia an outlet to the Adriatic.[13]

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[12] According to the stipulations of the peace signed with Turkey at Ouchy-Lausanne on October 15, 1912, Italy had been authorized to retain possession of the islands as a guarantee of the execution of the terms of the treaty (evacuation of the Turkish garrisons still fighting in Libya, etc.). Later on, when Italy entered the World War, the Allies themselves gave recognition to her full possession of the islands.

It looked as if the old body of the "Triplice" had received a transfusion of new blood. By the end of the year 1912, the treaty of alliance was renewed for twelve more years;[14] a significant Convention for the collaboration of the allied fleets in the Mediterranean was soon to be concluded;[15] and contacts and agreements were to be resumed with a view to direct cooperation between the German and Italian armies in the event of a common war against France.[16]

But, as the facts were soon to prove, any revival of the alliance could be but an illusory and short-lived phenomenon. For the Italian people, the Hapsburg Monarchy remained "the hereditary enemy" and "Trent and Trieste" the all-important aspiration which overshadowed any other ambition; Germany, haunted by the fear of losing the "necessary" Austrian ally, was often unable to exert that restraining and mediatory influence within the alliance which the delicate relationship between Austria and Italy would have required; and Austria was neither wise nor fair in her dealings with the "unredeemed" Italians, while her Balkan policy time and again alarmed the Italian Government.

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[13] In this connection, Tittoni, then Italian Ambassador in Paris, went so far as to declare to the French Premier, Poincaré, that Italy would be bound to side with Austria-Hungary if the latter became involved in an European conflagration arising from the Albanian question.

[14] The treaty was renewed without any change; but a protocol was appended which embodied the acknowledgment of the Italian sovereignty in Libya and the confirmation of the exchanges of notes about Balkan questions which had taken place between Italy and Austria-Hungary in 1900-1901 and in 1909 (see above pp. 178 and 186).

[15] Such a convention was a direct answer to the naval agreements concluded in 1912 between France and England and between France and Russia. Another, very limited convention, however, had been concluded by the Powers of the Triple Alliance as early as December 1900, but we are not yet informed as to its exact stipulations.

[16] The main object was to be the transportation of Italian troops on the Rhine front, as provided by the technical agreements of 1888, which had been, so to speak, suspended in 1901, revived some time later and formally declared inoperative after the Italian occupation of Libya.

It is small wonder that, during the development of the Balkan crisis, Italian public opinion clearly reflected the dislike and suspicion with which it viewed any collaboration with the Hapsburg Monarchy, however useful and even necessary such collaboration might appear. No wonder the Italian Government took the first opportunity to point out to Vienna the exact limits within which Italy was willing to associate herself with Austria in the Balkans or felt herself bound by the obligations of the Alliance, should a European conflagration flare up from the Balkan action of Austria. In July 1913 when a conflict broke out among the Balkan States after their victories over Turkey, Austria-Hungary told her allies that she would not permit Serbia to receive, as a consequence of that war, any great additional increase of territory. In its answer, the Italian Government categorically denied this to be a case of defensive action on the part of Austria; and therefore formally excluded the applicability of the "casus foederis" of the Triple Alliance, should any Great Power come in on Serbia's side. Moreover, the Italians strongly warned the Austrian ally against such a "highly dangerous adventure." "We shall hold you back by your coat-tails, if necessary"—the Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, is said to have told the Austrian Ambassador. Germany had already thrown her decisive influence in the same direction, and another crisis passed without destroying the peace of Europe.

But the progressive strengthening of Serbia could but evoke before the eyes of Austria-Hungary the nightmare of a new Piedmont that would attract and unite the South Slavs and deal the death-blow to the multi-national Empire of the Hapsburgs. From Berlin too, the international situation looked darker and more disquieting, and people were inclined to lend a more attentive ear to the plans of Vienna: after all, a success seemed to be really "needed" in order to restore both the shattered prestige of the Austrian ally and the balance of power which the outcome of the Balkan wars had shifted in favor of the Triple Entente. The murder at Serajevo afforded the occasion; and this time, Germany and Austria, mindful of the experience of the preceding year, carefully kept their Italian ally in the dark.

Thus, when the "punitive expedition" against Serbia turned out to be the starting point of the conflagration, Italy's position was clearly defined. As the Italian statesmen told the German Ambassador as early as July 24, that is to say as soon as the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia became known, clearly Austria's action against Serbia and its European consequences fell outside the defensive scope of the treaty of the Triple Alliance; moreover, Italy had not been consulted nor informed beforehand by her allies. In such a situation, the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance—even before the Italian obligations towards France or the attitude of Great Britain—caused and fully legitimated Italy's neutrality. But Italian neutrality already meant death for the Alliance. The formal denouncement of the treaty was to come only nine months later, on the eve of Italy's declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. But the events of those months—which anyway already belong to the history of the World War—can be considered but necessary stages on the road of Italy's intervention on the side of the Entente.

Truly—as Ferdinando Martini, the Italian Minister of Colonies, said, leaving the Council of Ministers where the Italian neutrality had been decided upon—truly the Triple Alliance was the first casualty of the World War.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

On account of the nature and limits of the present article, any specific reference, in the form of footnotes or otherwise, to the documentary evidence supporting the text has been dropped. For similar reasons, no attempt will be made to give anything like an exhaustive bibliography of the subject, which would include at least one hundred items. I shall confine myself, therefore, to a few words concerning some works of recent publication, which may not be easily available to the American reader:

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CILIBRIZZI, S.: *Storia Parlamentare, Politica e Diplomatica del Regno d'Italia (da Novara a Vittorio Veneto).* Rome, Albrighi e Segati, 1923 ff., vol. II-IV. Diligent and valuable for press comment and parliamentary debates. No original value.

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POLAND'S EASTERN FRONTIERS 981-1939

by Oscar Halecki

I

The western and the eastern frontiers of Poland

BOTH in the west and in the east Poland has flat, open, and unprotected frontiers. This geophysical situation is a permanent factor in Polish history involving the most serious problems of national security, problems of defence as well as of possible expansion. No mountains, similar to the Carpathians in the South, formed natural boundaries either West or East from the original home of the Poles. Rivers proved no adequate substitute for them as boundaries and even when a frontier sector coincided with a river, it was not for long and never furnished adequate military protection. From the tenth to the twentieth century these natural conditions influenced, sometimes most decidedly, Poland's western and eastern policy.

But here the analogy between West and East comes to an end, at least in modern history and even since the later Middle Ages. During the first four centuries the frontiers of medieval Poland were undergoing changes of a kind which in the West was more frequent and considerable than in the East, and in the north-western sector, where the access to the Baltic was the chief issue, this unsettled situation lasted even a hundred years longer. But the advance of the German Empire which, since the death of Boleslas the Brave (1025), had continued the process of attrition of the borderlands of Poland, was finally stopped in the time of Casimir the Great (1333-1370), and Polish Pomerania, lost in 1308, was recovered in 1466. A few years ago that whole problem was admirably summarized by an American writer: Poland's western frontiers—he says—[1] "were definitely fixed by the Second

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[1] Frank H. Simonds in his introduction to Kellogg, Charlotte, *Jadwiga Queen of Poland,* Washington, 1936, p. xxii.

Peace of Thorn, a quarter of a century before Columbus set sail upon his first voyage. They endured right down to the eve of the American Revolution and were restored with but inconsiderable changes, by the Treaty of Versailles, largely through the uncompromising insistence of Woodrow Wilson." During the same period, however, in contradistinction to that Polish-German frontier which was perhaps the most permanent in modern Europe and modified only by the partitions of Poland and the bargains at the Congress of Vienna, the eastern frontier of Poland, after a fundamental change in the fourteenth century, was subject to many fluctuations, even before the partitions at the end of the eighteenth altered the course of Central European history.

There is still another difference between the two problems. Even the first one is far from being universally known and understood, but nevertheless it requires scarcely more than a quite elementary study of European history. The second, on the contrary, inseparable from the general problem of Poland's eastern borderlands, belongs to the most intricate in that history. It is not only the mere story of a frontier line: it includes the whole Lithuanian, White-Russian and Ukrainian questions which are—especially the two latter—so highly controversial. All these questions being reopened today, it certainly is urgently necessary to elucidate the situation in spite of all the difficulties of research. And just as in so many similar cases, historical research, in addition of course to other kinds of investigation, is absolutely indispensable, if one seriously wants to realize the various aspects of such a big problem of contemporary international relations.

II

What Is Eastern Galicia?

How far should we go back? That is always the first question to decide when making an historical approach to a contemporary question. If Poland is concerned, one usually has to go back a thousand years, owing to the antiquity and continuity of her historical evolution. And as a matter of fact, it really is almost one thousand years ago, exactly in 981, that her eastern boundaries were altered for the first time, precisely in a region which today happens to be again under dispute: in what is called Eastern Galicia. The name itself did not appear until later and is, for various reasons, an artificial one. We do not know exactly which part of Eastern Galicia belonged to the Poles before 981 and was taken from them by Vladimir of Kiev, according to the earliest Russian chronicle. It was at least Przemysl and some areas near the upper Bug. Galicia is however the Latinized form of the name of Halicz which soon became the center of the whole region and the capital of one of the numerous principalities into which the State of Kiev—the Russia of the first period of her history—had been divided. But not only the Poles tried more than once, sometimes with success, to recover the borderlands: Hungary too interfered in the beginning of the thirteenth century with a view to the creation of a "regnum Galiciae" under her control. Hence the "historical" rights, the more dubious indeed, which were to support the claims put forward by Austria almost six hundred years later at the first partition of Poland, and hence the whole of her share was again named Galicia, although she annexed at that occasion, especially in the West, much more than the old Halicz territory, so that only Eastern Galicia of our times corresponds to the Halicz-Galicia of the Middle Ages.

The medieval dynasty—a branch of the Ruriks—who had united the latter with Volhynia, disappeared in or near 1323 and was succeeded by a related prince of Polish origin. After his death in 1340, and probably as the result of a previous agreement with him, his cousin, King Casimir the Great of Poland, claimed the whole heritage,[2] and, in spite of the rival pretensions of a Lithuanian prince, really united with Poland, after several campaigns, against Lithuanians and Tartars, the whole territory of Halicz and even parts of Volhynia, extending his influence as far as Podolia. The center of the province was however no longer

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[2] Paszkiewicz, Henryk, *Polityka ruska Kazimierza Wielkiego,* Warsaw, 1922, where the whole Eastern policy of Casimir the Great has been admirably outlined.

Halicz, but the then rapidly growing city of Lwów (Lviv in Ruthenian, Lemberg in German, the French form Léopol coming from the Latin Leopolis).

This first notable extension of Poland's eastern frontier, exactly six hundred years ago, certainly reached farther than the original limits before 981. The population of Casimir's acquisition, although including from the beginning a fairly large Polish minority, was chiefly Ruthenian. It appears from the sources[3] that it was a matter of indifference to them whether they should be connected with Poland or with Lithuania, there being no other alternative at that moment. Later on Casimir's liberal and tolerant attitudes, respectful of local customs, desirous to support not only the Roman Catholic but also the Greek Orthodox Church organization, highly favorable to the economic development of the country, gained the sympathy of practically all the inhabitants. Except for a few years of Hungarian administration soon after the death of the great king, whose successor, Louis of Anjou, united the whole of Poland with Hungary, the province of Lwów, or Eastern Galicia—to use that familiar although inaccurate appellation—was to remain Polish, without any further interruption, until the Partitions, becoming more and more closely connected with Poland in the cultural sphere.

But very soon it ceased to be the only part of the Kingdom which was not purely or even predominantly Polish from the ethnographic and linguistic point of view. The Polish-Hungarian union which lasted only twelve years, was followed almost immediately by an entirely different federation which united Poland for centuries—again, we have to say, until the Partitions—with a large country situated beyond her Eastern boundaries. It was the same Lithuanian state which had opposed Casimir the Great in Volhynia and Podolia, although the king himself, far-sighted as he was, had seriously considered the possibility of a mutual understanding in the near future.

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[3] That is the conclusion not only of Paszkiewicz but also of the greatest Ukrainian historian, M. Hrushevskii, in Vol. IV of his work quoted below.

III

The Union Treaty of 1385

The Polish-Lithuanian union so entirely transformed the whole problem of Poland's eastern frontiers that here again we have to go back to the origins: to the treaty signed at Krewo, near Wilno, on August 14, 1385,[4] which fixed the conditions under which the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiello, married to the Polish queen Jadwiga, was to become King of Poland. In the text of that treaty, one of the most important in the history of Eastern Europe, fundamental to the development of the next centuries, every word needs to be discussed and interpreted with the greatest possible care, particularly the brief sentence where Jagiello, summarizing the chief condition of his election, "promittit suas Lithuaniæ et Russian coronæ regnie Poloniae perpetuo applicare."

From the legal viewpoint "applicare" was a rather vague expression, and therefore raised endless discussion, not only among the relatively modern historians,[5] but even as soon as the agreement was put into practice. But instead of describing the lengthy evolution of a federal system which bound together the two countries, first by feudal ties, then by a merely personal union, and finally, at the Diet of Lublin, in 1569, by a really organic parliamentary union, we have to consider here the description of Jagiello's realm: the distinction made between his lands of Lithuania and those of Russia. For only by taking into account that Lithuania proper, before joining Poland, had been federated herself with various Russian principalities, can we realize that Jagiello's state extended along the whole eastern frontier of old Poland.

Originally there had been a striking difference between her northeastern and her southeastern neighbors. We have seen above that in the southeast she had always had Slavonic neighbors: first the large Kievan state, later on, after its internal divisions, the principalities of Halicz and Volhynia, and beyond these two territories, other principalities of a similar character (a character which we will have to define more precisely) followed eastward without having, of course, any direct relations with Poland. North of the Bug, however, and primitively as far as the Baltic coast, boundaries chiefly formed by vast forests separated the Poles from the group of Baltic peoples to which the Lithuanians belonged. Among these tribes, the old Prussians and their close relatives the Yatwingians had been Poland's immediate neighbors, but in the thirteenth century the former were conquered by the Teutonic Order, while the latter disappeared in fierce struggles with all her neighboring countries, and their territories, later called Podlasie, became a subject of interminable controversies between the Poles and the Lithuanians, henceforth in direct contact.

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[4] Published as all the other Polish-Lithuanian conventions, in Kutrzeba, St., and Semkovicz, W., *Akta Unii Polski z Litwą 1385-1791,* (Cracow-Warsaw, 1933), nr. 1.

[5] In my "Przyczynki genealogiczne do dziejów układu krewskiego," *Miesięcznik heraldyczny,* XIV, (1935), 97-111, I have published new source material supplementing the views expressed in my *Dzieje Unii jagiellońskiej,* Vol. I (Cracow, 1919).

At the same time, and in spite of the permanent danger menacing them from the German knights in Prussia and Livonia, the Lithuanians succeeded not only in occupying smaller Russian districts along their southeastern frontier, but in attaching to their rapidly expanding state an increasing number of principalities which had once belonged to the Kievan state, including Kiev herself.[6] Thus we understand why they appeared as rivals of Poland when Casimir the Great claimed Halicz and Volhynia. But these successes of a rather young and still pagan state which attached the whole of western Russia to Lithuania and eventually—with Lithuania and through her as intermediary—to the kingdom of Poland, while eastern Russia simultaneously was being united under the leadership of Moscow, are somewhat harder to explain.

It is scarcely necessary to emphasize the importance of that question for a genuine understanding of the problem of Poland's eastern frontiers. For in consequence of the Krewo treaty Lithuania's eastern frontier suddenly became the eastern limit of a federation depending on the Polish crown, and territories as far as Kiev in the southeast or Smolensk[7] in the northeast were connected with Poland who at that same moment saw herself unexpectedly confronted with a hitherto entirely unknown power, their new eastern neighbor Moscow. But the question which in view of this situation arises before the historian, is not only that connected with Lithuania's expansion before her union with Poland; it is also the question of the real meaning of the constantly used names of Russia, Great Russia, Little Russia, White Russia and the Ukraine.

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[6] Studying the origin of the conflict between Lithuania and Moscow in the first volume of his *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa* (Warsaw, 1935), Paszkiewicz has described in detail the former's expansion before 1385.

IV

"All the Russias"

Writing on almost any problem of Eastern Europe the historian has to distinguish again and again between *Rus* and *Russia.* And when expressing himself in one of the non-Slavonic languages he feels seriously handicapped by the fact that there does not exist in these languages any adequate translation or rather adaptation of the former term which in English, for instance, appears only exceptionally, in artificial spellings like *Rus* or *Russ,* while usually it is simply identified with the latter. That is, however, by no means a mere question of terminology. The name *Rus* whatever may be its origin, undoubtedly covers the whole territory of the state created in the course of the ninth and the tenth centuries by the Varangians, and includes all the various tribes of the eastern Slavs united in that state around its capital Kiev and under the dynasty of Rurik. *Russia,* on the contrary, is the name which in modern history is given to the state which, under one of the branches of that dynasty, originated during the thirteenth century on the colonial territory settled by one of the groups of the eastern Slavs and which in the next century came under the dominance of Moscow and eventually, but not before the end of the eighteenth century, succeeded in uniting the other groups, practically the whole old *Rus*, within the limits of one empire, the greatest in Europe. Hence the title of Czar of "all the Russias."

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[7] Strictly speaking Smolensk, which during the fourteenth century fluctuated between Lithuania and Moscow, was finally attached to the former in 1404.

Of course that historical process may be interpreted in different ways. According to the traditional interpretation of Russian historiography, all the Eastern Slavs should be considered as one Russian nation and the Muscovite state as the organic continuation of the Kievan state, whose center moved from the Dnieper to the Volga, just as in a later period of Russian history it moved from Moscow to St. Petersburg. This viewpoint admits, of course, that there have always been differences between the three main groups of the Russian people: the Great Russians who colonized the vast northeastern regions "beyond the forests"; the Little Russians who remained in the Kievan region, in the steppes of the Ukraine and in the neighborhood of the Poles; and finally, north of them and next to the Lithuanians, the smallest group, the White Russians. But considering these differences as simply regional, and the languages spoken in the three parts of the country as only dialects, Muscovite Russia considered at the same time that she had a natural right to "collect" all the other Russias and to "liberate" them from Lithuanian or Polish rule.

In contradistinction to these opinions that have been accepted almost unanimously by Western historiography, not only Polish or Lithuanian historians but also those representing the Little Russians and the White Russians themselves, in spite of disagreements among themselves on many minor points,[8] all emphasize both the difference of origin and the difference of subsequent evolution between the Western and the Eastern part of what is generally called Russia. And to make it quite clear, they usually limit the old name of *Rus* or, in its Latinized form, Ruthenia, to the western part only, which they never call Russia; while the leaders of the Little Russians, or Ruthenians in the narrowest sense (excluding the White Russians sometimes called the White Ruthenians), went still farther and, to put an end to all confusion and all connection with the Great Russians, adopted the name of Ukrainians. And the Ukraina, in English usually Ukraine, originally a name which simply meant "border," and used to be limited to the steppes on both sides of the lower Dnieper, is now being identified with the whole national territory of the Little Russians.

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[8] The standard work of Ukrainian historiography is Hrushevskii, M., *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy,* in 9 vols., from the origins to 1657. Only the first volume has appeared in a German translation. Among the White Russian historians we should mention Downar-Zapolskii.

We are intentionally calling it a national territory because this second interpretation of eastern Slavonic history distinguishes among the Eastern, just as among the Western or Southern Slavs various nations, although their national consciousness was slower to develop than in Western or even in Central Europe. In addition to the linguistic difference, there must be considered first the racial background which in colonial Great Russia or Muscovy was chiefly Finnish until the Slavonic expansion towards the northeast, and secondly, a still more important point, the growing opposition between the cultural influences which penetrated into the various Russias either from the European West or from the Asiatic East. Old Kievan Russia had never entirely lost her early contacts with the Latin world, not even after the religious schism and the rupture between Byzantium and Rome. That situation began however to change when Kiev ceased to be the political center of all the Russian principalities and those of them which had been created in the Volga basin, became more and more important. But the definitive change was caused by the Tartar conquest in the middle of the thirteenth century. It is true that the domination of those Asiastic invaders was established over the whole of Russia. But while in the western part there was always a strong opposition to the Tartar yoke and while Daniel of Halicz and Volhynia for instance even accepted a royal crown from Pope Innocent IV,[9] the princes of the new colonial Russia, especially those of Moscow who since the beginning of the fourteenth century occupied there the first place, rather attempted to strengthen their position by bowing to the authority of the Khans of the Golden Horde.

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[9] The relations between Halicz and the Holy See in the thirteenth century have been studied by the Ukrainian scholar Chubatyi in *Zapysky Tow. Im. Shevchenka.*

For that very reason the Lithuanian advance toward the Black Sea met with almost no opposition from the numerous principalities occupying the place of the disintegrated Kievan state; it meant liberation from the Tartars and entrance into a federation where the various territories of western Russia could enjoy a large autonomy. But it meant at the same time a complete separation of these regions, inhabited by the ancestors of the White Russians and the Ukrainians, from those where, under the leadership of Moscow, a new Great Russian state was being formed,[10] which was soon to become the basis of a separate Great Russian nation, a Russia in the modern sense.

The union with Lithuania, however, was not yet a final solution of the problem to which cultural sphere the Dvina and Dnieper basins should belong. The Lithuanians, still pagans, fighting the Teutonic Order, and strongly influenced by the orthodox Ruthenians who soon became a majority in the Grand-Duchy, hesitated between Western and Eastern influences. Only by uniting with Poland was the Lithuanian state, one of the largest in Europe, yet threatened from all sides and without internal homogeneity, able to acquire any permanent support. This helpful alliance weighted the scales in favor of the West. Lithuania proper became just as Roman Catholic as Poland and Jagiello's "Russian lands" as well as those which Casimir the Great had won for Poland—in other words, the whole of Ruthenia—was now united in a powerful realm of predominantly Western and Latin character. This Ruthenian population did not abandon either its faith or its language, and remained a nationality distinct from both the Poles and the Lithuanians. But White Russians and Ukrainians who still differed very little from each other now started a national evolution which in reality has little in common with the new development of Muscovite Russia.

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[10] Presnyakov, A. E., *Obrazovanie Velikorusskago gosudarstwa* (Petrograd, 1918) gives the most detailed account of that formation and, for the first time in Russian historiography, has treated it separately from old Kiev Russia.

V

The Frontiers of Lithuania from 1386 to 1569

Jagiello's promise that all his lands should, in one form or another, remain united with Poland, was realized the next year, in 1386, when, baptized and married to the Polish queen, Jadwiga, he was crowned Polish king. But still before the end of the century, it became apparent that the *applicare* of the Krewo treaty could not mean a mere incorporation, and all the conventions which, early in the next century, were concluded by the Polish and the Lithuanian representatives, made it even clearer that the constitution of the new Jagiellonian monarchy would be based on a Polish-Lithuanian dualism. The Lithuanian Grand Duchy obtained a more and more complete status of equality with the Polish kingdom. There remained therefore an internal political frontier between the two parts of the federation: the Eastern frontier of Poland proper, while the Eastern frontier of Lithuania must be considered as the eastern limit of the federation as a whole, a situation which did not change before 1569. Both lines are therefore of interest for those studying the eastern boundaries of Poland.[11]

The first of the two, the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, lost of course a great deal of its importance, thanks to the Polish-Lithuanian union. But even after 1386 it remained controversial until a settlement was obtained, not without serious difficulties, in the middle of the fifteenth century. During more than sixty years, two different sectors of that frontier were the object of recurring disputes: in the north, the old boundaries between the Polish province of Mazovia and Lithuania proper; in the south, the borderline dividing the Ruthenian provinces of both countries, of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy. These will be discussed separately.

The northern sector, from the Bug where that river turns westward to the frontier of East Prussia and almost to the Niemen, covered the former territory of the Yatwingians. A rather narrow strip of land, the center of which was once Drohiczyn while now it is the city of Białystok, disputed, as we shall remember, long before the union treaties, continued to go from hand to hand, sometimes by peaceful change, at other times not without some struggle, until it remained with the Lithuanians. The Polish element was, however, already so strong among the population of Podlasie—that very name indicates the connection with Poland—that Lithuania had to grant them a substantial autonomy, including the use of Polish law. Somewhat later even the use of Polish as the official language was repeatedly demanded. The definite incorporation into Poland proper was eventually decided in 1569, simultaneously with greater territorial changes in the southern sector.

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[11] I have done this in my lectures at Cracow University in 1916-1917, publishing a summary: "Geografia polityczna ziem ruskich Polski i Litwy 1340-1569," *Sprawozdania Tow. Naukowego Warszawskiego,* 1917.

There it was the position of Volhynia and Podolia which was under dispute. The trouble would have been avoided if all Ruthenia, or at least all the Little Russian, Ukrainian provinces of the federation had formed a political unit something like a third constituent part of the Jagiellonian monarchy. But since they had ceased to form such an entity long before they had come partly under Polish and partly under Lithuanian rule, such a solution—we may say such a trialism—was scarcely taken into consideration. What the population of these former principalities, separated from each other for centuries, actually asked for was, first, a local autonomy and, later, participation in the new constitutional liberties granted to the original provinces of Poland and Lithuania from the first years of their common political life.[12]

The question as to whether any of the Ruthenian lands should be connected with Poland or with Lithuania was comparatively easy to decide in all cases where there had been a clear situation before the Polish-Lithuanian union. Thus it was obvious that Halicz or Eastern Galicia should be a part of Poland, while Kiev and the White Russian provinces were to remain Lithuanian. On the contrary, the influences of both countries having penetrated into Volhynia and Podolia ever since the middle of the fourteenth century, it now took almost one hundred years before it was agreed that the main part of the former province, roughly speaking the lands beyond the Bug, should be united with Lithuania, and the main part of the latter with Poland. Why, after another hundred years, not only Volhynia and the rest of Podolia, but also the Kiev province with all the Ukrainian steppes went from Lithuania to Poland, receiving essential autonomy, could not possibly be understood without a thorough investigation into the eastern frontier problems of the Grand-Duchy during the whole Jagiellonian period.[13]

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[12] In 1434 it was granted to the Ruthenians almost simultaneously in both countries.

Thanks to the union with Poland, Lithuania was strong enough not only to maintain, but also to extend her eastern limits up until the middle of the fifteenth century. In 1449, a peace treaty seemed to fix forever the frontier between Lithuania and Muscovy, and even to define the spheres of influence for both countries while friendly relations with the Tartars of Crimea favoured Lithuanian domination even beyond the Dnieper and as far as the Black Sea, a coast reached also by Polish Podolia. But in the second half of the century, especially after the fall of the Republic of Novgorod, insufficiently supported by Lithuania, the equilibrium in Eastern Europe was modified in favor of the growing Muscovite power which, in connection with new Tartar invasions, started a long series of wars against its Western neighbors with a view to conquering all their Russian territories. Some petty principalities along the Oka river, where Lithuania had encroached upon Great Russian regions, were of course occupied first, even before the far-reaching aggression of 1500 when the Jagiellonian state lost about one-third of its borderlands, including the whole province of Severia, bringing the new frontier near to the Dnieper and to the walls of Kiev. In another war, in 1514, Smolensk was taken, and the loss of a second important White Russian city, Polotsk, in 1563, was perhaps a still more serious blow to Lithuania. Somewhat earlier the theater of war had been extended to Livonia, a country which, being menaced by Ivan the Terrible, had placed itself under the protection of Sigismund Augustus, the last of the Jagiellons,[14] but was defended only with the utmost difficulty. The truce concluded in 1570 provisionally left Moscow in possession of all her conquests, threatening Lithuania not only from the East, but also from the North where scarcely more than Riga and the Dvina region remained in her hands.

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[13] All the changes of that frontier have been studied most carefully by Natanson-Leski, *Dzieje granicy wschodniej Rzeczy pospolitej polskiei,* I (covering the Jagiellonian period), Warsaw, 1921.

But during the previous year, decisions had been reached which were to change the issue entirely. Hitherto Lithuania, whose union with Poland was still exclusively assured by the common dynasty and by the person of a common monarch, had to conduct on her own account all the eastern campaigns and, in addition, to assure the first line of defence of the Ukraine against the Tartars. It must be observed that Polish auxiliary forces had participated in the wars against Moscow, sometimes playing a decisive part, and that the Polish frontier guards helped to stop the Tartars when they advanced as far as Podolia or Volhynia. But a better coordination of these common efforts was badly needed, chiefly in the interest of the Lithuanians. For that very reason the common Diet of Lublin in 1569, directed and inspired by King Sigismund Augustus himself, strengthened the ties between the two countries, making their union more organic and fit for common action, and incorporating not only Volhynia and Eastern Podolia but also Kiev with the whole Ukraine into the Polish kingdom.[15]

We have already mentioned that settlement as a change of the internal frontier between the two federated states, a change the more important because henceforth all the Little Russian lands were closely connected with Poland proper, White Russia alone remaining with Lithuania, in conformity with the geographic situation. But it certainly was not less important that from that very moment the whole southern sector of the eastern frontier of the commonwealth formed the eastern frontier of its Polish part;

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[14] I have tried to explain the origin of that decision in "Les Jagellons et la Livonie," *Conventus primus historicorum Balticorum Acta et relata* (Riga, 1938), pp. 347-352. The most detailed description has recently been given in the book of Jasnowski, J., *Mikołaj Radziwilł Czarny* (Warsaw, 1939).

[15] These incorporations are studied in my book *Przytączenie Podlasia, Wołynia i Kijowszczyzny do Korony Polskiej* (Cracow, 1915).

so that now Lithuania had to defend only the northern, White Russian and Livonian sector, while the task of protecting Kiev and the whole burden of watching the Tartars fell upon Poland. Both countries, while remaining fully autonomous in their internal life, were now opposing a common front to their eastern neighbors which then, and for many years to come, seemed to be the most dangerous ones.

VI

From the Union of Lublin to the Partitions

The consequences of the Lublin union, conspicuous as they were in general, influenced more particularly the situation at the eastern boundaries of the "common republic," as the federation used to be called officially. During the last hundred years almost all the changes of these boundaries had been to the benefit of Moscow. On the contrary, soon after 1569 these changes, scarcely less frequent and important, successively restored the old frontier of Lithuania, and during the next century Moscow could make no new advance.

The last Jagiellon did not live to see the achievements which he had so ably prepared. First it was King Stephen Báthory who, after three victorious campaigns, recovered in 1582 the region of Polotsk and the whole of Livonia.[16] Then King Sigismund III's intervention in the Russian troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century resulted in the retaking of Smolensk (1611) which, together with Severia (Chernigov), was ceded to the Republic in the Truce of 1618, and finally, after new victories of his son, Ladislas IV, in the Peace treaty of 1634.[17] The first of the two regained provinces was again made a part of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy which once more comprised the whole of White Russia; the second, traditionally connected with Kiev, became with the other Ukrainian regions a province of the Polish kingdom. It was here, however, in the Ukrainian Southeast, that the intricate Cossack problem, which should be discussed separately,[18] had been causing since the end of the sixteenth century the long series of troubles which, in the middle of the seventeenth led not only to a dangerous insurrection, but also to a still more dangerous intervention of Muscovite Russia. Its consequences proved disastrous for both the Poles and the Ukrainians. In 1654 the Cossacks placed themselves under the Czar's protection and when they realized a few years later that the promise of autonomy of Little Russia under Great Russia's control was a mere fiction, a part of them planned in 1659 a new federal union with Poland and Lithuania.[19] It was already too late. After long years of warfare, the Andrussovo treaty of 1667 divided the Ukraine between Poland and Muscovy, which now definitely became the modern Russia. The latter received the territories beyond the Dnieper, including the city of Kiev on the right bank, and also—from Lithuania—the long-disputed Smolensk province.

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[16] The new frontier under King Stephen Báthory is described in part II of Natanson-Leski's book quoted above.

[17] The frontier of 1634, including the minor changes of the line established in 1618, is the subject of an important contribution by Godziszewski, W., in Vol. II of the proceedings of the new joint Committee created by the leading learned societies of Poland to prepare an historical atlas of Poland *(Prace Komisji Atlasu historycznego Polski).*

This time the new frontier line was to last for more than a century. Confirmed in 1686 under John Sobieski, it was not changed until the first partition of Poland. After the serious losses in the middle of the seventeenth century—in 1657 East Prussia ceased to be a Polish fief and in 1660 almost the whole of Livonia was ceded to the Swedes—the Republic seemed to have definitely fixed boundaries both in the west and in the east. Within these boundaries, unchanged during a century which saw continuous modification of almost all the frontier lines on the European continent, Poland, although remaining a federation of Poland proper—the so-called "Crown"—and Lithuania, became culturally more homogeneous, in spite of the fact that Lithuania and the eastern provinces of the Crown were inhabited by a largely non-Polish population. This unity was in part the result of a gradual process of Polonization, started even under the Jagiellonians. But even more than the Polish language,[20] spontaneously adopted by the Lithuanian and Ruthenian gentry and by a great part of the population of the towns, Western civilization, spreading over the whole territory of the Republic, made it a cultural entity, closely connected with the Latin West of Europe. These intimate bonds, going back to the period of the Renaissance, to Humanism, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation,—all the great trends of European civilization which went as far as Poland's eastern frontier but stopped at that limit—were strengthened now by French influences, which, from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards, dominated Poland's cultural life long before they reached Russia.

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[18] Vols. VII-IX of Hrushevskii's Ukrainian history are almost entirely devoted to it. From the Polish point of view the best discussion of that problem is to be found in Jabłonowski, A., *Historia Rusi południowej* (Cracow, 1912).

[19] The so-called Union of Hadziacz. A new book on that important agreement was in preparation before the present war by Tomkiewicz, W., author of many recent contributions to the history of the Cossack problem.

From that modern Russia, the greatly enlarged old Muscovy, the Russian or rather Ruthenian lands of the Polish Republic differed now even in the religious sphere. As early as 1596 their Orthodox hierarchy had concluded a union with the Roman Catholic Church,[21] reviving the traditions of the Florentine union of 1439, and in the course of the seventeenth century the great majority of the population, at least in the regions which remained with Poland after 1667, became "Uniates." But under Polish influence even Greek Orthodoxy proved not incompatible with Western culture. Such a cultural synthesis was developed in Kiev where the Moghila Academy, the nucleus of the oldest Russian university,[22] created under Polish rule, contributed to intellectual progress on both sides of the political frontier. In general however this eastern Polish frontier, especially as finally established in 1667, was at the same time one of the most important cultural boundaries in Europe. It was in reality the limit of Western civilization.

(To be concluded)

VASSAR COLLEGE

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[20] See Martel, A., *La langue polonaise dans les pays ruthènes aux XVIme et XVIIme siècles* (Lille, 1938), a most remarkable study of Polish cultural influences in the Eastern borderlands.

[21] The book of Likowski, H., on the so-called Union of Brest, first published in Polish in 1896, has appeared in several languages. See also the study of the whole cultural background by Smolka, St., *Les Ruthènes et les problèmes religieux du monde russien* (Rome, 1916) and my *"Le problème de l'Union des Eglises," La Pologne au VIme congrès international des sciences historiques* (Warsaw, 1930), summarized in *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences* (1928), pp. 615-619.

[22] Jabłonowski, A., *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska* (Warsaw, 1900).

AUSTRIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KINGDOM OF GREECE*

by Friedrich Engel-Janosi

II

THE inaction of Metternich during the Egyptian Crisis in 1840 revealed once more the fact that only western problems mattered to him. And he could well be content to sit back and merely watch the rift develop between France and England during this crisis since it was perhaps his main aim, as it was likewise that of Russia, to destroy the alliance of the western powers. The differences between these powers ended in a decisive diplomatic defeat for France, a fact which fitted into Metternich's idea that Austria and England might have a joint policy in the Near East, and, thus, in Greece. He states: "I am little interested in the question as to whether this empire (i. e., Turkey) is Ottoman or Arab. But it shall not be either Russian or French," and he instructed Prokesch that he should cooperate with the British Minister in Athens. This unwelcome instruction provoked from Prokesch the lament: "I consider it as one of the heaviest scourges God could inflict on me that I must have a close and friendly connection with this man."[47] Nevertheless he bowed to the instruction of Metternich, and endeavored to act together with "his dear colleague." The "dear colleague" had, at the same time, received a suggestion from Palmerston's successor that he try to reach a better understanding with the whole diplomatic corps at Athens.[48]

One of the results of the collaboration of Lyons and Prokesch was the appointment of a Greek as Prime Minister, Alexander Mavrocordatos, one of the two most prominent men in the country, who had previously occupied the post of Greek Minister in London, and who was regarded as the head of the pro-

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[47] III/27/41, to Ottenfels in Briefe an Verschiedene, A.P.

[48] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* ed. by A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, II (New York, 1923), 592; Eardley-Wilmot, *loc. cit.,* 93.

*Part I of this study appeared in the April issue of the JOURNAL, pp. 28-44.

English party in Greece. It was well known that he aimed at reconciliation with Turkey, in accordance with the English program. But there was strong opposition to him; he was referred to as the "Fanariot" the name given to Greek residents in Constantinople. This opposition had a long history. Back in the period of the War of Independence Prokesch had already written of him: "all the Greeks were his adversaries,"[49] and in referring to the Greek's short reign of power at this time he says "only the distress of the nation put him at the head of affairs in 1825." In these same early papers of Prokesch in which he speaks of Mavrocordatos' desire to make himself dictator ("the nomination of Capodistrias was the severest blow dealt him"), the Austrian expresses the opinion that he was by far superior to all other Greeks. He describes him as extraordinarily agile, cunning, and vehement, yet yielding; and always on his guard, "A Fanariot in the full meaning of the word." To this picture Metternich adds now: "He is to be relied upon as little as is any Greek."[50] Elected Prime Minister in the spring of 1841, again his reign was brief. Before he had any chance to show his mettle, he fell a victim to "French intrigues and the vanity of the king,"[51] who was opposed to reconciliation with Turkey, and was deposed in September of that same year. This triumph of the French party in Greece was shared by all those who openly sought the realization of "Greater Greece." It is possible that they underestimated the strong opposition that Guizot, the leading Minister of France, would—according to his own words—offer to any change in the near future of the Greek frontiers which, as he himself admitted, had been drawn too tightly by a "troublesome necessity."[52]

After the fall of Mavrocordatos, the struggle for influence began anew between the representatives of the European powers. Metternich sent Prokesch instructions to join with the representatives of Russia and Prussia in forming a moderate, conservative group, but his minister was not able to bring this about.

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[49] "Berührungen und Verhältnisse," A.P. cf. Appendix.

[50] *Briefwechsel,* II, 222; X/24/41.

[51] *D.* IX/10/41, A.P.

[52] Guizot, *loc. cit.,* VI, 262f; VII, 265.

Everywhere trouble seemed to be brewing. Prokesch again envisaged Athens filled with armed riots and feared for the safety of the King: "[Otto] could meet the same end as Capodistrias."[53] In the beginning of 1842 Stratford Canning, who was to become one of the most famous British diplomatists in Constantinople, came to Athens for the purpose of achieving the settlement with Turkey. But Otto proved obdurate, giving as his reason that a treaty with Constantinople would have no value since Turkey would certainly not keep it. In clear opposition to the counsel of England and Austria, the King and the government waged a policy tending to stir the people with nationalistic fervor and induce them to favor an immediate expansion of Greece. The circle closest to the King continued to warn him that only by war with Turkey could his dynasty maintain a real connection with the people. The success of such a conflict, they said, was guaranteed by the fact that all Greeks, on both sides of the fronties, were eager for war against Turkey;[54] Prokesch, however, insisted to the King that these were the ideas, not of the nation, but of a few. Yet, while he might have been correct in his assumption that not all the Greeks were thirsting for war, still they all blamed the king for any political failure of Greece—as for example the failure of the Greeks to buy Crete from the Turks.[55] Crete, not being Greek, stirred up more ill feeling than had the narrowness of the northern boundaries of Volo-Arta. Again Prokesch notes ominously: "The king is today in a situation not unsimilar to that of Capodistrias in 1831"—the year in which the Count was murdered!

We can see from Prokesch's diaries how he felt both exposed and thwarted by the apathy of his government: "King Otto sees and hears only with the eyes and ears of the French party." Yet over almost all Europe there seemed to be spreading a growing indifference to the destiny of Greece. Prokesch himself speaks of it as "a feeling of depression in the nation because of the miserable situation of the country, the incapability of the government and the indifference of the powers." The feeling that "a violent crisis is inevitable" gains ground everywhere: As early as January, 1842, Canning had written that matters in Greece could "not long remain in their present unsatisfactory state." By September 9, 1843, Lyons is ready to report that "as far as talking goes, revolution is already ripe"; four days later he speaks of a mischievous spirit abroad "prompting the government to provoke a revolution."[56] And on the night of the 14th-15th of September the revolution came. It was carried out according to the pattern of the military pronunciamentos of Spain and Italy: a constitution was enforced on King Otto. Prokesch comments: "The King alone with his wretched Bavarians—no choice for him but to abdicate or to sign. He chooses the latter and he is right."[57] The report of the representatives of the protecting powers states imperturbably: "While not believing the catastrophe to be so soon forthcoming, we foresaw it only too certainly."[58] "This, then, is the end of ten years' miserable management," Prokesch enters in his diary. "It could hardly have been otherwise. Financial and social bankruptcy." Earlier, he had hoped that the ministry of Mavrocordatos might save the state from revolution, but, thanks to French, Bavarian and Prussian influences, this was not to be. Now, after the September revolution, Lyons and Prokesch earnestly continue their policy of collaboration for "Otto and the constitution, and a monarchy." Indeed, for some years, Prokesch had been in favor of a constitution—if not too radical—though one introduced by peaceful means.[59] But the efforts of the two ministers met now with little support from the other representatives: the French Minister was not sure but that he might lend his support to a leftist movement; the Russian Minister, convicted of conniving with the Philorthodoxes, left Athens. But the behavior of Otto in this moment was encouraging. Accepting the situation, he nevertheless showed stamina, rejecting the advice that would have persuaded him to overthrow the constitution as well as the counsels of Louis who would see the Greek constitution modified according to the principles of German Diets. In regard to this paternal counsel Prokesch exclaims in a letter to Metternich: "I pray with the King and the Queen that Heaven may protect us from the rashness of our friends!" But he adds, "The position of the King is now excellent—so excellent that he could stand having ten Bavarian ambassadors."

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[53] *Briefwechsel,* II, 229, XI/13/41; *Johann,* 130, VI/27/41; an Verschiedene VIII/12/41.

[54] *Briefwechsel,* II, 235.

[55] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* II, 591; Eardley-Wilmot, *loc. cit.,* 86ff.

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[56] Eardley-Wilmot, *loc. cit.*, 95; IX/13/43, R.O.
[57] *D.* IX/15/43, A.P.
[58] IX/16/43, R.O.
[59] Guizot, *loc. cit.*, VII, 275; VII/2/40, R.O.

Now that the situation of Otto had gained in strength, the main task became that of choosing the new leader who could guide the destiny of Greece. The two great sons of Greece came back home, Mavrocordatos arriving in the first part of October, Kolettes hardly a month later. The one was brought to Greece on an English ship, the other on a French. To the French, and particularly to Piscatory, it was Kolettes—"the most Greek of all Greeks, as he was once called"[60] who represented the man of the hour. As Minister to Paris, Kolettes had stored up rich political experiences. Prokesch, when he knew him in the years of the War of Independence had been rather distrustful of him. While acknowledging his keen judgment, he also perceived in him a kind of bold treachery: "an outstanding intriguer even among the Greeks: and that is something." Kolettes' Greek following largely consisted of the "captains" *(pallikares)*, the clan chieftains, many of whom had been the popular heroes of the war of Independence. These were little interested in matters of European diplomacy, their aim being simply to enjoy the ruling position in Greece once held by the Turks, along with all the luxurious concomitants of such a position. Something of the attitude of these "captains" is revealed in the remarks which Kolettes once made to Prokesch: "If the government should say that it will pay for 2000 men to defend a certain pass, and a captain takes charge of the defense and carries it through to success, is it not only fair that the government should pay him for 2000 men, even though he had but 500?"[61]

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[60] Driault, Ed., *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce,* II (Paris, 1925), 267.

Even before Kolettes had arrived in Greece, there were rumors of his plans for "Greater Greece." In accordance with their policy Lyons and Prokesch gave their support to Mavrocordatos, as they had done before. To obtain his election they even considered supporting the participation in the new cabinet of Metaxas, the highly influential, though not particularly gifted, leader of the pro-Russian party. As a matter of fact, it was Metaxas himself whom the King decided to choose as the first post-revolutionary Prime Minister. His stay in office lasted but briefly; all during his ministry Mavrocordatos and Kolettes continued to put forth their claims of fitness to solve the Greek problem, with the immediate result that the "Fanariot" was chosen by the King to replace Metaxas.

The ministry of Mavrocordatos was one of the periods of Lyons' greatest influence, when he could assume the role of "the real protector" of Greece. Russian influence had not yet recovered from the blow it suffered from the events of September 15, and as for Austria, her influence in Athens was scarcely helped by the attitude of Metternich, who remarked at this time that he considered the whole of the "Greek boutique" as rubbish—dangerous rubbish, but still rubbish. Thus, while Prokesch himself was sincerely devoted to the Greek King and the Greek nation, and never relaxed his efforts to maintain the constitution, yet his situation was one to be pitied. For more than ten weeks he had not received a line from Vienna. "And now," he says, "I am to try to persuade the King that Vienna is interested in the court at Athens."[62]

Mavrocordatos lasted hardly longer than had Metaxas before him. This man who, according to the French Minister, was always ready to substitute cunning for energetic activity, had neither the vitality of Kolettes, nor the latter's extensive following throughout the nation. After four months he was overthrown, to be succeeded by Kolettes. But the latter found it necessary to invite Metaxas to share in his ministry, which, as an indication of Russian influence, immediately aroused the opposition of Lyons. Along with Kolettes the "captains" flocked into the capital; the secret password spread that the Greeks on both sides of the frontiers must be reunited; riots broke out at the nation's boundaries. At such a time Prokesch perceived how dangerous for Greece was England's hostility: "If the western powers let King Otto fall, he is lost—this very moment. And after him will come anarchy and riots, spreading as far as the gates of Constantinople."[63] Once more he went to Vienna with the purpose of interceding for Greece, and once more he was disappointed. At the moment the Viennese politicians seemed to be interested only in Hungarian affairs. Finally, however, he managed to procure from Metternich "a démarche for King Otto at the important courts, with the aim of substituting an alliance of all the great powers in the place of the former three-power alliance."[64] Such a new coalition, which would mean the inclusion of the two conservative states of Austria and Prussia, could have done much to strengthen the position of the King in Athens. But Berlin and London refused to cooperate and the plan met with failure. Metternich wrote: "The moral of the story is that it is impossible to do anything really good for Greece." To this he added: "No one has ever created a state; states must create themselves."[65]

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[61] *Jugendzeit*, 56, cf. "Gura" in *Appendix.*

[62] *D.* II/9/44, A.P.

And it seemed that Kolettes was determined to use all means at his disposal to the end that Greece might create herself. Prokesch says of him at this time: "In him is concentrated all the energy that this country is capable of mustering";[66] It is in his papers too that we find the following description of the *modus operandi* of the new Prime Minister: "It is after the Turkish fashion that Kolettes carries on his affairs—and this is quite all right. He chats from morning to night, always cordial and affable; he knows how to send people away satisfied or at least hopeful. He puts nothing down in writing—or at least as little as possible; he is a cautious and judicious man. And he takes hold of things from their practical side."[67] The opposition in Greece called Kolettes a barbarian and indeed he cared as little for Greek classic antiquity as had Capodistrias; even the French, who supported him, looked upon his "captains" as *canaille*.

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[63] *Johann,* 193, V/6/44.

[64] *D.* X/10/44, A.P.

[65] *Briefwechsel,* II, 287, XII/26/44; Comte de Nesselrode, *Lettres et Papiers,* VIII (Paris), 259.

[66] *Briefwechsel,* II, 299; IV/26/46.

Kolettes' policy was continually opposed by England.[68] It was the French representative with whom Kolettes worked as ally, and it was France on whom he relied, for he believed that France was willing that Greece should be really independent. Even among the Frenchmen in Athens, however, there were those who foresaw that, in the event of a Greek crisis, France would play the same spineless role that she had in the Egyptian affair of 1840, and that again England would be triumphant. Guizot himself, for all his Philhellenism, writes: "However great may be our interest in Greece, it is not there that our greatest problems lie."[69] As for the German states, there was obviously little chance that they would risk all for Greece, and even less that Metternich's "incredible apathy" (as Thouvenel termed it) toward the Greek problem would change. The fact that all groups were, at this time, striving to bring about an Austrian intervention in Greece undoubtedly appealed to the Austrian Chancellor's self-reliance, but that was all. His interests were fixed in western and southern Europe, and he took great pains to avoid a strain on the forces of Austria. In September of 1847 he wrote: "I had foreseen the events in Middle Italy, and thus you can understand my desire to bring the Greek quarrel to an end."[70] Prokesch's wife, who had been in Austria in the spring of that same year, heard in the political salons of Vienna (and reported this to her husband) that Austria was already prepared to agree to the abdication of the childless King of Greece.[71] Thus the choice remained for Greece to become either English or Russian, the alternative which Lyons had proposed at the very beginning of his mission in Athens. But Prokesch and the King continued to believe in the possibility of an independent Greece. They thought the outspoken British Minister to be misled and incapable of a true understanding of British policy. Even Metternich himself underrated its real aim. He thought that the opposition against Kolettes was merely "a phase in Palmerston's feud with the rulers of France."[72]

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[67] To Ottenfels V/10/45, to the archduke Johann XII/21/45, an Verschiedene, A.P.

[68] When Prokesch visited London in 1856, Stratford Canning as well as Palmerston spoke of Kolettes unfavorably; *D.* VIII/24, 28/46, A.P.

[69] Guizot, *loc. cit.,* VII, 341; Thouvenel, *loc. cit.,* 30, 107.

[70] A.P.

[71] IV/25/47, V/1/47, A.P.

Thus the three years of Kolettes' ministry represented a courageous but futile struggle in the field of foreign relations. For Greece was completely dependent financially upon her three protecting powers,[73] and particularly upon England—a fact which Lyons seized upon on several occasions in order to interfere in Greek policy. Nor were the complications that arose within his ministry limited to dealings with Western Europe. There is, for example, the incident connected with the Turkish Minister Musurus which, originating in a minor affair of diplomatic etiquette, was aggravated by the intronsigent attitude of Musurus[74] to a political conflict of serious proportions. The flames were fanned as high as possible by Turkey, who saw in Kolettes a dangerous political adversary, and finally Metternich was called in as arbitrator. Though aware that right was on the side of the Greeks, Metternich allowed his desire to have done with things promptly to prevail.

During these difficult times Prokesch underwent a change of heart. As may be remembered he had backed Mavrocordatos against Kolettes after the September revolution, but, as time went on, slowly and hesitatingly, but finally with complete conviction, he went over to Kolettes' side. Naturally his diplomatic colleagues commented on this change, and Prokesch was attacked by the British and by that part of the Greek press that was allied with the British legation. But Prokesch writes:[75] "Nothing shall lead me astray; they shall perceive that an Austrian officer... knows how to keep his path straight and to defend a throne attacked from all sides—even though he have little hope of saving it." He was to write to Gobineau some years later: "do not ask me what the purpose is; we fulfill our vocation and that is enough. We always serve aims quite other than those in which we believe."[76]

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[72] *Briefwechsel,* II, 305; *D.* VI/3/47, IX/1/47, A.P.

[73] An attempt to procure a loan from the Viennese Rothschild seems to have been unsuccessful, cf. Metternich to Pr. and Rothschild to Prokesch, both V/8/47, A.P. and *Briefwechsel,* II, 301.

[74] Musurus had been employed as private secretary by the Austrian Admiral Dandolo and by Prokesch about 20 years before.

As for the internal policy of Kolettes, this went smoothly enough during the first part of his ministry—as long, that is, as he maintained his alliance with Metaxas, the leader of the Russophiles. But this alliance, which no party took very seriously, could not, by its very nature, long endure. It was impossible, for example, that confidence should continue to exist between Otto and Metaxas, because of Russia's hostility against the King. So that when the inevitable break came with Metaxas, and Kolettes had to face alone complications on the internal front in addition to those arising out of his international policy, he was not equal to this double burden. Finally (for the Musurus incident was still fresh) Prokesch himself, along with the new Prussian Minister, Werther, with whom he was in complete accord, advised Kolettes to withdraw from his post. In answer the Prime Minister said that he had already considered this step, but that he was doubtful if the monarchy at this moment was well able to stand another shake-up.[77] Death settled the matter; even as he spoke the Greek statesman was already suffering from the malady that was to prove fatal, and two weeks later, in September, 1847, he died—the man to whom Prokesch had written (in May 1846): "You alone can secure the future of this country, this country which I have loved and still love." Years later, when the Austrian Minister, an aged man, looked over the notes he had written many years before, he inserted an additional comment to his earlier description of Kolettes: "If he had lived, he would have rescued Greece." And we know that Guizot called Kolettes the most glorious of the survivors of the War of Independence, and the only one among them who grew to the stature of an important "politician." At the funeral of Kolettes, "all of Athens, half of Greece" took part.[78]

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[75] To Ottenfels VIII/10/45, an Verschiedene, A.P.
[76] *Correspondence Prokesch-Gobineau* (Paris, 1933), 98.
[77] *D.* VIII/17, 21/47, A.P.

Prokesch's activity in Greece after the death of Kolettes might be termed an anticlimax and a rather unpleasant one. He had nothing to fear for the sake of Greece from the European Revolution of 1848, which left practically no trace in that country, but he was continually plagued, either by "incidents" such as the Don Pacífico affair—and as long as the hostility of Lyons and Palmerston continued such incidents were always imminent—or by the internal situation of the country with its inveterate weaknesses that could ever prove sources of danger. The King continued to remain a Roman Catholic, and since he was childless, the question of succession to the throne was unsettled. Moreover, because of the wretched internal policy of the country, it was impossible to bring together the men who might have formed a strong government. This last obstacle was particularly perilous. But perhaps the greatest danger to the future of the monarchy lay in the hostility of Russia. Prokesch speaks of a letter of the Tsar in the spring of 1847 as furnishing further evidence of this: "it is clear proof to me that King Otto has been forsaken."

The king kept changing his government by shifting about, one after the other, whoever still remained of the leaders of the War of Independence. Motivated in this by his desire to placate the different European powers, he constantly had on his hands the oddest imaginable assortment representing the diverse parties in the country. In this way he succeeded in wasting completely whatever talents the members might have possessed, among them those of Mavrocordatos and Metaxas. Kolettes' successor was a man who was said to believe with special favor that the cross was soon again to be erected on the Hagia Sophia.[79] We may get a glimpse of the situation at Athens from an entry in Prokesch's diary, in regard to the forming of a Greek ministry in March 1848: "A hint to Persiany (the Russian Minister) that I would not be opposed to a Mavrocordatos-Metaxas ministry which would include also an element of the nationalistic party. He will report this to Lyons. With Their Majesties in the evening, I point out to them the necessity of forming a new ministry—an English-Russian one."

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[78] *D.* IX/13/47, A.P.

[79] IX/20/47, R.O.

For long, and in vain, the nation and the King had looked for a clear, binding statement from the great Powers. Instead of the clarity they desired, there existed, in the shadows, a continuously changing co-regency consisting of various members of the diplomatic corps. This was a government lacking in cohesion which was forced to depend for its momentum on the energy and ideas of single personalities who were all too subject to sudden shifts of policy. Yet, though this co-regency was irresponsible enough in all conscience, there is no reason to doubt Piscatory's enthusiasm for the "New Hellas," or the sincerity of Prokesch who said that he had loved this country for so many years, and still loved it. During his residence in Athens he completed a study of the Greek War of Independence which has become a classic and his vacations were mostly spent in an often successful hunt for antique inscriptions and sculptures throughout the country; "respect Antiquity, it is the Palladium of Modern Greece," he wrote to Kolettes in 1846.[80] It must also be pointed out that the late-comer Werther performed his duties very conscientiously. Of them all, however, it is Lyons who, by the sheer force of his will, stands out preeminent.

When, in the early months of 1849, the Austrian and British Ministers were recalled,[81] it might have been said that a period of Greek diplomatic history had been brought to a close.

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[80] *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reich* (Wien, 1867).

[81] Prokesch left Athens February 18, Lyons March 26, 1849. *D.* II/20/49; on board: "Heitere Nacht, früh bei Kap Matapan. Betrachte noch einmal Schritt für Schritt das vielbekannte Land, den im Schnee strahlenden Taygetos."

APPENDIX

Characterization of some Greek leaders by Prokesch from his manuscript "Berührungen und Verhältnisse" written 1820-1830. (Archives of Prokesch-Schleinitz.)

Church. Engländer, neapolitanischer General, Generalissimus der Griechen. Nauplia 1827. Artiger Mann, aber wie ein Theaterprinz angekleidet. Wahrschleinlich vom besten Willen, aber von wenig Fähigkeiten. Wir trafen uns zuerst im Hafenschlosse Burzi, wo ich eine unangenehme Verhandlung mit der Regierung hatte. Die Griechen nannten Church den Goeletten General, weil er während des 6. Mai an Bord seines Schiffes sich befunden hatte.

Gura. Rumeliote; schöner, kräftiger, junger Mann. Ganz roh, aber einer der griechischen Häuptlinge, welche am meisten natürliche Anlagen besassen. Treulos und falsch wie alle; grausam, geld—und ehrbegierig; ein christlicher Türke. Seine Schule machte er unter Ali-Pascha von Janina, und Odysseus. Der Streich, der ihn bemerkbar machte, war der Mord eines Türken in Athen, der sich die Feindschaft des Tyrannen von Janina zugezogen hatte. Er ging wochenlange mit demselben um, machte denselben ganz sicher, trank mit ihm in einer Kaffeestube auf dem Markte, passte ihm im Nachhause-Gehen auf und schoss ihn nieder. Gropius und Gura selbst zeigten mit 1825 die Stelle; man sah noch das Pulverschwarz an der Wand. Odysseus rettete ihn nach dieser Tat aus den Händen des Pascha von Negropont und Gura wurde der Lieutenant des Odysseus. So fand sie die Revolution. Odysseus hob seinen Lieutenant mit sich und Gura erscheint mit ihm als Strategos, da jener Häuptling von ganz Attika war. Odysseus tat ihm sogar die Ehre an, Gura's Namen neben den seinigen auf das Bollwerk zu setzen, das er an der Akropolis unter den Propylaeen baute. Gura fasste nun den Gedanken seinem Wohltäter über den Kopf zu steigen. Dieser selbst und Kolokotronis gaben ihm dazu die Gelegenheit. Odysseus trat mit den Türken in Unterhandlung und Kolokotronis lehnte sich in der Morea gegen die Regierung auf. Gura wurde der Mann der Regierung, marschierte über den Isthmos, verheerte und zerstörte Korinth, überwand Kolokotronis im Tretos und brachte diesen bis zur Auslieferung seiner selbst. Nun ging Gura nach Athen und richtete sich als Herr dort ein. Von diesem Augenblicke blieb seine Stellung gegen die Regierung zweifelhaft. Er hatte jedoch Kolettes zum Freund und war dafür dessen Stütze. Die Freigehung Kolokotronis' und der Rückzug der Rumelioten verwundeten ihn, aber er war klug genug um einzusehen, die Hauptsache sei, dass er sein Fürstentum gegen die Türken verteidige. Er zog daher in die Umgebungen des Parnass zu Felde, dort lockte er Odysseus in die Falle, der seinen Frieden mit den Griechen zu machen drohte und von dessen Rache er alles zu fürchten hatte. Er gab ihm die heiligsten Versprechungen und sobald sich Odysseus ausgeliefert hatte, legte er ihn in Ketten und sandte ihn nach Athen. Die Regierung verlangte den Gefangenen. Gura gab ihn nicht und um aller

Gefahren und Sorgen deshalb los zu sein, liess er ihn erwürgen. Gura zog gewöhnlich für 7000 Mann Sold und im Verhältnis Lebensmittel, sooft und solange der eine und die anderen zu haben waren. Die wirkliche Zahl seiner Truppen stieg kaum auf 1000 Mann. Er plünderte Attika regelmässig aus. Alle seine Schätze häufte er auf der Akropolis auf, zu deren Wächter sein Vetter Mamuris und seine Frau bestellt waren. Diese, eines Primaten Tochter aus Menidi, fühlte die Fürstin. Jung, schön, stets reich geschmückt und gekleidet, erregte sie ausserdem Interesse durch liebreiche Formen. Sie ging nie ohne eine Schar von dienenden Mädchen aus und alle Soldaten verneigten sich vor ihr. Mamuris erschien nur als ihr Kastellan; sie aber als Herrin und Burgfrau. Ich liess mich ihr während meiner ersten Anwesenheit zu Athen (May 1825) durch Dr. Vitalis, ihren Haus– und Gewissensarzt, vorstellen, sah sie im August und September desselben Jahres häufig, sprach ihre Protektion an und befand mich gut dabei. Es war gegen Ende August, dass Gura aus dem Felde zurückkam. Sein Einzug in Athen war der eines Fürsten in seine Stammburg. Ich ging ihm mit Gropius auf der Strasse von Eleusis entgegen. Alles Volk lief ihm entgegen. Von der Akropolis donnerten die Kanonen. Er ritt ein arabisches Ross mit Anstand und glänzte in Schmutz. Auf der Akropolis empfing ihn seine Frau im vollen Staate und führte ihn ins Bad; denn bei den Griechen ist es Sitte während der Zeit als sie gegen den Feind stehen, das Hemd nicht zu wechseln. Im Umgang gefiel mir Gura. Er war offen und stolz. Bald zeigte sich was ihn so früh aus dem Felde zurück geführt hatte. Es war die Furcht gewesen, das Opfer der Politik Mavrocordatos' zu werden. Gura erklärte, sich für die französische Partei, durch Roche, de Rigny und Sophianopulos bearbeitet, hauptsächlich aber aus Hass gegen die englische. Vergeblich liess ihn Mavrocordatos zur Unterzeichnung der Unterwerfungs Akte (September 1825) einladen; vergebens wurden Tombazes, Stavro Johannes u. a. eigens deshalb an ihn gesendet und sogar Kolokotronis bewogen, ihm zu schreiben. Gura erklärte sich offen dagegen. Unter dem Vorwande des Angriffes auf Negropont, machte Mavrocordatos das Korps der Taktikos nach Athen rücken. Gura ging nicht in die Falle und Fabvier, obwohl scheinbar gut behandelt, brachte keinen Teil seiner Truppen ins Schloss. Gura verliess nun Athen nicht mehr und häufte Vorräte in der Akropolis. Im Jahre 1826 rückte Mehmed—Reschid Pascha vor Athen und begann die Belagerung. Gura wehrte sich brav, wurde aber im Dezember auf der Bastion vor den Propylaeen während der Nacht durch eine Flintenkugel erschossen.

Seine Frau zeigte sich als Heldin in dieser Gelegenheit und ist überhaupt der schönste weibliche Charakter, den die griechische Revolution aufstellt. Sie ermutigte die Besatzung und wurde von ihr als Kapitanesse anerkannt. Einige Wochen später stürzte das Erechteion, das sie bewohnte, während der Nacht ein und begrub sie mit zehn Frauen. Darf ich Fabviers Versicherung glauben, so hätte sie gerettet werden können, Mamuris aber wehrte, dass man noch während der Nacht grabe, und zwar aus Heisshunger nach ihren Schätzen, denn er war Erbe. Am nächsten Morgen fand man die Körper erstickt, noch warm.

Kolettes, aus Rumelien; Arzt Ali Pascha's. 1825 einer der fünf, welche die Gewalt in Händen hatten und bei weitem der fähigste damals zu Nauplia. Die Seele der Rumelioten; Feind Kolokotronis' und Mavrocordatos'. Selbst unter den Griechen ein ausgezeichneter Intrigant, was viel sagen will. Durch ihn erhielt ich Pässe und Empfehlungen zur Reise von Nauplia nach Athen zu Lande und zum Einlass in Akrokorinth. Von Mavrocordatos' Erhebung datiert sein Fall; aber jener behandelte ihn lange mit Vorsicht und sogar mit Aufmerksamkeit. Beile fielen fast gleichzeitig. 1826, da das Festland so gut als verloren war, liess sich Kolettes, Deputierter bei der Nationalversammlung von Troizene, mit dem Kiaja des Seraskiers von Rumelien in Briefwechsel ein und machte eine Unternehmung auf Talantis scheitern. Obwohl der Verrat zu Tage lag, wagte sich niemand an ihn. Während der Unruhe zu Nauplia 1827 figurierte Kolettes unter den Liguisten. Viel Aeusseres, gute Sprache, Schärfe im Urteil, kalte Treulosigkeit, Terrorist.

(Addition written in later years): Wie gemildert in späteren Jahren und wie mir wahrer Freund geworden! Niemand hatte wie er die Gabe stiller Heiterkeit und die mächtige auf das Volk zu wirken. Hätte er gelebt, er wäre der Retter Griechenlands geworden.

Kolokotronis. Chef der Moreoten. Derber roher Mann; kräftigen Körpers, lebhaften Ausdrucks, sehr gesprächig. Er hatte mehrmals das Schicksal Griechenlands in Händen, aber sein Geiz machte ihn die Gelegenheit versäumen. Gura und Kolettes waren seine Hauptgegner. Der erste überwand ihn 1824 bei Korinth und zwang ihn sich seinen Feinden auszuliefern. Der andere wollte ihn hinrichten machen, um Griechenland ein Beispiel zu geben, und Mavrocordatos stimmte in diesen Entschluss, für den überdies Gura eifrig sprach. Die Landung Ibrahim Paschas 1825 in Morea und der Fall Navarins entschieden seine Freiheit, denn man hatte keinen anderen Weg, die Moreoten aufzuregen, als Kolokotronis an ihre Spitze zu stellen, Aus seinem Gefängnisse zu Hydra wurde er nach Nauplia gebracht (Mai 1825) und zum Generalissimus ernannt. Damals hätte er Griechenlands Diktator werden können; aber er tat wenig. Ich sah ihn im Oktober desselben Jahres, wo er Geld zu fordern nach Nauplia gekommen war. Damals war er noch gerade so bedeutend, um ihm Versprechungen machen zu müssen, bei denen man sich freilich die Nichterfüllung insgeheim vornahm. Er sprach verständig und gefiel mir in seinen Worten.—In Jahre 1826 tat er nichts. 1827, als die Meinung war, dass Griechenland verloren sei, suchte er erst Nauplia, dann Korinth durch Bestechung und Verrat an sich zu bringen, wahrscheinlich um seinen Teilfrieden mit den Türcken machen zu können, kam aber in beiden Gelegenheiten gegen die Rumelioten zu kurz. Uebrigens galt er für einen Anhänger der englischen Partei und hatte 1825 sogar Gura zur Unterzeichnung der Unterwerfungs-Akte, obwohl vergeblich, eingeladen. Sein Sohn Genaios zählt unter den Generalen. Ein junger, eitler Mann, klein von Gestalt, ohne interessanten Gesichtsausdruck; immer reich gekleidet und von zahlreichem Gefolge begleitet. Ein jüngerer Sohn war Fabviers Liebling (1825), damals etwa 14 Jahre alt, ein allerliebster, kühner, schöner Junge. Der Vater liess ihn vor mir exerzieren und reiten; das war des Knaben Lust.

Mavrocordatos, Alexander Fürst.—Phanariote im vollen Sinne des Wortes. In Europa zu viel und zu wenig geschätzt. Mann von Kenntnissen, Fleiss, gewöhnlicher europäischer Bildung, ungemein regsam, schlau, heftig dabei fügsam und stets auf seiner Hut. Allen andern Personen auf dem Schauplatz weit überlegen; nicht ohne klare Ansichten von den Bedürfnissen seines Landes. An Jahren einige dreissig. Trug sich fränkisch, was den Griechen sehr misfiel. Angenehme Gestalt und Umgangsformen. Im Lachen etwas Wildes. Gar nicht Militär und seine Tätigkeit oft im kleinen zersplitternd.—Alle Griechen waren seine Feinde und nur die grosse Not des Vatelandes konnte ihn 1825 an die Spitze der Geschäfte stellen. Er suchte mit allen Kabinetten anzubinden und entschied sich endlich für das englische, aber gewiss anfänglich nur als Mittel, um sich festzu halten. Die Idee, sich zum Diktator aufzuschwingen, schwebte ihm lebendig vor, aber die Mittel versagten ihm. Nachdem er die Unterwerfungsakte an England (September 1825) durchgeführt hatte, griff er die französische Partei mit einer gewagten, in Griechenland bis heutzutage unerhörten Strenge an. Ihre Chefs . . . wurden eingekerkert. Mavrocordatos baute auf die Taktikos, aber die Katastrophe von Karisto, der Fall von Missolunghi und der Nichtausspruch des englischen Kabinetts stürzten seine Hoffnungen.—Die Ernennung des Grafen Capodistrias war der empfindlichtse Streich, der auf ihn geführt wurde.—Mavrocodatos schloss sich nun wieder inniger an Hamilton und der Londoner Traktat zeigte ihm wenigstens sein Vaterland, gerettet, wenn auch nicht zu seinen Füssen.—Da ich Mavrocordatos im Juli 1827 zu Poro wiedersah, war er in Bedauern erregender Niedergeschlagenheit. Der Fall von Athen, die Feigheit der Truppn, die Unzulänglichkeit von Church und Cochran, der Geldmangel, die Auflösung, die sich überall in Griechenland zu zeigen begann, liessen kaum mehr einer Hoffnung Raum. Wenige Tage darauf kam die Nachricht von der Unterzeichnung des Traktates von London.—Mavrocordatos lebte mit sehr wenigem. Die Vorwürfe, dass er gleich den übrigen griechischen Chefs sich bereichert habe, sind falsch. Er gab vielmehr alles das seinige.

REVIEWS

Wedgwood, C. V., *The Thirty Years War.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. Pp. 544. $4.50.

Beller, E. A., *Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years War.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. Pp. 50, 24 plates + 1 frontispiece. $10.00.

Watson, F., *Wallenstein. Soldier under Saturn.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938. Pp. 440. $4.00.

Ahnlund, Nils, *Gustav Adolf the Great.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. Pp. 314. $3.00.

The interest of European and American scholars in the Thirty Years War has increased notably during the last decade. A complete history of the stormy years, a monograph and two biographies have been added recently to the series of studies in English of that period of European history.

Miss C. V. Wedgwood's work is a comprehensive account of political, constitutional and religious struggles which raged on the continent of Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century. Her book has replaced the English version of A. Gindely's *History of the Thirty Years War* which had been for several generations an indispensable guide through the labyrinth of diplomatic negotiations and military actions. With great courage the author has approached the difficult subject which many Continental historians of that period have hesitated to treat as a whole, preferring monographs and analytical studies to a general survey. Her book is well organized and constructed. Only after long and systematic study, of which the *apparatus criticus* gives ample evidence, was it possible to separate essential facts from insignificant happenings and to present diplomatic moves and military actions in their proper setting. In twelve chapters the author carries the long struggle from the first signs of the grave crisis in the early seventeenth century to the Peace of Westphalia and concludes with a succinct estimate of the political effects of the war as well as of its social and economic results. The volume takes a prominent place among the recent contributions to historical literature on the seventeenth century and will very likely remain for a long time on the shelves without a rival.

The history of the Thirty Years War is to a great extent a gallery of portraits of rulers, statesmen, diplomats, and warriors who successively appeared on the stage and molded the destinies of the peoples of Europe. Whoever attempts to distribute fairly the light and shadow on that picture confronts a very delicate task. There was scarcely a single impartial observer or chronicler during the whole period of bitter struggles for predominance in Europe whose judgment modern historians could accept without scruple. In the bibliography of contemporary writings eulogies alternate with fierce attacks almost under every heading. Europe was in those fateful years not less sharply divided than it is nowadays. It was difficult even for mediocre writers to take a middle course or to keep any appearance of neutrality. Miss Wedgwood has not identified herself either with the Catholic or with the Protestant camp. It was evidently her desire to establish the truth through a comparison of contradictory testimony and by careful weighing both of censure and of praise. In some cases, however, her characterizations betray indebtedness to writers from the Imperial party and to their comments upon people and events. There is very little in her book that could be quoted in favor of the ill-fated Elector of the Palatinate, Frederick V, or of his wife; "incompetent," "over-trustful," "obstinate," "wrong-headed"—such adjectives are used in connection with their names. On the other hand she passes a milder verdict on the policy and personal qualities of Emperor Ferdinand II, against whom the Protestant writers of the period mostly directed their bitterest invectives. Other instances of a slight leaning toward writers from the Imperial camp could be quoted. They usually attacked. Their voice was, as a rule, sharper as well as stronger, and their arguments more plausible than the wearisome *apologiae* of the Protestant Estates with heavy documentary vindications of their cause. Self-assurance was combined with satire in the writings of Jesuit commentators and secured for them more popularity with their contemporaries than the Protestants were able to command. The art of propaganda was highly developed. The Catholic writers made on the whole more use of it, and thus made a deeper impression upon men and events.

Miss Wedgwood has quite properly treated the Thirty Years War as a European conflict. Thus she has been able to provide a very broad frame for her colorful picture. She has perceived that from the very beginning of the crisis more was at stake than the future of Protestantism and the preservation of ancient privileges of the Estates in Bohemia and in other Habsburg lands. She was well prepared for an exhaustive study of the conflicting interests and of the course of the war. In the bibliography, as well as in the footnotes, she refers to writings in English, French, Latin, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and Swedish. It would really be very difficult to produce an adequate account of the war and of its effects upon life in Europe without at least a reading knowledge of languages of peoples who had an active part in political or military actions. The few Czech titles were doubtless taken either from bibliographies or from works in German.

The sections of the book dealing with the situation in the Bohemian Kingdom are based for the most part on scholarly works in German. Miss Wedgwood has made a serious attempt to weave the conflicts in Bohemia into the texture of her narrative and she has largely succeeded. There are, however, some gaps or weak spots in her narrative. As far as the period of the struggle in Bohemia in 1618-1620 is concerned, it is to be regretted that not more attention has been paid to V. L. Tapié's recent book *La politique étrangère de la France et le début de la Guerre de Trente Ans*. The French historian was well acquainted with monographs and articles of modern Czech scholars who in many ways corrected or supplemented Gindely's views. But even with the help of Gindely's *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges* in four volumes, to which the author often refers, it would have been possible to give a more precise and comprehensible survey of events in Bohemia and to avoid inaccuracies or omissions. A *lapsus memoriae* probably accounts for the incorrect date of the death of John Hus and of Jerome of Prague (p. 69). The same might be said of the year of the foundation of the Jesuit order (p. 21) and several minor points, such as the title of Calvin's *Institutiones.*

But more serious is the occasional inaccurate rendering of Gindely's statements and arguments which has obscured in several cases the treatment of conditions in Bohemia. The structure of Czech society would have largely differed from conditions in other countries if the Estates of Bohemia really, as she says, "consisted of three divisions, nobles, burghers and peasants" and if the nobles really had been acting "on the advice of committees of peasants and burghers" (p. 71, 72). As a matter of fact not even in the period of revolution in 1618-1620 did the peasant class rise to such prominence. Of the leaders of the rebellion only Andreas Count Schlick and Heinrich Matthias Count Thurn have attracted the author's attention. Nothing has been said of the spokesmen of the Moravian nobility (e. g. Žerotín) or of the leaders of the strong group of noblemen from Bohemia who sympathized with the Calvinists and paved the way into Bohemia for Frederick of the Palatinate. Without at least mentioning them it is difficult to explain why the Estates decided for his election and what considerations outweighed the obvious risks of such a decision. But even passages concerning Thurn differ in several points from biographical data clearly established by Gindely. The discrepancy between his text and Miss Wedgwood's narrative gives the facts a different meaning. For instance, according to her, (p. 76) "Thurn as a mere knight in the Estates had no vote at the election of Ferdinand II," but Gindely showed beyond question that Thurn, as a member of the group of high dignitaries of the country (he held the office of the Burggrave of Karlstein and as a Count could not be a mere knight in the Estates), participated in discussions concerning the election and clearly stated his position. What is said (p. 74) of Thurn's education in the Catholic faith and of his knowledge of Czech also differs from Gindely's account to which the footnote refers. It would have been possible to learn from Gindely that the President of the Bohemian Directory, V. V. de Ruppa, and not Thurn conducted negotiations with Frederick's advisers (p. 85). Of several minor errors which have slipped into Miss Wedgwood's discussion of Ferdinand's procedure against the Czechs two may be mentioned. There are really more signs of the Emperor's wrath on the original charter, known as the Letter of Majesty, than the author is ready to admit (p. 142); the document has been preserved in the Crown Archives of Bohemia and shows that the Emperor really used scissors or a sharp knife to make it valueless. The canonization of John of Nepomuk took place only in 1729 under Charles VI, and was not procured by Ferdinand II. (p. 176).

By her comprehensive history of the Thirty Years War Miss Wedgwood has greatly facilitated orientation in the problems of that period. There are many aspects that had been neglected by historians of the old school whose eyes turned usually in two directions, toward diplomatic activities and operations on the battlefields.

Prof. E. A. Beller shows in his well arranged and beautifully printed monograph how propaganda and counterpropaganda molded and influenced public opinion during the Thirty Years War. He draws an interesting parallel between methods used in those times and nowadays, maintaining that "the media employed by the propagandists three hundred years ago were similar to those today." He has concentrated on the most lively and effective products of the propagandists, the illustrated broadsides which circulated in large numbers and penetrated more easily among the public than documentary pamphlets. Twenty-four typical sheets are reproduced to illustrate the author's introductory study and his comments upon the attempts of spokesmen of various parties and groups to justify their actions or to discredit the adversary. Prof. Beller has translated from German the explanations which were composed either in prose or rhyme (mostly doggerel) and printed as a counterpart of the copperplate engraving. There is here and there a little to add to his critical commentary. The correct name of the Bohemian nobleman who is represented on plate I as shooting at the victims of the Defenstration is Berbisdorf (on the plate it reads Pernsdorf) and not Berensdorf. On plate IV the bloodflag of the Transylvanian Prince Bethlen Gábor is reproduced. The German explanation says that it was given by the Prince "dem Emerico Thurzco als Landfenderichen." The English translation: "It was presented to the Turkish Emir as to the Country's Ensign" is misleading. From histories of the early period of the War we learn that the Hungarian nobleman Emerich Thurzo was often employed by Bethlen Gábor (see Gindely, *History of the Thirty Years War*, I, 229). Against him, not less than against his master, were the verses on the broadside directed.

In an interval of two years the 300th anniversary of the assassination of Wallenstein followed after the tercentenary of the heroic death of Gustav Adolf. They were commemorated in a large number of articles, monographs and books in various languages. A biography of Wallenstein in English by Francis Watson appeared in 1938, four years after the anniversary. The book was intended for a wide public and stands half way between an historical sketch of the life and activities of the Imperial General and a popular biography in the current style. The author had traveled in Central Europe and visited places known from his hero's life. He was shown unprinted documents in the Archives in Prague, Vienna and in some German collections. He read books and articles on Wallenstein and discussed the General's plans and actions with several experts in seventeenth century history. He wished to write a book that would capture the reader at once and keep him under its spell. It was not difficult to find in written or printed sources stories and details which enliven the narrative and stimulate the reader's interest. They circulated in Wallenstein's time—the author of the book has not been discouraged from repeating them by objections of modern historians who dismissed most of them as unreliable or fictitious. If he had done so, he would have had to sacrifice much colorful detail. The fluency of his narrative has not been slowed down by a new scrutiny of problems of Wallenstein's policy with which historians of the critical school were confronted. The book reads well and evokes the atmosphere of the period. Among modern biographies of Wallenstein's contemporary and rival, the Swedish king Gustav Adolf, the book of Prof. Nils Ahnlund ranks very high. It was intended as a tribute to the great ruler and appeared in Swedish in 1932, on the 300th anniversary of the fateful battle at Lützen. It was translated into French and Czech. It certainly deserved to be included in the series of publications of the American Scandinavian Foundation as a fine example of modern Swedish scholarship.

There is far more in Prof. Ahnlund's work than an outline of the king's spectacular career or a descriptive account of his campaigns. The book is well constructed. In three chapters the story of the monarch's life and his characterization have been given; the other half of the volume has been devoted to the study of his domestic and foreign policy. Thus the author has presented the reader with a brilliant sketch of Swedish history in the period of unparalleled expansion and success and not merely with a biography in the ordinary sense. It is often easier to write on men whose greatness was not realized by their contemporaries and who were not the subject of controversy during their lifetime. "Traditional views" stand like a smoke screen between the hero and his reader and easily lead the latter astray. A sober estimate of Gustav Adolf's policy and a critical interpretation of his motives and interests, such as come from Prof. Ahnlund's pen, was a far more delicate task than would have been a laudatory account of his actions in the style of earlier Protestant historiography. Prof. Ahnlund has not hesitated to use the epithet "the Great" which the lords of the Swedish council bestowed upon their master, but his eyes have remained open to weak spots in the king's character and to his leaning toward *Realpolitik* in moments of grave decisions.

"There is still much to be done before Gustav Adolf's work is revealed and elucidated in all its aspects," says Prof. Ahnlund at the end of his book. It may be said on the pages of this Journal that Gustav Adolf's attitude to problems of pacification of Central Europe still remains a desideratum. There is sufficient evidence of his interest in the struggle of the Bohemian nobility with the Habsburgs in 1618-20—there appeared on the horizon a possibility of an alliance between Bohemia and Sweden, directed both against Vienna and the Swedish rival on the shores of the Baltic, the Court of Warsaw. Gustav Adolf's collaboration with the leaders of the Czech Protestant nobility in exile in the last years of his life was motivated partly by sympathy with suffering correligionists, partly by realistic considerations. This is another illustration of Prof. Ahnlund's thesis that the king "had in mind not so much religion as the *status publicus* in which religion was itself included."

Columbia University. OTAKAR ODLOŽILIK.

ALLEN, W. E. D., *The Ukraine: A History.* Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 404. $4.50

A history of the Ukraine in English is long overdue and the public now has a second within the space of two years. The more recent from the Cambridge Press is a composite work—at least a foreword informs us that Russian and Ukrainian scholars collaborated with the author in the preparation of the material. As is usually the case with such co-operative undertakings complete unity in presentation is not maintained. The arrangement in eight chapters has involved extreme compression of subject matter. On the whole, Ukrainian history is seen from the Muscovite as opposed to the Ukrainian national point of view. This has led to over simplification and some rather extravagant statements with regard to European history. The easy generalizations associated with Teutonic *Historismus,* or from the arsenals of *Geopolitik,* at times jostle one another in its concluding chapters. "Few Polish historians will deny that the 'Ukrainian problem' proved fatal to the old Polish state," seems to imply a belief on the part of the author that this alone was responsible for the disruption of Poland—a conclusion which ignores the fact that the greater part of the Ukraine had long since been lost to Poland a century before the partitions. Such a hypothesis takes no account of the disappearance of the native dynasty or the introduction of the system of election of its kings which provided an admirable scope for foreign intrigue and intervention, of the gradual extension of political liberties to the point of anarchy at a time when strongly centralized absolutisms were coming into existence all around her. The "Ukrainian problem" was no more than one, and that not the chief, factor in the disintegration of Poland.

Towards the end of the book the language becomes more mystical and apocalyptic. History is brought under such categories as "Byzantine" and "Latin overculture." Moscow is referred to as "a nomad Turco-Mongol empire"; the present war is viewed as Britain's attempt to establish the old Roman *limes* so rudely disrupted by Hitler's *panzer* divisions. One is at a loss to know what the writer means by such sentences as, "indeed the fire that had burned in Attila and Chingiz lit the devoted evangelism of Lenin and the doomed Caesarism of Tukachevski."

It strikes the reader that some phases of Ukrainian history have not been sufficiently stressed. While the formation of the Uniate Church in the sixteenth century is traced in some detail, it is lost sight of during later stages of its history. The section dealing with the Ukraine during the nineteenth century is disappointing. Passing reference only is made to the Decembrist movement, to the emancipation of the serfs, or to its results in the Ukraine. The general revolutionary movement in which the Ukraine shared is somewhat scamped. One feels that the writer in his concluding chapter on Ukrainian economy hardly makes out his case, when he tries to prove that the Ukraine does not provide a firm basis for its independent existence nor constitute a prize for a new German *Drang nach Osten.*

The high standard set by the Cambridge University Press for scholarly bookmaking is maintained. The maps are good though one or two have been spoiled by crowding them with detail. Transliteration of names presents the usual problem which the writer solves in his own way, not always with consistency; sometimes the Ukrainian, sometimes the Russian, and at other times the Polish form is used. A number of slips have got past the editor. On p. 188, "During Easter week 1770 Mazeppa" is obviously an error for ". . . 1707." On p. 279 we read that "Lenin fled to Finland." The official history of the Communist Party merely says that "Lenin . . . was forced to go into hiding and took refuge in a shanty near Razliv station." Why the writer has felt impelled to insert the umlaut in Ludendorff's name is puzzling as there seems to be no precedent for this variant.

University of Oklahoma. STUART R. TOMPKINS.

ANDERSON, EUGENE NEWTON, *Nationalism and the Cultural Crisis in Prussia, 1806-1815.* New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939. Pp. ix+303. $3.00.

The importance of nationalism in the history of the last century and a half, and its significance in the modern world have long been recognized, but it was not effectively analyzed or carefully investigated in this country before the *Essays on Nationalism* published by C. J. H. Hayes in 1926. In the meantime, the peace settlement of 1919-1920 had called the attention of foreign scholars in larger numbers to the problem. There have been numerous works which have tried to analyze and define nationalism, to trace its development in theory and practice, or to show the contributions of various writers to its doctrine, but Professor Anderson has taken a different approach to the subject. In his opinion, "the studies of nationalism have been on the whole either too theoretical or too factual." He has made a series of case studies, selecting "seven individuals, contemporaries in the first period of German nationalism, to represent types of caste, or class, and occupation." His purpose was not to determine the contributions of these seven to doctrine, but "to show how in a situation of cultural crisis at the beginning of the nineteenth century certain elements in occupation, caste, or class contributed toward or against a person's development into nationalism."

Professor Anderson has made use of the principles and terminology of psychiatry and has found them useful but not infallible. In contrast to many "modern" biographers, he recognizes the limitations of his method and says: "In the end, one must confess that he does not know why these figures acted with respect to nationalism as they did; one can only describe the fact and explain some of the conditions affecting it." Though the question "why" can be answered only by hypothesis, the method, especially the distinction between "character" and "situation" nationalists, makes it easier to describe and to understand what happened.

No one who has struggled to define and to explain nationalism will fail to recognize and value the labor that has gone into Chapter I, "Nationalism and the Nationalistic Situation." It must be read, however, with the reservations expressed on page viii of the Preface constantly in mind. Its generalizations fit the cultural crisis in Germany in the first part of the nineteenth century, but do they apply with equal validity to the development of nationalism and nationalists at other times or in other cultural communities? For example, the author states that "during the last century and a half nationalism has arisen in society when the slow conflict involved in the transition from one culture to another is brought to a head by some general disaster caused by a foreign enemy." This may be true of France in the Revolution and of Turkey in the early 1920s as well as of Germany in the Napoleonic Age, but is it also true of Bohemia, Finland, Hungary, and Italy? The answer to this question was not what Professor Anderson was seeking, but until he or others, following the example set in the subsequent chapters of this book, have made more case studies, our generalizations must continue to be tentative and qualified. It should be mentioned in passing, that on page 3, nationalism is defined as "devotion to the nation in an intense degree" while on page 5 a distinction is made between "normal devotion to the nation and abnormal manifestation of it, or nationalism."

The following chapters are arranged in the order of the degree to which their subjects were affected by nationalism. The first three, Fichte, Arndt, and Kleist, were badly adjusted intellectuals. They developed a strong sense of nationalism. Fichte and Arndt succeeded in finding comfort and security in it; Kleist failed to do so and committed suicide. Gneisenau went part way on the road to nationalism. Nathusius the business man, Marwitz the junker, and Frederick William III the king, more secure in their economic and social status, remained respectively indifferent, opposed, and oblivious to the nationalist current. The essays carry conviction of their essential truth, and, as suggested above, provide models for what needs to be done if we are to have a realistic knowledge of other nationalists and other nationalistic situations.

University of Minnesota LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

HARRIS, DAVID, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878. The First Year.* Hoover War Library Publications, No. 11. Stanford University Press, 1936. Pp. 474. $4.00.

Perhaps because the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 has been described from all angles by scholars of many nations without ever finding the definitive presentation which it deserves, it is with pleasure and relief that students of diplomatic history have welcomed this first volume of what promises to be so competent and complete an account that further investigations will be superfluous. Except for a slighting of the Slavic sources, Professor Harris has spared no effort in collecting his material, and his long citations from the archives of London and Vienna give the work exceptional documentary value. And he is more concerned than are most diplomatic historians with the local aspects of his crisis. Even without using the fundamental Serbian studies of Čubrilović he reconstructs, from scattered sources, a remarkably accurate picture of the political scene in Serbia and of the hitherto obscure negotiations among the Balkan peoples for a united front against Turkey. He discusses the still unsolved question of the "causes" of the Herzegovinian revolt (pp. 16-18) without coming to any conclusion of his own. The share which Ignatiev and the Russian consuls had in it is not dealt with; probably it was much less than has generally been assumed. The responsibility of certain Austrian expansionists and of the Slavic committees in Dalmatia, on the other hand, is clear; Mr. Harris marshals evidence which leaves us in no doubt on that score.

If the record of the long and desultory negotiations over the Andrássy Note and the Berlin Memorandum shows anything, it is the utter lack of consistency in the policies of Russia, Austria, and England, the three powers most directly concerned. It is an untruth even to speak of "national" policies, for in each case there was a welter of groups and personalities, all going in different directions and none of them certain just where. Ignatiev, for example, was carrying on a long-term diplomatic battle not only with Andrássy but also with his own Foreign Office in St. Petersburg. The reader gets an impression of extreme confusion of purpose. Certainly the story does not move, like a Greek drama, toward any inevitable dénouement. But behind the personalities we do get a glimpse of certain forces which we know will be present, and perhaps determinative, in the succeeding years of the crisis: Panslavism, South Slav nationalism, Turkish regeneration.

The author closes each chapter with a convenient summary. His avoidance of general conclusions and judgments is quite justified, since this volume is but the first of a series. We await its successors with eagerness.

Council on Foreign Relations JOHN C. CAMPBELL
New York City

CROTHERS, GEORGE D., *The German Elections of 1907*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 277. $3.00.

This well-written, readable dissertation performs several useful functions. It provides the most satisfactory and extended analysis in English of the German elections of 1907. It presents an interesting picture of the operation of political parties in Imperial Germany. It establishes a broad basis for an understanding of the rise of German national sentiment to the heights which it has reached under the Hitler régime. It shows clearly the changes in German public sentiment which took place in 1906-1907 with regard to such "national" problems and policies as colonial expansion, ultramontanism, and socialism. And it throws much-needed light on the attitudes of the various nationalistic German groups in pre-World War days toward the Catholic Center and the Social Democratic parties—light which makes it much easier than before to understand the success of the Nazi propaganda aimed at these "liberal" groups both before and after 1933.

The author was forced to rely for his primary information largely on the chief contemporary German newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets, on the stenographic reports of the debates in the Reichstag, and on the memoirs of various political leaders. Party records and materials of archival nature were unavailable to him, either because they had been destroyed or because the government of the Third Reich barred access to them. Furthermore, the author was confronted by all the obstacles that face anyone who wishes to make a scholarly study of so elusive a thing as "public opinion," especially the public opinion in a foreign country several decades ago. But despite these handicaps, Dr. Crothers has produced a work of first-rate scholarship.

It is clear from this volume that the elections of 1907 were the first in Germany in which the concept of patriotism was successfully used to attract popular votes. There was ample evidence of the widespread appeal of the patriotic theme, particularly when patriotism was defined so broadly as to include the encouragement of the pursuit of colonial expansionism and world policies. On the basis of these elections at least, Dr. Crothers points out that Samuel Johnson's definition of patriotism as "the last refuge of a scoundrel" might well be paraphrased to read: "Patriotism is the safest refuge of a politician."

In the matter of actual and direct influence on government policies, Dr. Crothers shows that the elections of 1907 were instrumental chiefly in speeding up colonial reform and putting more vigor into the progress of naval expansion. For the rest, Chancellor von Bülow's foreign policy already had been so aggressive that public opinion only now was catching up in spirit; the foreign office did not materially change its position or become more aggressive as a consequence of the elections. Indeed, any such change would have been as much, perhaps more, dependent on the international scene as on the internal political situation, and the international setting at the time was not conducive to a more vigorous German foreign policy.

The only important aspect of the subject which is not fully treated in the book is an explanation of *why* in the elections of 1907 the German people for the first time cast their ballots in a manner indicating a desire for a more positive foreign policy than previously. But this probably is one of the imponderables that cannot be explained on the basis of written documents and sources—were they ever so plentiful. And in any case, the volume deals in eminently satisfying fashion with the special task which the author set for himself, namely, the task of showing that the elections of 1907 definitely nurtured the growth of a German national sentiment.

Union College WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM

ELLIS, HOWARD S., *Exchange Control in Central Europe.* Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi, 413. $4.00.

It is to be regretted that Central Europe has been greatly neglected by foreign economists, particularly in matters of economic history. A closer study of Central European economics would have had a profound bearing on a more realistic understanding of the trends that ultimately led to totalitarianism. Both in terms of international politics and of economic experimentation, Central Europe represents one of the strategic hubs of the world. We must be grateful to Professor Ellis for analyzing in this scholarly, well documented volume the lessons of exchange control in Austria, Hungary, and Germany during the fateful years 1931-1939. He describes the various degrees of exchange control, from "the innocuous form of favoring necessities against luxuries in rationing out *Devisen* for imports" to "arbitrary deflections of exports and imports . . . as a method of political intimidation and bribery." His discussion of clearings, compensations and various other payment agreements is one of the few successful efforts at evaluating what Nazi economists have been acclaiming as a system of modern money, a claim which Professor Ellis refutes with great forcefulness. As he points out, exchange control was inherited from the last few cabinets of the Weimar republic in Germany. It has, incidentally, been in force in most Central European countries during and after the first World War and was simply revived in 1931 when the financial storm broke loose. Yet the experience of each of the three countries points out what ultimate aims can be followed by using the device. Austria, for whom exchange control was but a means of overcoming an immediate crisis, practically abandoned all stricter forms of control. During 1936 and 1937 Austria even "had an enviable position amongst European debtor countries . . . unique in being able to secure again short-term commercial credits on the London market. Germany, on the other hand, developed exchange control into a formidable weapon of conquest. Bulgarians, Jugoslavians, Turks, Greeks, and Rumanians were bullied, cajoled, cheated, and lured into increasing their trade with the Reich."

The book can be discussed from two points of view: as an enquiry into the technique of exchange control within an otherwise uncontrolled or only partly controlled economy; the other aspect, which seems to grow in importance since the publication of Professor Ellis' studies in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* in 1939 and 1940, is exchange control as an essential feature of totalitarian all-out control. As he points out, the German brand of exchange control "produced results which were not only ulterior to its avowed monetary and financial aims, but, more significantly, ulterior to any economic calculus." Exchange control became foreign trade control. Political aims engulfed the economic calculus. "German exchange control can be explained after the first two years of its history only in non-economic terms." Whatever the role played by exchange control in the purely economic sphere, Ellis is perfectly right when he comes to the conclusion that "it is finally a device by which a dictatorship achieves and continues to exercise control over the economic and political destinies of the populace." Words have a different meaning under an economy of force from that which they have under an economy of wealth.

Professor Ellis' work is an important contribution to the understanding of some of today's most perplexing problems.

Reed College Frank Munk

Shotwell, James T. and Deák, Francis, *Turkey at the Straits: A Short History.* New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 196. $2.00.

As a concise handbook for ready reference on the major aspects of the Straits Question, *Turkey at the Straits* should have a wide reception. However, as a history or even a general survey of that very important and highly complicated question, it is obviously deficient.

In the preface the authors state that their purpose was "to pick out only a single theme from the confused history of the Near East, that of the control of the Straits," and that the book is to serve only "as a guide" to the main events and "to the pertinent documents in each case." Within this narrow, but highly significant field, they have successfully achieved their purpose; and in presenting this summary from ancient times to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty of October 1939, they have produced a convenient and satisfactory volume for the general reader.

The volume has many features which will add to its value as a handbook. An appendix includes the text of the more important treaties and international agreements relating to the Straits, from the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 to the Mutual Assistance Pact of October 1939. A chronological index lists all treaties and conventions respecting Turkey and the Straits from 1251 to 1939. Throughout the text, references to printed sources and documents are numerous and, in general, satisfactory. One could desire, however, to see more citations from personal memoirs and biographies. For example, in discussing the Tcharykow episode of 1911, it would be of value to the reader to know that Tcharykow's own account, *(Glimpses of High Politics)* published in 1931, was available.

In a brief summary of this type one must not expect all aspects of recent research to be covered. However, a survey of P. E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Harvard University Press, 1934) and Professor Kerner's article on "Russia's new Policy in the Near East after the Peace of Adrianople," *(Cambridge Historical Journal*, Volume V, No. 3, 1937), would have indicated the important role of Palmerston, as well as the reasons for Russian policy, in the vital period after the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi to the Treaty of London of 1840 and the Straits Convention of 1841. At that time the principle was established that the closure of the Straits was a matter of general European concern and not one between Russia and Turkey only. Goriainov, though still a valuable source, was published as long ago as 1910.

Two further points should be mentioned. The strategic importance of the Straits, and its relation to general Mediterranean strategy, could easily have been further emphasized. The connection between the Central Asian and the Straits Question should also have been indicated. After all, the Straits Question, important as it is, cannot be regarded as an isolated, or even as a European, problem; but it was affected in many of its phases by important developments in Central Asia and elsewhere.

University of Colorado JAMES G. ALLEN

HITCHCOCK, EDWARD B., *"I Built a Temple for Peace": The Life of Eduard Beneš*. New York: Harper, 1940. Pp. 364. $2.50.

When the story of our time of troubles is written, it will give a significant place to the life and work of Eduard Beneš, Foreign Minister and President of Czechoslovakia. Born in old Bohemia in 1884, he achieved the distinction of symbolizing with Thomas G. Masaryk not merely the Czechoslovak struggle against the Hapsburg Monarchy, but the ideal of a genuine "new order" in Europe and the world to which the Nazi-Fascist champions of totalitarian reaction have thrown down the challenge.

The political history of Eduard Beneš is so closely intertwined with that of his country that it is already fairly well known. One gets it from his own work, *My War Memoirs,* from his series of addresses before the Czechoslovak Parliament and the League of Nations, and from the biographies and reminiscences of others who figured in the European diplomatic game. The present work, which is written by a former foreign correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* and the *Christian Science Monitor* and aide to Beneš during his visit to the United States in 1939, is of interest not so much for the story of Beneš's political career as for the statesman's personal history. For example, Mr. Hitchcock gives us an excellent account of Beneš's deep rootage in the soil of Bohemia. He tells of his courtship and marriage to Hanna Vlček, who became his constant and faithful companion. Beneš's intellectual heritage and firm grounding in the art of thinking are well portrayed and help to explain the "optimism" for which Beneš was noted. His political career is described in the chapters covering the Czech revolution, the building of the Czechoslovak state at the Conference of Paris, the return to Prague, the development of a foreign policy around the League of Nations and the Little Entente, and finally the pilgrimage through self-exile after the disaster of Munich.

The time has not yet arrived for a definitive biography of a man still in his prime and with much work yet to do. There is a good deal of material of which Mr. Hitchcock might have made use in a longer work, but the biography has been well told and can be highly recommended to all those who are interested in Central Europe and the ideals for which President Beneš has so unflinchingly stood.

Miami University HARRY N. HOWARD

Bláha, Arnošt, *Sociologie inteligence* (The Sociology of Intelligence). Prague: Orbis, 1937. Pp. 396. Kč. 60.

Only recently have American scholars become interested in the implications of the theory known as "the sociology of knowledge" *(Wissenssoziologie)*, which holds that the "modes of thought" of all individuals are determined by, and therefore relative to, the nature of the social groups to which they belong. So, not only economic classes but also "generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups, schools, etc.," can be treated from the point of view of this sociological hypothesis on the basis of a sort of generalized relativistic logic or epistemology. But as has been usually the case, America's recent enthusiasm for this approach has been antedated by a decade of European research in the field. A fine example of such study is Bláha's present work which is a virtual culmination of his numerous other studies during the two decades of Czechoslovakia's independent existence. He here examines the problem of the intelligentsia, conceived as a social group, analyzing its situation in the world, its inner connections and its outer relations, as well as its social functions.

In typical Central European fashion, the work makes no concessions to the reader unacquainted with the characteristic scholarship of that part of the world. It refers to numerous scholars of various countries who have specialized in this topic and it does not hesitate to take up a theoretical battle with anyone along epistemological lines. Along this line we cannot develop any further controversies and must limit ourselves to a survey of Bláha's thesis.

Like Bacon, Comenius, and more modern proponents of the ideal of integrating all human knowledge, Bláha proposes an organization of scientific investigation in all the social sciences. But he is careful to suggest also the necessity of augmenting the available specialized research institutions. His suggestions arise from his own difficulties in securing material—his own visits and interviews and his utilization of biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, diaries, documents and novels.

Bláha believes that the intelligentsia can best be characterized in terms of its social function, that of spiritualization. Society cannot exist without a spiritual atmosphere, without spiritual ties and the spiritual values of truth, beauty, good, order, peace, consolation, etc. Through this function the intelligentsia creates for society the following necessary essentials of self-preservation: the spiritual integration of all special groups, the same spiritual atmosphere and spiritual values for all. It focuses round the principle of cultural spiritualization, which links society vertically. "Intelligentsia" is further a non-class and non-vocational social category. We find it at all levels of income, in all social groups within the realm of economic and political activity, namely in the upper social strata; in addition, it has a place of its own in the upper social strata. It, therefore, represents through its function a factor unifying and integrating all component parts of society. Although the intelligentsia comes from all social strata, for the most part it is the product of the middle classes.

Bláha shows particularly clearly how the material situation of this group has been gradually improved and how even social prestige has been transferred more and more from the aristocracy of power, birth and wealth towards vocations represented by members of the intelligentsia-group. The problem of unemployed intellectuals is serious; the causes are partly internal (due to the incompetence of the intelligentsia), and partly external (especially unfavorable power-relationships and the pressure of public opinion). Due to these causes, the intelligentsia suffers by different psychic deformations (sinking into irrationalism, yielding to emotional hysteria of the crowd, reaction against socialism, mental panic, neuro-psychosis) and by dislocations of its social relations. This crisis also appears as only one aspect of the general crisis of society, especially as a de-spiritualization of the political and economic order. Furthermore this crisis may be partially traceable to the pressure caused by the influence of power-relations and economic conditions, which has isolated the intelligentsia from the masses and weakened its main mission in society.

Heightened interest in this whole topic is evidenced by the recent appearance of another work in the same field: Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).

Hofstra College JOSEPH S. ROUCEK.

STOLPER, GUSTAV, *German Economy, 1870-1940.* New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, $3.00.

Gustav Stolper's book, "German Economy 1870-1940," is useful for two reasons: it gives a very readable account of some of the basic trends in Germany's economic development prior to Hitler and provides a short summary of about fifty pages on the economic and social changes under the Nazis. The author maintains that one underlying trend has dominated Germany's economic development since the resurrection of Germany under Prussian leadership, the trend toward "Statism." His discussion of the Third Reich comes after a thorough presentation of this theme and he thus views the Nazi economy as the natural heir of its predecessors.

In his own words: "Hitler had only to press the button and the machine was made ready to work. . . . The state owned the banks, the banks owned and controlled business, business controlled the jobs and the masses . . . had been trained . . . to look to the Government for whatever they asked of life. . . . The Moloch state cannot stop, in Germany any more than in Russia or anywhere else. It devours its own children until it dies."

The development of a closer interdependence between the state and business has been evident since the World War in all leading industrial countries as well as in Germany. Dr. Stolper's book thus emphasizes an already known trend. Statesmen and scholars having been thus forcefully reminded may now take up the task of analyzing the factors of the past which were decisive in this development, particularly in determining the rise of Nazism and war.

Dr. Stolper himself is well qualified for such a task although he specifically disavows any such responsibility in his preface. He has an intimate knowledge of pre-Hitler Germany, having been editor of the leading economic weekly, "Der deutsche Volkswirt," as well as a member of the Reichstag. He left Germany in 1933 and has since become an American citizen. He has thus both an intimate knowledge of a portion of Germany's history and likewise a vested interest in discovering the forces which destroy democracy.

Althought the section on the Third Reich is an excellent brief summary of economic development under Hitler, it suffers from condensation and possibly from the fact that the author has not been so closely in touch with German events since 1933. His treatment of business, industry, and trade suffers particularly from condensation. It is claimed, for example, that German industry has been socialized because of the extensive governmental control over business, and further that ownership of property has lost all significance, merely the titles of ownership remaining.

The reviewer's study of the Nazi economy has led to a different interpretation of the facts. Mr. Stolper leaves unexplained the new industrial empires owned by Nazi party leaders such as Goering and Ley. Ownership still gives security to control obtained in the political arena. Certain owners of industrial property have undergone great hardsips as a result of the war economy, while others in the area of heavy industry have made prosperity profits even after deduction of corporate taxes. The changing identity of individual members of the owning class as a result of the appearance of Nazi officials in the garb of "captains" of industry has been accompanied by an actual increase in the inequality of income and wealth. The owning class still exercises the function of receiving and accumulating profits although their other functions have been considerably restricted. For example, certain types of decisions such as the direction of investment, the regulation of price relationships and wage rates are taken out of the hands of the individual capitalists and corporations, and are centralized in the hands of the state. Fundamentally the reason for this is that it allows the system as a whole to continue to pursue the objective of accumulation of capital and profits unimpeded by the mutual working-at-cross-purposes of various elements which becomes such a marked characteristic of monopoly capitalism combined with relative freedom for all groups to organize in their own interest.

Finally, it may be stated, in disagreement with Dr. Stolper, that this system of state control evolved by the Nazis is inextricably bound up with war; hence it is futile to say, as he does, that the economic system can be maintained provided only the "Government refrains from exaggerating its adventure." War followed out of the Nazi system like night out of day.

Vassar College MAXINE SWEEZY.

SHOTWELL, JAMES T., *What Germany Forgot.* New York: Macmillan, 1940, Pp. vi + 152, $1.50.

Every American should read this book. In simple, clear and effective language Professor Shotwell corrects many prevalent mistaken notions by applying common-sense psychology and economics to the twenty years since the World War. To give in a page a summary of it is impossible, because its 150 pages are themselves essentially a summary of the 150 volumes of the *Economic and Social History of the World War* which he so ably edited.

Its title derives from the fact that Germany quickly forgot the destruction and cost to her of the war itself, because she soon concentrated all her attention upon the Versailles Treaty as the cause of her post-war troubles. Exhausted from the war, disillusioned, isolated from the rest of the world, the German people fell a victim to the skillful propaganda of the "stab in the back," and failed to realize that their suffering was caused quite as much by destruction of 1914-1918 as by the treaty of 1919. This enabled Hitler to revive belief in militarism, overthrow the Weimar Republic, and plunge the world into a new international anarchy.

Professor Shotwell briefly analyzes the Versailles Treaty and rightly shows that it was not so harmful to Germany as often represented. He supports Lloyd George's contention that it was not so much the Versailles peace-makers as the poor statesmanship of their successors that was to blame for the evils that overtook the world. He accepts the Binkley-Bloch-Renouvin thesis, which was not put forward until half a dozen years after the Treaty was signed, that Art. 231 on "war guilt" was not intended by its framers to express a moral judgment on Germany and her allies for responsibility in causing the war by their aggression, but was only a legal statement as the basis for the obligation to pay reparations. This is no doubt correct. The Germans blundered in interpreting it as a moral stigma; but one can hardly be surprised at their taking this interpretation when the Allied leaders, like Clemenceau, Poincaré and Lloyd George, repeatedly stated at Versailles and afterwards that Germany was responsible for causing the war.

Americans should read the book because it shows how disastrous was our failure to accept responsibility after Versailles, our raising of tariff barriers, and our failure to secure more in the way of reduction of armaments while the Weimar Republic still lived. "There are various kinds of anarchy: the violent and aggressive type which Hitler personifies; and the non-cooperative type which is the unconscious accomplice of the militarist" (p. 112).

Harvard University SIDNEY B. FAY.

EINZIG, PAUL, *German Finance, 1939-40.* New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. xvi + 271. $2.75.

Perhaps no better writer on finance could have been chosen to write an annual review on "World Monetary Developments" than Paul Einzig. Most of his experience has been on the continent of Europe, but he is also well acquainted in London and has a clear insight into the financial structure of Europe as a whole. Although this, his most recent volume, *World Finance, 1939-40,* is only the second of his series, we can look forward with great pleasure to future volumes.

This book does not have the advantage of a single theme like Einzig's previous book, *Bloodless Invasion,* which was so widely accepted as the best picture of German trade strategy. In this second book he is simply trying to tell the story of twelve months of Europe at war. Now that we have the additional knowledge that comes from experience, it would be very easy to look back on the situation a year ago, before the break through in the West, and criticize the author for his pre-occupation with French Policy and his discussion of the possibility of a prolonged inactive war. We know better now, but no one could have known much better a year ago. Einzig's remarks about the post-war situation are sound and constructive. He rightly admits that Democracy can no longer identify itself too closely with *laissez-faire* economics. The future world economy will be a regulated one, whether we like it or not. Whether that regulation is worked out under some form of international cooperation or whether it is imposed by narrow-minded conquerors: that is the important question.

Among the items discussed in this volume are the attempts at financial appeasement, the war scares, the relentless pressure of German expansion, and the financial mobilization of France and Britain in the early war period. Einzig's chapter on Profitable Neutrality has now been rendered completely out of date by the march of events. It may be interesting to readers to notice that Herr Wohltat, who appears in the negotiations for the release of Czech assets and the proposed whaling expedition, has now come into additional prominence as economic dictator of Holland. He has long been the most able negotiator of the German ministry of economics, perhaps sharing this honor with Clodius. We may hear more of these gentlemen in Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey in the near future.

University of Denver DOUGLAS P. MILLER.

DEÉR, JOSEF, ED., *Siebenbürgen.* Budapest: Hungarian Historical Society, 1940. Pp. 311, 279 illustrations.

This sumptuously produced volume, the work of leading scholars of the Hungarian Historical Society, covers the history, economics, society, geography, art, and literature of Transylvania. It was prepared with the aim of familiarizing the German public with the facts concerning the Hungarian *irredenta* recently re-incorporated in the Kingdom of St. Stephen. Obviously some of the chapters are of a controversial nature. We meet the old Daco-Roman question in Professor Alföldi's chapter "Daker und Römer," and the Szekler question in Professor Homan's chapter "Die Szekler," and that of the origin of the Vlachs in Professor Tomás' chapter "Rumänen." Other chapters are on less debatable ground. Professor Lukinich is at home in his short survey of "Das Selbständige Staatsleben Siebenbürgens"—i.e., the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The narrative of Hungarian art in Transylvania by Professor Gerevich is the longest and most richly illustrated in the whole volume. He points out that the Saxons in Transylvania were faithful to German Gothic, but the Hungarians become enthusiastic devotees of the new Italian Renaissance, both in architecture and the decorative arts. This popularity lasted clear into the eighteenth century, so that Baroque came late into the picture. The last section of the book treats the twenty-year period of Rumanian rule with numerous maps, charts and statistics. Responsibility for the decline of industry, commerce and agriculture in Transylvania in this period is laid squarely upon the Rumanian government and politicians. Much care has gone into the preparation of the large ethnographic maps enclosed in a pocket on the back cover. Unfortunately they are so bulky as to break the binding. Rumanian and Slovak scholars might object to many of the conclusions in controversial chapters, but it is none the less an extremely valuable as well as a handsome volume.

University of Colorado S. H. THOMSON.

BLOOM, SOLOMON F., *The World of Nations. A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 225. $2.50.

This is an excellent book. Although acquainted with the secondary literature on the subject, the author has based his work directly upon Marx's own writings. His use of the method of historical analysis is given point and direction by his knowledge of Marxian theory, and his study is unusually rich and compact. After the many theoretical defenses or refutations of Marxian ideas, this modest volume affords a refreshing example of the value of finding out exactly what Marx said and meant. It analyzes Marx's ideas on one of the basic forces of the century, and adds much more than at first seems apparent to our knowledge both of communism and of the social role of the nation and nationalism.

The author is aware of the limitation of his subject, and cautions the reader as folows:

> "Marshaled together, these speculations on national theory assume a somewhat disproportionate significance. In the context of Marx's work, they were random and informal reflections. They betrayed the casual manner of a man of catholic tastes and lively intellectual interests pursuing a line of thought peripheral to his principal concerns. Such remarks cannot be treated on the same plane as his views on economic or social politics. In short, Marx was only very incidentally a theorist of nationality or race. He never attempted definitions of the race or the nation that would distinguish them from other aggregates of men" (pp. 15, 16).

None the less the author rightly justifies his investigation by the fact that Marx "implied a definition of the nation" and "concerned himself quite closely with the character and problems of specific modern nations" (p. 16).

As one reads this book one is impressed (1) by the extent to which Marx incorporated the concept of the nation into his theories, (2) by the looseness of his comprehension of the concept and the haphazardness of his relating it to his economic and social theory, (3) by his failure to gauge the power of nationalism, which time was quickly to prove to be greater than that of communism, (4) by the inordinately slippery, casuistical, opportunistic, unsystematic nature of much of Marx's thinking on the subject—witness his astonishing remarks about the Jews, (5) by the accuracy of Dr. Bloom's judgment that "Marx simply was not a nationalist. Most of his occasional nationalist utterances were the obiter dicta of an opinionated and choleric personality . . . Perhaps it is not too much to say that he was haunted by the émigré's sense of frustration" (p. 194).

As a study in the history of nationalism the book suffers from the author's failure to distinguish between a nationalist and one who accepts the historical fact of the nation. After all, it is perfectly clear that Marx was not a nationalist. The value of this study lies in the analysis of Marx's conception of the nation and the role which this concept played in his social and economic theory. As a study in Marxism the book is one of the sanest and most interesting which the reviewer has read. It shows the usefulness of gauging the profundity of a person's ideology by investigating his comprehension of a vital force of the period which he regarded as of minor importance to his subject.

The American University EUGENE N. ANDERSON.

SHORTER NOTICES

Documents on Hungary, Editor, A. Goellner. Printed by the Royal Hungarian University Press, Budapest.

A collection of pamphlets intended for English and American readers. The group considered here were all published in September, 1940, which indicates the purpose of the collection. They are, as a group, illuminative, and can be taken to represent the official Hungarian position on the controversial subjects they cover. As might be expected of such a collection, there is some unevenness in quality, some careless writing, but they are not below the usual level of such collections.

Hévey, Laszló, *Agrarian Reform in Hungary.* Pp. 20. Pengö .75.

A short sketch of agrarian legislation. There is no doubt that the legislation since 1918 has been liberal in purpose. This sketch does not tackle the question of the fulfillment of these intentions. It is perhaps too early yet to know.

Rónai, András, *Hungarians in Rumania.* Pp. 25, 1 map. P. 1.00.

This short study is largely based on statistics of population and nationality growth in Transylvania. It is not difficult to accuse any such statistical basis, Magyar or Rumanian, of "interpretation." There is little doubt that the Rumanian majority made use of its position in various ways to displace the minority Magyars who had enjoyed preferential status in various commercial, political and professional pursuits previous to 1919. On the other hand, just how far the Rumanians went beyond what the Magyars would have done under similar circumstances will probably always be debatable. The question should be asked: Was the prosperity and preferential status of the Magyar population before 1919 due to its inherent social and intellectual superiority or to the fact that it was of the ruling race? This reviewer is both unable and unwilling even to hazard a judgment.

Elekes, Lajos, *The Hungarian Bastion.* Pp. 18. P. .75.

A short sketch of the middle period of Hungarian history, when she so nobly withstood the Turkish tidal wave. The author is critical of all Rumanian voivodes, but makes little or no mention of those Hungarian nobles who were willing to cooperate with the Turkish aggressor.

Tamás, Lajos, *Hungarians, Rumanians (Vlachs) and "Latinity."* Pp. 24. P. .75.

The apparent intention is to show that the Vlachs (Rumanians) were a shepherd mountain people long after the Hungarians were well westernized and conscious of their mission as the bastion against the Turk, that Vlach literature and language were but tardy developments, that Hungarian rulers were responsible for whatever early progress in culture was made among the backward Vlachs. The study concludes with an incidental attack upon the Daco-Roman theory of Rumanian origin.

Vida, Peter, *How Hungarian Transylvania Became Rumanian Transylvania.* Pp. 40. P. 2.00.

Vida, Peter, *The Szeklers are Magyars.* Pp. 33. P. 1.00.

This is the least satisfactory of these pamphlets precisely because it is the least restrained in the expression of the author's bitterness toward popular Rumanian claims that the Szeklers were of Rumanian origin.

P. F.

Potoček, Cyril, *Cyril and Methodius, Apostles of the Slavs.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1941. Pp. 172, $2.00.

The subject of the protoapostles to the Slavs is of perennial interest, and has not received sufficient attention in Western literature until the present time. The brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius came from the Byzantine court to the court of the Moravian prince Rastislav in response to an appeal for missionaries who could preach to the people in their own tongue. The efforts of German missionaries in the western Slav lands had been almost fruitless. Nationalism was already on its tortuous way in the Danubian basin in the ninth century. These brothers had the perspicacity to see that these lands looked westward for their light and went to Rome to get approval and consecration from the Pope. This story is told in a straightforward and interesting fashion. The author has used the better known studies on the subject, e. g., by Dvornik, Pastrnek and Jagić. On several minor points questions might be raised, but in general we can be gateful for a needed task done in a satisfactory manner. There are four appendices which are useful. One especially—"English translation of the Mass in the Byzantine Slavonic Liturgy"—contains material not easily accessible to western European scholars.

S. H. T.

EDWARDS, LOVETT FIELDING, *Danube Stream.* Toronto: Reginald Saunders, 1940. Pp. 243, $4.00.

In this account of life on the banks and waters of Europe's great stream we find a pleasant mixture of history, archaeology, and effortless sightseeing. Roman aqueducts, Turkish citadels, old battlefields pass before us, and the vision of the ebb and flow of peoples through the ages lends as much movement to the book as does the crowded international shipping on the Danube itself. Perhaps the author's most important contribution to an understanding of the complex region between Novidad and Giurgiu—roughly the extent of his drifting—is his emphasis on the degrees of assimilation and shadings of nationality exhibited by the frontier populations. The historical background, though conveniently simplified, is patchily introduced. Little attention is paid to post-Versailles political conditions. Mr. Edwards, with his knowledge of languages, his evident grasp of large historical patterns and his sharp eye for local peculiarities may well be equipped to produce a more serious cultural study of this region.

R. D.

DUPUY, R. ERNEST, *Perish by the Sword.* Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. 302, $2.50.

The book is largely concerned with the two American Expeditionary forces in Russia—Archangel and Siberia—but there is some occasional reference to the *Česká Družina* which fought its way eastward under Generals Gajda and Syrový against both the Bolsheviks and White Russians from Kiev to Vladivostok as the American forces came into friendly contact with the Czech legionnaires. There is little in the account that is new, but as the story has seldom been told in English, it is of some value. The numerous photographs which Major Dupuy has collected and reproduced are most interesting.

W. R.

STUYT, A. M., *Survey of International Arbitrations, 1794-1938.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939. Pp. 479.

This is a very useful catalogue of 408 cases of international arbitration from the Jay Treaty of 1794 to the Vienna award of November 2, 1938, chronologically arranged. Each case is briefly, even severely, schematized so that the reader can find the salient facts of the dispute and its settlement, and bibliographical details for the whole text of the arbitration are provided. The crux of the dispute is given in the words of the text, the arbitrators named, date of arbitral treaty and award and the disposition of the dispute. Schematization always has its drawbacks, but in this case, a useful guide to further textual study is the result. The countries of Central Europe had at least their share of arbitration in the two post-war decades.

BARANYAI, ZOLTÁN, Ed., *Visages de la Hongrie.* Paris: Plon, 1938. Pp. 621, 257 Illustrations.

A general guide book to Hungary, designed for tourists and the "general reader." The short chapters are unsigned but, from the list of collaborators, are written by competent professors, publicists, and artists. Nothing seems to have been overlooked. There are sections treating everything *inter alia multa* from l'âme hongroise, le film, la vie musicale, les animaux domestiques to le commerce extérieur—and there is a considerable bibliography of works in French on Hungary.

PANETH, PHILIP, *Czechs Against Germans.* London: Nicholson & Watson. 1939. Pp. 255, 8/6.

Dr. Paneth spent many years in Czechoslovakia as a foreign correspondent, and was familiar with leading personalities in and out of government circles. His book has the flavor of direct contact with events. Many doors were open to him which more superficial observers would have been unable to pass through. There is therefore much documentary value in this book, particularly as the author did not escape from Czechoslovakia until some weeks after German occupation March 15, 1939. On the other hand, the book was evidently written under much emotional pressure, and the reader does not get a consecutive or well-organized presentation of either Czech democracy at work, or of the Czech-German problem as it had been working itself out in the years before Munich. Several of the most interesting and perhaps most valuable chapters are not precisely related to the title at all, that on the Parliamentary system, and that on the Carpatho-Ukraine.

S. H. T.

Pamphlets on World Affairs. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 15 cents each. 1940.

No. 27 J. Hampden Jackson, *The Baltic.*

No. 30 Cyril Falls and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Was Germany Defeated in 1918?*

No. 36 O. C. Giles, *The Gestapo.*

No. 41 E. L. Woodward, *The Origins of the War.*

No. 46 Duncan Wilson, *Germany's New Order.*

Germany's New Order, by Duncan Wilson, is a concise presentation of the German plan for the economic reorganization of Europe, with a brief summary of Germany's economic system since 1933. The "New Order" is described as part of the German propaganda campaign and launched after the fall of France. It was not an original German war aim. In essence the "New Order" is based on the assumption of German political and economic domination of Europe, with Germany as the highly industrialized center and the other European states as its agricultural colonies. The pamphlet concludes that "the 'New Order' is only the old order of exploitation."

J. G. A.

WARRINER, DOREEN, *Eastern Europe after Hitler.* Fabian Society, Research Series No. 50. London: Victor Gollancz, 1940. Pp. 39, 1s.

This is a very valuable pamphlet, based on some years of research in the labor and land problems of Central and East European countries. Miss Warriner brings out the significant fact that agricultural productivity is lower the farther one gets from the North Sea toward the southeast and east. She explains this low level by "excessive density of population on the land." She surveys the interaction of racial and class feelings, nationalism and politics, and traces their effects during the years of economic crisis into the early period of the war, and ends with certain concrete suggestions along lines of economic cooperation among the smaller Central European states with joint support from Germany and Britain. We would welcome more studies of this sort as solidly worked out as this one.

W. R.

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ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA

Aside from some self-correcting misprints in the April issue of the Journal, the following corrections should be made:

P. 22, l. 6, after "ism," insert: "and by the definitive compilation of 1669 Catholicism, Lutheranism,"

P. 88, l. 10, for "hard roads," "good lords," read "hard road," "great ends."

P. 90, lines 11 and 12, should be transposed to p. 93, to follow l. 17.

P. 112, last line from bottom should be third line from bottom.

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A CZECH PLAN FOR A DANUBIAN FEDERATION—1848

by Otakar Odložilík

IN February, 1848, the fire of revolution spread swiftly from France to other countries. Early in March Italy, Germany and the Hapsburg lands in Central Europe were in flames. The revolt against prevailing conditions fell upon many governments with a crushing effect. The wave of dissatisfaction was particularly strong in the Habsburg Empire. It rose to such a height that it swept away in a few days the Government and the whole system as personified in Prince Metternich. After riots in Vienna, supported by the liberal middle class, students and workers, uprisings or demonstrations came in other parts of the monarchy. In less than two weeks they put an end to a secret, arbitrary and inefficient rule and opened to people in the Danubian area a fair prospect of a constitutional system, of freedom and prosperity. A quick and thorough reconstruction of the monarchy seemed to be feasible and easy in the days of rejoicing over the fall of Metternich's régime.

In a short time it became evident that it had been far easier to overthrow the old system than to lay foundations for the new order. The dynasty was discredited by its long association with Metternich and by unrestricted support given to his policy. The reins of government fell from the hands of the feeble and sickly emperor Ferdinand V; and the question arose as to who would direct the reconstruction of the state upon liberal and constitutional lines. In the spring of 1848 no member of the house of Habsburg-Lorraine possessed the quality which would enable him to step in the foreground and assume responsibility for a quiet transition from the period of absolutism to the new era. Lack of a capable ruler would be a serious drawback in any country with a long monarchical tradition. It was more so in the Austrian Empire where not only local traditions but also racial differences were to be considered and brought into harmony with the main principles of the new constitution. Any attempt to entrust with leadership members of any one racial unit was viewed with distrustful eyes by the representatives of other groups and gave rise to fears and apprehensions.

More than three centuries had elapsed since Ferdinand I, ruler in the Austrian lands, acceded to the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary. The personal union, such as had existed at the beginning of the Habsburg rule in the three countries, had been replaced by firmer bonds between those lands and the ruling house. Efforts of the Habsburgs to secure a strong position in Bohemia were crowned with success in the early part of the seventeenth century. The Bohemian nobility revolted in 1618, but after two years of struggle they were defeated and the country lost its liberty. There was but little resistance in the Alpine provinces. The Hungarian nobility revolted several times at the end of the seventeenth and early in the eighteenth centuries, and it may be said that in that country the Habsburgs never had such a success as in Bohemia; but even there opposition against the centralist policy of the Vienna Court was considerably weakened. New territories had been added in the eighteenth century to the original possessions of the dynasty by conquest, by agreements with other Powers or by marriage treaties. Territorial expansion reached its climax toward the end of the century when Austria acquired a large portion of Poland at its third partition.

Attempts were made in the era of enlightened absolutism to organize the Habsburg lands as a compact body and to efface border lines between the old nucleus of the monarchy and the new acquisitions. The bold scheme of Joseph II in which there was no room for differences in language, institutions or local traditions, met with resolute opposition from the conservative nobility both in Bohemia and Hungary. It was partly abandoned, partly modified by his brother and successor Leopold II.[1] Faced with the danger of revolutionary movements the dynasty made a compromise with the most conservative elements of the nobility. Centralistic tendencies were not abandoned but changes in the structure of the monarchy were made gradually and due regard was paid to the susceptibilities of the highest social class. In 1804 the Habsburgs, who for many centuries had almost invariably borne the title of Roman Emperor, assumed a new dignity, that of Emperors of Austria. Thus an opportunity was presented of drawing still closer together the ties between the ruling house and the individual provinces. After the Congress of Vienna leading statesmen decided to foster among the peoples inhabiting the territory of the monarchy a consciousness of unity, based on common citizenship under the scepter of a common ruler. It was their aim to create an Austrian patriotism as a counterbalance to local traditions and separatist tendencies.[2]

The system of "calmness and order" dominated Austria during the first half of the nineteenth century. But the peace and internal tranquillity in which Metternich and his henchmen had taken pride had not been based upon harmonious cooperation of the people with the government. It was an enforced peace and therefore rested upon very unstable foundations. Under the surface forces were working against the policy of the government, not for uniformity, but toward differentiation and decentralization. Early in the nineteenth century, under the influence of the French revolution and of the Napoleonic wars, the peoples within the Austrian Empire began to grow conscious of their particular identity and character. They began to resist attempts to absorb them in a common nationality group which would have been called Austrian. The lands of the Habsburg dynasty became the theatre of a rapid expansion of the national consciousness of their population. The Emperors Francis II and Ferdinand V and their advisers succeeded in suppressing the movement up to 1848. After a violent impact from outside the whole structure collapsed.

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[1] Robert K. Kerner made the policy of Joseph II and of Leopold II the subject of a detailed study. His monograph *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1932), has revealed both the weak spots in Joseph's program of reforms and the strength of the guardians of the old order among whom the conservative nobility of Bohemia had a prominent place.

[2] André Robert's *L'idée nationale Autrichienne et les guerres de Napoléon* (Paris, 1933) was intended as a monograph but gives general information concerning Metternich's effort to rally members of various racial groups round the Imperial throne and educate them as Austrian patriots.

The spring of 1848 was one of the critical periods in the history of the Danubian basin.[3] Those who were interested in the preservation of the "Vormärz" system were pushed into the background by the liberals, and lost control of affairs at least for some time. In various racial groups representatives of the middle class came to the forefront and voiced their views and desires. Parallel with efforts of the new government in Vienna went discussions concerning the future organization of the conglomeration of provinces, known to the outside world as the Austrian Empire. There existed wide differences of opinion among those who had assumed leading positions in public life. People were not lacking who had little or no interest in the preservation of the monarchy. The Italian provinces were fired with a unanimous determination to shake off the Habsburg yoke and to push the Austrians from the Peninsula. Among the Poles the desire to restore the independence of their kingdom weakened interest in discussions concerning the new constitution of the monarchy. The German-speaking population was divided. Conservative elements wished for as little change as possible in the internal structure of the country whereas the liberals demanded not only civic rights within the meaning of the watchwords of the French revolution but also connection of the Western half of the monarchy with united Germany. In

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[3] Of a fairly large number of books on the revolutionary period, 1848-9, by Austrian historians the following ones still retain great value: Anton Springer, *Geschichte Österreichs von 1809-1850,* vol. II (Die Österreichische Revolution), Leipzig, 1865.—J. A. von Helfert, *Geschichte Österreichs vom Ausgange des Wiener Oktoberaufstandes,* (6 vols, Prague, 1869-1886).—J. A. Helfert, *Geschichte der Österreichischen Revolution,* (2 vols, Freiburg, 1909), describes the events of March—May 1848, so that a gap (June-September) remains to be adequately filled.—Czech policy in 1848-9 has been treated in several monographs. On a vast amount of unprinted documents was based K. Kazbunda's book, *České Hnutí r. 1848* (Prague, 1929). There is a comprehensive monograph on the Polish movement: Józef Feldman, *Sprawa Polska w Roku 1848* (Kraków, 1933). Veit Valentin's *Geschichte der Deutschen Revolution von 1848-9* (2 vols. 1930, 1931) must often be consulted by students of the revolutionary movement in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Hungary spokesmen of the lesser nobility and of the liberal bourgeoisie with Lájos Kossuth at their head, rejected the program of expansion of Magyar national existence within the framework of the monarchy, as proclaimed by the old nobility grouped around Count Istvan Széchényi. Kossuth wished to separate Hungary from the dynasty and from its other domains and to convert it into a constitutional state. Speeches and proclamations of the malcontents were instantly reinforced by facts. There was unrest in Lombardy and Venetia. Elections to the national assembly in Frankfurt proceeded in the German-speaking provinces of Austria without difficulty or interference by the government. A Hungarian cabinet was established in Budapest, and in April, 1848, a liberal constitution, modeled on the Belgian constitution of 1831, was accepted by the national assembly. The task of reconstruction of the whole monarchy was seriously endangered by the increase of centrifugal forces and by local actions. The very existence of the monarchy was at stake early in the spring of 1848. Only with difficulty had balance been preserved between its supporters and opponents. The imperial sanction of petitions and promise of far reaching reforms seemed to be the only salvation in those critical weeks.

Those who were indifferent to Austria's continued existence as an independent state were not a majority in 1848. The force of old traditions was still strong. When the revolutionary movement had subsided, it became evident that the dynasty possessed enough attractions and power to hold the mass of the people on its side. Imperial troops remained intact and saved the prestige of the Emperor in Italy, in Prague, in Vienna and in Hungary when reactionary elements had regained ground in some parts of the monarchy and passed from passivity to an offensive. They had no understanding of the new situation in Europe and resolved to work for the restoration of autocracy. For them the problem of a thorough reconstruction of the country did not exist. In their opinion it was only necessary to reestablish the former close cooperation between the Court and the Army. A change on the throne was considered of vital importance. In November, 1848, Ferdinand V was brought to resign and on December 2, the accession of his nephew Francis Joseph was solemnly proclaimed in the temporary residence of the Imperial family in Olomouc (Olmütz) in Moravia. An energetic course of action both against the revolting Magyars in Hungary and the moderate liberals in other parts of the monarchy was being carefully prepared throughout the winter of 1848-9 and was launched before the coming of the first anniversary of the outbreak of revolution.

Between the two extreme wings, the reactionary groups on the one hand and the advocates of the disruption of the empire on the other, there were moderate elements working not only for preservation but for a consolidation of the monarchy by constitutional reform. Of the programs and proposals for its reorganization the scheme of František Palacký was without any doubt the boldest and the best defined.[4] It not only corresponded to contemporary conditions in the Danubian area but also anticipated with surprising accuracy the future course of events. Had the program with Palacký laid down in 1848 and early 1849 been accepted and incorporated in the new constitution, the interests of the dynasty would have been brought into harmony with the desires of the population. Ground would have been prepared for the regeneration of the monarchy as well as for its new rôle in European politics.

In 1848 Palacký was middle aged.[5] He was born in 1798 in a Moravian village, Hodslavice, and had risen from humble origins to a prominent position among the Czechs. His remarkable career predestined him for leadership of his people in political struggles. He studied for several years in Protestant schools in Slovakia and came to Prague in 1823 with the intention of devoting his life to the study of history and to the revival of the glorious past of the Czech nation. He soon became known in the small group of Czech patriots and came in contact with members of some Bohemian noble families who, out of opposition to Vienna, supported studies of Czech language and history. They entrusted Palacký with the writing of a comprehensive history of the Kingdom of Bohemia and secured for him an appointment as historiographer to the Estates of Bohemia. Two volumes of his work appeared before 1848, but constant difficulties with the censor[6] slowed progress of the publication which was to make Palacký well known in learned circles of Central Europe. From 1830 he acted as secretary of the Royal Bohemian Society of Arts and Sciences and in that and in many other functions largely contributed to the development of intellectual life in Bohemia.

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[4] According to Josef Redlich, *Das Österreichische Staats—und Reichsproblem* (Vienna, 1920) vol. I, 1, p. 281, Palacký "hat sich doch den Ruhm erworben, als erster einen neuen grossen politischen Gedanken, die Idee der nationalen Autonomie in Osterreich formuliert zu haben."

[5] There is a chapter on his life and literary work in Count Fr. Lützow's *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia* (1905) p. 88 sq.

Intimate knowledge of the ideas and interests of the conservative nobility and almost daily contact with some of its representatives left traces in Palacký's character. He based his political program on liberal principles but made no secret of his dislike of radicals in politics or in social problems. For his association with the nobility and for his distrust of mass movements he was often criticized by Czech as well as foreign radicals and stigmatized as an ally of conservative elements. Such verdicts, passed, as they were, in the heat of passion, did not correspond to reality and presented Palacký's thought and work in a false light. His conservatism and reserve with regard to popular slogans had limits and emanated more from constant occupation with the past than from class prejudices or the lack of foresight. Close connection with groups of Czech and Slovak patriots, who were increasing year by year in number, counterbalanced the association with the nobility and directed the historian's attention to modern problems. Palacký soon found himself in the midst of scholars and writers who worked for the revival of Czech intellectual activities and for the emancipation of Czechs and Slovaks from German or Magyar hegemony. He soon realized that the indifference of his noble patrons in matters of language ran counter to the growth of national consciousness in the lower social classes and became a brake for the natural course of life in a country with a racially mixed population. He did not hesitate to cast his lot with the national movement and supported it wholeheartedly despite discouraging remarks from his well-wishers among the aristocrats. Only with growing reluctance did he continue writing his History in German as had been stipulated in his contract with the Estates. Even the general plan of his work underwent a significant change: the History of Bohemia and its institutions was changing under its author's hands into the history of the Czech people in Bohemia and Moravia and their destinies.

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[6] An example of the censor's practise has been quoted by Elisabeth Wiskemann in her book *Czechs and Germans,* p. 16.

There was no platform for political discussions in Metternich's period. Only at its end did police measures relax and modern books as well as pamphlets and newspapers find their way into the country. The middle class was not prepared for participation in political life. Lack of program and experience became a handicap especially in those parts of the monarchy where divergent interests made impossible the collaboration between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. First proclamations betray as a rule uncertainty and indecision, but in the stormy days of the spring and summer of 1848 programs crystallized very quickly and the horizon of new leaders widened rapidly. The school of experience was more stimulating than studies of political theory or forms of government.

Palacký's entry in the arena of political struggles coincided with the outbreak of discontent with Metternich's régime in Prague. For about a year he was feverishly active trying to establish a new base for the future development of his people. His ideas, in the first weeks of the sping, 1848, were somewhat vague and more of a defensive than constructive character. It was not easy to envisage the shape of things to come in days of general concentration on the destruction of the old system, and

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[7] For a sharp criticism of Palacký and of Czech policy see K. Marx, *Revolution and Counterrevolution or Germany in 1848* (London, 1896), p. 62. Marx's remarks betray an absolute lack of understanding and information.—In Michael Bakunin's "Second Appeal to the Slavs," published by Václav Čejchan in a monograph *Bakunin v Čechách,* (Prague, 1928) no distinction was made between Palacký and the leader of Imperial troops, Gen. Jelačič. Bakunin wrote: "Wallt ihr frei sein? Jagt fort die verätherischen Führer, welche wie Jellachich, Rajaczicz, Palacký, Brauner und viele andere, euch alles versprochen und nichts gehalten, welche euch absichtlich betrogen, euch an die Ősterreichische Dynastie, an Nikolai verkauft haben, und nehmt andere, ehrliche, volkstümliche Führer. (Čjchan, l.c., p. 198).

to transform popular slogans into a comprehensive program for action.

There is no doubt that Palacký was far better prepared for the role of a political leader than any of his contemporaries in Bohemia. His knowledge of national history was unique. Connections with the nobility, which had been less exposed to pressure from Vienna than other social classes, travels abroad and correspondence with foreign scholars broadened his outlook and enabled him to see home problems in a wider, international setting. There was no wonder that he could not dissociate deliberations on the future existence of the Czech people from a reorganization of the Austrian Empire and of the whole region east of Germany and west of Russia.

Palacký's plans for the reconstruction of the Danubian area underwent a remarkable change in the course of sessions of the first Austrian Parliament. He was a member of the committee which was formed early in August, 1848, from prominent figures in the Parliament to elaborate upon a constitution for the Monarchy. He was entrusted with the task of drawing in collaboration with four other members of the committee, a preliminary project of the constitution. His proposal met with less approval than that of his colleague Caetan Mayer. Meetings of the committee took place at the end of January, 1849, in the summer residence of the Archbishops of Moravia, Kroměříž (Kremsier) where the Parliament transferred its activities in the autumn, 1848, after the outbreak of revolution in Vienna. In Kroměříž Mayer's draft became the subject of deliberations whereas from that of Palacký passages were read as variants.[8]

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[8] Minutes of those meetings were published by Anton Springer, *Protokolle des Verfassungsauschusses im Ősterreichischen Reichstage 1848-9,* Leipzig, 1885. Springer based on them chapters concerning discussions in the Reichstag in the second vol. of his *Geschichte Ősterreichs,* p. 614 sq. A controversy developed as to the authenticity of the protocols. In a letter to Dr. Alois Prazák from 1874 (see Fr. Kameníček, *František Palacký v Ústavním Výboru Říšského Sněmu Rakouského,* 1848-9) he categorically denied the official character of the protocols and declared that they were compiled by some individuals and never approved by the plenum. He wrote as follows: "Es ist nicht das erstenmal, dass die sogenannten "Sitzungsprotokolle" des Constitutionsauschusses von Kremsier mir Verdrusslichkeiten zuziehen; seit Springer's Geschichte Ősterreichs (Band II, 1865) war dies schon oft der Fall. Ich muss aber vor allem kategorisch verneinen, dass uber die Verhandlungen des Constitutionsauschusses jener Zeit irgend welche Protokolle uberhaupt aufgenommen oder gefürht worden wären. Wohl hatte Minister Bach uns einige Schriftführer

In the course of discussions Palacký spoke several times. Most important was his speech on January 23, 1849, wherein he went far beyond his original project and recommended a thorough reconstruction of the Monarchy on ethnographical lines. It is necessary to examine not only his speeches in the committee but also many articles and proclamations as well as his first draft of the constitution.[9] Only in that way can we perceive the implications and revolutionary character of his scheme. Though it was not presented formally and in a definite shape it deserves our close attention because along this line provisions might have been made not only for temporary coordination of conflicting interests but for permanent guarantees of peace and security of the Danubian basin.

Though primarily interested in the future constitution of the monarchy, he had in sight the whole area between the German Confederation and the Russian Empire, inhabited, as it was, by a number of small peoples. With their security and peaceful development he was mainly concerned when the old system collapsed. He voiced his fears and hopes in one of his early statements, a letter which he wrote on April 11, 1848, to Frankfurt.[10] It was the answer to an invitation to take part in deliberations concerning the election to the German National assembly. Members of the organizing committee had very inadequate knowledge of conditions in the lands of the Bohemian Crown, and of the rapid growth of national consciousness among the Czechs and there-

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zugewiesen, die den Verhandlungen beiwohnten und sich darüber Aufzeichnungen machten —zu ihrem Gebrauche und nach ihrem Gutdünken, welche auch ihr Eigentum blieben. Da dieselben jedoch nicht zur Kenntnis des Ausschusses gebracht, niemals in den Sitzungen vorgelesen und von niemandem verificirt, ja für mich, wie für andere Mitglieder, ein Geheimniss blieben, so kann man sie nur mit Unrecht "Sitzungsprotokolle nennen." A careful reading of the text as published by Springer confirms on the whole Palacký's statement that only notes of discussions were made and preserved.

[9] It must always be borne in mind that there was a difference between the first draft of the constitution which Palacký offered to the Committee for consideration, and his contributions to discussion in the meetings in January, 1849. An outline which gives us the main points of Palacký's first draft appeared in a collection of his smaller writings *Gedenkblätter,* 169-76. Historians like Helfert usually speak only of Palacký's first draft and pay little, or no attention to his speeches in the Committee in January, 1849.

[10] His letter was published several times both in German and in Czech (see *Gedenkblatter,* 149-155). There were some historians in the organizing committee who knew Palacký and were responsible for his invitation. See Jules Chopin, "Les Déceptions d'un Austrophile," *Revue de Paris,* 1918, p. 430, and Veit Valentin, *Geschichte d. Deutschen Revolution* I, 515 and 551.

fore they sent an invitation even to the most prominent Czech. They considered the country as predominantly German and wished to have it represented in the German Parliament. In a dignified manner Palacký refused that invitation. His letter consisted of two parts. The first one is a scholarly refutation of current opinions concerning the relation of the medieval kingdom of Bohemia to the Empire. The second may be taken as the first project for the reconstruction of the Danubian area.

The problem which Palacký wished to solve to the general satisfaction has remained the subject of discussion ever since. Today, as in 1848 or 1918, those who examine the causes of unrest in Europe and deliberate upon the pacification and consolidation of the old continent, are confronted with the cardinal point of its stability. The question was in 1848 and is nowadays how to establish a balance between large and powerful units and their small neighbors and secure their permanent and harmonious collaboration. Palacký was interested mainly in the small peoples in the Danubian basin, but his leading ideas could be easily generalized and applied successfully in other regions.

He was alarmed by the campaign in favor of a united Germany into which, according to the ideas of members of the Frankfurt committee, the German speaking provinces of Austria were to be incorporated. He fully recognized the right of German patriots to discuss and prepare the best form of Government for Germany but wished to draw a visible line between the German Confederation and the Austrian Empire. He believed that its preservation, integrity and consolidation was a great and important matter not only for his own nation but also for the whole of Europe, for humanity and civilization itself. According to Palacký Austria had its mission in Europe and its continued existence was desirable and essential for the preservation of peace and order.

In 1848 Palacký considered a united Germany the lesser evil. In his opinion Russia was the real menace to small nations settled in Central and South-eastern Europe. As a true liberal he disliked the autocratic form of government which prevailed there.

Moreover, the Russian policy of expansion aroused his fears. "You know"—thus he wrote to Frankfurt—"that this Power (i.e. Russia), now grown to vast dimensions, increases and expands itself decade by decade in far greater measure than is possible for the countries of the West; you know that, secure at its own centre against practically every attack, it has become, and has for a long time been, a menace to its neighbors, and that although it has unhindered access to the North, it is nevertheless, led by natural instinct, always seeking and will continue to seek, to extend its borders southwards. You know, too, that every further step which it will take forward on this path threatens at an ever accelerated pace to give birth to, and to establish, a universal monarchy, that is to say, an infinite and inexpressible evil, a misfortune without measure or bound, such as I, though heart and soul a Slav, would none the less profoundly regret from the standpoint of humanity even though that monarchy be proclaimed as a Slavonic one." A union of small peoples in Central Europe was in Palacký's opinion the best barrier against the Russian peril. The river Danube Palacký considered the vital artery of the region and maintained that the focus of power of the federation must never be diverted far from that river.

Palacký's ideas were not dictated alone by fears of the twofold danger which threatened his own people and its neighbors in Central Europe, nor by consideration of an effective defense of that region. He formed his program after a careful analysis of the contemporary situation and after a surprisingly correct estimate of the trends of mankind's modern history. Palacký realized that two driving forces will direct people's destinies in times to come. One of them he discussed in an unfinished article concerning the State[11] and occasionally touched upon in his later speeches and writings. The other was the subject of several public statements in 1848 and 1849.

In 1848 Palacký was deeply impressed by the revolution of communications which he did not fail to observe from his quiet study in one of the patrician houses in the New Town of Prague.

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[11] It was published from manuscript in a collection of Palacký's minor writings in Czech, *Spisy Drobné,* vol. I, pp. 7-8.

Modern means of transportation shortened distances between countries and changed their mutual relations. In addition to mechanical inventions the progress of human civilization reduced differences between racial units and standardized their life. All this taken together convinced Palacký that centralization of the world was advancing by leaps and bounds. He concluded that in a shrinking world chances for the preservation of small nations as independent entities were vanishing and that their federalization and close cooperation was of extreme importance as the only guarantee of their survival.

Let us pause for a moment to see what led Palacký to believe that world centralization had become a new and a mighty factor in the history of mankind. In the revolution of communications Metternich's Austria was certainly not the leading country. The railways there connected only the most important centres—the line from Vienna to Prague was not finished till autumn, 1845. Coaches and omnibuses still dominated highways, carrying passengers and mail. The telegraph was just coming out of its cradle and its use was only exceptional. There was no regular connection between Central Europe and the American continent, though the foundation of a line from Hamburg had been under discussion.

Far away from centres of international trade, in a city which had been systematically neglected by the Vienna government and which by its numerous churches and palaces led people more to meditation on its past glory than to visions of the more mechanized age, in the ancient capital of Bohemia, Palacký foresaw new forms of intercourse between nations of Europe and of the whole world and drew from his visions conclusions for his political program. It is hardly possible to accuse of conservatism a man who coordinated his political thinking with the first indications of the amazing progress of technology in years to come, a man who in 1861 made in the Austrian Upper House the following statement:[12] "The spirit of the world is also a factor in history and not the least important one; it works and it has manifested itself in our days more clearly than ever before. Its most important product, if I may say so, is the centralization of our earth, of mankind, a centralization steadily advancing, so elementary and strong that various actions of our ministries are to it in the same relation as distances between railway stations to distances between various planets." It would be unjust to deny to Palacký the epithet "homo Europaeus."

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[12] *Gedenkblätter*, p. 260.

The other driving force according to Palacký was the growth of national consciousness in Europe. On several occasions he spoke of its epoch-making character. Earlier than statesmen in prominent positions he realized that struggle in the defense of national identity and character had become one of the most important elements in modern history. His origin, his studies in Slovakia during the period of national awakening, his close connection with Czech patriotic writers, his work in various institutions of learning had brought him in close connection with the new currents of thought and their advocates. Early in 1849 he wrote[13]: "With the idea of nationality, awakened in our times more than ever before, there entered into the history of mankind a new, powerful factor, whose effect on the course of events will be fully estimated only in the coming century." At the end of that year he made another statement,[14] a last warning to those who, after the suppression of the revolutionary movement, had been entrusted with leading positions in the monarchy: "A sense of nationality, it is true, has been from time immemorial among all nations a powerful lever in public affairs and in the life of the state; particularly in our own case, in Bohemia, it has appeared, so to say, in the forefront of history in practically every age, excepting only the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. At the present time, however, it has attained a force and effect in the whole of Central Europe such as it never possessed before. What the Church and religion were to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries such to our age is the idea of nationality."

It was not difficult for Palacký to realize that the two main forces were not in harmony and that they worked against each other: the revolution in communications tending toward centralization and the forming of large blocs; the growth of national consciousness toward disintegration and disruption of states with racially mixed populations. A conflict of reason and sentiment inevitably accompanied any attempt at an application of general ideas in a concrete case. The twofold danger to which the Danubian area had been exposed spoke categorically for the preservation of a large unit, of the regenerated Austria. Palacký had no doubt of this in 1848. In order to emphasize its necessity he made in his letter to Frankfurt a statement which has often been quoted: "Assuredly if the Austrian state had not existed for ages, there would have been a need for us in the interest of Europe and indeed of humanity to endeavor to create it as soon as possible."

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[13] *Gedenkblätter,* p. 190.

[14] On December 21, 1849, he published an article "Concerning Centralisation and Equal Rights of Racial Groups in Austria" in a Czech daily, *Národní Noviny,* edited by his intimate collaborator Karel Havlíček. It was reprinted in *Spisy Drobné.*

But even when strongly advocating the preservation or formation of a large unit as a bulwark against the aggressive power in the East and the potential rival in the West, Palacký paid full attention to the racial problems. He knew that differences of language made transition from the absolutist to a constitutional system of government more difficult in the Habsburg monarchy than in any other country. He was fully aware of the bearing of this problem upon public life in the monarchy and wanted to bring the new force in harmony with other components of the new system. Long before he was able to elaborate upon details of the Austrian constitution, he had come to the conclusion that it is possible to reconcile the two tendencies and that a large state with mixed population has its raison d'être and can exist even in the period of growing differentiation along racial and linguistic lines. But there was only one juridical and moral basis for such a country, viz., the rule that all nationalities and all religions should enjoy there complete equality of rights and respect in common. It was not easy to apply strictly the leading principles to the existing conditions in the Danubian area. For many reasons Palacký's ideas as contained in his speeches in the committee were a compromise between the postulate and reality. Of those reasons several must be mentioned because only then will it be possible to present Palacký's views in a contemporary setting and to see the line between the essential and the accidental components of his scheme.

It goes without saying that Palacký accepted monarchy as the form of government, and the House of Habsburg-Lorraine as the ruling family. Thus the future was to be connected with the past and continuity of old institutions with the new order preserved. More for practical than theoretical reasons Palacký had not taken the republican system seriously into consideration and did not dwell upon its shortcomings or merits.

Acceptance of the monarchy was not the weakest spot in Palacký's scheme because a transition from the republican system was always possible without danger of collapse of the whole structure. Acquiescence in other matters and willingness to respect the status quo was far more important and would have undoubtedly proved to be a serious handicap if Palacký's scheme had been accepted in principle and put in practice. Of racial groups in the territory of the monarchy several only had no kinsmen beyond the frontier of 1848, viz., the Czechs and Slovaks, the Magyars and, of the Southern Slavs, the Croats and the Slovenes. In all other cases the political frontier coincided with ethnographical lines, leaving parts of various racial groups within the framework of the monarchy, parts outside as components of other states. Such was the case with the Italians, Germans, Poles, Ruthenes, Rumanians and Serbs. There is no evidence in Palacký's public statements of his scrutiny of this extremely delicate problem. Some of his words, however, indicate that he realized that changes might and would come in the future with the growth of national consciousness inside and outside the monarchy. He was less occupied with political frontiers and their permanence or possible changes than with general principles of government in racially mixed states and their definition. Accepting in that given moment the existing framework, he did not exclude possibilities of its diminution in one or expansion in another direction. He said on one occasion[15] that the constitution must be broad and elastic enough to correspond both to the existing situation and to changes that might come in the future. He undoubtedly believed that sound principles, once accepted as a basis and general rule, might be applied to any number of partners in the proposed federation.

The third problem with which Palacký had been confronted was the peculiar structure of the monarchy. Its territory consisted of a certain number of provinces, unequal in size or number of population, with different titles and traditions. There was a wide difference in every respect between the kingdom of Hungary and the principality of Vorarlberg. Opinions as to the advisability of preservation of such units differed considerably.[16] In Palacký's view, more important than the difference of size was the fact that border lines of those provinces did not always coincide with ethographical or linguistic frontiers. Even in this case it was necessary to decide either for a compromise or for a radical change of existing conditions, for preservation of historical entities or for the creation of new units with no difference between political and ethnographical lines. Palacký's speeches and writings from 1848 betray uncertainty and hesitation on that point. In principle he was ready as early as spring, 1848, to pay more attention to modern ideas and requirements than to traditional forms and institutions, but practical considerations retarded the triumph of the statesman over the historian. According to the first draft of the new constitution from autumn, 1848, historical frontiers were to be respected. Moreover, Hungary and the Italian provinces were entirely left out of consideration and the rest of the monarchy was to be divided into four conglomerations of historical units with Polish, German, Czech and Yugoslav majorities.[17]

During the winter of 1848-9 Palacký passed from this compromise to a new, more revolutionary scheme with which he acquainted members of the committee late in January, 1849. The principle of nationality was the leitmotif of his deliberations and all else was subordinated to it. He recommended that the monarchy (including Hungary and the Italian provinces) be divided into eight units: 1. German-Austrian; 2. Czechoslovak; 3. Polish; 4. Illyrian (Slovenes and Croats); 5. Italian; 6. Serb; 7. Magyar; 8. Rumanian. He went into detail and stipulated which territories should be included into each of those groups.[18] He recommended that the Austrian Empire first be dissolved into eight national territories which then would form by a free decision a federation with the same ruler at its head.

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[15] In the session of the Committee for the Constitution on January 24, 1849. See Springer, *Protokolle,* p. 35.

[16] There is plenty of evidence of that in Springer's *Protokolle.*

[17] For details see *Gedenkblätter,* p. 169, and *Spisy Drobné* I, p. 59.

Palacký's scheme was a very bold one. He abandoned in principle the basis on which his original project of federalization of Austria had reposed. Though he was well aware of practical difficulties he admitted in theory the division even of entities so perfect from the geographical and historical angle as Bohemia and Hungary in order to give free rein to the ethnographical principle.[19] No member of the committee fully grasped the meaning of his recommendations and warning words. The response was therefore inadequate and discouraging. A Slovene delegate from Ljublana, Dr. Kaučić, spoke in favor of the ethnographical principle, but failed to perceive the importance of forming larger units out of territories with a kindred population.[20] He also left out of consideration Hungary and the Kingdoms of Lombardy and Venetia. Kaučić's proposal stood half way between the two projects of Palacký, his first draft in which historical provinces were respected, and his remarkable contributions to discussion in the meeting on January 23, 1849. Even Palacký's most devoted adherent and collaborator from the group of Czech deputies, F. L. Rieger, showed less admiration for the project of a complete reconstruction of the Monarchy than for the moderate project of federalization, as contained in Palacký's first draft.[21] Sharp criticism from benches of German-speaking centralists showed abundantly how great was the aversion against any scheme that held out for the non-German races a hope of improvement of their position in the Monarchy. It is obvious, however, that Palacký saw clearly what problems the future would bring.[22] His scheme allowed for the growing force of national consciousness even in places where it had not as yet manifested itself, as, e.g., among the Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia and Subcarpathian Russia, and sought to clear the way fully for it. Palacký hoped that by liberal provisions frictions would be more easily eliminated than by precise formulas or rigid clauses.

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[18] Details can be found in Springer's *Protokolle,* p. 26.

[19] Even the inaccurate rendering of speeches in the meetings, as preserved in the *Protokolle,* leaves us in no doubt that Palacký's consent to the division of ideal geographical units was not given without hesitation and was conditional. According to *Protokolle* (p. 26) he said: "Ich bin keineswegs gegen die Trennung Deutsch-Bőhmens und Czechiens; wäre dieselbe nur praktisch mőglich, dann würde ich sie vorschlagen. Bőhmen ist ein Kesselland; einen Kessel kann man aber, ohne ihn zu vernichten, nicht teilen." There is an important statement concerning this point in Palacký's letter to Pražák (see above, note 8). Palacký wrote as follows: "In der Hitze der Debatten, da die Deutschen furchteten von der Majorität der Slaven beherrscht und erdruckt zu werden, erklärte ich allerdings in die Isolirung einzelner Nationalitäteneingehen zu wollen, damit in Landesangelegenheiten jedes Volk für sich beschliessen könne, was ihm gut dünke, weil, wie ich sagte, wir Slaven keineswegs über die Deutschen herrschen, aber von ihnen auch nicht beherrscht werden wollen. Dem zu wäre ich auch nicht abgeneigt gewesen den Deutschbőhmen und Deutschmährern einen besonderen Landtag zuzustehen, wenn man anderseits z. B. auch die Slovaken zu den Czechen in Bőhmen und Mähren hinzugezogen hatte; aber einen Vorschlag oder főrmlichen Antrag zur Teilung der Monarchie in nationalen Departments oder Kreise habe ich niemals gemacht und hätte auch in eine Zerreissung der böhmischen Krone nie eingewilligt." It must be borne in mind that in 1874, two years before his death, Palacký was convinced that the best solution of the Czech problem would be the restoration of the Bohemian Kingdom to the same status which was given to Hungary in 1867, and that long before that, he had given up hopes of a thorough reconstruction of the monarchy along ethnographical lines.

No vote was taken on Palacký's suggestions. Even his first draft of the constitution was given far less consideration than the project of Caëtan Mayer. His ideas were less alarming than the uncompromising application of the principle of nationality advocated by Palacký. Views of moderate centralists and of moderate federalists came closer together in the course of discussion.

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[20] It is obvious that Kaučić had only a very vague idea of conditions in the western half of the Monarchy and that he was influenced more by the past than by a vision of future development. He said (Protokolle 23): "Wir wollen bei der Provinzialeintheilung nach meiner Meinung dem Prinzip der Nationalität und Convenienz Rechnung tragen und nur das beisammen lassen was gern beisammen bleibt . . . Ich teile Ősterreich so ein: 1. Czechisch Bőhmen oder Czechowien; 2. Deutschbőhmen oder Bojerheim; 3. Ősterreich ob und unter der Enns und Salzburg; 4. Deutsch Steiermark und Kärnten; 5. Slavisch Steiermark, Krain und Slavisch Kustenland als Slavonien; 6. Schlesien; 7. Mähren; 8. Deutschtirol und Vorarlberg; 9. Welschtirol; 10. Italienischer Teil des Kustenlandes; 11. Dalmatien; 12. Polen oder Mazurisch Galizien; 13. Ruthenisch Galizien; 14. Bukowina."

[21] See Springer, *Protokolle,* p. 30.

[22] It may be shown by two examples how widely opinions of German-writing Austrians differed in the appraisal of Palacký's ideas and activities. His contemporary with strong centralistic leanings, Anton Springer, had no kind word for them. In the introduc-

The final text, approved in the meeting on March 4, 1849, in Palacký's absence, was a compromise by which no group was really satisfied. Old provinces (14 in number) were retained as components of the Austrian state. Hungary, as well as the kingdoms of Lombardy and Venetia, were left out of consideration.[23]

In several meetings which took place late in January and early in February, 1849, problems of distribution of power and competence, of rights and duties became subjects of discussion. Palacký attended these meetings for some time, then, more and more discouraged by the lack of vision of most members of the committee, he resigned his place thereon. His Czech colleague, F. L. Rieger, spoke on several occasions. He was twenty years younger than Palacký and later took the helm as leader of the Old Czech party. Versed as he was in constitutional problems, he wished to organize the Danubian monarchy on a sound basis, suggesting Switzerland and the United States as models for the federated Austria.[24] His ideas and proposals went far ahead of the time and were received by the bulk of the members of the committee just as coldly as Palacký's project for a federation of ethnical units.

Mayer's text, though approved by the committee, was never read in the full session of the Parliament. In March, 1849, the Vienna government felt strong enough to disperse the deputies and to introduce by an Imperial decree its own text of the constitution. In a short time even this constitution had been abrogated. Absolutism was again enthroned in a somewhat different form from Metternich's system but equally void of spirit, and oppressive. Austria was once again thrown back instead of being given an opportunity of regeneration and free expansion.

In the early sixties, after failure in Italy, the constitutional system was again introduced, but very little attention had been

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tion to *Protokolle* he criticised Palacký's stubbornness ("das eigensinnige Festhalten P's an einer Verfassungsreform") and maintained that he had no genuine interest in the future constitution of the monarchy (p. 6). Josef Redlich on the other hand (see above, note 4) spoke highly of Palacký's analysis of the problems and needs of Austria.

[23] It has been published by Springer as an appendix to *Protokolle,* p. 365, foll. 1.

[24] See Springer, *Protokolle,* p. 50. Mayer's sceptical comment upon Rieger's suggestion is on p. 52.

paid to the wishes of various nationalities. Not federation with equal rights and duties for all partners but the dual system was introduced in 1867, with guarantee of the supremacy of two groups, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary. In the time preceding the settlement (Ausgleich) Palacký wrote a series of articles entitled "The Underlying Idea of the Austrian State,"[25] wherein he uttered the last words of warning against discrimination between dominating and subjugated races. He no longer insisted on the preservation of the monarchy but stated with resignation: "We existed before Austria and we shall exist when she has passed."

In Palacký's writings we find another remarkable alteration of his views as expressed in the letter to Frankfurt. He lived to see the Prussian victory in France in 1870-71 and the proclamation of the German Empire under the Hohenzollerns. He was greatly alarmed by the growth of an aggressive spirit in Germany and with anxiety followed the influence of spectacular victories of German armies upon the German-speaking Austrians and Magyars. Hopes of preservation of the monarchy were waning. To Palacký its collapse sooner or later seemed to be inevitable. The freedom and security of his own people as well as of other smaller peoples in the Danubian area was again at stake. In 1872-4 when the last political writings of Palacký appeared, the roles were reversed. Germany with the Hohenzollerns at its head was the menace. When Palacký directed his eyes beyond the frontiers of Bohemia, he did not turn them to Berlin or to Vienna, but to Russia to seek there the centre which was fitted to insure and defend the peace, the liberty and the rights of small nations in the Danubian basin.[26]

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[25] The Czech title was *Idea Státu Rakouského;* the German version appeared with the title *Őstereichische Staatsidee.*

[26] There is a passage concerning Russia in Palacký's epilogue to his first edition of smaller writings which appeared in 1872 with the title "Radhost" (the epilogue was reprinted in *Spisy Drobné* I. p. 340 foll.) He wrote among other things the following sentence: "I consider it no small gain that I have no more need to be afraid of any kind of future universal Russian monarchy" (*ibid.* p. 362) "Pokladám si to za nemalý zisk, že jíž nenachazím příčiny báti se budouci nějaké universalní monarchie Ruské." Palacký was influenced both by the Prussian expansion and by reforms introduced in Russia by Alexander II, and he did not hesitate to correct his views concerning Russia as they were contained in his letter to Frankfurt in 1848.

It would be very attractive to make a comparison between Palacký's time and the present situation, to draw a line between conditional and permanent components of his scheme of a Danubian federation. Instead of that we quote a passage from his letter to Frankfurt which is as true today as it was in 1848: "The rights of nations are in truth the rights of Nature. No nation on earth has the right to demand that its neighbors should sacrifice themselves for its benefit, no nation is under an obligation to deny or sacrifice itself for the good of its neighbor. Nature knows neither dominant nor subjugated nations. If the bond which unites a number of diverse nations in a single political unit is to be firm and enduring, no nation must have cause to fear that the union will cost it any of those things which it holds most dear. On the contrary, each must have the certain hope that in the central authority it will find defense and protection against possible violations by its neighbors of the principle of equality. Then will every nation do its best to confer upon that central authority such powers as will enable it successfully to provide the aforesaid protection. I am convinced that even now it is not too late for this fundamental rule of justice, this *sacra ancora* for a vessel in danger of foundering, to be publicly and sincerely proclaimed and energetically carried out."

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RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA DURING THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN CRISIS IN 1863

by Anatole G. Mazour

THE annexation of Schleswig-Holstein by Prussia is a subject well discussed in historical literature. From various excellent sources we are able to draw a good picture of the opinions of the various governments in western Europe during the crisis. Great Britain's propitiate disapproval of Bismarck's policy; the half-hearted suicidal coöperation of Austria; the greedy, suspicious and muddling policy of France; Sweden's impotent sympathy with Denmark—these are all too well-known to be recounted here. It is now common knowledge that Bismarck was prepared for as many as three wars if necessary in order to obtain the two fat Duchies, and the diplomacy conducted under his guidance during the critical months preceding the war of 1864 was one of Bismarck's "proudest" records, as he himself admitted on one occasion.

In reopening the Schleswig-Holstein problem Bismarck envisioned its "solution" as a part of a much larger scheme—the unification of Germany. Whether the Continent realized this or not is immaterial. The fact is that practically every European Power, with the exception of Russia, watched the action from Berlin with a mixed feeling of suspicion and animosity. But the part Russia played in this brief though momentous crisis is less clear and is only casually referred to by the various writers of this period. Only recently, with the publication of the Russian diplomatic correspondence pertaining to this subject, the matter begins to emerge far more clearly. The purpose of this brief study is to analyze these documents.[1]

When in 1863-64 Bismarck turned his sullen looks upon his neighbor to the north, Denmark in despair began to search for friends in this cold world. It was assumed in Copenhagen that the dynastic Oldenburg ties between Denmark and Russia would force the latter to stand by the Danish Government through thick and thin. It was precisely on this point that the Court at Copenhagen committed its first fatal blunder. Russia's foremost concern was not the Oldenburg dynasty tie; she regarded the retention of Danish sovereignty as vital to the preservation of European peace and the control of Jutland by a power that would not constitute a threat to Russian shipping as paramount to her national interests. For, it may be reminded, whoever controls Jutland holds the key to the Baltic—a fact frequently overlooked by a good many writers. The occupation of the Baltic limitrophes is not enough as long as the Baltic Sea is a *mare clausum* of an unfriendly power. In 1864 Prussia constituted no such threat to Russia.

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[1] "Rossiya i Prussiya v Schlezvig-Golshtinskom voprose. [Russia and Prussia and the Schleswig-Holstein Question.]" *Krasnyi Arkhiv,* II (93), 1939, 51-118.

It was under Russia's diplomatic pressure, however, that in 1848 the occupational forces of Prussia under the command of General Wrangel had to withdraw from Jutland, thus satisfying Nicholas I and infuriating General Wrangel. The only reason for Nicholas' intervention was his continuous fear that the precarious peace of Europe might be upset by a single awkward move and embroil Russia in social turmoil. On July 2, 1850, there was restored under the pressure of England and Russia, chiefly the latter, a peace virtually accepting the *status quo ante bellum,* which to the Prussian nationalists was merely a truce. Some two years later, Nicholas I further undertook the ungrateful part of adjudicator at the Conferences of Warsaw and Olmütz in October and November 1850 respectively, when he made use of the weight of Russia's steamroller again to terminate any further disturbance of the peace of Europe and to check possible revolutionary repercussions in Eastern Europe. Instead of going into minute detail to solve the tender national problems, Nicholas I, true to his military inclinations, squarely placed before Prussia and Austria the terms, requesting them to settle all differences at once, under threat of a solution enforced upon them by Russian arms. Thus came the well-known Punctation of Olmütz, or as the offended Prussians called it, the "Olmütz humiliation," signed on November 29, 1850, according to which the parties consented that the Federal Diet should settle the problem of Holstein, while Austria and Prussia undertook by combined action to restore peace and order in that Duchy.

Simultaneously on August 2, 1850, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Sweden signed the Protocol of London by which these Powers bound themselves to respect the integrity of Denmark, leaving the judgment upon the problem of succession for some later date. Upon the latter question action was taken only on May 8, 1852, by the Treaty of London, which again confirmed the integrity of the Danish Kingdom; it announced that in case the royal male line of Denmark was extinguished, the crown was to pass to Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sondenburg-Glücksburg and his heirs, embracing both Denmark and the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. At the same time the Treaty provided that the relations between Denmark and the Germanic Federation regarding Holstein and Lauenburg, as provided by the Federal Act of 1815 and the Federal Law, were to remain unaltered. The Treaty of London was signed by seven states, the three immediately involved, namely, Denmark, Prussia, and Austria, and by the other four Powers, Great Britain, France, Russia and Sweden. At the same time Denmark promised not to annex Schleswig, a pledge that later, when it was violated by the Constitution of 1863, was taken as a pretext to renounce the Treaty of London by Prussia and Austria.

Having attained all that, the Powers assumed that the whole perplexing question had been settled. Yet within less than a decade the entire issue flared up once more, this time to be decided by the generals on the battlefield rather than by the diplomats in the Foreign Offices. The occasion to allow Bismarck to open the entire question anew came in March 1864, when Frederick VII of Denmark proclaimed the annexation of Schleswig, though not Holstein. And when on November 15, Frederick VI had passed away and his successor Christian IX followed the policy of his predecessor, Denmark gave Prussia an excellent pretext for a "final remedy" against the lingering grievance and sadly remembered "Olmütz humiliation." Europe had to face the crisis all over again, though this time the solution was bound to be different since Prussian affairs were led by a new man with a will and determination and diplomatic craftsmanship previously unknown in Berlin. It is with the beginning of this second phase of the crisis, which flared up in 1848, that the aforementioned documents shed light upon this intricate diplomatic episode and the attitude Russia took during this crisis.

When on January 14, 1864, Count Ubri, Russian Ambassador to Berlin, had returned to his post after his Christmas vacation, he could already observe "the significance which the Danish question assumed" at that moment.[2] The agitation was caused by the information that reached Bismarck from Copenhagen where the Danish Diet rejected the Austro-Prussian proposal for the occupation of Schleswig in order to carry out the provisions of the London Agreement and thus compel Denmark to abrogate the Constitution of November 13, 1863. During the brief audience which Bismarck hastily gave Count Ubri on January 12, he informed him that this time Prussia and Austria, acting within the rights given them by the Treaty of London, were forced to undertake a speedy occupation of Schleswig. The delay was mainly caused by the completion of an accord between Berlin and Vienna. When the Russian Ambassador inquired whether Bismarck would take the trouble of at least sending Denmark an ultimatum, his reply was in the affirmative, allowing Copenhagen forty-eight hours. Such a short period, Count Ubri remarked, would produce an unfavorable impression upon the Continent, which would consider it as a merely provocative act. He further warned Bismarck that public opinion in France, particularly that of the army, would never permit the sacrifice of Denmark; and that the same was true in regard to Great Britain, the government of which would never abandon the Danish people with a light heart. But Bismarck remained adamant, resolved to pursue the course he had charted, and from the brief conversation Ubri carried away the conviction that the course of events had evidently been all determined as far as Prussia was concerned. "Schleswig will soon become the arena of serious and sorrowful events," concluded

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[2] Ubri to Gorchakov, January 15/3, 1864.

Count Ubri, unless Denmark accepted Russia's advice to adopt the "salvaging decision" and abrogate her new constitution. St. Petersburg had been thus informed by Count Ubri of the imminent conflict.

The immediate reaction in the Russian capital was for noninterference. Two weeks before Gorchakov had learned of the looming conflict (December 30, 1863), he had informed Count Brunnow, Russian Ambassador at London, of the two-fold policy which his country intended to pursue: on one hand Russia was to see to it that Prussia be restrained from excessive demands; on the other, that British suspicions toward Prussia be dispelled. Denmark must be persuaded to allow the occupation of Schleswig and the expulsion of the Prince of Augustenburg from Holstein. Dispatching a copy of the same message to Count Ubri, Gorchakov added that in this manner Russia hoped to forestall the division of Europe into two hostile camps. In short, what Gorchakov wished to attain was a coordinated Austro-Prussian policy approved by France, Great Britain and Russia.[3] To accomplish this Gorchakov suggested to Denmark that she should appeal to the "friendly Powers" for a conference in order to solve the Schleswig question. But Denmark was adamant and refused to listen to such advice, for fear that these "friendly Powers" might deprive her of more territory than she would be apt to lose in an open conflict. Nor was London very enthusiastic about such a conference as long as the actual aims of Prussia were not clear.[4] Russia's plan for the solution of the painful Schleswig problem was doomed to failure from the very beginning.

The attitude of both Russia and Great Britain irritated Bismarck somewhat, who wanted to know more precisely where the two stood and what they intended to do in case of war. What Bismarck wanted was a frank commitment which would approve his interpretation of the Treaty of London and thus allow him free action against Denmark.[5] In no vague terms he urged that Russia and Prussia stand together, unless France should intervene on behalf of Denmark and should occupy Danzig, an act, as he warned, which would undoubtedly affect Russia most vitally and deprive her of the opportunity of remaining a passive observer. General von Gablenz, Commander of the Prussian occupational forces, went even further, when he strongly urged Count Ubri, because of the general European situation, to restore the Holy Alliance except that it should be based on more liberal principles since, he argued, times had changed, but not geographic and political conditions. Austria, Prussia and Russia combined, Gablenz proceeded, represented an impregnable force which France could never challenge.

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[3] Gorchakov to Ubri, January 19/7, 1864.

[4] Gorchakov to Brunnow, January 19/7, 1864.

[5] Ubri to Gorchakov, January 20/8, 1864.

"Does it not seem to you, Prince," commented Count Ubri after narrating the conversation with the Prussian leaders, "that they come back to us as soon as they commence to feel the need of a reserve that would assure safety to Germany. . . ."[6] Yet, Count Ubri added, should Austria and Prussia be defeated, Russia would have to stand alone against France. And Napoleon's policy during the Polish rebellion was a too recent memory to leave any optimism should such a state of affairs arise. In conclusion the Russian diplomat warned Prince Gorchakov that the reason that he annoyed him with detailed dispatches was largely because he knew that should "the flood from the Seine begin to move towards us [*sc*. Russia], Germany's ability to check it would prove absolutely helpless."

The tense atmosphere in Europe caused by the Schleswig-Holstein crisis continued to linger. Russia's endeavor to persuade Denmark to submit as gracefully as possible to a superior foe proved futile. France and Great Britain had asked Berlin to postpone action for six weeks, hoping meanwhile that the summoned Diet would revoke the Constitution of November 18, but this hope proved unjustified. Bismarck kept on insisting that he was acting within the legal rights given him by the Treaty of London of 1852. On January 28, Gorchakov telegraphed to Berlin, imploring Bismarck not to hasten action against Denmark until a special courier arrived in the Prussian capital. What Gorchakov feared most was a rupture between Prussia and Great Britain joined by France, in which case the entire Continent of Europe involving Russia would be thrown into a turmoil.[7]

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[6] Ubri to Gorchakov, January 23/11, 1864.

Meanwhile the instructions dispatched to Count Ubri reiterated the advisability of close watchfulness and a further attempt to seek a means whereby the Danish problem might be solved amicably by the coördinated policies of Austria, Prussia, Russia and England, a policy which "must dominate all the rest." Toward France Gorchakov held an unconcealed antipathy, and such an agreement, he well understood, would undoubtedly be distastful to Paris, but in spite of French disinclination such an agreement must be attained. Should the arrangement fail to materialize, London and Paris would come to a separate understanding. In that case, Gorchakov feared that Europe would become so divided as to endanger Russia's position. To avoid such a complication the British government must be persuaded to stand firmly by the Treaty of London and see to it that Denmark would loyally carry out its provisions while the Powers must pledge to Denmark that the occupation of Schleswig would in no manner impair Danish integrity. In other words, what Gorchakov was trying to accomplish at the expense of Denmark was a settlement that would provide for a united front of conservative governments, including England, but isolating France.

To this plan Bismarck rendered a willing ear, at least so long as Russia would promise to aid Prussia in settling the problem of the Duchies. But the main difficulty was in London where a pledge was required before the four Powers could come to any agreement, that Danish territorial integrity would be respected, a request that irritated Bismarck, and, even more so, William I. What Bismarck sought was assurance that the conflict, once it came, would remain localized. "Allow us," he told Count Ubri, "to exchange with Denmark a few cannon shots and the situation will be cleared. The King particularly insists upon a policy that would make military activities possible."[8] After this rather frank request Ubri could not escape the impression that war was unavoidable and that its outbreak was only a question of time. The Ambassador was correct, for while he was informing his superior of his impression the Austro-Prussian allied armies were already on the soil of Holstein, entering the Duchy on January 21, 1864, and a week later, to be precise, February 1, they trampled the soil of Schleswig.

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[7] Ubri to Gorchakov, January 28/16, 1864.

[8] Ubri to Gorchakov, January 31/19, 1864.

Denmark did not despair, hoping that the other Powers, particularly Great Britain and Russia, would stand on the side of the victim of aggression. And can Denmark be blamed for such optimistic calculations? Had not Lord Palmerston himself declared in the House of Commons on July 23, 1863, that Denmark would not stand alone in case Danish rights were violated. Exactly what Palmerston meant, whether he intended to pledge British aid, or to assure coöperative action by the signatory Powers of the Treaty of London was not clear. At least Denmark must have thought so, otherwise that state would never have dared to challenge the giant to the south.

On February 13, 1864, the Danish Minister to St. Petersburg presented a note on behalf of his government, appealing for assistance against an enemy which was far superior in force and numbers. Recalling that Russia had always considered Schleswig as an inseparable part of Denmark, the envoy now begged for aid so that his country would not shed the blood of her best sons in vain. Alexander's marginal note on this document demonstrates the cool and impersonal attitude taken by the Government of Neva. It reads: "We have done and will do morally everything possible to defend Denmark. As to actual intervention, that is out of the question."[9]

To Russia it was far more important to prevent the war from resulting in an unfavorable combination of powers or a situation which would enable the revolutionary forces to exploit the disturbing conditions. The attitude pleased Vienna and even more Berlin, which hoped that the other Powers would take the same stand. "History," philosophized Morenheim, the Russian chargé d'affaires at Berlin in his dispatch, "has condemned the compromise of 1851-52." Any indecisive action would only encourage disorder in Germany. Morenheim therefore had found Bismarck's course correct, though, he added significantly: "I called the attention of Mr. Bismarck to the probable fact that a careless attitude toward Great Britain would force the latter with the inevitable law of gravity into the arms of France." He therefore cautioned the Prussian Minister-President to move cautiously lest he wreck the peace of Europe which had been so carefully guarded by Prussia herself.[10]

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[9] Baron Plessen to Gorchakov, February 13/1, 1864.

Meanwhile London sent out a trial balloon to Russia and France, inquiring if it were not timely to dispatch a squadron to Copenhagen, although it was carefully stated that this act was to be considered only as a demonstration of the three Powers in favor of arbitration. But Gorchakov soberly warned Britain that, though always willing to coöperate on behalf of peace, Russia did not wish to see Denmark build up false illusions about such collective action.[11] Before committing himself to any action Gorchakov first wanted to know the precise number and tonnage of ships to be sent, and, secondly, what would be France's reaction to the English plan. Unless given convincing assurance beforehand, Gorchakov did not believe his country would consent to any action, for the whole undertaking impressed him as nothing but "English pride injured by the general conduct of his government," rather than genuine consideration of a general peace. Before Russia would commit herself to any policy she must never lose sight of the most important fact, that her cordial relations with Vienna and Berlin must not be disturbed. If Russia joined the naval demonstration initiated by London it would be only for two reasons: first, to prevent an Anglo-French coalition directed against Prussia and Austria; second, that such a diplomatic combination, having once acquired a preponderant influence in Denmark, would not be used for any but peaceful purposes.

Failing either to prevent the war or to intervene on behalf of Denmark, the British Government had no other recourse but to exert, as gracefully as possible, some effort for the sake of a speedy conclusion of peace. In a circular to the Continental Powers Great Britain offered to summon a conference to meet in London on April 12 (the Conference met the 20th) in order to terminate the war. Russia accepted the offer, though nourishing "no illusions as to its favorable outcome." Gorchakov's advice to Brunnow, who was to represent Russia at this conference, was to pursue a policy in strict accordance with that proclaimed at the accession to the throne by Alexander II, namely, non-interference in continental affairs. After having experienced the price and the gratitude for playing the rôle of a continental gendarme for about four decades, Russia had decided to give her utmost attention to domestic problems. Nevertheless, Gorchakov felt that the Danish question was pregnant with grave potentialities bound to affect the Empire of Russia. Gorchakov was therefore willing to lend moral support, bearing in mind that the integrity of the Danish monarchy and royal succession be preserved for the sake of maintaining European peace and a continental balance of power.

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[10] Morenheim to Gorchakov, February 15/3, 1864.

[11] Gorchakov to Brunnow, February 24/12, 1864.

But Gorchakov was neither blind nor sentimental about the preservation of royal Denmark. "To believe in the possibility of unconditional restoration of a state of affairs that preceded the war would mean to lull oneself with illusions," he warned Brunnow.[12] Developments in Germany precluded any such hopes, and the whole issue before the conference, as Gorchakov wisely stated in his instructions to Brunow, was this: "What guarantees would be considered satisfactory simultaneously to the claims of Germany, the rights of Denmark and to the interests of Europe?"[13] The proposal for a plebiscite in the two Duchies, made by the French government, left St. Petersburg rather skeptical, and Gorchakov advised Brunnow to vote against it should such a plan come up before the Conference.[14]

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[12] Gorchakov to Brunnow, March 28/16, 1864.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Gorchakov to Brunnow, April 5/March 24, 1864.

Soon after the London conference opened Brunnow had sadly observed that "Prussia was abusing her victory." Russia's aim, argued Brunnow, was to see that Denmark's sovereignty be preserved and that Prussia and Austria consent to that, yet at the conference table Brunnow was afraid plans might assume a different course. Should this happen, Brunnow told his government, he would rather leave the conference with honor than desert the principle upon which it had been agreed the Powers would coöperate. Here Alexander made a marginal note: "If things assume such a nature, there will be nothing else for us to do." With ill-concealed irritation Brunnow reminded his government of Bismarck's shrewd diplomacy, his insistence, for example, that Russia claim at Frankfort the Kiel harbor in order that Bismarck might exploit either the nationalistic explosion which would logically follow such an act, or even a war with the German States involving most likely Great Britain and Sweden.[15] Brunnow therefore urged his government that before the Conference proceeded with its work Russia must obtain a specific understanding with Bismarck as to what were his war aims.

The London conference soon ended, totally failing to attain its purpose. Meanwhile, touring western Europe, Alexander II and Gorchakov met with the Austrian and Prussian Emperors at Berlin and later at Kissingen, during which time Gorchakov frankly stated in the presence of Bismarck Russia's official attitude. The audience was marked by quite outspoken anti-British sentiment on the part of the Prussian statesmen and equally frank expression concerning the position of Russia, in which the typical maudlin diplomatic terminology was totally absent. Again, what Gorchakov was afraid of was not a possible Prussian-British conflict, but that as a result of such friction an Anglo-French alliance might emerge which would totally upset the European balance of power. The events in Poland were too close to forget French conduct toward the uprising in the Polish capital. In case of a war between Prussia and Great Britain, Gorchakov warned William I, Russia would have to sympathize with the latter in spite of her loyalty to Prussia and the cordial relations between the two royal houses, the Romanovs and the Hohenzollerns. Should the British fleet appear in the Baltic, he frankly admitted, the Russian government would even be forced to abandon her position of a neutral observer. "You would not, of course, shoot at us?" the King interrupted him. "No, Your Majesty," replied Gorchakov, "but the very presence of our flag among your enemies would be a sufficiently sad proof that from the political point of view, we cannot favor the issues which support you. It would be an extreme inconsistency if we should act otherwise." "I understand," replied the King.[16]

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[15] Brunnow to Gorchakov, May 4/April 22, 1864.

Had there been a question of Prussian national existence, Gorchakov expounded further, Russia would have taken a different attitude, but, under circumstances such as those existing in July 1864, it was a question of inciting a continental conflagration with consequences that were hardly calculable. The Danish question to Russia was a secondary issue; what was involved chiefly was the question of the preservation of a "conservative union of Russia, Prussia, Austria and England, directed against a revolutionary spirit and individual ambitions." The threat of revolution so recently witnessed flaring bright in Poland and supported by France necessitated, from the Russian point of view, that Prussia, the gateway to Poland, remain strong enough to prevent "foreign intervention," presumably French aid to Warsaw.[17] Incidentally, we may mention that by such an arrangement Gorchakov evidently hoped to come to some amicable agreement with London concerning the Near Eastern question.

France at the same time played a double rôle. She flirted with nationalistic Poland and at the same time mortally feared the rising nationalistic might of Prussia, and thus hoped to hold the former as a check upon Prussia. Napoleon III was also hopeful that he might entice Russia into the French orbit, by cautiously holding out such bait as Kiel, but Gorchakov was not taken in. That the victory of Prussia did not altogether favor Russia's position in the Baltic was clear to the Foreign Office on the Neva. But all Russia could do was to pursue a policy of watchfulness, caution, support a balance of power abroad and a continuation of the reforms begun within the Empire itself. With Prussia relations had to remain cordial, but already in 1865 Gorchakov had misgivings that if Berlin insisted stubbornly upon its policy, regardless of the cost, it would exclude Russia's possible coöperation. The report of Gorchakov to Alexander II presented on September 3-15, 1865, concludes with a statement that explained the difficulties in establishing a better understanding with London. What made the establshment of more friendly relations with London difficult was Britain's compliant policy toward France, he explained. On the other hand, London suspected Russia's policy in the Near East, thus barrng a logical agreement that had been delayed for some two score years. By that time there had risen before both Great Britain and Russia a new Germany, no more following the line of Bismarck, but of William II. But that is another story.

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[16] Gorchakov to Brunnow, July 13/1, 1864.

[17] Report of Gorchakov to Alexander II, September 3/15, 1865.

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FROM PRAGUE TO WARSAW

by Josef Hanč

The occupation of Prague on March 15, 1939, followed by the extension of German protection to the newly created Slovak "Schutzstaat" on March 23, with German bases for military operation, spread all along the Polish-Slovak border, and the annexation of Memel on March 22, were events which moved faster than protests, communications and diplomatic arguments. They aroused consternation in London and Paris. Warsaw regarded them as a serious blow to Polish security, for with the disappearance of the friendly southern neighbor all but ninety miles of the total frontiers of Poland, some three and a half thousand miles, were open to an inward thrust from every direction. Poland was encircled by the two mightiest great powers of Europe, Germany and the Soviet Union, each of which had been claiming her territory. Hitler's plan of dividing the Eastern European nations before defeating them moved one more decisive step forward, while the democratic and quasi-democratic powers offered a pitiful picture of indecision and cross-purposes.

The plan had begun to materialize in Austria a year earlier. By directing Mussolini's ambitions to an empire to be created in Africa, German diplomacy immobilized his attention to Europe, and secured his disinterest in the fate of Vienna, once his protégé. By annexing Austria, Hitler had opened the most vulnerable southern frontier of Czechoslovakia, forced that country between half closed pincers, which England and France, as well as Poland, helped him to close. Now it was Poland herself which became the principal target of concentrated German pressure. Distrust of Hitler's true intentions, poorly screened for the time being by the German-Polish Declaration for 1934, now burst into the open. In the background fear of war was rapidly gripping all the principal powers. In April of the same year Italy increased further her inflated military budget, and England, France and the United States also increased expenditures for military purposes. The House of Commons passed the conscription bill by 376 votes against 145, and Russia created a new Ministry of the Navy. The aggravating situation of Poland furnished the chief stimulus for these feverish and somewhat belated measures.

The immediate strategic objectives of Germany were the Free City of Danzig and Polish Pomorze, the Corridor, but the real aim of Hitler's diplomacy was to eliminate the Polish state as a European power. The struggle for control of the mouth of the river Vistula and the adjacent Baltic territory had been going on for nearly a thousand years. In that endless struggle between land and sea the Prussians sought to prevent the rise of a strong Polish state by cutting off the Poles from the Baltic seacoast. The Poles, on the other hand, endeavored to reach and maintain the outlet to the sea which in their minds symbolized their independence and national greatness, and in addition offered them strategic and commercial advantages. From the tenth century to 1309 they had enjoyed that contact with the sea. The Teutonic Knights conquered it from them and held it until 1454. Then Poland became again a maritime nation until her first partition in 1772. Since 1360 Danzig belonged to the Hansa League, it administered itself and lived as a rich middleman on the expanding trade with the Polish hinterland and the Baltic towns. From 1772 to 1919 West Prussia and Danzig were again a part of Prussia and the Reich, respectively. The Versailles Treaty reestablished the autonomous position of Danzig within the Polish customs area, and gave Pomorze to Poland. Thus East Prussia was separated on land from the rest of Germany, a provision which no government in Berlin was willing to accept as permanent. Gustav Stresemann refused to sign non-aggression treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland, for "they would have seriously obliged Germany to abstain from all initiative." By the Locarno pact he accepted that undertaking in the west, but not in the east. He fought the eastern "bleeding frontiers" with diplomatic formulas and ideas. Had Germany been strong, he would have certainly fought with military weapons as any other German Chancellor or Foreign Minister.

It was therefore with great relief that Pilsudski in 1934 entered into an arrangement of apparent friendship with Hitler. Of all the German leaders it fell to the National Socialist Chancellor to break the ancient tradition of enmity. Instead of aiming at the elimination of Poland with the consent or help of Russia, Hitler suddenly embarked upon a contrary policy of friendship with the Poles and enmity toward the Soviets. At least, so it seemed to the Poles, many of whom hated the Russians more than they hated the Germans, and some of whom were not disposed to doubt the sincerity of National Socialist assurances. In point of fact the Poles could argue for several reasons that no real cause existed why their relations toward Germany could not be placed and remain upon a friendly footing. Thanks to the transit arrangements the Corridor could become, and to some extent had already become, invisible. Furthermore, there existed the cheaper and convenient sea communication between East

Prussia and the rest of the Reich. Pomorze had never changed its preponderantly Polish character, despite the ruthless Prussian policy of forcible colonization. Danzig had no commercial importance for Germany, as it was preeminently a trading post for Polish exports and imports. The Polish government was not changing the ethnical character of the German populated Free City whether they tried to do so or not. In 1910 there were 308,000 German Danzigers to 16,000 Poles, as compared with 387,000 and 15,000, respectively, in 1929. It seemed as if even the Germans saw the point. Such was the impression conveyed by their ace spokesman during the heyday of the German-Polish fraternization. Hitler himself referred directly to Danzig and the Corridor in a way which could not fail to inspire confidence. He told Ambassor Lipski that "a rapproachment with Poland was more advantageous to Germany than uneasy relations with Russia. Russia is Asia . . . Germany faced the problem of finding areas for economic expansion, or room for her population. Poland had not, and could not, provide either. . . . In the face of greater problems the Corridor was of no importance whatsoever. How could the Reich be prejudiced, provided good German-Polish relations existed, by this short journey of a few dozen kilometers across Polish territory? In a few years, given the continuance of good relations, in Germany they would forget all about the Corridor, and in Poland the question would cease to be acute." On November 5, 1937, Hitler spoke on the occasion of the declaration of the treatment of German and Polish minorities and said again that "there would be no changes in the legal and political position in Danzig." By that time the Danzigers were pretty well nazified, a development which the Polish government undoubtedly regretted, but made little effective effort to hamper or counteract. The last time Hitler publicly praised German-Polish relations was in his pre-Munich speech in the Sportpalast on September 26, 1938: "A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found; it has been found, and it will be continually extended."

This was the last of the reassuring statements that came from Germany. With the Munich victory in their pockets, and Poland's acquiesence in the Czechoslovak partition, the National Socialists were hastily bringing the Poles to the ground of reality. At a luncheon with Ambassador Lipski at Berchtesgaden on October 24, all of a sudden von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for "a general settlement" of all issues between Poland and Germany. Lipski was told that the Declaration of Friendship and Non-Aggression signed under Pilsudski implied that the problem of Danzig and the Corridor would be solved within the framework of that instrument in a peaceful manner, and that in no way could it be interpreted as having removed the existence of those issues. Lipski was also reminded of the alleged persecution of the German minority and of the strangulation of Danzig economically, both of which called for a prompt solution. There had indeed been a reduction in the volume of transit trade through Danzig with the corresponding increase in the traffic through the government-sponsored harbor of Gdynia, located in purely Polish territory, but it was not certain whether this was the cause or the effect of the anti-Polish attitude of the 400,000 Danzig Germans. The proposal included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would retain her railway and economic facilities there, the construction of an extraterritorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze, a twenty-five year guarantee of Polish frontiers, the possibility of joint action in colonial matters, in the problem of the emigration of Jews, and in a foreign policy toward Russia on the basis of the Anti-Komintern Pact. The Carpathian Ukraine problem could also be settled in a manner to satisfy Poland by the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier at the expense of post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia.

The Polish reaction to these suggestions was thoroughly negative. First of all, the Warsaw government had a different conception of the Declaration of 1934, interpreting it as the reaffirmation of the Versailles territorial provisions in so far as the Polish frontiers were concerned. Moreover, the timing of the proposals, coming as they did, after and not before the break-up of Czechoslovakia, put the Poles on the alert. All that Colonel Beck would be willing to concede was the replacement of the League protectorate over Danzig by a joint German-Polish guarantee of the existing status and further facilities across the Corridor. Pilsudski's postulate that "the Danzig question was a sure criterion for estimating the Reich's intentions" still held good. "Any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich would lead to a conflict." On January 5, 1939, Beck had a talk with Hitler from which he returned "for the first time in a pessimistic mood." Hitler had told him that "as a German city Danzig must sooner or later return to the Reich." There would not be any *fait accompli,* however, for a strong Poland was still a necessity for Germany on account of the Russian menace. "Every Polish division engaged against Russia was a corresponding saving of a German division." There followed a brief reference to the German-Polish relations in the Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on January 30, but it dwelt upon the past only, and was conspicuous for the absence of any reassuring note as to the future. As prior to Munich the scene was being shifted to Downing Street.

At the height of the Munich crisis Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in a national broadcast made the following remarks: "However we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbor, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on a larger issue than that. Armed conflicts between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force I should feel that it must be resisted." In March, 1939, i.e., six months after Munich, Chamberlain became convinced that Germany was the power seeking domination. At Munich he believed that Hitler's objectives were limited to the unification of the territories with predominantly Germanic population. He visualized himself as a crusader righting what he regarded as a serious blunder of the

Versailles Treaty. By March he saw that he had been duped, that the objectives of the Axis partners were limitless, and that by forcing Czechoslovakia into submission he had destroyed whatever balance might have existed between the democratic forces and the aggressors. To be exact, on March 15, the day of the annexation of the first non-Germanic territory, the British Prime Minister did not yet feel strongly on the subject. In fact he implored the House, partly alarmed by what had just occurred, not to be deflected from the course of appeasement. "Although we may have to suffer checks and disappointments from time to time, the object we have in mind is of too great significance to the happiness of mankind for us lightly to give it up or set it to one side."

It was three days later at Birmingham where Chamberlain announced a change in his attitude towards Hitler, by implication, and a change of England's policy in Eastern Europe. The inner history of those three days would deserve a careful analysis with Chamberlain's mind as its chief subject of study. No evidence has so far been made public on the doings of Sir Neville Henderson at Berlin on the fateful days of mid-March, except a German record of the meeting between the British Ambassador and the Reich State Secretary held on March 14. From this record, the final judgment of which must be delayed until the British version is known, we learn that Henderson, while inquiring about the future German policy toward Czechoslovakia, wished to make it clear that he was neither making a *démarche* nor did he wish to create the impression that his government was interested in the Czechoslovakia affair, for it was accepted in London that Germany had preponderant interest throughout Czech territory. No reliable conclusion could be drawn at present as to the nature of Henderson's reporting, and to the influence which his reports, if any, may have had on Chamberlain's immediate and somewhat evasive reaction to the Prague coup. However, strong anti-appeasement outbursts were heard in the House of Commons and throughout the British liberal, labor and conservative circles, which coincided with the opinion held by several influential professional diplomats in the Foreign Office. This and Chamberlain's own personal disillusionment formed the background of the historical speech at Birmingham.

The change of British policy toward Eastern Europe took the form of an attempt to elaborate "an anti-aggression front" to stop Hitler's advance. Coming as it did after the elimination of Czechoslovakia, the main prop of postwar Eastern European structure, the attempt was bound to encounter great difficulties. The chief of them was the unsatisfactory relationship between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Poland and Rumania on the other. The plan was an ambitious one, and had it been resorted to before, instead of the Munich negotiations, the chronicle of Eastern Europe for the past two years would have to be written much differently. It included the creation of a diplomatic barrage, which in wartime would develop into a military front, extending from the White to the Black Sea. There it would be joined with the nations of the Near and Middle East and projected to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and Egypt, all member states bound to one another through nonaggression or mutual assistance pacts of security under the protection of England and France. As at Munich England took the lead, while France, torn by inner dissention and without initiative, rather haltingly followed suit.

The first link in this chain was the Anglo-Polish understanding made public on the last day of March. Great Britain assumed the obligation to assist Poland in the event of any action which threatened Polish independence and which the Polish government considered it vital to resist with her national forces. The British government had originally in mind a collective declaration by France, England, Russia and Poland providing for mutual consultation. The Soviet government was prompt in answering the British request in the affirmative, provided France and Poland accepted the proposal. Poland opposed a collective declaration in which the Soviets would occupy a place of importance, however, and in the British cabinet influences eventually prevailed which did not favor full and direct Soviet participation. Poland feared that once the Red Army entered her territory in fulfillment of the collective obligation, it would permanently occupy the Ukrainian and White Russian provinces. For the same reason the Soviet proposal of a four-power conference was frustrated. Officially this modification of the British method was explained by the urgency of the Polish situation "which permitted no delay." The Prime Minister assured the Labor opposition that the switch had not been made "behind Russia's back," and that Moscow had been informed of the nature of Anglo-Polish negotiations. A military alliance between the four powers, or at least between France, England and Russia, had apparently not been officially contemplated, even though it found favor among some Laborites. England also abandoned her earlier project of Anglo-Franco-Polish collective consultation, yielding to the Polish preference for bilateral pacts "in order to avoid waste of time." On April 6 the unilateral guarantee was converted into a reciprocal agreement, England and Poland obligating themselves to render one another assistance in case of aggression. On April 16 similar guarantees were offered by Great Britain, and also by France, to Greece and Rumania, without, however, obligating these two smaller powers to reciprocal assistance.

In Germany the British and French activity in Eastern Europe was resented as "another policy of encirclement." The German people were told that the Polish affair was only a pretext for curbing the Reich at any cost. England was pictured as attempting the repetition of "the blood-thirsty game of Queen Elizabeth against Spain, of Cromwell against Holland, of Pitt against Napoleon, and of Edward VII against Germany. Now to forge the ring around Germany, England stretched her hand also to Moscow."

In Warsaw the Poles, armed with the British guarantee and French assurance, adopted from the start a firm attitude, refusing to compromise on the main issue of the growing conflict. On March 26 Ambassador Lipski told Ribbentrop that "any further pursuance of German plans meant war with Poland."

On April 28 Hitler spoke to the Reichstag. He was still willing to come to a peaceful solution, but on his own terms, and no longer considered himself bound by the Declaration of 1934. In his view Poland unilaterally infringed upon the Declaration by entering into an agreement with a third power. Replying to this charge Colonel Beck declared on May 5 that Hitler's argument, assuming the premise that the Anglo-Polish agreement was incompatible with the German-Polish Declaration, was untenable, for neither England nor Poland had any aggressive intentions. The German offer of the recognition of Polish frontiers after the separation of Danzig was defined by Beck as in reality a unilateral demand, for Hitler offered to recognize what had already been *de jure* and *de facto* indisputable Polish property. He, too, favored further negotiations provided they were carried out on the basis of peaceful intentions and procedure. This was the last direct exchange of official views between Berlin and Warsaw. From May to September, 1937, no contacts of any consequence were maintained between the two Governments. As in the case of Czechoslovakia the British Government interposed itself as intermediary between the disputing parties. Its policy was a complete reversal of its earlier tactics. If in the Czechoslovak crisis Chamberlain over-exerted himself against the weaker side, in the case of Poland he gave the smaller party virtually a blank check.

Without some sympathetic collaboration of the Soviet Union the Eastern European diplomatic barrage was doomed to become a torso. There was no doubt that London wanted Russian participation, if only to preclude a closer Russo-German rapprochement. But neither England nor France wished to bind themselves too closely to a régime, on the interpretation of which the official and the public opinion was anything but united. A certain section among the British conservatives, the liberals and Labor, all envisaging the inevitability of war and all convinced of the futility of further appeasement, saw in the Soviets large reserves and resources of man and material power, and favored a real entente with Moscow. In France, people wavered between the traditional policy of looking toward the small Eastern European nations as complementary to French security, and the policy of coming to a direct agreement with Hitler at the cost of cancelling all continental alliances except that with England and of developing the colonial empire. There were also what might be called the psychological difficulties between Moscow and the western democracies. Stalin mistrusted Chamberlain, and the mistrust was reciprocated. The Russians did not believe too much in the revolutionary change of English policy, seeing that it was in the same hands which brought on Munich. Was Chamberlain really taking the sword? If so, then it was up to him to pay the price by reciprocating the Soviet assistance which he solicited.

Stalin's speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party on March 10, 1939, was indicative of the difficulties which the inclusion of Russia in the planned Eastern Peace Front was to be confronted with. Systematic concessions of non-aggressive states encouraged the aggressors who had already seized Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria and the Czechoslovak Sudetenland, said the virtual Soviet dictator. "The majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security and have taken up a position of non-intervention, of neutrality. . . . Caution did not allow the Soviet Union to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them."

In England and France it was presumed that a strong Poland and Rumania, as buffer states between Russia and Germany, were of the same value to Moscow as they were to London and Paris, and that Russia should therefore see her advantage in supporting the Anglo-French sponsored alignment. Moscow on the other hand could not see how any useful purpose would be served in co-guaranteeing Polish and Rumanian eastern frontiers to which she had consistently and repeatedly made objection. Moreover, the Polish policy since 1934 was viewed at the Kremlin with utter displeasure. It was pointed out that Warsaw vetoed every attempt at a collective system in Eastern Europe in which

Russia would be included as one of the guarantors. It was also noted that Colonel Beck went out of his way on the eve of the Munich crisis to plead with the Scandinavian and Baltic small countries not to adhere to automatic sanctions should such be invoked in connection with the German-Czechoslovak conflict. The Polish refusal, up to the very last minute, to permit the Soviets to fight Germany through Poland presented another practical difficulty. Moscow feared that the defeat of Poland would bring the German military machine right to the Russian western borders with the result that the gravity of the war would be shifted to the Soviet lands, an eventuality Stalin was determined at all costs to avoid.

Some light was thrown on the protracted Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations by Foreign Commissar Molotov in his address to the Supreme Council on May 21. By that time the rest of Czechoslovakia, Memel and Albania were added to the list of the victims of aggression, and Rumania had been turned into a virtual German economic protectorate under the terms of an agreement concluded earlier in March. On the whole, European diplomacy was assuming very realistic shape. The dropping of Litvinov, the man of Geneva, was illustrative of this general tendency. Molotov laid down the minimum conditions on which Russia would be willing to support actively the policy of combating aggression. They included a defensive pact between France, England and the Soviet Union, guarantees by these great powers to all Eastern European and Baltic states without exception, concrete military agreements regarding the extent of assistance to be effectively rendered in the event of aggression, and quality and reciprocity of obligations. Russia wanted to be sure that she could count on English and French assistance should she become the object of an attack. Eventually the western powers recognized this principle of reciprocity, but Molotov complained that this recognition had been hedged around by such reservations that it might prove to be a fictitious step forward. The Soviets were asked to give assistance to the countries to which England and France had already extended their guarantees, but according to Molotov nothing had been said about England and France assisting Estonia, Latvia and Finland should these small neighbors of Russia be unable to defend their neutrality and be used with or against their consent as a territory of passage for German troops against Russia, as had already happened at the end of the World War. By the inclusion of the Baltic states within the Eastern Front Moscow sought to restrict the diplomatic activities of these three neighbors and to prevent them from choosing their own protector in case of emergency. From the practical point of view the guarantees of the Baltic region would have been of small significance unless military bases were permitted to be established within its territory and along its seacoast. Neither England nor France was willing to grant any such concessions, and the Baltic states themselves were opposed to it. Estonia and Latvia preferred the German offer of non-aggression, while Finland declared strict neutrality. Under such conditions the only justification for continuing the Russian negotiations was the anxiety to keep Moscow away from incalculable maneuverings of the diplomacy of Hitler and Ribbentrop.

Attempts to secure Soviet participation in the Eastern Front by a roundabout and indirect way by taking advantage of Turkish-Soviet friendly relations were also far from satisfactory. The mutual assistance agreements between England and Turkey and France and Turkey, signed on May 12 and June 23, respectively, were eventually extended to fifteen year formal treaties. These treaties provided for mutual and reciprocal help, but relieved Turkey from her obligations in the event her assistance would involve her in a conflict with the Soviet Union. In practice this meant that Turkey's hands were tied by Russia, and that her freedom of action was conditioned at the Kremlin rather than in London. Up to the time of writing, the conduct of the Ankara government in the Eastern Mediterranean war has confirmed the real nature of the Anglo-Turkish and Turkish-Soviet relationships.

While the Anglo-French Eastern Front was being laboriously worked out, the Axis powers were not idle. On May 22 the Milan agreement was dressed into a definite military Rome-Berlin alliance, which Molotov characterized as "an offensive alliance." As far as Mussolini was concerned there would be "no more waltzes" in Italian foreign policy. Even if Mussolini wished to turn around, as he had done with regard to Austria, Hitler would see to it that no reversal should happen in the future at the southern extremity of the Axis. If a volte face were ever necessitated by the revolving diplomatic circumstances in Europe, it was to be in line with Germany's needs. In fact such a turn was already in process. After the break-up of Czechoslovakia, involving as it did the dissolution of the London-Paris-Prague-Moscow quasi-system of security, Hitler's main efforts were directed toward bringing about a rapprochement with Stalin. On no condition would he place Germany in a position of having to fight on two fronts, i.e., against France and England in the west, and Russia in the east. Stalin, too, found satisfaction in being able to put on record the continued symptoms of good German-Russian relations: "The hullabaloo raised by the French, British and American press over the Soviet Ukraine was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible ground." The German-Soviet agreement which many people feared, in which the wishful thinkers did not believe, and which the English and French fascists, deceived by Hitler's formula of fighting for the capitalistic cause, refused to contemplate, on August 23 became a reality. At the time when the Anglo-French negotiators at Moscow held before the Kremlin "barbarians" the vision of a peace imposed by a coalition of peaceful powers, the Soviet government was carrying on an entirely different series of negotiations with Germany, the second bidder. Taking into account all the antecedents of European diplomacy during the past few years and months, and paying due attention to the state of the Soviet Union, it was not difficult to predict the final choice. England and France offered a peace, not altogether certain, at the cost of the loss or postponement of the recovery of the provinces Russia coveted. The two distant democratic powers, militarily no match for Germany, also offered qualified assistance, the effectiveness of which Moscow doubted. Moreover, they might implicate the Soviet Union in a war. Germany on the other hand asked for no military assistance, offered peace at the convenient price of neutrality, and gave Russia a free hand in the Baltic. The more resolute the British attitude toward Germany grew, and the more apparent it became that this time England meant business, the more vaccilating grew the Kremlin stand. Russia was out to conduct a Russian policy, unburdened by any Genevan or democratic ideology. The agreement was based on the non-aggression and neutrality treaty of 1926. The Soviet Union and Germany bound themselves to refrain from any act of force, both singly or jointly with other powers, and promised not to participate in any grouping of powers which aimed directly or indirectly against the other party. This amounted to the collapse of the grandiose scheme of the eastern barrage against aggression. The position of Poland became extremely precarious, and, compared with 1914, France and England were to enter the war under much less auspicious circumstances.

The news of the German-Soviet agreement was intended by the Wilhelmstrasse to stun the world, and particularly the British. Germany reckoned with localizing the inevitable war, for England would now shrink from fighting her on a single western front. However, it was Hitler's turn to be surprised. England and France decided not to be intimidated. The Anglo-Polish agreement of April 6 took the form of a definite alliance signed in London by Lord Halifax and Ambassador Raczynski. It covered also the Danzig menace for it provided for mutual aid should a third state be threatened by aggression. A similar clause was included in the Franco-Polish protocol of September 4, which reinforced the 1921 treaty of friendship. All signatories undertook the obligation not to conclude a separate armistice or peace except by mutual agreement.

The historians of the first world war have criticized Sir Edward Grey for not having made his position clearer in 1914, and have expressed the view that had England declared her determination to fight in the event of the invasion of Belgium, Germany would have refrained from aggression. The historians of the second world war will have no such ground for criticism of British declared intentions. As early as August 22 Prime Minister Chamberlain in a personal letter to Chancellor Hitler stated that on this occasion no such tragic misunderstanding would be permitted. It would be a mistake to take the announcement of the Moscow-Berlin agreement to indicate that the intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland was no longer a contingency that needed to be reckoned with. Hitler accepted the challenge by stating that Germany had no intention of attacking either France or England, but that she possessed in Eastern Europe certain interests, viz., Danzig and the Corridor, which she would not renounce. Should the British announcement of assistance to Poland be carried into effect, he, Hitler, would order immediate mobilization to meet the contemplated threat against the Reich. Two days later, on August 25, in a supplementary communication, Hitler informed Sir Neville Henderson, that should England forego her support of Poland, and be willing to settle the colonial problem peacefully, he was willing to accept the British Empire and even to support it. Reacting to what in Downing Street was taken as an attempt at bribery and blackmail, Henderson gave Hitler an answer within three days in the course of a personal interview. England would not, for any advantages offered her, jeopardize the independence of a state to whom she had given her guarantee. The British government recommended direct negotiation between Berlin and Warsaw on the basis announced by Chancellor Hitler on April 28, and an international guarantee of the Polish settlement. In the evening of August 29 the Reich government accepted in principle direct negotiation, provided that a Polish representative, authorized to negotiate and to sign, should come to Berlin within twenty-four hours, i.e., before midnight of August 30. As to the guarantees, the Soviet Union would have to agree to them, a point whose precise meaning was vague in the extreme. The

German government was skeptical about Polish acquiescence, the answer ran, and did all this only because of the prospect of the German-British alliance.

At midnight on August 30, Henderson brought the British answer to Ribbentrop. He recommended abstention from border incidents, and a *modus vivendi* at Danzig for the period of direct German-Polish negotiations. Since Germany received no answer from Poland, Ribbentrop told Henderson that the question of further proposals no longer existed. In order to show, however, what proposals Germany had intended to make if the Polish representatives had come, Ribbentrop read to Henderson the much discussed sixteen points which had been allegedly prepared by the German Foreign Office for Polish signature. This was the first time that they had been made known to anyone outside the inner German circles. The proposals included the cession of Danzig to Germany, and a plebiscite in the Corridor to be arranged within twelve months under international supervision. The port of Gdynia was to be left to Poland without a plebiscite. The country which would be outvoted would have the right to build an extra-territorial *Auto-bahn* and a four-track railway line, e.g., either Germany to East Prussia, or Poland to Gdynia, according to the outcome of the plebiscite. Both Danzig and Gdynia would be exclusively mercantile harbors without any military installations. Nationality rights *(Volkstum)* of minorities would be reciprocally protected, damages inflicted on Poles in Germany and on Germans in Poland since 1918 made good, and, in the event of an agreement, both countries would eventually demobilize.

A controversy arose as to whether the abortive German proposal was a virtual ultimatum or not. Ambassador Henderson, to whom the sixteen points seemed "altogether not too unreasonable," interpreted it as such, because of its time limit. Hitler justified its urgency by the fact that "two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face within firing distance of each other, and that at any moment some incident might lead to serious conflict." Another controversy concerned the delay in the delivery of the proposal. The German government accused Halifax, "the dishonest broker," of duplicity, for the proposal, which had been made in the evening of August 29, was allegedly communicated to the Polish government through Sir H. Kennard, the British Ambassador at Warsaw, some time between August 30 and 31, that is after the expiration of the period in which a Polish emissary was awaited. Moreover, the German argument went, instead of applying pressure upon the Poles to induce them to send their plenipotentiary, the British government discouraged them from taking this only peace-saving course. The British government explained its position to the German Foreign Minister on August 30, when Henderson told Ribbentrop that his government was not in a position to advise the Polish government to accept this procedure. Great Britain suggested that the normal diplomatic way should be adopted, i.e., the German government should hand their proposals to the Polish Ambassador in order to set matters in motion and to make it possible for the Polish Ambassador to co-operate with his government in preparing for direct negotiations. If the German government would also communicate these proposals to the British government and the latter were of the opinion that the proposals constituted a reasonable basis for the solution of the dispute, it would use its influence in Warsaw to achieve a settlement.

Had the general political situation in Europe been similar to that in the summer of 1938, the British government would have exerted itself to produce a Polish emissary at short notice. This time the circumstances were different. In London there was no inclination to map out another Munich, and to help Hitler to an easy victory by succumbing to one more display of force. The Polish government instructed Ambassador Lipski to hand the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich a declaration that it was favorably considering the British suggestion of direct negotiations, received during the night of August 30, but not to accept any text relevant to the German proposals. The instructions came to Berlin soon after twelve o'clock on August 31. At 6:15 P.M., Lipski was received by von Ribbentrop "to establish direct contact" but without full powers to negotiate. "On my return to the Embassy I found myself unable to communicate with Warsaw," wrote Lipski, "as the Germans had cut the telephone lines." In the early hours of September 1, the German wireless announced that German armed forces had entered Polish territory. Chancellor Hitler delivered a speech to the Reichstag on that day telling the members that since 5:45 A.M. the Germans had been returning Polish soldiers' fire. Said he: "I will carry on this fight, no matter against whom, until such time as the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured. As for the rest of the world, I can only assure them that November of 1918 shall never occur again in German history."

Later in the morning of September 1, Ambassadors Henderson and Coulondre informed the German Foreign Minister that, unless satisfactory assurances were given to their respective governments of the suspension by Germany of all aggressive action against Poland and of her readiness to withdraw her forces promptly from Polish territory, England and France would without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland. Mindful of the success that this last minute intervention achieved at the time of the Munich crisis, Mussolini hoped, though now with less optimism, that he might be able to isolate the war in Poland, and prevent its spread to the west. On the last day of August he suggested to France and England through their Ambassadors at Rome that they meet at a conference of the four great powers on September 5. The conference would first arrange for an armistice between Germany and Poland in which each army would retain the position which it had reached, and then examine the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which caused the crisis. As matters stood, the military position would under such circumstances have favored Germany. Both England and France accepted Mussolini's suggestion in principle, France with a more ardent desire and hope of their acceptance by Germany, perhaps, than England. They laid down the condition, however, that the German troops withdraw to the Reich's frontier, a condition which Hitler was unlikely even to consider. Mussolini therefore decided on September 2 to abandon his project. The following day at 9 A. M. the British Ambassador in Berlin informed the German government that unless not later than at 11 A. M. that day satisfactory assurance had been given by the German government concerning the withdrawal of its forces, a state of war would exist between the two countries as from that hour. At 11 A.M. a state of war actually began. Under identical circumstances French Ambassador Coulondre delivered a note to the German Foreign Minister in which the French government declared itself in duty bound to fulfill its contractual obligations toward Poland. Following the two declarations, nothing occurred that might give a more favorable turn to the precipitating course of fatal events. The second world war was on. It was just eleven months and three days after Chamberlain and Hitler signed the Anglo-German declaration "never to go to war with one another again."

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CZECH AND GERMAN: ACTION, REACTION AND INTERACTION

by S. Harrison Thomson

A GREAT part of European history is concerned with the impact of one race or people upon another, whether by war, conquest, commerce or political and social rapprochement. As we read this history, our interest and curiosity are aroused, and we could often wish that the impact did not so soon soften to the point where impact becomes amalgam. For if their individuality becomes lost in union we can never find out whether the one or the other people has inherent superiority. The Goth, the Lombard, the western Greek and the Moslem became a composite in medieval Italy. The Arab, the Iberian and the Visigoth in Spain; the Germanic Franc and Vandal and the Gallo-Roman in France; the Celt, the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman in England—these all furnish us with abundant material for analysis of the process of racial amalgamation. But we have fewer cases of inter-racial impact where the two peoples involved have not joined. We have studied amalgamation, but hardly at all racial and national persistence of one people in the face of pressure from another vigorous people. It is this process of racial integrity over a period of centuries which we shall examine.

Recent events in the field of international politics have made us more conscious of some of the facts and forces that lie behind the thinking of some of the peoples in Central Europe. We recognize readily that present turmoil is hardly more than a continuation of past struggles. Precisely for that reason we desire to discover whether this turmoil has been inevitable, and, because it arises from apparently ineradicable racial traits in the two peoples concerned, whether it is going to continue to be so.

There are two large ethnic groups concerned: the German and the Slav. The Germanic group has been throughout history increasingly homogeneous, the Slavic group in some measure increasingly heterogeneous. The tendency of German history has been toward consolidation—*Grossdeutschtum.* The tendency of Slavic history, in spite of sporadic efforts toward Panslavism, has been in the direction of the formation of distinct branches of the larger group. For that reason we should treat the Slavs separately, German and Czech, German and Pole, German and South Slav, assuming, for simplicity's sake, that the German, wherever he may be found, is more likely to be uniform than the various subdivisions of the Slav race. There is some fallacy in the assumption, but not enough to invalidate our approach.

Bohemia, intended by nature, if we may judge by her mountain frontiers, to be isolated and insulated from the north, the west and the south, has yet been the scene of fifteen centuries of struggle between the Western Slav, that we shall call the Czech, and the German. Throughout this period the intensity of this struggle has varied greatly, but it has apparently always been there, latent or active. The causes of this struggle are now and have been debatable, but the fact and importance of its presence have been admitted by all students of this history, Reich German, Sudeten German, Austrian and Czech.

Palacký, the historian of the Czech people, who was partly responsible for the Czech revival of the nineteenth century, wrote:

> Czech history is the ground on which, from time immemorial, the antagonisms of Germanism and Slavism have broken out in their sharpest form and have come to their clearest focus. The essential content of Czech history is a perpetual struggle between the German and Slav elements.[1]

Adolf Bachman, writing in 1904, representing the point of view of German historiography, concluded:

> Bohemia, or rather the Sudetenlands considered as a unit, have been for centuries the classic land of national battles between German and Slav.[2]

But it must be added that this has not been a struggle at all times equally tense and bitter, nor has success ever crowned the effort of one or the other of the antagonists for long at a time. In politics, culture and economic status there has been a pendulum-like swing between dominance by the Czech and dominance by the Germans.

Let us look at some of the generally accepted facts. About the middle of the fifth century A. D. the Marcomanni and the Quadi, Germanic tribes who had inhabited Bohemia since the first century B. C., were forced to accompany Attila westward. They fought in his army at the battle of the Catalaunian Fields in 451, and then disappear from recorded history.[3] Probably almost immediately thereafter the Slavs began to come into a depopulated land. These Slavs were pagans and maintained their paganism undisturbed until the beginning of the ninth century, when Frankish missionaries and arms began to have some effect. But the inability of these missionaries to preach in Slavonic militated against immediate acceptance of their faith by the Slavs. Two Greek priests from Salonika, the brothers Cyril and Methodius, who knew Slavonic, were called from Byzantium. For a short while it looked as if these Western Slav lands might become a part of the Eastern Orthodox orbit.[4] But soon the Greek use fell into disfavor and Bavarian and Saxon priests flowed into the land and introduced a Latin lithurgy with the open support of the Czech rulers. Their influence was spread by the foundation of monasteries throughout the lands of Bohemia and Moravia. With the establishment of a separate bishopric at Prague in 973 the growth of German influence in matters ecclesiastical was stayed. The second bishop of Prague was a Czech, St. Adalbert (Vojtěch), and of his 17 successors to the year 1200, ten were Czech.[5] As was to be expected, the influence of the German monastic foundations on agricultural methods was, from the very first, determinative. But we must also note that these establishments were gradually czechized as the members of the foundations came to be, in the majority, Czech. Czech society does not begin to show distinct germanization until the Czech princes and kings of the Přemyslid line, and, imitating their example, the leading Czech nobles began to take wives from princely German houses. From 1034 to about 1280 a round dozen Přemyslid ruling princes married German wives and Czech nobles by the dozens followed suit. All these wives brought German retainers, nobles and ladies, chaplains, courtiers and servants. German communities grew up around the castles, which in turn attracted German traders and craftsmen. They endowed chapels, canonries and monastic foundations.[6] Inevitably many of these educated Germans became royal councillors. Troubadours, minnesingers and artists came to these germanized courts in great numbers. The social and cultural influence of these marriages upon the patterns of life among the Czechs can hardly be overemphasized. Of antagonism to this germanization of their aristocracy we find almost no trace during the eleventh century. But Cosmas of Prague, writing in 1125, records that Prince Spytihněv, on the day of his enthronement in 1055, performed a great and memorial deed, ordering all, poor or rich, native or transient, of German blood to be driven from the land of Bohemia in three days. Spytihněv's mother and wife were German.[7] But the bitter resentment of Cosmas and other Czechs was of no avail. The end of a period was at hand. We shall call this first period a period of Czech action, and it may conveniently be said to end about the middle of the twelfth century.

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[1] *Die Geschichte d. Hussitentums und Prof. Constantin Höfler* (Prague, 1868), p. 74.

[2] "Die älteste Streit zwischen Deutschen und Tschechen an der Prager Universtät, in *Hist. Vierteljahrschrift* VII (1904), 39.

[13] v. Novotný, *České Dějiny,* I, 146 ff.; A. Bachmann, *Geschichte Böhmens,* I (1899), 49 ff.; J. Schránil, *Die Vorgeschichte Böhmens und Mährens* (Leipzig, 1928), 282.

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[4] A. Naegle, *Kirchengeschichte Böhmens* I (Prague, 1915), 61 ff.

[5] A Frind, *Die Geschichte der Bischöfe und Erzbischöfe von Prag* (Prague, 1873), 14 ff.

[6] A. Schmidtmayer, *Geschichte der Sudetendeutschen* (Leipzig, 1938), p. 31 ff.

Throughout the twelfth century the Germans continued to come into Bohemia and Moravia. But it may be noticed that the nature of the newcomers has changed somewhat from their predecessors. The first arrivals had been of the feudal nobility and its hangers-on, traveling merchants and the clergy. In small numbers they were absorbable. But by the middle of the twelfth century the records tell us that those who came—merchants, artisans of all sorts, farmers—were desirous of settling. A new problem had to be faced. The first documentary evidence of any attempted solution of this problem is the so-called Sobieslavum, 1167-68. In this grant the reigning prince, Soběslav, gave to German townsmen the right to have their own town, with German town-law, their own priest and judge, in the outskirts of Prague. Relations between the Germans, who are called "free men," and the Czech natives, from whom the Germans are distinguished *natione, lege et conswetudine,* are governed by an elaborate code of procedure. German extraterritoriality is clearly protected.[8] This is only the first of a long series of privileges to groups of German merchants and artisans. The Přemyslid kings followed a policy of open encouragement of German colonists. City after city gained its privileges from one or other of the later Přemyslids, and many others from local nobility. The chancellor of Přemysl Otakar II, Bishop Bruno of Olomouc, a Schleswig noble in the middle of the thirteenth century, was responsible for the foundation of around 200 towns and villages in Moravia and eastern Bohemia. In all of these new settlements German law was recognized.[9]. Guilds of various trades grew up. The townsmen were soon divided into a patriciate and a craftsman class, and class struggles in the fourteenth century were as common in Bohemia as in the rest of Europe.[10] The encouragement to Germans to immigrate into Bohemia was so general that a not-inconsiderable number of German farmers joined Czech farmers on the soil.

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[7] *Cosmae Pragensis Chronicon Bohemorum,* II, *s.a.* 1055 (ed. Pelzel et Dobrovsky, 1783, I, 129f.

[8] Cf. Novotny, *České Dějiny* II (1913), 1027 ff.; text in Friedrich, *Codex Diplomaticus Bohemiae* I, 290, more recently Z. Kristen in *Český Časopis Historický* xxviii (1922), 161ff.

[9] Schmidtmayer, *op. cit.,* p. 63f.

But the German urge to colonize soon reached its peak,[11] and by the natural laws of the increase of population the Czechs began to make encroachments on German superiority in the towns. By the middle of the fourteenth century many towns originally completely German became czechized to an alarming degree, e.g., Pilsen and Mies. German merchant families who had made substantial fortunes in the thirteenth century had bought or built castles, and identified themselves with the land of Bohemia as fervently as the native Czechs. These German colonists came from all over Germany, Saxony, Thuringia, Bavaria and even farther away. They had no common political or social tradition, and did not form, at this date, any kind of racial or national unit. When Czech resurgence came, these Germans were to be unable to offer a unified resistence.

Czech opposition to this German immigration grew passionately bitter during the fourteenth century. An anonymous pamphlet written about 1325 recites the grievances of a Czech against the Germans of all classes, but he is particularly bitter against the German cleric and merchant. "Let the wise man note and the prudent man consider how this astute and fraudulent people insinuates itself into the richest prebends, the leading benefices and the most fruitful possessions, even into the councils of the princes." . . . "In the German cities their artisans of every kind have conspired so that anyone must sell his product at a price set by them. If he sells for less he will be punished corporally or fined heavily, and sometimes a man may be forcd to give up his trade for good." Then, after blaming the Czech princes for encouraging these German "vultures," he breaks out: "Oh, my God, the foreigner (*alienigena*) is preferred; the native is trampled upon. The normal and proper thing is for the bear to stay in his forest, the wolf in his cave, the fish in the sea and the German in Germany. That way the world would have some peace."[12]

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[10] B. Mendl, *Socialní krise a zápasy ve městech čtrnactého věku* (Prague, 1926), p. 67ff.

[11] On German colonization in detail see J. V. Šimák, *České Dějiny,* I, 5 (Prague, 1938).

This may seem exaggerated, and if it were isolated we should have to dismiss it as jealousy or disgruntlement. But the patriotic Czech chronicle of Dalimil, written in the second quarter of the same fourteenth century, gives something of the same picture. Dalimil praises the words of Prince Ulrich when he explained why he chose a Czech peasant girl for his wife and not a German princess:

> The German woman will favor my people less.
> She will have German servants and teach my
> Children German, and from that will come
> Dissension among my people and ruin to the land.[13]

He criticized Přemysl Otakar II bitterly for inviting the Germans into the land and added: "It were better the land be a desert than that, by the king's order, the Germans should hold it."[14]

But in this vituperation of the Germans we would do well to remember that the real resentment was against newcomers. The German families who had for generations been established in the country and had given evidence of having a *Landespatriotismus* were generally not aimed at in these outbursts. Indeed the Chronicle of Dalimil was twice translated into German. It represented as well the feeling of the native German against the foreign born. Yet these are the distant voices of a growing resentment which as it gains volume is to turn the tide of this German period of action, which may be estimated roughly to have lasted a little more than two centuries. This period is in no wise a German reaction. It was a widespread outgoing movement from Germany, a part of the greater Ostbewegung. The Czechs were only incidentally in the way.

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[12] W. Wostry, "Ein deutschfeindliches Pamphlet aus Böhmen aus dem 14. Jahrhundert" in *Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen, LIII* (1915), 193-238; Latin text, 226-232.

[13] *Kronika Dalimilova* c. 41 (modernized Czech ed., (Prague) 1920, p. 80).

[14] *Kronika Dalimilova,* c. 92 (*ed. cit.,* p. 165).

From the vantage point of the twentieth century we can be very sure that in many ways this large German immigration was beneficial to the land and people of Bohemia. Western Latin culture and society in its manifold forms was mediated to the Czechs by these Germans.[15] Czech literature, both in form and content, was vastly influenced by the literature which the Germans brought with them into the land. The disturbing and healthy democratic movements, both in and outside of the cities, came into Bohemia along with German merchants and artisans who believed that *Stadtluft macht frei.* This characteristic of the urban mind was congenial to the freedom-loving Czechs, and they acquired rapidly from their German teachers a mastery of the complexities of the function and organization of the town. Biologically, as pioneer and adventuresome stock, these immigrants may have been superior to those who stayed behind in Saxony, Bavaria or Thuringia. The end-result, because they never succeeded in outnumbering or absorbing the Czechs, may have been to strengthen Czech love of freedom and national consciousness and thus to fortify Czech resistance to Germanism.

This period of German aggressive colonization, most clearly characterized by its effects in commerce, mining, bourgeois pursuits, and a rapid urbanization, and by its influence in high political circles, we have called a period of German action, following a long period of Czech dominance which we have called a period of Czech action. From this time on, that is from the middle of the fourteenth century to early in the sixteenth century, less than two hundred years, our pendulum swings back. It is a period generally known as the pre-Hussite and Hussite period, the Golden Age of Czech nationalism. It is a tempestuous time, coinciding with the growth of nationalistic feeling elsewhere in Europe. A strong case might be made for regarding Czech history in these centuries as part and parcel of the general movement toward cultural and political unity. But we must not, we dare not, disregard weighty factors which distinguish this nationalistic movement from its contemporaries. Nowhere else in Europe was the symbiosis of two peoples so painfully evident. Norman and Englishman had long since accepted their amalgamation. The problem of the too powerful individual feudatory which disturbed France and postponed its unification was relatively unimportant in Bohemia. The Estates might be troublesome, but this source of disturbance was of relatively little moment. Nowhere else in Europe did religion combine with race and social privilege to make the cauldron boil. One other powerful factor enters into consideration: language. The early history of the Czech language is one of long retarded maturity. The courts—of king and noble—used German, which was the honored tongue of a whole world surrounding Bohemia. Czech was the language of the farmer and the servant. When German ascendancy became irksome, the native Slavs quite naturally clung to their tongue which the German scorned and was, furthermore, unable to pronounce. Yet German as a language was destined to live on in Bohemia, largely because it was supported by commercial interests and political connections with greater Germany beyond the mountains. An impasse was thus created. The very inevitability of the German language spurred the Czechs on to regard their own language as the sign of their race. There may have been little consciousness of the problem of language at that time, but we can see that it was fundamental. It is a factor that has perhaps been too little emphasized in a study of the relations of the two peoples.

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[15] K. Krofta, *Deutschtum in der tschechoslowakischen Geschichte* (Prague, 1935), p. 25ff.

The Hussite movement, reforming, evangelical, anti-ecclesiastical, anti-feudal in intent, grew upon soil that had been in preparation for almost a century.[16] The immediate theological and philsophical doctrines involved were important in themselves, yet they should be regarded as mere occasons for the outbreak, incidental to the deeper issue at stake which was, I take it, whether or not the Czech people, longer in the land and more numerous than the Germans, should continue to be ruled within their own boundaries by a privileged minority, entrenched in church, court and society along feudal lines.[17] On this issue the Czechs may be said to have won a qualified victory. The almost incredible impulsive force of the Hussite hosts may be explained if we realize that the Czechs were able to identify and combine the two most powerful national motivations—race and religion—against their opponents, the Germans, who, in addition to being Germans, were, in the eyes of the Czechs, enemies of the law of God. The victory was a partial victory. But it was a victory in the sense that German immigrant stock began a wholesale emigration from Bohemia, beginning even before the departure of the German students and professors from Prague after the Kutná Hora decree of 1409. The tempo of this exodus increased until the battle of Lipany in 1434, when the moderate Hussite party won a clear military victory over the radical Taborite element of the Czchs. The lot of the remaining Germans became easier and within a few decades we can find definite indications that the tide of immigration is again flowing from Germany into Bohemia,[18] though it is almost a century before it assumes the proportions of a German flood.

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[16] See V. Novotný, *Náboženské hnutí české XIV Stoleti* (Prague, 1914).

The victory of the Czechs in this Hussite period was a qualified or even dubious victory in that Bohemia lost, through the exodus of Germans, much of its most energetic and intelligent population. The University of Prague almost ceased to function, and the land was virtually isolated from the rest of Europe for decades, with tragic consequences for native culture. The guilds and trade associations lost many members, though it is now fairly clear that no essential craft or business disappeared.[19] Toward the end of the fifteenth century the international-mindedness of the moderate Hussite king, George of Poděbrady, brought many Germans back into Bohemia, and currents of communication and cultural and social flow were reëstablished.[20] The way for the inter-flow of German Lutheranism and Czech Hussitism was being prepared. The period which we can properly call a period of interaction was at hand.

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[17] The Czechs never took kindly to the social aspects of feudalism, because the knight was usually a German and their social superior who scorned them. They reciprocated his scorn with interest.

[18] J. Klik, *Národnostní poměry v Čechách od valek husitských do bitvy bělohorské* (Prague, 1922), p. 282ff.

[19] Z. Winter, *Dějiny řemesel a obchodů v Cechách v XIV a XV století* (Prague, 1906), p. 404ff.

[20] K. Krofta, *op. cit.*, p. 61f.

Hussitism was in essence anti-ecclesiastical and individualistic. Lutheranism began by emphasizing these same doctrines. A common enemy, the established Roman Catholic church, brought Hussites and Lutherans naturally together. After the bitterness of the preceding century and a half, both Germans and Czechs were doubtless a little surprised to find themselves in the same camp. But surprise quickly gave way to enthusiasm. Luther himself remarked in 1520: "We have all been Hussites without knowing it. Even Paul and Augustine were Hussites . . . It is high time we join with the Bohemians and abolish this hatred and jealousy on both sides.[21] Bartoš Pisař, the Czech chronicler, remarked in 1530 on the fact that Luther had changed German hatred for the Czechs into love—a greater miracle than was ever performed by any of the saints.[22]

We speak of this period as one of interaction. It was at least that—confusion might perhaps be more accurate. The German-speaking world was divided into two large camps: Protestant and Roman Catholic. Germans in Bohemia were divided among themselves along the same lines. Among the Czechs there were a few who still leaned to the Roman Catholic allegiance, but the Czechs were in the great majority either moderate or radical Hussites. In the whole of Bohemia we have by the late 1530's two large camps. In one Czech Hussites or Utraquists aligned with German Protestants; in the other Roman Catholic Germans and what Czech Catholics there were. National lines were for the time being forgotten. The isolation of fifteenth century Bohemia was now a thing of the past, and the Czech Protestants have become part of an international movement. To complicate the scheme of alignments the Czech nobility began to ally itself with the German nobility, because of a growing fear that the old concept of an elective kingdom resting upon the Estates was, with the advent of the Hapsburg dynasty in 1526, in danger of being superseded by an hereditary kingship. This class allegiance often conflicted with national and confessional allegiances. The Hapsburg king was, for dynastic reasons, above national commitments in politics, and supranational in his ecclesiastical policies, particularly after the Jesuit influence became dominant. That this four-cornered balance was both delicate and temporary is obvious.[23]

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[21] Address to the Christian Nobility, article 24.

[22] Quoted by K. Krofta, *op. cit.,* p. 67

The situation abounds in anomalies. The Czechs, who had just won a long struggle in the name of nationalism, apparently willingly gave up their national unity. Then they tried to defeat germanization by electing a German Protestant king. The futility of this illogical move was made terribly manifest at the battle of the White Mountain in 1620. However, the Spanish Hapsburg victory on that day was not a German victory but a Roman Catholic victory over Protestantism, both German and Czech, though the Germans were to reap such benefits as there were to be gained.

The next two centuries are a period of German dominance, not only dynastic and political, but literary, economic and social. Yet there was not much glory in the dominance for anybody. The best blood of the Czech nobility and bourgeoisie emigrated, along with much of the best of the German Protestants. After the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, Germans came into the land in great numbers, took over commerce, industry, the control of agriculture and political position. Three-fourths of the land was confiscated and given to court favorites, German Catholics. The agricultural class, by now almost exclusively Czech, as this class had been forbidden to emigrate, was enserfed by royal patent. The Bohemian Diet ceased to be Czech and lost, furthermore, almost all its power of initiation. The tax burden greatly increased and of course fell most heavily on the Czech peasantry, now reduced to a feudalism such as had not obtained in the Middle Ages. The Jesuits, favored by the Hapsburgs, were effective, and Czech spiritual resistance was worn down. The Catholic Counter-Reformation proceeded rapidly. By 1735 Protestantism had virtually become a crime, and in 1752 a declaration of Protestantism was punishable by death.[24] There was a certain cosmopolitanism or supranationalism which was more successful in denationalizing the Czechs than pure German nationalism would have been. From the restricted point of view of a vigorous culture, these two centuries, the seventeenth and the eighteenth, offer us nothing from either the Germans or the Czechs in Bohemia. Spirit and élan were lacking even for the German.[25]

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[23] See W. Weizsäcker, "Das Nationalbewusstsein als Faktor der böhmischen Geschichte" in *Zft. für Sudetendeutsche Geschichte,* II (1938), 155-160.

[24] R. J. Kerner, *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1932), pp. 3ff., 273-306, 313.

In the eighteenth century the German language was the language of business and society. Czech had been driven almost totally underground.[26] The Czechs had indeed been so denationalized that the more charitable and liberal of the German leaders felt called upon to encourage the Czechs to use their own tongue. In 1787 a German writer said: "The German tongue is now universal, and will soon drive out the Czech unless serious patriotic measures against that eventuality are taken." Czechs and Germans, speaking a common language, German, worked side by side in many enterprises. The native German was proud of his Böhmen, but the Czech, where expression was possible, and *a fortiori* where it was not, remained unreconciled, if compliant.

The suppression of the Jesuit order in 1773 gave the Czechs hope that they might recapture their own educational system and the direction of their own cultural life. It was a short-lived hope. The reforming Emperor, Joseph II, in the interests of uniformity and centralization, drove the Czech language from the schools of Bohemia, from all offices of government, from the church and the courts of law.[27] The year 1790 was the nadir of Czech national fortunes. In 1792 the great Czech scholar Dobrovsky published his *Geschichte der böhmischen Sprache und Literatur* in German, as if Czech were as dead as Latin. But once again for the Czech people, it was darkest before the dawn. Forces were at work which were to further the Czech revival. Joseph himself, had he but known it, was largely responsible for the reversal of Czech fortunes, because of his very efforts at centralization, which would have destroyed Czech as a language and with it Czech national consciousness. This repressive effort shocked into new life the very thing it aimed to kill.[28] The liberal thinkers of northern and western Germany furnished added impetus and encouragement to the renaissance of Czech national feeling. Perhaps the most significant single German contribution to the Czech rebirth, aside from the work of Joseph II, was the impassioned apostrophe of Herder to the Slavic peoples, written in the late 1780's.

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[25] Wolkan, *op. cit.,* p. 35: "so können die Deutschen noch mehr die beginnende Gegenreformation als den Beginn eines nationalen Niederganges betrachten."

[26] R. Wolkan, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur in Böhmen und in den Sudeten ländern* (Augsburg, 1925), p. 48ff.

[27] E. Denis, *La Bohême depuis La Montagne Blanche* (Paris, 1903), I, 523ff.

> The wheel of changing time turns on and does not stop . . . and when a law-abiding spirit, instead of a lust for war promotes quiet industry and peaceful concourse between peoples, then will also you—now sunk so low—once a busy and happy people, be freed from the chains of slavery and rule over your fair lands, from the Adriatic to the Carpathians, from the Don to the Moldau, and you will there celebrate the ancient festivals of your peaceful labor and commerce.[29]

Goethe was also appreciative of Slav and particularly Czech aspirations to rise to the fulness of their native greatness. A number of scholars in Bohemia of German ancestry, e.g., Dobner, Voigt and Pelcl, had been arousing Czech pride by their publications in Bohemian history.

The next century witnesses a feverish as well as fruitful effort on the part of Czech and Moravian and even Slovak poets, journalists and scholars to arouse their own people to the possibilities that lay within their grasp. The impetus came for the most part from the nobility and the rich, but also from the less favored urban classes and in a fw cases the peasantry. The egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution, so attractive to the lower classes, spread like wildfire among the Czechs. Furthermore the lower classes in Bohemia saw in the upper Czech bourgeoisie and nobility a group who had traitorously become germanized. This realization only added to their zeal and their hatred of everything German.

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[28] Denis says of Joseph II, (*ibid.,* p. 596): "il voulu créer un Etat, il a créé des peuples."

[29] J. G. Herder, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit,* Bk. xvi, c. 4 (ed. Kuhnemann, Stuttgart, Teil 3, p. 669f.), Bd. iv.

The confusion of the Napoleonic period allowed this spiritual and intellectual revival to gain such headway that the severe repressive measures of successive Hapsburg rulers, particularly during the Metternich régime, served only to heighten Czech nationalism.[30] The oppressor was German. Earlier oppressors had been German, but they had been driven out. This most recent one might be, too. Czech patriotism sought escape in contemplation of a glorious past, a contemplation colored by the romanticism rampant all over Europe. Along with other fond hopes loyal Czechs welcomed Panslavism which appeared to them to be the great hope of a small Slavic nation, ground under the ruthless heel of a German master. How vain and illogical this hope was to be patriots did not realize for decades. But the Czechs were not the only sufferers under this stupid régime. All education, science, art and religion, German almost as much as Czech, was deadened. Ambitious and liberal German students and men of letters were obliged to go to Jena, Leipzig, Halle and other north German centers if they did not want to be forced into a reactionary mold.

The work of the Czech patriots was one of propaganda among their own people. German was still generally accepted by the upper and middle classes of Czech blood as the superior vehicle until almost the middle of the century.[31] The long uphill struggle of these leaders of the Czech revival could be called less a struggle against Germans than against the German language and through it, German culture in all its forms. Two centuries of Hapsburg germanization had almost achieved its aim. Yet the impalpability of the Czech language, of Czech history and literary tradition as the rallying point of Czech national feeling made it almost impossible for the German administration to stop the growth of that feeling. From 1830 to 1848 not a single administrative, judicial or political measure favorable to the Czechs was enacted by Metternich's régime. Yet during those years the power of Czech national and separatist feeling was growing by leaps and bounds. The most powerful personal forces in this revival from about

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[30] Denis, *op. cit.,* I, 634ff., II, 10ff.

1830 on were two: the historian Francis Palacký (d. 1876), to whom the essence of Czech history was the struggle of the German and Czech races on Bohemian soil, and the journalist Karel Havlíček (d. 1856), who preached Czech independence to the masses through a series of articles on Ireland and its troubles in the 1840's, so composed as to be a thinly-veiled running comment on the progress of the Czech struggle, and at the same time fan the flames of Czech patriotism. Both Palacký and Havlíček found it necessary to convince the Czechs they were not inferior to the Germans. They found this hard to do. "A Czech imbecile," said Havlíček, "is the equal, before God, of a German imbecile, and if I had to choose, I should prefer to be Czech, partly out of patriotism, partly because any Czech can become such an imbecile without great trouble and torture of soul." The masses of the people, the lower bourgeoisie as well as workers and peasants, were finally convinced that political autonomy was necessary to national life. Czech language, literature, history, art and the traditional spirit of religious freedom had by the late 1840's been restored to their places of honor. The attempt to regain that political autonomy in the March Revolution of 1848 was but the logical outcome of the decades of spiritual and social preparation. In 1848 it turned out to be premature. With the details of that bloodless, romantic and apparently futile revolution we are not here concerned. It failed, partly because the Czech patriot-leaders were as yet politically inexperienced, partly because they had not clearly defined their aims, and were indeed divided among themselves, partly because the Czech populace had not yet been adequately educated to the idea of political autonomy and could give but superficially an impression of solid support of their leaders, and partly because the German administration, though weak, could still count on the open support of the rich, united and conscious German minority in Bohemia and the non-participation of the Czech nobility who feared the liberal and even democratic tendencies of the Czech patriot-leaders. And this fear had some justification in that there can be no doubt that the Czech movement got its real vitality from the democratic idea, an idea of the future, to be sure, though in its Czech presentation it was continually connected with the Hussite past. The events of 1848 and 1849 showed that the Czechs, in spite of their failure, were again strong, conscious of their nationality, determined to achieve some kind of organic political and cultural unity. The events of 1918 were implicit in the events of 1848.

We can speak of the period from the end of the eighteenth century to 1918 as a period of Czech action, following two centuries of German action.

We are now presented with a total picture of two clear periods of German dominance and three distinct periods of Czech dominance since the arrival of the first Slavic tribes at the end of the fifth century. Without over-simplifying a very complicated symbiosis, it is safe to say that this 1500 year phenomenon is unparalleled in Western European history with respect to the persistence of the constituent elements. This very uniqueness has occasioned much speculation as to cause and ultimate tendencies.

Palacký saw the whole course of Czech history as a racio-religious struggle. But his great *Geschichte Böhmens* stopped in 1526. He could not have maintained his theory throughout the period of the Lutheran Reformation, which, as we have seen, should be called a period of German and Czech interaction.

Masaryk regarded the Czech renaissance of the nineteenth century as the logical eventuation of the Hussite movement whose sectarianism was broadened and elevated by a nobler humanitarianism. But this view disregards the similar reactions that took place before the Hussite reformation, and cannot adequately account for the deeper groundswells of nationalistic feeling.

Wolkan, a Sudeten German literary historian (1925), holds that when North German culture is high, that of the Sudeten Germans is also high, and Czech culture follows the Sudeten German and conversely. This condition may be true at certain points of history, but it disregards Czech original contributions,

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[31] Denis, *op. cit.,* II, 175ff.; Hans Raupach, *Der tschechische Frühationalismus* (Essen, 1939), p. 33ff.

of which there have been many—in religion, art, military science and in political consciousness.

Rádl, a Czech social philosopher (1928), holds that when German culture was high, Czech culture was also high, and conversely—a parallelism of development which was simultaneous, not necessarily causal.[32]

Konrad Bittner, a Sudeten German literary historian (1936), holds that when German cultural vigor in Bohemia has been dominant, Czech has been proportionately low, and conversely.[33] But this is too simple. It is based solely on literary standards and literary expression among a very limited group—the patriciate. His study has not thus far gone beyond the Hussite period. It is difficult to see how he can treat the Reformation period of interaction on this theory.

None of these theories of the cultural relations of the Czech and Germans can be said to be satisfactory. To be at all acceptable, each of them must choose a limited period or sphere of treatment and exclude so much indisputable data as to be invalidated.

No substitute theory is here offered. I doubt if there can ever be any simple solution or rationalization of this age-old problem which will satisfy all the conditions which history and human nature present.

Yet there are some observations which may be made on a basis of our study.

1. Whenever the Czech-German question has become acute, the precipitant has come from outside—either geographically, as Germany or Austria, or politically, as the Roman Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire or the Hapsburg dynasty.
2. The early division into opposing camps was: the Czechs against the German newcomers—*alienigenae,* foreign born—and there have always been indigenous Germans on the side of the Czechs, opposing the foreign-born newcomers. A later division, in the

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[32] E. Rádl, *Válka Čechů s Němci* (Prague, 1928).

[33] K. Bittner, *Deutsche und Tschechen* (Prague, Leipzig, 1936), pp. 7-10.

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was between the Czech liberals on the one hand, and, on the other, the reactionaries or the patriciate, who were both Czech and German. We cannot therefore find a division on purely national grounds that will hold for our whole period.

3. The Czechs have always recognized, implicitly or explicitly, that they were indebted to German civilization for mediating the culture of the West to them, and have not objected to this mediation as such, but they have insisted that they had their own contribution to make.
4. There has been repeatedly a fundamental divergence between the two peoples in their respective concepts of the State. The Germans, perhaps because of their greater numbers and their lack of organic cohesion, have been moved to insist on an inclusive state. The Czechs, fewer but more cohesive, have tended to demand that their separateness from the Germans be recognized.
5. The battlefield upon which the two peoples have contended may be seen to have changed somewhat. At first the two peoples fought for commercial supremacy. The Germans won on this battlefield. Later it was a religious and spiritual war, carried on by arms, yet in the name of religious freedom. On this battlefield, victory lay with the Hussite Czechs. Lastly the struggle shifted to the field of political theory: should they be ruled in a dynastic state, or should they be their own rulers in a federation of autonomous states? The winning weapons on this battlefield were pamphlet, poetry and patience, wielded by their scholar patriot leaders. And in 1918, at least, this engagement was won by the Czechs.

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POLAND'S EASTERN FRONTIERS, 981-1939

PART II*

by Oscar Halecki

VII

The Partitions and After

Without discussing here the whole problem of Poland's partitions,[23] and not even all the revolutionary territorial changes resulting from the violation of her long-established frontiers, we shall consider exclusively how her eastern boundaries have been forced back by the three consecutive Russian annexations.

The first one, 1772, had so little to do with the claim for uniting "All the Russias" that the Russian Empire abandoned to Austria that part of so-called Little Russia, sometimes also named Red Russia—which together with the region south of the upper Vistula was to form an entirely artificial "Kingdom of Galicia." We have seen above that Austria's aggrandizement was being justified by an obvious distortion of no longer existent Hungarian pretensions. From the Russian side no "rights" whatsoever could be put forward to justify the new frontier line which arbitrarily cut off the territory beyond the Dvina and the upper Dnieper from the White Russian provinces of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy.

But the line which Russia reached in 1793, at the second Partition, was still more arbitrary because it was not even based upon geographical considerations creating anything like a "natural" frontier. This time a very much larger strip of land was taken away from both the Crown and the Grand Duchy including, with the rest of the White Russian border regions of Lithuania proper, vast Little Russian territories reaching to the frontier of Austrian Galicia and to a line which prolonged that

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**Editor's note:* It should be pointed out that this article was written in Feb., 1941.

[23] I need only refer to the standard work of Lord, R. H., *The Second Partition of Poland* (Cambridge, Mass., 1915).

frontier to the north. Of course all the new boundaries drafted in 1793 were entirely "provisional," Russia and Prussia having already decided to divide as soon as possible what still remained of the Republic between themselves and, if necessary, Austria. This was really achieved two years later, and Russia tried to obtain again, as in 1772, a more or less natural frontier: the Niemen and the Bug, these two rivers having been connected almost by a straight line where they come nearest to each other.

It has been said more than once[24] that while taking in this way the largest share of the dismembered Republic the Russian Empire, different from the two Germanic co-partitioning powers, did not annex any Polish territories proper. And it is true that in the Russian part the majority of the population was either White Russian or Ukrainian. But it should not be forgotten that there were included also almost all the Lithuanians who had absolutely nothing in common with any Russia. We also venture to recall, first, that all these White Russians and Ukrainians—the Ruthenians as they used to be called—were entirely different peoples from the Great Russians, the Russians in the modern sense; secondly, that everywhere the upper classes of the country concerned had become Polish centuries before, while considerable Polish minorities, belonging to all social groups, were scattered over the whole territory; thirdly, that this territory was by then culturally Polish; and finally, that it had been politically connected with Poland, thanks to a union freely consented to four hundred years before the Partitions. There was nowhere discernible any separatist tendency throughout the Republic, the constitutional ties between the Polish Crown and the Lithuanian Grand Duchy having even been strengthened once more, by an almost complete unification, in 1790.

All the new international boundaries on formerly Polish territory were supposed to be permanent. They did not last more than twelve years—from 1795 to 1807—when Napoleon, disregarding all these recent and purely artificial limits created the

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[24] For instance by Rambaud, A., *"Les partages de la Pologne," Hist. Gén.*, VIII, 360.

Duchy of Warsaw, subsequently enlarged them in 1809. On both occasions Russia, without losing any of her conquests, was appeased by minor territorial cessions. In 1807 she received, out of the Prussian share of old Poland, the district of Białystok, mainly the former province of Podlasie, and in 1809, the district of Tarnopol in eastern Galicia. In both cases the new frontiers were still more artificial than before, but while Tarnopol returned to Austria at the Congress of Vienna the district of Białystok remained excluded from the so-called "Kingdom of Poland," created at that congress.[25]

The settlement of 1815 was, as a matter of fact, nothing but another—the fourth—Partition of Poland. Russia's share was very considerably increased, because the Kingdom of Poland whose autonomy proved entirely fictitious was united with the Czar's Empire and after the unsuccessful insurrections of 1830-31 and 1863 simply became a part of it, eventually losing even its name. There always remained however some difference between the Kingdom consisting of territories which in 1793 and 1795 had been annexed by Prussia and Austria and the territories east of it, taken by Russia in 1772, 1793 and 1795. The latter, now forming nine Russian provinces ("governments") and called by the Russians themselves the "Western land," never ceased to be considered by the Poles as the borderlands of Poland, taken away from her in violation of her rights. Hence the Poles of the kingdom, as long as they themselves enjoyed an autonomy which seemed to justify some hopes of a better future, incessantly claimed the reunion of these provinces with the kingdom. Alexander I, when wishing to gain Polish support and confidence, even made some rather vague promises in that direction, and when the Polish insurrections broke out under his successors, their leaders wanted to liberate not only the Congress kingdom but also the lost provinces in the east where the Polish movement for independence had never lost its vitality.

Therefore this big territorial problem remained an object of controversy between the Poles and the Russians even during the period when no independent Polish state was in existence.[26] And for that very reason the Czarist government during these hundred years persecuted the Poles and Polish culture in the borderlands still more severely than in the kingdom. "Northwestern" Russia, i.e., White Russia including Lithuania, and "Southwestern" Russia, i.e., Little Russia or the Ukraine which the Poles call by the old name of *Ruś*, were to become purely Russian lands in the modern, Great Russian, sense of the word without any traces of Polish influence. For similar reasons the Russian Empire, centralized under the absolute rule of the Czar of "all the Russias" persecuted also the other national movements which since the revival of all the European nationalities, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century developed in the same contested region: the Lithuanian movement in the northern and the Ukrainian in the southern part. As to the latter not even the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation or language was admitted officially and still less of course the existence of a White Russian nation whose national consciousness was indeed growing rather slowly.

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[25] Montgomery Hyde, H., "The Congress of Vienna," *Cambridge History of Poland* (Cambridge, 1940), Chapter XII.

These problems, too, could not possibly be treated here at length.[27] What really matters for the question we are discussing is the mere fact that the century of Russian rule in Poland and the eastern borderlands could not but produce some important changes which were to influence their further destinies. On the one hand the Czarist administration succeeded in reducing to a certain extent the traditional role of the Polish element, although the Russification proved rather superficial and the actual percentage of the Polish population much higher than indicated in the official statistics. On the other hand the various new national movements were not only anti-Russian but were also directed against Polish cultural influence. Even in the face of a common persecution the non-Russian nationalities did not establish any cooperation or common program of political action. The reason for this failure was chiefly social. The large masses of Lithuanian or Ruthenian population which, even under Polish rule, had kept their own language and customs, once fully aware of their national individuality and active in political life, took a position different from that of the Polish-feeling gentry. Aiming at national autonomy or even independence, they wanted to free themselves from both Russian oppression and Polish influence, and in spite of many interests in common with the Poles and despite the truly democratic evolution of the Poles themselves there developed a mutual distrust between the various national groups and still more between their respective political leaders.

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[26] Strongly emphasized by Recke, W., *Die polnische Frage als Problem der europäischen Politik,* (Berlin, 1927).

[27] There exists no complete history of the Russian domination in these territories. H. Mościcki published only the first volume of his *Dzieje porozbiorowe Litwy i Rusi.*

When therefore the war of 1914 reopened the whole Polish question and the possibility of Poland's reconstruction, it was obvious even to the Poles that the historical eastern frontiers of pre-Partition Poland had to be adapted to these changed political and psychological conditions in the Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands.[28]

VIII

Curzon Line and Riga Treaty

In the West minor frontier districts of Prussian Poland had been thoroughly germanized, while Polish populations outside of Poland's historical boundaries, especially in Upper Silesia, had become conscious of their nationality. Here, however, it was not a question of a fundamental transformation and the Polish claims formulated at the Paris Peace Conference represented the unanimous opinion of the whole nation. The problem of the Polish-German frontier therefore could be definitely settled in the Versailles Treaty, while article 87 of the same Treaty, leaving in suspense the question of Poland's eastern boundaries only reserved to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the right to fix them in the future. It is of interest to examine why it proved impossible to settle these boundaries during the long negotiations at Paris.

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[28] Briefly explained in my book *La Pologne de 963 à 1914* (Paris, 1933), pp. 342-344, which will soon appear in an English version, brought up to 1941.

One of the reasons did not concern Poland alone. Russia, a former Ally, was not represented at the Conference and her future development was quite unsettled in 1919, and her government was not at that time recognized by the Western powers. Those powers therefore considered it impossible to take any final action concerning the territories of the former Russian Empire. The separate peace treaties which Soviet Russia had concluded with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk a year before the Paris Conference were specifically repudiated in another article of the Treaty of Versailles, the frontiers then dictated by Germany had to all intents and purposes lost their importance and the whole territorial readjustment of Eastern Europe had to be discussed *de novo.*

That was of course favorable to the new Poland which had unanimously protested against the decisions taken at Brest-Litovsk in which the Polish state in existence since November 5, 1916, under German and Austro-Hungarian control had not participated.[29] The frontiers of that state had not been fixed either in the initial proclamation of the two Emperors or afterwards, but there had been some prospect that in compensation for far-reaching limitations in the West its territory would be extended in the East. At Brest-Litovsk however, while the northeastern frontier still remained open, the cessions made in the south-east to the Ukrainians disregarded even the limits of former Congress Poland and the *status quo* in Galicia. But the arbitrary delimitations of February 9 and March 3, 1918, had yet to be replaced. Since the withdrawal of the German forces from the Eastern front the situation there had become chaotic. The Bolshevik advance had forced the Lithuanians to transfer the seat of their national government from Wilno, where it had been established while under German occupation, to Kaunas, but that advance was checked by the Poles who liberated Wilno on April 19, 1919. Fighting between them and the Soviet Army was going on in White Russia, while farther to the south the Ukrainian independence movement defended the Kievan Ukraine against the encroachment of the Bolsheviks and at the same time turned against the Poles in the disputed territory of Eastern Galicia which after a heroic defense of Lwów was definitely occupied by Poland in June, 1919. At the end of the same year the Great Powers still deliberating in Paris almost simultaneously took two provisional decisions in view of that situation: Eastern Galicia was granted to Poland, but only as a mandate for twenty-five years, and in former Russian Poland a line was drafted which definitely included within Poland all that certainly seemed Polish but without any prejudice to the ultimate allotment of territory farther east, even expressly reserving Poland's right to that territory.[80]

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[29] Handelsman, M., "Les efforts de la Pologne pour la reconstitution d'un Etat indépendent" in *La Pologne, sa vie économique et sociale pendant la guerre* (Paris, New Haven, 1932) I, 47. This is the first volume of the Polish Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War, edited by James T. Shotwell.

It must be emphasized that this line of December 8, 1919, later known as the Curzon line, was nothing but a provisional minimum frontier, almost exactly corresponding to the western frontier of Russia after Poland's third partition. By drafting it the Allied Powers certainly did not mean to recognize a right of Russia to the territory she had annexed in the three Partitions. They simply wanted to make it quite clear that *at least* the whole of Congress Poland with the only exception of a small Lithuanian corner in the northeast and also the region of Białystok, arbitrarily given to Russia in 1807, were undoubtedly Polish and that all the possible controversies should be limited to the territories east of that line.

The Poles were of course even less inclined to consider it as a final frontier, and they were equally unanimous in claiming Eastern Galicia, not for a twenty-five year period after which new troubles could be expected, but as a province which, having been connected with Poland for almost six hundred years, was to remain such in the future. But Polish opinion itself was divided as to the proper settlement of the problems concerning the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukraine. And there were indeed two different ways of adapting the historical frontier of the years before 1772 to the changed conditions of the twentieth century and of giving satisfaction to the modern principle of national self-determination.

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[80] Temperley, H. W. V., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris,* VI (London, 1924) 275. See also Reddaway, W. F., "The Peace Conference, 1919" in the *Cambridge History of Poland* (Cambridge, 1940), Chapter XXI.

In the first place there was the possibility of a federal solution. The old frontier, violated by the partitions of the eighteenth century, could be restored, including, if possible, all the White Russian and Ukrainian populations. In that case these populations as well as the Lithuanians must be allowed and even helped to create their own states ultimately to be united with the Polish state by freely concluded agreements and to form together with Poland a large federal system. Pilsudski, who was in favor of such a solution, suggested it in his proclamation to the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy in April, 1919, and just a year later concluded a convention with Petlura's Ukrainian government, leaving Eastern Galicia and the western part of Volhynia to Poland and closely allying both countries in their war against Soviet Russia.

But the whole federal conception failed of realization for reasons which can be indicated here only briefly. After having occupied Kiev jointly, the Poles and the Ukrainians were defeated by Soviet forces. There was an important difference in the results of the defeat for the two allies. The Ukrainians were obliged to accept Soviet rule while the Poles, after a great victory over the Soviet army near Warsaw, pushed the Russians towards the northeast. But Poland's campaign in this direction involved her in a conflict with the Lithuanians so that even a union limited to Poland and Lithuania was now out of the question. Under these conditions the whole frontier problem was decided by the treaty concluded at Riga, March 18, 1921, between Poland and the Soviets. Long negotiations preceded the signing of the treaty, but by confirming the territorial stipulations of the armistice of October 12, 1920, the Riga Treaty took its place as a typical peace of compromise. Poland, although victorious, abandoned her claims to the historical frontier before the first partition of 1772 and accepted a new frontier, much farther west, more or less corresponding to the Polish-Russian boundaries after the Second Partition of 1793, so that Russia only renounced her share in the Third Partition of 1795. We are using the term Russia although formally the treaty was concluded by Poland with three independent Soviet Republics: Russia, White Russia and the Ukraine. The two latter were now supposed to be federated, not with Poland, but with Russia, a union which soon made their independence a mere fiction. The southern sector of the frontier, separating Poland from Soviet-Ukraine, entirely corresponded to the previous agreement with the national, democratic Ukraine of Petlura. It is true that it left on the Polish side a large Ukrainian minority and that in the north a smaller but not unimportant White Russian minority was also included in the Polish Republic.[31]. But considerable Polish minorities remained on the eastern side of the frontier which realized all the advantages and disadvantages of the second solution—different from the federal plan—of Poland's eastern problems.

In order to understand that solution, it is worth while remembering that the Riga frontier, adopted after so much fighting and discussion, proved almost identical with the boundaries suggested at the Paris Conference by the Polish delegate Roman Dmowski. He represented that part of Polish opinion which, being doubtful as to the possibility of federal unions, wanted to see established a national Polish state with a majority of Polish population, including only those White Russian or Ukrainian border regions which seemed indispensable in order to guarantee to Poland, confronted by her powerful eastern neighbor, a minimum of security and especially the secure possession of centers of Polish culture as old as Lwów and Wilno.

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[31] See my (anonymous) series of articles "La statistique linguistique de la République polonaise," *La Voix de Varsovie* (Paris, 1939-1940) I, No. 2—II, No. 13-14, where the census of 1931 is analyzed. The Eastern borderlands (the provinces of Wilno, Nowogròdek, Polesie and Volhynia) are studied in Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 13-14, all with linguistic maps.

The Wilno problem was only partly decided at Riga, the Soviets declaring themselves disinterested in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. Here again the failure of any federal scheme, even when suggested to both parties by the League of Nations,[32] necessitated the drafting of an entirely new frontier, independent of historical tradition and coming as near as possible to contemporary linguistic boundaries. Such an adaptation proved easier in the case of Lithuania than along the Soviet frontier, although this time more Polish minorities were left outside the Republic than Lithuanian minorities in Poland. And in that case the decisions of the Allied powers were of much greater use: the final Polish-Lithuanian frontier, assigning Wilno to Poland, was nothing but the provisional demarcation line drawn up by Marshal Foch and the Conference of Ambassadors, joining in the south the Curzon line, a short sector of which was used as a boundary between the two countries in the Suwałki region.

IX

The Present Situation

Although the frontier between Poland and the Soviets resulted from a mutual agreement, and although the *de facto* frontier between Poland and Lithuania coincided with a delimitation made on behalf of the Allied powers, the *de jure* recognition of Poland's Eastern boundaries by these powers was obtained only on March 15, 1923. Apparently they postponed it so long, because they wanted to ascertain whether the new territorial settlement would prove practicable. Two years after the Riga Treaty and one year after the formal incorporation of the Wilno region, based upon an urgent request of a local Diet, it was obvious that the frontier established after so many controversies was a reasonable one and in actuality corresponded to the needs of the real situation.

That impression of 1923 was confirmed by the experience of the next sixteen years. As to the long Polish-Russian frontier, both sides seemed to be satisfied with the compromise solution and no one raised any clamor for revision. Even the position of the minorities, which in the Treaty of Riga had received reciprocal guarantees of fair treatment, did not lead to any official differences between the neighbor states. Of course, from a general point of view, it was regrettable that the national movement of the Ukrainians and the much weaker one of the White Russians had not received satisfaction. But it has been rightly pointed out by a well informed American expert[33] that if the situation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland was open to serious criticism, the fate of the overwhelming majority of that nation remaining under Soviet Russia's control in the so-called Ukrainian Republic was much worse.

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[32] The project of the Belgian minister, M. Paul Hymans, approved by the Council of the League, published in the League's *Official Journal,* II (1921), 780-781.

The problem of the new Polish-Lithuanian frontier certainly was a different one. Much shorter than the Polish-Russian border from which it was separated by the still shorter, but entirely uncontroversial frontier between Poland and Latvia, the boundaries west of Wilno were never recognized by Lithuania and both sides protested against the treatment of their respective minorities. There cannot be, however, the slightest doubt that in the Wilno region the majority of the population definitely desired to remain with Poland[34] and only suffered, as well as the whole population of Lithuania, from the lack of any normal relations, either diplomatic or economic, between the two countries which were historically and geographically closely connected. For the same reason frontier incidents were inevitable, one of which provoked the Polish ultimatum of March, 1938. But in contrast to the ultimatums which were presented to Lithuania one year later by Germany and two years later by Russia, Poland asked for nothing but the establishment of diplomatic relations in a form of strict equality between both states. After that was accepted by Lithuania, the tension was immediately relieved and even followed by a period of friendly negotiations which eventually promoted economic and cultural contacts and, without raising any territorial questions, actually normalized Polish-Lithuanian relations in the year preceding the outbreak of the new war.

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[33] Buell, R. L., *Poland, Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), p. 285.

[34] For these and other questions, see Kutrzeba, St., "The Struggle for the Frontiers" *Cambridge History of Poland* (Cambridge, 1940), Chapter XXII.

The outbreak of hostilities on September 1, 1939, had no connection with Poland's eastern frontiers. The German invasion aimed exclusively at a revision of the western boundary. And even the pretexts which were to justify the Russian invasion of September 17 did not touch any frontier problem. Finally, when the real war aims of both aggressors were disclosed, it was not so much a question of this or that frontier of Poland, but of the frontier between the two large neighboring countries which, as in the 18th century, had decided to destroy Poland entirely and to divide her territory. But while such a decision of principle must have been taken upon the eve of the war, in connection with the German-Russian treaty of August 23, it seems doubtful whether the new frontier line had been drafted in advance. For a few days after Russia's entering the war, it was officially announced that her share would reach the Vistula between the mouth of the Bug and of the San, including even the eastern suburbs of Warsaw and, as a matter of fact, as the German troops were withdrawing, the Soviets were advancing toward that line. However, the final agreement of September 28 extended again the part occupied by the Germans to the Bug river, including the region of Lublin. Without discussing, therefore, these initial changes, we have only to consider the actual limits of the Soviet occupation. In the part north of the Bug the new western "frontier" of the so-called White Russian Republic is at the same time eastern frontier of territories "definitely" annexed to Germany; in the southern part, the new western "frontier" of the so-called Ukrainian Republic is being considered as the eastern frontier of the "general government" which without being incorporated into Germany, is nevertheless treated as a "permanent possession of the Reich," not even a "protectorate," but something like a colony on European soil. But although that whole line which really is nothing but a delimitation between the German and the Russian occupations, is certainly not an eastern frontier of Poland, it must be commented upon here, because of the misunderstandings which it has raised in Anglo-Saxon countries.[35].

More than once it has been stated that after all, the Russians advanced only as far as the Curzon line which even at the Paris Conference had been recommended by the Allied powers as the only reasonable eastern frontier of Poland. We have recalled above that the Curzon line was something quite different and could not possibly justify any claims of Soviet Russia to all the territories east of it. But in addition to that, it must be emphasized that the present delimitation coincides with the Curzon line only in its middle sector, from the place where the Bug river turns westward almost to its sources. The southern sector from the upper Bug to the Carpathians, including eastern Galicia, does not coincide with the Curzon line in any proper sense. The Peace Conference treated eastern Galicia separately from the former Russian territories, and never took any final decision as to its attribution, and still less attributed it to Russia or to any Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and when drafting a tentative demarcation between eastern and western Galicia, followed a quite different line.

It is, however, in its northern sector that the present delimitation is particularly shocking. Going far beyond the Curzon line which, like Russia's frontier after the third partition, ran directly from the angle of the Bug to the angle of the Niemen at Grodno, the actual Soviet occupation included not only the Białystok district as given to Russia in 1807, but almost the whole Białystok province of contemporary Poland[36] which is much larger, covers about 12,500 square miles and extends over the łomža region, inhabited by a purely Polish population. Here it touches the equally 100 per cent Polish territories "incorporated" into Germany and the pre-war frontier of East Prussia, a province to which the Germans have now added another purely Polish part of the Białystok province: the region of Suwałki on the Lithuanian border. After the annexation of Lithuania by the Soviet union, it has been made clear that here too the new "frontier" is now to be a "definitive" boundary between Germany and the Soviets.

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[35] See also my (anonymous) article "Retour à la ligne Curzon," *La Voix de Varsovie* (1939), No. 1, with map.

[36] In the above cited series of articles on Poland's linguistic statistics the province of Biatystok is treated in No. 8, pp. 124-128.

It is scarcely necessary to point out how artificial and purely arbitrary these new divisions really are. What chiefly matters is that the Soviet occupation is by no means limited to territories inhabited by White Russians and Ukrainians. Their "liberation" was of course a mere pretext, but in addition to these peoples, Soviet Russia has subjugated, on both sides of the Curzon line, about five million Poles, of whom half a million have already been deported to Siberia. And even the Wilno region which first had been generously handed over to Lithuania has now been annexed along with the whole of the Lithuanian Republic so that it is superfluous to attempt to describe the fictitious frontier changes in that part of Poland.

Having treated the whole problem of Poland's eastern frontier from a historical viewpoint, we shall avoid any conclusion concerning the future. The only conclusion which arises from the present situation will simply be the statement that among the many changes which that frontier underwent in the course of a thousand years' history, the one made in 1939 certainly is the most unfortunate and the one least likely to endure. It could be compared only with the boundaries dictated after Poland's third partition in 1795, but we have seen that, supposedly drafted "forever," they lasted but twelve years.

VASSAR COLLEGE

A NOTE ON THE BRENNER FRONTIER

by René Albrecht-Carrié

UNLIKE her frontier with Yugoslavia, Italy's frontier with Austria was not the subject of any serious controversy in 1919. The contrast is all the more remarkable that the reason for the bitter debate over the eastern frontier—Wilson's adamant opposition to the incorporation into Italy of too great a number of an alien population—applied in large measure to the northern frontier as well. In both places, the lines claimed by Italy were strategically the best, but it was generally agreed in non-Italian circles that reasonable military frontiers could be drawn which would avoid the annexation of a quarter of a million German Austrians in one case and three times that number of Slavs in the other. However, as Wilson raised no objection to the Brenner frontier, that frontier never became an issue. In fact, Wilson lent his support to two small rectifications of that frontier, at Sexten and Tarvis, both in Italy's favor.

We know that the American Territorial Report, available in January, recommended for Italy a frontier in the north intermediate between the ethnic line and the line of the Treaty of London.[1] A similar recommendation came from British quarters.[2] We also know that, certainly as early as January, Wilson was committed to the Brenner frontier, and, what is more, that this commitment came as a surprise to his own experts.[3] All of which has raised the question of how Wilson came to make this decision, possibly as the result of an oversight as has been suggested,[4] and, more generally, how the Brenner frontier came to be secured by Italy. Some contributions to this important question are made by Aldrovandi Marescotti,[5] which are worth examining in some detail.

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[1] This report is given in full in Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris,* (Privately printed, 1928), IV, Doc. 246. The parts of this document relevant to this discussion are reproduced in Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference,* (New York, 1938), pp. 364-68. Cf. also, *Ibid.,* Maps IV and V, pp. 92, 93.

[2] "Note by Colonel Cornwall on a suggested frontier between Italy and German Austria." Miller, *op. cit.,* Doc. 513.

[3] "Notes of a Conversation between President Wilson, Signor Orlando, Colonel House and Signor Scialoja, held on January 30, 1919." Miller, *op. cit.,* IV, Doc. 268.

[4] Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and The World Settlement* (New York, 1923), II, 146; Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1926-28), IV, 450. For a discussion of the evidence heretofore available, cf. Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.,* pp. 80-5.

According to Aldrovandi, during a meeting between Wilson and Orlando on January 9, the former said no more than that "a part of Istria" could be given to Italy. The memorandum which Wilson handed to Orlando on April 14 granted Italy the Brenner frontier, but apparently the attached map showed a different line. When Orlando commented on this discrepancy at the second meeting that day, Wilson, according to Aldrovandi, made the rather surprising statement that he was not concerned with the line on the map which had been drawn in accordance with Lloyd George's wishes.[6] In spite of this, at the Council meeting of May 7, when Lloyd George remarked in connection with the Austrian treaty that there was no question over the frontier with Italy, Wilson replied that he would like to think the matter over.[7] Rumors were circulating in May to the effect that the question of the Tyrol might be reconsidered[8] and, at the Council meeting of the 29, when the final touches were being put to the Austrian treaty, Aldrovandi pointed to Orlando, under the heading "Future frontiers of Austria," the following remark: "with Italy a line shall be fixed by the Allied and Associated Powers at a subsequent date."[9]

In order to obtain the final word on this whole question of the

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[5] The new evidence discussed here is taken from Aldrovandi Marescotti, *Guerra diplomatica* (Milan, 1937), footnote on pp. 442-47.

[6] Lloyd George's memoirs of the Peace Conference, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938) are of no assistance in elucidating either this particular point or the general question of the Brenner frontier in 1919.

[7] The exchange was as follows:

Lloyd George: There is no discussion on the frontier between Austria and Italy. We can tell them [the Austrians]: This is your frontier. The whole difficulty concerns the frontier between Croatia and Italy.

Wilson: I should like to think it over.

This shows that Wilson's remark may well have referred to the whole question of the Italian frontier and not merely to the Brenner as Aldrovandi claims (p. 444). Orlando, in the letter to Aldrovandi Council, May 7, reported by Aldrovandi, *op. cit.,* pp. 297-98.

[8] On this point, cf. Paul Herre, *Die Südtiroler Frage* (Munich, 1927), pp. 89 ff.

[9] Aldrovandi Marescotti, *op. cit.,* p. 438.

Brenner frontier, Aldrovandi wrote to Orlando asking for his recollections, and received in reply a letter—dated October 25, 1935—which contains the following passages:

> Wilson . . . while he was resolutely intrasigent on the question of including within our boundaries peoples of the Slav race, seemed instead indifferent at the inclusion of Germans. What is more, he used his readiness to grant us the line of the Brenner as a means of extracting from us concessions in the Adriatic. Conversely, the Allies (France and England) kept in touch with the Austrians using the prospect of some concession in their favor in the Alto Adige to reinforce the obstacles destined to hold Austria from her gravitation toward Germany.
>
> Wilson was thus holding the Brenner as a sort of hostage in the interest of Serbia. When, in the second half of April, the disagreement with Wilson became very violent and a break occurred, the Brenner frontier remained definitely in suspense. Then came the Austrian delegation and among us Four we discussed every part of the treaty with Austria except the Italian frontier.

Professing to have been worried by this, Orlando goes on to assert that during this period (in May) he sought to reach some compromise on the Adriatic mainly with the Brenner in mind, and, on the evening of the 28th, let Wilson know through House that he accepted the Tardieu Plan[10] as a basis of discussion. This broke the ice with Wilson, and, on the 29th, continues Orlando:

> I arrive with House and find Wilson with Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Wilson gets up, comes toward me with open arms, and almost embracing me, says that he recognizes that by accepting the Tardieu compromise, even if only as a basis of discussion, I had given evidence of a conciliating spirit which he fully appreciated, for which he expressed his admiration, etc., etc. After which, turning around, he says: "And what has been arranged for the Italian frontier for to-morrow?" Embarrassing silence of the two [Lloyd George and Clemenceau]. Col. Hankey remarks that in the peace conditions already printed the Italian frontier is marked: "Réservée."
>
> And Wilson proceeds: "But it must not be suspended! Italy

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[10] This was the last attempt at solving the Adriatic problem before the overthrow of the Orlando Ministry. It is not to be confused with the proposals made by Tardieu during the absence of Orlando and Sonnino from Paris from April 24 to May 6.

> is entitled to this line and it must be assigned to her." The silence of the two continues. And Hankey asks: "Shall we then set the line of the Brenner as it appears in the Pact of London?" And Wilson: "Yes, but with some modifications, because the line of the Pact of London is not just enough for Italy (sic!). That line must be rectified, adding Sexten and the Tarvis valley to Italy."
>
> The silence of the others continues. And thus we obtained the Brenner, plus the valleys of Tarvis and Sexten.[11]

This letter has been quoted at some length for it raises certain interesting questions. Orlando was the chief Italian delegate until June, 1919; his testimony is therefore of the highest importance. The first part of the letter agrees with our knowledge of Wilson's position on the Brenner and the Adriatic. As to the French and British activities in Vienna, there was a certain amount of intrigue and a much larger part of rumor. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the atmosphere of 1919 it was quite natural for the Italians to be concerned as they were over these rumors. It is also true that Wilson felt that what he considered his generosity toward Italy in the case of the Brenner frontier should have been met by willingness on the part of the Italians to yield to him on the Adriatic, but there is no evidence to show that he ever considered going back on the first point in the event that the Italians did not yield on the second. His memorandum of April 14 and his Manifesto of the 23rd specifically recognize this frontier. During all the discussions in May conducted outside the Council the Brenner frontier was always taken for granted, even by those Americans who had been originally opposed to it, and to whom Wilson's acquiescence had come as a surprise. If Orlando merely continued discussing the Adriatic issue on account of the Brenner, then he must have shown considerable reticence, for such an idea appears nowhere else; neither Aldrovandi nor Crespi,[12] for instance, give any inkling of it. It would be surprising that every part of the Austrian treaty should have been discussed except the Italian frontier, if that frontier had not generally been taken for granted on all sides, especially when we consider that it was the most important single item of that treaty for the Italians.[13] A more reasonable supposition would seem to be that the question of the Brenner frontier was indeed generally considered as settled and that the notation "Réservée" referred not to it but to the fact that the disposition of the former Austrian territory south of this frontier was still in dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia.[14] As to the claim that it was only Orlando's agreement on May 28 to consider the Tardieu Plan which brought Wilson around the next day, and the description of the scene between Orlando and Wilson on that occasion, it can only be called surprising. Even allowing for a florid style—although Orlando is writing a private letter, long after the events, and not indulging in the emotionalism of public speaking of which he was a master—it is certainly not in keeping with Wilson's character. What is more, Aldrovandi, who gives those sections of the Minutes of the Council relating to Italian problems, reports no such description, merely recording Wilson as acquiescing once more in the line of the Treaty of London with the additions of Sexten and Tarvis.[15] American evidence bearing on these points[16] indicates change in Wilson's attitude which remained throughout this period that agreement could only be reached with the Italians through their coming around to his point of view on the Adriatic question.[17] It is therefore difficult to avoid the impression that Orlando, writing in 1935, was seeking to present past events in a light that would enhance his credit for having secured the Brenner frontier for Italy. The question of precisely when and how Wilson came to commit himself to this frontier still escapes final elucidation, but there seems no reason to alter the belief that he did so from the very beginning of the Peace Conference and that thereafter he abided by his decision.

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[11] Aldrovandi Marescotti, *op. cit.*, pp. 445-46. Incidentally, Tarvis is not a valley.

[12] Aldrovandi Marescotti, *op. cit.;* Crespi, *Alla difesa d'Italia in guerra e a Versailles* (Milan, 1937).

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[13] Not much weight can be given to the hypothesis that Orlando was purposely avoiding the issue in order to bring it up at the last moment, taking then the position that he had thought the matter settled all the while. In view of his recent experiences and of the treatment of Italy by her allies in other matters such a policy would have been highly improvident and completely indefensible.

[14] These territories were ceded by Austria to the Allied and Associated Powers collectively.

[15] Orlando: I have been told that up to now the drafting committee has received no instructions in regard to the frontier between Italy and Austria.

Wilson: As far as I remember, it is understood that the frontier is that indicated in the Treaty of London, with rectifications which give the Sexten valley to Italy as well as certain regions in the neighborhood of Tarvis.

Minutes of the Council, May 29. Aldrovandi Marescotti, *op cit.*, p. 440.

[16] For instance Miller, *op cit.;* Seymour, *op. cit.;* George Louis Beer's Diary (unpublished).

NEW YORK CITY

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[17] Crespi likewise, who was the Italian most directly concerned in evolving the Tardieu Plan, gives no inkling of such happenings as described by Orlando. Cf. Crespi, *op. cit.*, pp. 613-14, relating the discussion of the Council meeting of May 29 among the Italian delegates on May 330.

NICOLAS IORGA (1871-1941)

by

John C. Campbell

The stormy politics of Roumania have deprived the historical profession of one of its most brilliant members. Professor Nicolas Iorga was a man of world reputation, a scholar whose prodigious feats in the quantity production of books and articles have been the wonder of his colleagues for four decades. His major concern was the history of Roumania, for every historian in Southeastern Europe assumes the role of spokesman and defender of his own nation. But Iorga was more than that. He was a keen student of two civilizations, the Western and the Byzantine, and was himself a remarkable synthesis of the two. Iorga drank deeply at the springs of European culture. He was schooled in Germany and in France, wrote many of his books in the Western languages, and never lost contact with the West. From his chair of Universal History in the University of Bucharest he interpreted Western Europe to generations of Roumanian students; in his annual lectures at the Sorbonne, and in his many works, he interpreted Roumania to the world.

Iorga always remained, in spite of his broad culture and his cosmopolitan connections, a fervent Roumanian nationalist. Setting himself against the current of superficial imitation of France, he found his real inspiration in the history, in the traditions, in the "soul" of the Roumanian people. That is the key to his teaching, to much of his historical writing, and to the editorials which he turned out daily for forty years in his own party newspaper, *Neamul Românesc*. As national historian, as Rector of the University of Bucharest, as founder and director of a dozen national institutes, as author of books by the hundred, articles by the thousand, and thirty-odd full-length dramas, he inspired a whole generation. Broadly cultured in all fields of arts and letters, he dominated an era in Roumanian intellectual life. His *Liga Culturală* in Bucharest and his college at Valenii-de-Munte became centers of national and even international importance.

As an historical scholar Iorga displayed an erudition which was overwhelming. His power of memory was miraculous. Yet these gifts were counter-balanced by weaknesses. He was not infallible. In his bitter controversies with Hungarian and Bulgarian historians and even with his Roumanian colleagues, he often stubbornly defended positions which were obviously untenable. Also, much of his recent work, including the monumental ten-volume *Istoria Românilor,* bears marks of haste and carelessness. Nevertheless, his work as a whole calls for admiration and respect. In view of the amazing quantity produced, it is worth remarking that a very high percentage of it is scholarly and sound.

As a personality, Iorga was respected rather than loved. And by some he was hated for his egotism and his high-handed methods. His ventures into politics, almost uniformly unsuccessful, made many enemies for him. Most bitter against him were the Iron Guardists. Although no enthusiast for parliamentary democracy as it was practised in Roumania, Iorga felt that the new barbarians were attacking more than democracy, that they were destroying the fabric of Europe's humanistic civilization. He had the courage to speak out against them, and paid for it with his life. His friends and admirers everywhere pay homage to a man of genius and integrity, a great historian and a citizen of Europe.

Council of Foreign Relations JOHN C. CAMPBELL
New York City

DOCUMENTS

On July 18, 1941, the British Government gave complete recognition to the hitherto Provisional Czechoslovak Government headed by Dr. Eduard Beneš. The recognition was conveyed by Mr. Anthony Eden to Mr. Jan Masaryk, and Mr. Philip Nichols was named Minister to the newly recognized Czechoslovak government.

On the same day the following agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was signed and went into effect. The text of the agreement follows:

> The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia have effected the following agreement:
>
> 1. The two Governments have agreed to exchange Ministers Plenipotentiary and Envoys Extraordinary immediately.
> 2. The two Governments accede reciprocally to lend each other mutual aid of all kinds in the present war against Germany.
> 3. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consents to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Czechoslovak national military units under the command of a person to be named by the Government of Czechoslovakia with the consent of the Soviet Government. Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will operate under the direction of the Supreme Military Command of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
> 4. The present agreement enters into force from the moment of signature and is not subject to ratification.
> 5. The present agreement is drawn up in duplicate in the Russian and Czechoslovakian languages. The two texts are of equal validity.
>
> Signed: IVAN MAISKY, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain.
>
> JAN MASARYK, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

On July 30, the government of the United States took diplomatic action parallel to that of Great Britain and Russia in recognizing the Provisional Government of Dr. Beneš as the government of Czechoslovakia. The action of the State Department was announced in Washington and simultaneously transmitted to the Foreign Office of the Czechoslovak Government in London by Mr. John G. Winant, American Ambassador to London. Mr. Winant's note of recognition, as sent to Mr. Masaryk, read as follows:

> The Secretary of State has directed me to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States, mindful of the traditional friendship and special interest which has existed between the peoples of the United States and Czechoslovakia since the foundation of the

> Czechoslovak Republic, has watched with admiration the efforts of the people of Czechoslovakia to maintain their national existence, notwithstanding the suppression of the institutions of free government in their country.
>
> The American Government has not acknowledged that the temporary extinguishment of their liberties has taken from the people of Czechoslovakia their rights and privileges in international affairs, and it has continued to recognize the diplomatic and consular representatives of Czechoslovakia in the United States in the full exercise of their functions.
>
> In furtherance of its support of the national aspirations of the people of Czechoslovakia, the Government of the United States is now prepared to enter into formal relations with the provisional government established at London for the prosecution of the war and the restoration of the freedom of the Czechoslovak people, under the Presidency of Dr. Beneš, and while continuing its relations with the Czechoslovak Legation at Washington would be pleased to accredit to the provisional government an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, to reside in London, for the conduct of relations pending the reestablishment of the government in Czechoslovakia.
>
> I shall later communicate with Your Excellency regarding the diplomatic representative whom my government would like to designate.

* * * * * * * *

After preliminary pourparlers between the Soviet Foreign Office and the Polish Government in London, initiated at the instigation of Mr. Eden, an agreement between the two governments was finally concluded on July 30. The text of the treaty follows:

1. The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. The Polish Government declares Poland is not bound by any agreement with any third power which is directed against the U.S.S.R.
2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two governments upon the signing of this agreement, and an immediate exchange of Ambassadors will be arranged.
3. The two governments mutually agree to render one to another aid and support in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
4. The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses its consent to the formation on territory of the U.S.S.R. expresses its consent to the forma- appointed by the Polish Government in agreement with the Soviet Government, the Polish Army on territory of the U.S.S.R. being subordinated in an operational sense to the Supreme Command of the U.S.S.R., in which the Polish Army will be represented. All details as to command, organization and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent agreement.

5. This agreement will come into force immediately upon signature and without ratification. The present agreement is drawn up in two copies, in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force.
6. The Soviet Government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory either as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds, as from the resumption of diplomatic relations.

PROTOCOL

1. As from the resumption of diplomatic relations, the Government of the U.S.S.R. grants an amnesty to all Polish citizens now detained on the territory of the U.S.S.R. either as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds.
2. The present Protocol comes into force simultaneously with the Agreement of July 30, 1941.

The treaty was signed by M. Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to London, and General Wladyslas Sikorski, Premier of the Polish Government, in the presence of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in the Foreign Office in Whitehall.

BOOK REVIEWS

Harris, David, *Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. vii, 437. $3.00.

This volume is an intensive but interesting study of the inter-relation of foreign policy, foreign events, news stories or propaganda, and domestic politics in Great Britain in the year 1876. The wholesale butchery and unspeakable atrocities inflicted by irregular Moslem troops upon the Bulgarians after the latter's attempted revolt in that year provide the starting point for the study. The fear of Russian intrigue and expansion in the Balkans and Disraeli's consequent pro-Turkish policy explain the British government's apparent indifference to and minimization of the atrocity stories when they first reached London. Disraeli was quick to assure Queen Victoria that the stories were exaggerated. But reports of others than the pro-Turkish British ambassador to the Sublime Porte eventually began to appear in the British press and account for the wave of indignation and horror which swept over the British people. These emotions, in turn, led to an attack upon the pro-Turkish policy of Disraeli and Lord Derby and even to a demand for a reversal of Britain's policy and a definite stand against the Sultan in behalf of the Balkan Christians. *Punch,* for example, asserted that the "sick man" could never recover in the European climate and urged that he be sent into Asia for a change of air. At the height of the anti-Turkish agitation the papers were filled with charges and counter-charges, and hundreds of mass meetings were held throughout the kingdom to voice the popular indignation and protest.

Inevitably the situation lent itself to partisan politics and soon Liberal papers and leaders were denouncing both the Turk and the Disraeli government's policy in the same breath, giving little heed to what might be best for Britain from the viewpoint of power politics. The Bulgarian atrocities, Gladstone declared, should be made the issue of the campaign in the by-election for the seat vacated by Disraeli's elevation to the peerage in 1876. For a time the prime minister and Lord Derby were forced to stand on the defensive. But eventually the humanitarian emotions of the British began to subside, the Conservative press began to urge loyalty to the government in a matter of foreign policy, and finally the Disraeli government launched its own propaganda stories of Russian atrocities in Turkestan. A counter-wave of meetings under Conservative auspices then produced resolutions of confidence in the ministry. In the end, Disraeli, although apparently deterred from any hope of taking Britain into a war to protect Turkey against Russia, was able to adhere to his pro-Turkish policy enough to force Russia to accept the Congress of Berlin, from which he himself returned bringing "peace with honor."

Professor Harris is to be congratulated on a piece of work well done. He has quite evidently done a tremendous amount of research in public documents—some unpublished, contemporary newspapers and magazines, memoirs, biographies, and special studies. The work is extensively documented and a special bibliography is included. So also are a number of illuminating documents taken chiefly from the archives of the United States. The volume undoubtedly contributes to a fuller understanding of British foreign policy in the years from 1876 to 1878.

Indiana University F. Lee Benns

Auernheimer, Raoul, *Prince Metternich, Statesman and Lover.* New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1940. Pp. 365. $3.50.

Herr Auernheimer was an important member of the staff of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, and a favorite drama critic and *feuilletoniste* of certain perfumed and *fin de siècle* circles of Viennese society. His life of Metternich is charmingly written, somewhat in the manner of Schnitzler. It moves along pleasantly, but there is no fundamental analysis of the workings either of the European balance of power system or of the old Austrian Empire. For the historian it cannot expect to compete with the translation of Victor Bibl's life of Metternich in French (Paris, 1935) or with H. de Couldray's life in English (New Haven, 1936). It hardly needs to be said that it is not to be compared with von Srbik's definitive biography of the great conservative (Munich, 1925, 2 vols.) which should by all means be made available in English.

Oberlin College Frederick B. Artz

Curtiss, John Shelton, *Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire, 1900-1917.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. ix, 442. $4.00.

Mr. Curtiss' volume does credit to American scholarship in the field of Slavonic studies. In no other language, including the Russian, is there available an equally comprehensive and competent discussion of this highly important subject. Based on wide reading and extensive use of documentary materials, this book gives a detailed and interestingly written account of the Russian church administration during the last pre-revolutionary decades, of the church's economic resources, and of its educational and missionary activities. Both liberal and reactionary tendencies among the churchmen are discussed with reference to the revolution of 1905, and the failure of the imperial government to bring about the badly needed ecclesiastical reform is traced throughout the years of the constitutional interlude. The story ends with a chapter entitled "The Sway of Rasputin."

Mr. Curtiss has limited himself to the study of church and state relations in Russia, and here his findings amply corroborate the familiar idea of a church entirely subordinated to the state in administrative and political matters. It was this situation that Dostoevsky, himself an ardent believer in Orthodoxy, described as the "Babylonian Captivity" of the Russian church. Nobody can reproach Mr. Curtiss for not having gone into the other sides of the religious life in pre-revolutionary Russia. And yet one is moved to say that his book does not tell the whole story, that in spite of the subservient bishops, the consistories, the reactionary priests in the Duma, and even of Rasputin, there remained alive in Russian Orthodoxy both creative religious thought and genuine piety. Had it been otherwise, we would not witness to-day the surprising phenomenon of the survival of the Orthodox church in Soviet Russia after nearly twenty-five years of persistent and vigorous governmental efforts to undermine its position.

It also would be a mistake to ascribe the Bolshevik attack upon the church solely to the latter's intimate association with the old régime. The Soviet government began with the Orthodox church because it was the largest and the most important religious body in he country. But subsequently the same policy of persecution was extended to all other religious groups, including the most radical Protestant denominations among the Russian sectarians. In the light of this experience, fully explained by the ideological and political tendencies of a totalitarian régime, one well might wonder whether the Orthodox church would have fared much better under the communist dictatorship even if it had been thoroughly reformed on the eve of the revolution.

Some of the facts brought forward in Mr. Curtiss' study make one revise the customary idea of the pre-revolutionary Russian church as a highly privileged, wealthy, and powerful body. We learn from his book, for instance, that most of the church income "was received . . . without the intervention of the state" (p. 87). The parish priests were maintained by payment for ministrations while "the Russian pilgrim was probably the source of the greatest income for the monasteries" (p. 99). Since the days of Catherine II, "the church ceased to be a great landholding institution" (p. 27), and in 1905 the monasteries possessed only about 0.2 percent, and the parish churches about 0.5 percent, of the total land in European Russia (pp. 94-5, 118). The author points out that much of it was waste land, or far northern forest. Neither does pre-revolutionary Russia appear as a priest-ridden country. Around 1900 there were in Russia a little over one hundred thousand secular clergy, about seventeen thousand monks, and slightly over forty thousand nuns (p. 71). In 1912 one of the serious problems the church had to face was the actual scarcity of priests (pp. 311-12). Likewise, by 1904 the secular schools had a considerable advantage in the number of pupils over the schools of the church (p. 183), and undoubtedly the ratio continued to change in favor of the former. Very interesting are the data on the social origins of the Russian episcopate in the early twentieth century. Mr. Curtiss tells us that the bishops "were for the most part sons of parish priests, without wealth or influence at court" (p. 49). A noble bishop was a rare exception. All this put together forms a picture that is significantly different from that in eighteenth century France, or in Spain in more recent times.

There is still another significant difference which, I think, should be emphasized. There was no clericalism in Russia as an independent and militant force. The position of the church hierarchy was somewhat like that of the bureaucracy, and in a sense the church was a victim rather than an accomplice of the old régime. Perhaps, Mr. Curtiss tends to exaggerate the extent of the church's political activity and influence in Russia. I shall cite but two examples. He quotes a passage from a catechism prepared for school use by the Synod, dealing with the duty to honor and obey the Tsar, and he comments upon it as follows: "Such precepts, if well taught, must have exercised a powerful influence upon the minds of the young" (p. 187). As one who had undergone the treatment, I can assure Mr. Curtiss that they did not. In most cases, it was a mere routine performance on the part of the clergy, and not a real attempt at indoctrination. In another place, Mr. Curtiss cites a special prayer ordered by the Synod in December, 1905, to "abate all the conflicts now taking place, and the bloodshed and the internecine strife, and give peace and quiet," as an evidenec of an attempt on the part of the church to preserve the *status quo* (p. 140). May I point out that it would be only natural for any church in any country to pray for "peace and quiet" in times of violent civil strife, irrespective of any political considerations.

Harvard University MICHAEL KARPOVICH

GANKIN, OLGA HESS and FISHER, H. H., *The Bolsheviks and the World War. The Origin of the Third International.* Hoover War Library Publications, No. 15. Stanford University Press, 1940. Pp. xviii, 856. $6.00.

In these days when propaganda for or against this or that has assumed the proportions of a major industry, it is highly enlightening to find in a comprehensive volume a collection of documents and other material which reveals the methods employed by the Bolsheviks during the World War both to fight pacifism and to promote their own interests. But since the entrance of the Soviet Union into the present conflict, the volume under review must be regarded as having even greater importance than merely a tool for historians.

As early as October 17, 1914, Lenin clarified the Bolshevik position in relation to the war when he wrote: "The slogan of 'peace' is incorrect as the slogan must be: changing the national war into a civil war. In order that the struggle may proceed along a definite and clear line, one must have a slogan that summarizes it. This slogan is: For us Russians, from the point of view of the interests of the laboring masses and the working class of Russia, there cannot be the slightest doubt, absolutely no doubt whatever, that the lesser evil would be here and now, the defeat of Tsarism in the present war (p. 158)."

This quotation alone places the volume on a "must" list for our statesmen and public men since it would be fatal for our civilization if the liberals of today repeat the mistake of the socialists of yesteryear by failing to see Bolshevism in its true color.

After a preliminary chapter on the early activity of the Bolsheviks and their struggle with the Mensheviks for the control of the socialist movement, the main body of the book deals with the activities of the Bolsheviks abroad in 1914-1916, with the International Socialist Conferences from September 1914 to April 1915, and with the Zimmerwald, Kienthal and Stockholm conferences from September 1915 to September 1917. The volume closes with a chronology of the socialist movement from 1848 to 1918, an extensive bibliography and biographical notes on the persons mentioned in the text.

The editors should be congratulated upon their careful work, though one is surprised at the omission in the bibliography of such indispensable studies as: General A. I. Spiridovich, *Istoria Bolshevisma v Rossii ot vozniknovenia do zakhvata vlasti 1883-1903-1917* (History of Bolshevism in Russia from its beginning to the seizure of power), Paris, 1922; and *Deiateli Soiuza Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Oktiabrskoi Revolutsii* (Prominent persons of the USSR and of the October Revolution), Moscow, n. d.

It seems also that the biographical notes, without which the reader would have difficulty in identifying many of the people mentioned in the text, could have been improved by the adoption of some uniform rule in listing persons under their real names as well as under their aliases. It is somewhat confusing to find one set of persons listed under their aliases with their real names and often other aliases in parentheses as, for instance, Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, whose real names were Bronstein, Rosenfeld, Radomyslsky, whereas others as Piatakov, Radek, Weltmann are to be found under their real names. In some cases, as those of Litvinov and Steklov whose real names are Vallakh and Nahamkes, respectively, these are not given at all.

University of Maryland LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

BIRDSALL, PAUL, *Versailles Twenty Years After*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941. Pp. 350. $3.00.

The story of the peace negotiations at Versailles in 1919 will continue to challenge the historian's interest until another peace conference supersedes it. Whole libraries have already been written around the storm in Paris that was almost as tempestuous as the war itself had been. The present work is certainly not the last, but it is, equally certainly, from the point of view of the American participation in those negotiations, one of the fairest and best informed. The title of the book is slightly misleading. Its story is concerned almost exclusively with the activities of the leading American negotiators—Wilson, House, White, their mutual interrelations and the general course of their dealings with the Allied representatives. The making of the Versailles treaty was much broader than this account would indicate, and the title could profitably have been more precise. Mr. Birdsall has had restricted access to the unpublished diary of Colonel House, has used the Lansing papers and the George Louis Beer diary, other diplomatic papers, and has had conversations with many members of the American delegation. The Wilson papers were made available too late to be used for this book. The bibliographical basis of the work is therefore as sound as could have been wished.

Some details, either of finding or judgment, call for remark. It is a little annoying to continue to hear that Czechoslovakia contained over 3,000,000 Germans (p. 8). The fact is that a great proportion of that number are not German but Austrian. There is a vast difference between German and Austrian, which western diplomats and historians would do well to remember or discover, as the case might be. We read (p. 14) that Mr. Wilson was "imperfectly supported by his own colleagues in Paris." In justice it should be remarked that some of his colleagues felt strongly that they were imperfectly supported by Mr. Wilson. We get the impression that Mr. Birdsall has a poor impression of Lloyd George. Yet his own narrative frequently belies that judgment, and Lloyd George comes off rather well. The statement on p. 43 that "sovereignty is not conditional" is difficult to understand in a treaty-making world. The story of the French effort to establish a Rhenish republic, though frequently told elsewhere, should be reread by all those who still favor the partition of Germany. The parallel between Danzig and the Saar (p. 226) is hardly exact. The position of the new and suppliant Poland in asking for much in order to get something was quite different from the position of victorious France demanding—and getting—the Saar.

It may be pointed out that in showing Wilson's success to lie in what he prevented (p. 293f.) Mr. Birdsall is damning with faint praise. It has yet to be shown that Mr. Wilson might not have both gained more for his ideals by the appointment of abler and more experienced and better informed negotiators—such as Taft or Root—and more at home by a more realistic attitude toward the Senate. When a president says, "I shall consent to nothing. The Senate must take its own medicine" (p. 295), the chronicles of American history without exception record his ultimate failure.

The book closes with some criticism of the "Union Now" fad. It is difficult to see how America, which rejected the League of Nations only twenty years ago, could accept a much more drastic "scrapping" of the national sovereignty, with even the considerable limitations already accepted. Here Mr. Birdsall is on perfectly solid ground. This book should be read very thoughtfully by those interested in the participation of America in the making of the next installment of peace.

University of Colorado S. Harrison Thomson

Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary. Volume I, 1919-1920. Collected and edited by Francis Deák and Dezsö Ujváry. Budapest: Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1939; New York: Columbia University Press. Pp.xxii, 1079. $5.00.

This important collection throws much light on Hungary's foreign policy from August, 1919, with the transfer of the conservative government from Szeged to Budapest, until the end of 1920. It contains almost nine hundred diplomatic documents, lengthy excerpts from the diary of the Hungarian peace delegation between January and June, 1920, and selections from the debates of the Hungarian parliament. French and German documents have been published in the original languages, Magyar documents in English translation. The references and index have been prepared with much care.

A large part of the documents relates to the innumerable conflicts which arose between Trianon Hungary and its neighbors. In general, they show that, while the Hungarian government was justifiably prompt to react against the injustices inflicted on its nationals in the lost provinces, it was also eager to defend by every available means their advantages as well as their rights. It was fortunate for the Hungarian government of that day that it could appeal for redress to the powerful intervention of the Inter-Allied Mission in Budapest; it is hardly a question whether the enlarged Hungary of the present would welcome a similar interference in its treatment of the areas reacquired since 1938.

The most interesting part of the collection deals with Hungary's efforts to win the support of influential French groups in its struggle to secure more favorable terms of peace. Even banal expressions of sympathy for Hungary's plight and of admiration for its struggle against Bolshevism were reported to Budapest in great detail. These new documents make it more clearly evident that, prior to the formation of the Little Entente, some French diplomats and financiers were thinking of the creation of a quite different Danubian grouping, one in which Hungary would have played a central role. The economic terms which unofficial French negotiators were urging would have speeded up Hungary's economic recovery, but would have left it with no real economic independence. In this drawn out flirtation, which virtually ended with the displacement of Paléologue by Berthelot at the Quai d'Orsay, the Hungarians were primarily concerned with securing immediate territorial concessions, while their French interlocutors always discussed them in vague terms, as something which might come about eventually as a result of Hungarian cooperation with French finance.

Some of the incipient tendencies of Hungarian policy of this time are interesting in the light of more recent events. Magyar sympathy for Poland was marked. The Hungarian government in every way expressed its moral support of Poland during the Polish-Soviet war. Efforts were made to organize a Magyar Legion to assist the Polish forces. In turn the Hungarians urged the Poles not to strengthen the Little Entente, which was beginning to take form. The element of correct but hostile legalism was even then uppermost in Hungary's relations with Czechoslovakia. A feeling of contempt and hatred marked its dealings with Rumania, and a sentiment of mingled hostility and respect was indicated in its relations with the Yugoslav state. The volume is a convincing illustration of the narrow range of manoeuver which is open to a defeated state even when the victor is an uneasy coalition of mutually jealous allies.

Cornell University PHILIP E. MOSELY

Government in Wartime Europe. Edited by HAROLD ZINK and TAYLOR COLE. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941. Pp. x, 249. $2.00.

The editors and contributors who made this volume possible attempted a difficult task in trying to provide a textbook for American students which would acquaint its readers with wartime political developments in the principal countries of Europe. The authors have attempted to chronicle the major political events and constitutional developments transpiring in England, Germany, Russia, Italy, France, the Balkan countries, and Norway and Sweden down to May, 1941. With most of the world either torn by actual warfare or suffering under the impact of the conflict and with events and shifts in policy occurring kaleidoscopically, it required audacity indeed to bring out this volume. As was perhaps inevitable, portions of this book are badly dated. It should also be pointed out that certain of the contributors either did not have adequate source material available or, where available, neglected to use it. In the treatment of certain countries there is a regrettable absence of reliance upon the texts of fundamental laws and other official or semi-official materials. As a result, the reader is sometimes left with the feeling that he has read a narrative skimmed from newspaper files. However, teachers and students who normally experience difficulty in obtaining access to adequate sources of information regarding European developments or who prefer the convenience of having such information collected in a single volume will undoubtedly find much of this book to be useful.

Although the various sections of this volume are somewhat uneven as regards quality, certain of them are useful indeed. In the opinion of this reviewer, the portions that are more solid in character and of greatest value are the sections on England, contributed by Mr. E. P. Chase and W. H. Wickwar; the sections on Germany, by Mr. F. M. Marx and Mr. Taylor Cole; and the section on Soviet Russia, by Mr. J. N. Hazard.

University of Michigan HARLOW J. HENEMAN

HAFFNER, SEBASTIAN, *Germany: Jekyll and Hyde.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1941. Pp. 318. $2.50.

Mr. Haffner is a young German now in exile; and his psychological study of Nazism may safely be described as rich in pages with which many of his anti-Nazi countrymen would agree. Hitler is, in this view, not the apostle of a new faith, but a man who creates faiths because they are useful. Nor is his movement the product of economic conditions or of middle-class resentment, though these things may have helped to make his success possible. The *Fuehrer* is at bottom a desperately unsuccessful German of considerable ability whose yearning to gamble and be somebody happened to coincide with the desire of the German nation, beaten in war, to do likewise. This duet would have been impossible, of course, were there not a certain consonance between the Hitlerian mind and Germany. Most of what Mr. Haffner writes is an attempt to define that consonance—to see what is genuinely Teutonic in Hitler and genuinely Hitlerian in Germany.

This is, as the student of history knows only too well, the sort of approach which can lead anywhere. Peoples do have a psychology, naturally, but there is not and probably cannot be anything like a scientific psychology of peoples. It is greatly to Mr. Haffner's credit that his conclusions are, for the most part, simple deductions from realistically considered factual material. He tells us without too much explanation that the German is normally not "Western"—that is, he cares little about who rules the country politically so long as he is left at peace and his neighbors behave. To a considerable extent he shares with Orientals a delight in being mystified by pageants and ceremonials, uniforms and music. In addition he has not often lived in a world where compromise, as the English understand that, has been the rule. For centuries he has always got the worst of every bargain; and his successes were obtained by taking somebody by the throat.

Modern Germany did, however, secrete the kind of person who eventually became the Nazi. It does not seem to me that Mr. Haffner tells us more about how and why they were secreted than we knew already. He follows Rauschning in pointing out that the first Nazi generation—the one which saw Hitler to the Wilhelmstrasse—was entirely different from the new youth formed by ruthless Nazi discipline and doctrine. This is clearly an amoral, ethically dissolute, ruthless youth whose ideal is Himmler. On the other hand, there is a Germany which Hitler has not reached—which, indeed, detests him as not even the British or the Czechs do. This Germany is actuated not by loyalty to defunct political ideals but by a common deep-rooted love for freedom, honor and honesty. Mr. Haffner's analysis of this group is interesting and instructive. I consider it the best in print.

The problem is, therefore, how to defeat the Nazis and how to strengthen the foes of Nazism. Mr. Haffner's answers are, whether one agrees with them or not, both striking and plausible. Hitlerism must be defeated—yes, but that must not be taken to mean either that the abdication of the *Fuehrer* would suffice, or that a veritable *Germania est delenda* policy is to be sponsored. There must be found a way of Europeanizing Germany without destroying her. Mr. Haffner thinks that if an effort were made, with the help of decent Germans, to restore the former German states as entities independent of Prussian hegemony, a lasting peace might be achieved. The evidence submitted in defense of this idea is the best part of a generally good book.

Hunter College. George N. Shuster.

Borkenau, F., *The Totalitarian Enemy*. London: Faber and Faber, 1940. Pp. 254. 10s. 6d.

This British study of the analogies between German National Socialism and Russian Communism might at first glance seem doubly dated; as reflecting the not always impartial views of wartime belligerency, and as applying to a bygone phase of the war at that. For are not Britain and the Soviet Union friends once more?

Fortunately there is much more in this study than wartime propaganda or journalistic comment on the short-lived Russo-German peace pact. It comes as close as any work, not even excepting Rauschning, to tracing the common elements of the two totalitarian systems, and it explains, in a far more concrete manner than Mrs. Lindbergh, the true character of that "wave of the future" which both of them ride. The common element is collectivism without liberalism. Both are in a sense "democratic" because they pulverize all classes and social groups under the crushing wheels of state authority; "There exists a very close connection between the extreme forms of mob rule and the extreme forms of autocratic tyranny" (p. 151). Neither system has any respect for private rights as such, including property rights. Though for reasons of expediency the Nazis tolerate private capital, the factory "owner" in Germany has probably less power of individual decision than the factory manager in Russia. (p. 27).

In the author's opinion "the transition from an economic system run by individual property owners at their own risk for their own profit to a centralized and planned economy" is inevitable (p. 243). But he holds that, granted a victory for Britain and other liberal nations, this transition can proceed with dignity and decency and with the sacrifice of no liberties except capitalistic freedom of exploitation and the right of a sovereign state to make war at will. He views collectivism with no dislike, it is only the illiberal form of it that is detestable. For the gross cruelties of the Nazi and the Bolshevik alike he has interesting and subtle explanations. The Russians scrapped liberty and other idealism because they got in the way of the practical business of dictatorship; the end was sacrificed to the means. Idealists were killed just because they were *idealists*, for the Girondin temperament is a nuisance to the practical politician and above all to the practical dictator.

As for the Germans, their story was even more complex. An idealistic, mystical nation, they could not be satisfied with the cold, hard bread of rationalism. Some transcendent faith they must have, and they found it in Hitler's "mad Messianism." Their national humiliations and divisions, by a kind of overcompensation well known to psychiatrists, led them to exalt Germany above humanity and above God; Germany had been too little, so now Germany must become everything. Such atrocities as the persecution of the Jews are more than expressions of political or economic dislike, or a diplomatic move to win Arab support, or nationalistic prejudice, or a training in chauvinism, or a search for a scapegoat, or even a sadistic love of cruelty, the explanations which others writers have offered. All these elements enter into the picture, but the main thing is a positive inversion of values, an active dislike of liberalism and humanitarianism as fetters on the power of a strong renascent nation.

Fortunately, this is but a mood and may be a passing one. "If Hitler's theory of inborn racial characteristics were true it would follow that the Germans . . . are a born nation of rogues. Peoples are asking themselves seriously whether there is really something wrong with the Germans as such. Fortunately, Hitler's racial theory is not true, and nothing of the kind therefore follows." Germany's submission to the Nazi ideology was "due to the combination of the effects of her disasters with a certain metaphysical turn of mind which is impermeable to scepticism, humor and common sense." When the régime goes down in defeat Germany will seek new ideals and gentler myths.

University of Michigan. PRESTON SLOSSON.

Pedagogická Encycklopedie (Pedagogical Encyclopedia), Edited by O. Chlup, J. Kubálek, J. Uher. Prague: Novina, vol. I, 1938, pp. 641; vol. II, 1939, pp. 640.

The American *Encyclopedia of Educational Research* appeared in 1941. In view of the enormous amount of energy expanded in the academic field known as "Education," and even more the desperate need to synthesize and integrate the growth of available knowledge in the various branches of human endeavoring, which is multiplying like protozoa through the process of fission and subdivision, we are surprised that such an undertaking was realized only in this year. In this respect, Czechoslovakia must be given credit for publishing such a work as far back as 1938.

The Czech publication differs, somewhat, from its American counterpart. The fundamental aim of the first is to summarize the available knowledge of the theory and practice of education—quite obviously an effort covering a much wider field than is the goal of the American publication which limits itself to "educational research," as its title indicates.

The Czech product is the outgrowth of the dreams of a number of well-known Czech "pedagogists" (that is, specialists in what is known in America as "Education"): the great Czech psychologist, G. A. Lindner, had propounded the idea; Dr. František Drtina wanted to culminate the "Liberty of Pedagogical Classics," which he edited, with such a volume, but died before being able to bring his plans to fruition; the same fate was suffered by Otakar Kádner, probable the greatest and most productive of all Czech specialists in pedagogy. But it is only fair to state that all these Czech professors had good examples in other educational encyclopedias, such as Lindner's *Encycklopädisches Handbuch der Erziehungskunde* (2nd & 3rd eds., 1884), Klika-Sokol's *Stručný slovník pedagogický (Short Pedagogical Encyclopedia*, 1891), German encyclopedias of Rein, Roloff, Loos, French encyclopedia of Buisson, Paul Monroe's *Encyclopedia of Education* of the pre-World War I days, the Polish *Encycklopedija wechowania* (planned in three large volumes but of which only one and a half volumes, I believe, appeared before the *horror Germanicus* swallowed Poland). But all these works, when studied even in a cursory way, are really mainly histories of education, as the accelerated tempo of education philosophies and researches changes the educational efforts and interpretations just as fast as the world wide events since 1914.

The Czech work tried to cover education as a "vade mecum," a sort of synthetic mirror of the contemporary educational strivings; in most cases, however, each treatment has its genetic backgrounds included in order to make the developments clearer to the reader. Volume I starts with "a" (and) ends with "Konsolidace školská" (Consolidation of Schools); volume II beings with "Konstituce" (Constitution) and concludes with "Sokol" (the Falcon—the name of the famed Czech athletic and patriotic organization). Whether volume III has appeared the reviewer has been unable to find out.

Let it be known that this is a magnificent publication which, when contrasted to the recent American *Encyclopedia* has one definite advantage over it. Its contributors are thoroughly acquainted with the theoretical and practical aspects of education in various countries and languages and hence have provided systematic, although extremely brief, expositions of their topics—such as "dědičnost" (Heredity), "Sociologie" (Sociology) and numerous other titles, while the American work shows, if anything, a pretty thorough ignorance of these large, and especially theoretical, aspects of knowledge abroad.

There are, of course, numerous weak spots in this Czech compilation. It possesses both the advantages and the disadvantages of the symposium. There is considerable variety both of subject-matter and of treatment. There are essays on diverse themes, and some themes have been omitted and some given too much space. But the defects are of the kind which every book of this type must confront. Moreover, a multitude of contributions to a book of moderate size does not make for unity of outline or for thoroughness of treatment. Thus, for instance, some titles have been given so little space that the information is practically worthless—As "Grzegorzewaská, Marja" (vol. I, p. 457), who comes off with seven lines on her career and seven lines of titles of her works, only one of which gives the year and none the place of publication. Furthermore, the book has its own peculiar weakness, so characteristic of the scholarly products of Central Europe. Some outstanding topics are treated in truly "doctrinaire" ways—the usual difficulty displayed by European theoreticians, and one which can be understood only by remembering that most European professors are exalted personages who achieve their positions only after years of sacrifices and bitter academic arguments, and who end by trying desperately to originate and propagate "schools" of knowledge. Thus such specialists are usually not on speaking terms with other proponents of other "schools," and tend to utilize every opportunity to write disparagingly—or, even better—fail to mention their "opponents" in their scholarly contributions. It is fair to admit that the *Encyclopedia* is really less guilty of this practice than other Czech publications, but it has been unable to avoid this practice entirely. For instance, Chlup's article on "Sociologie"

(Vol. II, pp. 629-637) received a ferocious criticism by O. Machotka, a representative of the "Prague School of Sociology," in *Sociologie and sociální problémy (Sociology and Social Research)*, vol. 6, No. 3-4, pp. 212-217, since Chlup showed his weaknesses by writing as the representative of the so-called "Brno School of Sociology."

These weak spots do not, however, prevent the reviewer from concluding that this is a remarkable scholarly product which ought to be accessible to everybody reading Czech. In fact, it should be known by every "educationist," since, for some reason or other, most of the American specialists in educational theories are provincial in their output, unable to integrate the available educational scholarly contributions from abroad with their synthesizing efforts. This is probably due to the fact that very few can read foreign languages and we need more scholars of the calibre of Howard Becker, who by reading German and by cooperating with specialists able to read various Central European languages, has injected a remarkable amount of sociological knowledge into American sociological output.

We only regret that the present work, as it stands on the reviewer's desk, will probably always remain incomplete without its third, final volume.

Hofstra College JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

LOTH, DAVID, *Woodrow Wilson—The Fifteenth Point.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1941. Pp. 365. $3.00.

It is no mere coincidence that in these tragic days the attention of writers should once more turn to Woodrow Wilson. At last the papers of Woodrow Wilson have been made available to students in the Library of Congress. There is evidence, moreover, that the late President of the United States is coming into his own. As Mr. Loth clearly indicates throughout his discussion of Wilson's rôle in world politics, the isolationists were to have their day, with results which ought to be clear to all but the very blindest.

The "fifteenth point" in the Wilsonian catalogue is the "personality" of the president. Mr. Loth, like most biographers, begins with the beginning—he traces the Wilson career from early childhood, through his period of formal education and the period when Wilson held professorships at Wesleyan and Princeton. The chapters dealing with the presidency at Princeton and the governorship of New Jersey are exceedingly interesting, though they do not present anything especially new.

Mr. Loth's treatment of President Wilson's war and peace policy is excellent. He points out that only reluctantly was Wilson brought to the sword's point with Imperial Germany. His treatment of Wilson's conduct at the Paris Conference in 1919 is admirable. Readers will find that Mr. Wilson was not as naive as the cynics used to have it. Chapter XIX, dealing with the League of Nations fight at home, is an especially interesting study of the "men of ill will," with the characterizations well drawn. The book closes with "the last crusade" for the League of Nations and "the wreckage" of that struggle which brought Wilson to his grave illness and finally to death.

But there was another "wreckage" as well—that of the great dream which Wilson had. But, as Mr. Loth indicates: "The issues are clearer now; the peace for which he led the United States to battle is yet to be won; his ideals have yet to be put into practice."

Mr. Loth's volume is exceedingly well written. A popular biography of a great American, the book ought to have a wide appeal.

Miami University HARRY N. HOWARD

DODD, WILLIAM E. JR. AND MARTHA DODD (editors); *Ambassador Dodd's Diary 1933-1939*. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Pp. 464. $3.50.

The Ministers and Ambassadors of the United States have traditionally been provincial politicians or men of great wealth. With rare exceptions, both varieties of incumbents have been unblissfully ignorant of international affairs. More recently, appointments to these highest posts in the Foreign Service have frequently gone to career diplomats—with a notable improvement in technical competence and worldly *savoir-faire* on the part of representatives of America in the great capitals. But career diplomats are bureaucrats, with all the usual vices of this species. They seldom serve as vigorous political spokesmen for Washington, as a Minister or Ambassador should. In his first term President Roosevelt tried the experiment of filling two important posts abroad, Madrid and Berlin, with men who were neither politicians, plutocrats nor bureaucrats, but distinguished historians and faithful interpreters of American liberalism. One of these men was Claude Bowers. The other was William E. Dodd.

This sensitive and genial Southerner began his scholarly career by winning his doctorate at the University of Leipzig in 1900 with a dissertation on *Jefferson's Rückkehr zur Politik*. From 1908 until 1933 he was Professor of American History at the University of Chicago, where he wrote sundry brilliant works on the Old South and won the esteem and heart-felt affection of his students and colleagues. From July of 1933 until December of 1937 he served as the Ambassador of the United States to Hitler's Reich.

His posthumously published diary, edited by his children and prefaced by an evaluation of the Professor-Ambassador from the pen of Charles A. Beard, was probably not written with the thought of publication in its present form. Those who knew its author must suspect that he intended ultimately to enrich this somewhat bare record of events with his own mature reflections on the broader meaning of the German scene during Hitler's preparations for world conquest. Yet the events themselves were so startling, and the Ambassador's contemporary comments on them were so frequently incisive and prescient, that the book is a piece of invaluable documentation on the tragic madness of our time. Here is much interesting and even amusing material on the personalities of the Third Reich and on the work-a-day world of diplomacy; on Dodd's efforts to live a simple life within the limits of his salary in a stilted atmosphere of conspicuous waste and vain display; on problems of defaulted debts, assaulted tourists, plaintive bankers and swashbuckling Nazi adventurers; and on the hum-drum round of dull dinners and receptions. "It would have been far better," he says of one of these occasions, "to have dined at home and read a good book, in case one could find a good book these days." But the meat of these memoirs lies in issues of wider import.

Dodd perceived, almost from the first, that the progressive misery of our epoch has been a product of two interdependent forces, one active, the other passive: the frenzied dynamic of militant Fascism, and the pitiable blindness and irresponsibility of democratic appeasers and isolationists. His own courageous efforts to exercise a moderating influence on the new German leaders by appealing to the best in the old German liberal tradition were frustrated at every turn by Nazi fanaticism and by the Phippses, Hendersons, Baldwins and Francois-Poncets, to say nothing of the Halifaxes, Lothians and Bullitts before their belated awakening. He felt nothing but contempt for the whole soggy mass of democratic "statesmen," social butterflies and business men who secretly admired Hitlerism or hoped to buy safety by throwing other people's children to the wolves.

He despaired of accomplishing anything useful under such circumstances. Several times he considered resigning, particularly after the Blood Purge and again after the Senate rejection of the World Court Protocols. The former development convinced him that no decent relations with Hitler were possible. "I have a sense of horror when I look at the man." "It is humiliating to shake hands with known and confessed murderers." The latter development caused him to doubt whether any American foreign policy was possible. "Pacifism," he wrote in 1935, "will mean a great war and the subordination of all Europe to Germany if the pacifist peoples do not act courageously at this critical moment in their history." At the end his resignation was hastened by what he considered the unsympathetic attitude of Sumner Welles and other representatives of the plutocratic-bureaucratic tradition in the Department of State.

Of his diplomatic mission, which Dodd himself regarded as a failure, might well be said what Woodrow Wilson once said of his life work: "I would rather fail in an enterprise which I know must some day succeed than succeed in an enterprise which I know must some day fail." While men like Sir Neville Henderson were betraying the cause of liberty and peace, Dodd was valiantly defending the ideals for which he and his country stood. His prognoses, on the whole, were correct. His advice to Washington was sound. Had it been taken in time by his Government and his countrymen, and by the European democracies as well, there would have been less truth in the dismal comment which the Dutch Minister once made to him: "We shall probably never have another happy day in our lives. All people seem so crazy." In a world of madmen and paralytics, disappointment is often the lot of those who are wise and brave. Dodd was both. And for this all Americans, and ultimately all Germans, will some day acknowledge their indebtedness to the gentle, gray professor who saw clearly and spoke plainly in the service of freedom.

Williams College. FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN.

GESHKOFF, THEODORE I., *Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. xvi, 345. $3.00.

This is another volume dealing essentially with the problem of Balkan union or confederation and centering the story around the development of the Balkan Conferences (1930-1934) and the Balkan Entente. Mr. Geshkoff, who approaches the problem from the standpoint of a follower of the late Alexander Stambuliski, the Bulgarian agrarian leader, devotes Part I of his study to a somewhat detailed treatment of the historical background of the federative movement in the Balkans, tracing it from the era of the ancient Greeks to that of the World War of 1914-1918. Parts II and III are concerned fundamentally with the "De-Balkanization of the Balkans" through the organization of the Balkan Conferences and the "Rapproachement of the Balkan States" on the bases of economic, social, cultural and political co-operation which the Balkan Conferences formulated. A final chapter deals with the organization and work of the Balkan Entente and brings its development down to the outbreak of the present struggle.

In the appendix to his study, the author has included thirteen key documents which are necessary to any understanding of the problem of Balkan union or confederation. There is also a bibliography citing the major sources for such a study.

Mr. Geshkoff has shown a fundamentally sound attitude toward the problem of Balkan unity. Like many students of the Balkan problem, he is well aware that solution lies in the direction of some kind of union. Neither in his presentation nor in his organization, however, does Mr. Geshkoff differ from the earlier work of R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente*, 1930-1935 (1936). His conclusions are essentially similar. Moreover, eleven of his thirteen documents were previously included in the earlier volume. It would have been well for Mr. Geshkoff to have given more details in his volume for the period from 1935 to 1940.

Miami University HARRY N. HOWARD

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THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE POLISH DEFEAT

by Stefan Reeburg

IN July of 1933 the outpost of Polish diplomacy in Berlin underwent a sudden change. Ambassador Wysocki, who for a number of years had maneuvered between the Scylla of Locarno and the Munich Charybdis of Hitler, was transferred to Rome. His duties were taken over by Lipski, head of the German section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two ambassadors differed as to length of service and age, Wysocki having behind him a diplomatic career of many years, while Lipski found himself at such a responsible post for the first time. Although 25 years younger than his 60-year-old predecessor, Lipski resembled him in temperament. He was a lawyer by training, conciliatory, slow but sound in his thinking. One was to work with Mussolini, the other with Hitler, both with individuals who believed in the dynamic treatment of international questions. Lipski, however, had the advantage over his predecessor of belonging to the group of main authors of the "Polish-German declaration regarding the outlawing of force in mutual relations," which was signed in Berlin several months after he was named ambassador.

This pact was an original creation from the legal standpoint. It did not contain the elaborations customarily found in international agreements, nor did it formulate conditions or details. Hitler boasted that in some ten odd sentences, in a manner clear and unmistakable, free from legalistic tricks, he was able to give to the nation which historically had so little in common with

Germany the assurance that within the next ten years nothing would disturb its peace.

This document, however, was not signed by Hitler and Pilsudski but by Lipski and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Neurath. Such was the technique of pact-making for which the Führer took the glory and responsibility. Public opinion in Poland greeted this manifestation of friendship with surprise. There is a centuries-old Polish proverb which holds that "so long as the world exists, never will the German be a brother to the Pole." The German occupation left after the first World War ineffaced traces of blood and the wounds inflicted upon the Polish nation by the German invasions had not healed. But Pilsudski lent his support to the pact; his prestige was so great that skepticism as to the wisdom of this sudden friendship with an immemorial enemy was overbalanced by confidence in the person of the Great Marshal. The pact also created a sensation abroad; by a strange coincidence it was criticized most severely in those circles which at Locarno had favored a closer understanding with Germany. As we know, this understanding had ended in failure but it lulled the democracies into a false security so that when Hitler marched into the Saar Basin and later into the Rhineland, France was unable to muster enough guns and people willing to shoot in defense of their rights. Pilsudski fully realized to what extent Poland had to rely on herself in this situation. Just a little earlier, he had, through Beck, sounded France on the subject of a joint attack against Germany, maintaining that this was the last warning bell before the approaching catastrophe. Time was working for the Germans and Pilsudski felt that the very near future would see them become a "terrible power" not only for Europe but for the entire world. Pilsudski was well informed as to German military might. He observed the development of Germany's aviation, he was worried by the militarization of her youth, he saw the increasingly aggressive attitude of the Germans towards the Allies, he constantly received reports of the machinations of pro-German maffias with politicians of every country. His proposal to attack Germany came at a time when that country was insufficiently armed and he was certain that it would be a comparatively easy task to remove the danger of retaliation about which the Berlin loudspeakers had been shouting so loudly. The Polish army at that time was definitely superior to the German army as far as military preparedness was concerned. Unfortunately, this proposition met with a refusal, whereupon the instinct of self-preservation asserted itself in Pilsudski. The pact of nonaggression was the idea of a man who, left to his own fate, attempts merely to gain time so that he might prepare for the inevitable blow. Pilsudski was aware of oncoming death. His organism, devastated by the hardships of revolution and wars, was being consumed by cancer. In these last moments of his life, he strove to render more remote from his nation the danger which he regarded as unavoidable. Therefore, simultaneously with the signing of this pact he began the fortification of Poland's western boundaries in the hope that several years of peace would suffice to set up adequate protection against the threatening peril.

What were Hitler's intentions? The crux of his plan lay in the successive destruction of each potential political power in Europe and in the subordination of the European continent to German authority. But Hitler, more than Pilsudski, was in need of time for the preparation of war. The reconciliation with Poland, an immemorial enemy, presented his neighbors to the West with testimony as to his boundless good will. Four days after the signing of the pact, Hitler, expounding the doctrines of national socialism before the Reichstag, states that "in foreign policy this doctrine does away with the desire to subjugate other nations, that it tends neither to dominate nor to assimilate anyone" and he concludes that "the sole concern of the New Reich is to live in peace and in amicable relations with other nations." A pact with a strong Poland also gave Hitler an increased moral credit among the German population. However, neither he nor Pilsudski were in any doubt as to the delusive value of this sudden friendship.

II

The Germans instantly began to put into practice a seeming improvement in their relations with Poland and while in the border cities of Toruń and Bydgoszcz street brawls periodically broke out between the Hitlerites and the Poles, German political personalities streamed to Warsaw, proclaiming their friendship and good will towards Poland. More and more frequently Polish bands played the "Horst Wessel Lied" at railway stations and in honor of the arriving and departing German dignitaries, banquets resounded with an exchange of compliments and good wishes, swatsikas flew over football fields and boxing rings. The German contestants were applauded by crowds of visiting "tourists," who carried valises of a standard type, the only contents of which generally was a camera. At automobile races cars of the "Oppel" and "Mercedes-Benz" construction numerically exceeded other makes. In this undisturbed manner, by means of complimentary tickets, courteously saluted by the hospitable Polish police, the German contestants were able to study the topography of Poland, to investigate the distribution of industrial centers, and to examine the navigability of rivers and the capacity of bridges.

One of the first official German guests was Goebbels. He came to Warsaw in the company of the head of the Press Bureau, Diettrich, and delivered a lecture on the subject of national socialism before an audience assembled by invitation in accordance with a list drawn up by the German Embassy. The list, however, disregarded the Nazi racial doctrine to such a degree that the audience numbered at least 25% of individuals whose grandmothers would have been disqualified by virtue of this doctrine.

A relatively frequent visitor in Warsaw was Goering, a sinister figure under his apparent naïveté. His prattle had the semblance of good-natured banter and he inundated his interlocutor with a flood of words so that he might in the course of a jocose conversation spring a question which had been prepared in advance. He proposed the carving up of Russia, he predicted that Poland would rule from the Baltic to the Black Sea. He preferred above all the company of generals, who naturally were on their guard against the primitive intelligence of the field marshal. Goering was received by Pilsudski only once. Since, in all his effusions the German had gravitated mainly towards the Russian question, Lipski established with Moltke, the German Ambassador in Poland, that during his interview Goering would not question Pilsudski concerning Poland's eastern neighbor. Nevertheless, finding himself alone with Pilsudski, Georing attempted to surprise him, only to encounter the silence of his host, who immediately rose and politely bade his importunate guest good-bye. Henceforth, the field marshal was taken on the famous wolf hunts in the Bialowieska Forest. There, he at least stood alone, leaning against a tree, his gun in his hand, at perfect liberty to kill. It used to be related that the woodsmen went to a good deal of trouble to shoot at the right moment the wolf at which Goering was aiming so that later, congratulating him on his accurate aim, they might lift the booty into his automobile.

Bridge clubs, social gatherings, golf, all constituted a terrain upon which one met well-dressed foreigners, Austrians in the main, always pleasantly smiling, obliging, making ironical remarks about the Führer and current conditions in Germany. Their position was a rather easy one for the Polish proverb "A guest in the home, God in the home" opened all doors to them. They became oriented in Polish moods, gathered and disseminated information and—inflamed the Poles against each other. In no country did gossip receive a more favorable ear than in Poland. Oblique hints, words left unsaid, insinuations sometimes put in the form of a question and sometimes expressed as a doubt, undermined authority. Intrigues in private life made enemies of the best of friends and finally brought about a situation in which no one trusted anyone else. This intangible activity disrupted the unity of the Polish people, disorganized the population psychologically and dissolved in a large measure the moral order of a country which had been reconstructing itself so magnificently.

One of the expedients used by the new agents was the fomenting of anti-Semitic riots. The relations between Poles and Jews had generally been good in Poland. The Pole does not know the feeling of deep hatred, especially towards someone weaker than he and history records that he has often paid dearly for this sentimentalism. Enlightened Polish opinion reacted with indignation to the anti-Semitic riots but there was no means of seizing the various threads and getting to the core of the matter. The most notorious anti-Semitic disturbancs took place in Minsk Mazowiecki when a demented young Jew murdered a cavalry sergeant in the street. This incident was so similar to the murder in Paris of von Rath, Secretary of the German Embassy, by the young Jew, Grynszpan, that it is difficult to reject the impression that the same hand acted in both cases.

In every economic field, and particularly in that of heavy industry involving the manufacture of machines and technical implements, in the inspection committees of defense production, there was always to be found some Viennese who spoke fluent French and Polish, offering his unsolicited advice, underbidding the English and American contractors, and promising to fill the most costly orders at the most reduced prices. Thus, orders placed for the latter half of 1939 for the government project of the Central Industrial Region were not delivered at all, although the sum of some 14 million dollars in payment for them had already been in German hands for a long time.

A painful maneuvre of Poland's newly found friends were runs on savings and other banks. In the period from 1933 to 1939 not a single year passed without a run on these institutions. Sometimes, as in the period of the Anschluss and the Sudentenland crisis, these runs were repeated several times. They would start simultaneously in places as remote from each other as Toruń and Lwów. They were an inexplicable phenomenon, exposing the financial institutions to constant shocks, maintaining a continuous state of anxiety among the population, and were based chiefly on absurd insinuations and gossip. This unceasing undermining of confidence, this tormenting of public opinion, this insidious penetration into all the nooks of Polish life was one of the most formidable methods of preparing an attack on Poland and perforce exerted an influence upon the work of the government and of the Poles.

III

The political baton of Poland reposed for many years in the hands of Colonel Slawek, Pilsudski's man of trust. Slawek had one aim in life: to serve his *Komendant.* Everything he did was either willed by Pilsudski or for Pilsudski. This noble idealist, however, did not possess Pilsudski's genius; never was the truth of the maxim "si duo faciunt, non est idem" demonstrated more convincingly than it was in his case. The problems confronting the young Polish nation were too complex to be solved successfully by a man possessed of great heart but devoid of the foresight characterizing his chief. Furthermore, fifth column activity served to thwart his plans and to confuse the clarity of his judgment.

The Polish problem was, generally speaking, two-fold. One phase concerned the stabilization of the political structure through the solution of the questions of national minorities, mainly of the Ukrainian minority, upon which German propaganda preyed. The other, equally important, was the problem of economic structure. Poland, a country predominantly agricultural, with a large surplus landless population which for a century had sought an outlet through overseas emigration, had everything in her favor to enable her to become, on the one hand, a producer of agricultural staples not only for Europe but for the entire world, and, on the other hand, a large scale consumer of industrial goods. Up to the last year before the war Poland's balance sheet showed a balance favoring the United States in foreign trade. An expanding export trade was bringing Poland into the ranks of important and sought-after producer nations. In order to maintain and better this situation, capital was of course necessary. Poland had embarked on its period of independence without capital; the nation forged ahead through sheer persistent labor, receiving little backing from the international financial market, yet honoring its obligations no worse and frequently far better than other countries.

Beyond doubt, the solution of the economic question would have automatically solved the political problems. The peasant population, composed for the most part of peasants who owned small tracts of land, would have furnished the best of citizens if it could have obtained cheap credit to carry out the land reform which had been enacted by the Sejm in 1919. Unfortunately, twenty years was too short a time to change a system which had endured for centuries and which had created a huge clan of landowners who tried by all sorts of methods to direct the agricultural policy of the government and especially of Slawek, who to a large extent was dependent for his support upon the great landowners. This old and seasoned revolutionary from the days of the Russian partition did not associate political ideas with economic problems. This was indeed characteristic of many of Pilsudski's pupils, who, although good soldiers, had no talent for figures.

IV

In April of 1935 a new Polish Constitution went into effect. Some time previously, Pilsudski, having learned that the Sejm had ratified the Constitution by a majority of only one vote, had asked the then Premier to return it to the Sejm with the admonition that such an important act required a higher number of adherents. The new passing vote did not greatly exceed the earlier figure but Pilsudski was already so ill that he was no longer very interested in this matter. The fundamental aspect of this legal act was the strengthening of the Presidential power by assigning to the Chief Executive a series of prerogatives previously belonging to the Sejm. It was a kind of "mixtum compositum" of the constitutional idea underlying the United States, diluted with concepts of a "new deal." As we shall see later, it was not given to Slawek to put this Constitution into effect, for events took a course different from that which he had expected.

The question of the Constitution might in the long run have perhaps been settled in one way or another, were it not for the complications in the international arena in 1935. It was no longer the grapevine but the press which openly published data about the gigantic German re-armament program. The famous visits in Berlin of the statesmen of virtually all the European countries had begun. The then French Prime Minister, Laval, paid a personal call on the Führer. In Poland, which had a military alliance with France, these French politics were branded as the politics "of a dead dog, floating on a wave." On his way to Moscow, Laval stopped at Warsaw planning to hold a conversation with Pilsudski, but this conversation never materialized because the Great Marshal died on the second day after Laval's arrival. The first French Premier to enter into relations with Hitler could only walk behind the coffin of the Great Builder of Poland, creator of the Franco-Polish alliance.

V

The most urgent matter following Pilsudski's death was to fill the post of Inspector-General of the Army, who, in the event of war, would take over the supreme command of the army. This function had hitherto been performed by Pilsudski, who had drawn his decisive influence upon the affairs of the nation from his personal authority. Now the political rule over the nation was to be placed in the hands of the President of the Commonwealth, Moscicki, and the Inspector-General was henceforth to be a purely military personality. The two oldest generals, Sosnkowski and Rydz-Smigly, were predestined for the nomination to this office. Both had at one time been the closest military aides of Pilsudski but in later years they had been removed from influence. Sosnkowski was a man of great intelligence, knowledge and ambition. His character is best illustrated by the fact that when in 1926 Pilsudski carried out his coup d'état, Sosnkowski, who did not agree with him, did not come out against his chief but, wishing to have a clear conscience, inflicted a serious wound upon himself by shooting himself in the heart. His foes accused him of leaning towards the nationalists, who were in opposition to Pilsudski. He was likewise charged with the desire to annex the power after Pilsudski's death. This man of great political sense, a realist and a first-rate organizer, was disinclined to become involved in personal conflicts. Rydz-Smigly was the antithesis of his colleague. An artist by temperament, of a soft character, with a large admixture of soldierly good-nature, he was very popular and appealed more to the imagination of the soldier. While, however, Sosnkowski had many important achievements behind him as Minister of War and as politician, Smigly, except for his worth as a front-line soldier, presented a blank page in staff and political activity. The competition was quickly over. Rydz-Smigly was named Inspector-General allegedly because of a wish expressed by Pilsudski before his death. Sosnkowski unreservedly subordinated himself to the new chief but relations between the two Generals remained cool.

Meanwhile, history moved on with lightning speed. During the interim between the death of Pilsudski and the resignation of Slawek, i.e., within the space of six months, there occurred events of such import as the introduction of compulsory military service in Germany and the violent outbursts of Hitler against Russia, with which Poland had a non-aggression pact. After the collapse of the "Stresa front" and the signing by England of a naval agreement with Germany, Hitler renewed his declaration concerning the stabilization of good neighborly relations with Poland and announced the liquidation in the near future of the disputes between Poland and Danzig. It seemed as if the pacific situations of Poland were becoming consolidated and the beautiful words and even more beautiful signatures were banishing the danger from the shores of the Baltic, the Warta and the Vistula. Somewhere to the distant south Italian bombs were falling on the woolly heads of the Ethiopians but from the sole spot which might threaten Europe resounded the very audible voice of the divine chancellor, proclaiming a Christ-like peace to all people of good will. All Europe, and Poland with it, deluded itself that it would certainly be able to steer clear of the German menace.

In October of 1935 the Sejm convened, elected in accordance with the new electoral regulations. Since the nationalistic camp, second in power only to the government party, refrained from participating in the elections, the Sejm was not an expression of the will of the majority of the population. It was a mute Sejm. The delegates avoided a difference of opinion with their leader, Slawek. In the very first days of the Sejm's deliberations, the question of the election of a new President came to the fore. Slawek argued that since the Constitution foresaw a new order of things for the country, President Moscicki should shake off the dust from his boots and submit himself to a fresh vote. The President, regarding himself as no less a continuator of Pilsudski's line of thought than Slawek, did not feel he had the right to resign prematurely from a post to which he had been named by Pilsudski. The friction on this point resulted in Slawek's defeat: he had to give up the premiership never again to return to the role of a decisive factor in Poland's political life. With the resignation of Slawek the political period based on the pure ideology of the Great Marshal came to an end. The stage was now to be occupied by personalities ranking lower in the Pilsudski camp.

VI

In 1935, Larcoche, who had for many years been France's Ambassador in Warsaw, gave up his office and was replaced by Noel. The previous record of this new Ambassador was, in the light of the tradition of the French diplomatic corps, a rather odd one. He had passed, in the days of Laval's ministry, to the Quai d'Orsay directly from the post of Prefect of Police and, as Laval's man of confidence, he immediately became the *éminence grise* of that Ministry. Following a brief stay in the Ministry, he accepted the post of Ambassador to Poland. The outpost in Warsaw was then his first diplomatic assignment, but this clever police official's eyes and ears were well directed towards Berlin at all times. One of his first acts in Poland was to enter into relations with malcontented politicians so as to undermine Beck's authority. He had trusted friends among the aristocracy, in industry, in intellectual circles. Using the existing Polish-French societies as a starting point, he welded them into a central organization and kept up his intimate association with this Institution's president to the very outbreak of the war. What the role played by this shifty-eyed French diplomat in the preparation of Polish opinion for war was will be shown by the future. That he was not *persona non grata* to the Germans is evidenced by his present nomination as Pétain's man of confidence in the German supreme command in Paris. The Polish public did not like him—neither his appearance nor his behavior inspired respect. He was a frequent guest of Rydz-Smigly. It was said that his influence on the General was considerable and it was whispered that, taking advantage of his friendship with Rydz-Smigly, he was creating a rift between the the latter and Beck. Since the General's relations with Slawek had not been cordial for some time, a situation came into being wherein the three closest collaborators of Pilsudski could not find a common language which would make possible the completion of the task left to them by the late Marshal.

Because the Sejm had no opinion of its own, this skillfully inspired difference of opinion among the head personages placed the nation between the devil and the deep blue sea. It must be acknowledged that these differences predominantly concerned internal policy, for the outlook of the Poles on questions of foreign policy was essentially uniform. Their sympathies were definitely on the side of England and France, and the agreement with Germany with which Beck was burdened was regarded by the Foreign Minister himself as a necessary evil. It was hoped that before the pact would run its full course by 1944 Poland would have time to develop sufficiently her economic strength, and to arm herself so as to be able to face the approaching danger.

Slawek's successor, Koscialkowski, therefore, had a hard nut to crack in order to maintain equilibrium under the pressure of these three discordant forces. He was, in addition, handicapped by the fact that his prestige was much lower than the prestige of Slawek. He did, it is true, stem from Pilsudski's team, but in the hierarchy of the camp he was several steps below Slawek. Furthermore, the camp, considering Slawek's resignation as unjust, refused Koscialkowski the moral credit which it had bestowed upon the man closest to Pilsudski. President Moscicki was fully cognizant of this situation but hoped to take advantage of it. By naming Koscialkowski Premier he wished to construct a bridge between the Pilsudski camp and the opposition which boycotted any participation in national official politics. From among the followers of Pilsudski, Koscialkowski was the closest to the leftist parties and, being of a conciliatory nature, was more acceptable to the opposition than anyone else. He was therefore chosen for the strategic role of effecting a rapprochement between the opposition and the President. However, the key person in the Cabinent was Kwiatkowski, a friend of long standing of the President, who received the portfolios of Vice-Premier and Minister of the Treasury. In government politics he represented the economic tendency, i.e., a tendency of seeming objectivity. To the initiated it seemed perfectly clear that the premiership would shortly pass into Kwiatkowski's hands. However, these speculations proved to be wrong. For the new government committed at the very outset a number of tactical blunders which antagonized the friendly elements and which supplied the opposition with fuel for attack. In the name of the government, Kwiatkowski came forth with a blanket criticism of his predecessors despite the general conviction that not everything they had done was bad and despite the fact that a large proportion of the Ministers from the previous government remained in the new Cabinet. Kwiatkowski introduced before the Sejm a program of work which he represented as his own, but which had in a large measure been prepared by his predecessors, embellishing it with so many promises that he raised doubts in the minds of the already skeptically disposed population. A paradoxical situation was created whereby the camp politically attacked its own people. For Koscialkowski and Kwiatkowski issued from the same political school as their predecessors—the differences lay more in temperament than in ideology. The battle which the camp initiated was not an official one directed from the floor of the Sejm; the attack, concentrated chiefly upon the person of Kwiatkowski, was conducted rather by means of intrigue.

VII

Kwiatkowski was the most dynamic minister in the Cabinet and had a wide range of possibilities at his command. In his capacity as Vice-Premier he was the President's chief adviser, keeping him informed in economic matters and serving as an inspiration in political affairs. In his capacity as Minister of the Treasury he had control of everyone and everything from ministerial budgets to the levying of taxes and penalties for non-payment of taxes. He was adept at navigating among the problems of internal policy, but he lacked the talent for intricate financial questions which as Minister of the Treasury he was called upon to solve. He was full of contradictions. An engineer by profession, he was extremely fond of commerce and investments and he devoted the major portion of his time to them. His financial policy was marked by experimentalism. Indeed, many examples had been set for him; the lack of direction in the realm of finance was by no means confined to Poland. The entire pre-war period of Europe was no different in this respect. But the connection between the Polish financial system and the needs of the country was such that it was more sensitive to errors than was true in other countries. The weak monetary circulation, based on the outmoded doctrines by which the Polish currency-issuing institution was guided, reduced to a minimum the possibilities of obtaining credit for the Polish economic world. If the backing of currency in gold in the classical manner of the end of the 19th century was the credo of European money-issuing banks, gold amounted to a veritable fetish in the Polish bank. The Minister of the Treasury became reconciled to this policy of the money-issuing institution and adopted an attitude with regard to it which held the bank to be a treasure-house from which one might obtain, by way of persuasion, sporadic credits for concrete projects. Instead of establishing the principles of currency circulation and credit activity along broad lines, he made every effort to find assistance for individual national factories or, together with the bank, he acted as the circumspect and punctilious distributor of credits. He was a master in the technique of enterprise but he was deficient in his knowledge of the technique of monetary circulation.

VIII

There were two Ministries which suffered most as the result of this system of work: The Ministry of War and the Ministry of Agriculture. The former constantly called for money, having the German example near at hand. At one of the Cabinet conferences General Smigly stipulated that the minimum sum required for improvement in the nation's armed force was two billion złotys. If we reflect that the entire Polish circulation at that time amounted to not much over one billion złotys and that the annual defense budget did not exceed 600 million złotys, we can readily understand the reaction this proposal evoked on the part of the Minister of the Treasury. The figure quoted by Rydz-Smigly was greeted as fantastic: the policy was continued of granting the army monthly credits, which up to the last month before the war never reached the sum of 100 million złotys. This was due neither to lack of patriotism nor to thoughtlessness but simply to the fact that Kwiatkowski, like his colleagues in the majority of the European countries, lived in the hope that *war would not come.* Poland cooperated closely with the League of Nations, it was bound by the rules of the international disarmament commission, it accepted German propaganda at its face value and it adopted the attitude of pacifism. It was known, of course, that the Germans were re-arming but no one suspected the tempo with which they were doing so. The camouflage of German propaganda acted so precisely that it dulled the self-preserving instinct of all Europe as well as of Poland.

The question of credits for agriculture resolved itself into financing the parcellation of the large estates and making it possible for the landless population as well as for those who owned small bits of land to set up their own farms. This problem was entrusted to Minister of Agriculture Poniatowski. The descendant of an old titled family, he was hated by the aristocracy because he was dispossessing it of its large estates, which he divided up among the peasants. He was gradually changing the agricultural organization of the country for the better but he was striking at the private interests of the gentry, who had lived upon these lands for centuries. Unfortunately, he too did not have the full support of the Cabinet. In spite of the fact that the only cure for Poland's economic and political condition lay in the parcellation of land in accordance with Poniatowski's program, the opinion of the government was divided in this matter. To understand this we must go back into Polish history. The villages and for many centuries even the towns belonged to the families of the gentry, the peasant working upon these estates for a remuneration. The relation between the so-called manor and the peasant was patriarchal in nature and was generally friendly. In the old Poland not only the individual peasant but entire villages would receive the status of gentry. Nevertheless, up to the very last days before the first World War the Polish peasant had not been satisfied as far as possession of land was concerned, approximately 7 million of the agricultural population out of a total population of 34 million living under primitive conditions. The more enterprising had emigrated, thereby furnishing foreign countries with the most capable and most enduring workers, while the remainder suffocated in an over-populated country (in some sections there were 250 people to one square kilometer). In post-war Poland the peasants received full political equality with the landowners and in 1921 a peasant even headed the Cabinet. In Koscialkowski's government the great landed estates were not represented; in fact, the official tendency of the Cabinet was fundamentally directed against the large proprietors of land. But the landowners did wield influence inside the Cabinet. They acted as a centrifugal force, governed not by a program of social reform, but by tradition, feeling and family ties. Land reform touched the gentry, but, they reasoned, Polish gentry had been a source from which not only evil had sprung during these many centuries. This class had produced the country's best defenders in all the wars which Poland had waged in its history. From it had come participants in the risings against the enslaving powers, it had supplied revolutionary elements during battles for national independence. The foremost socialist leaders issued from the gentry. Pilsudski himself, who spent not a little of his life in prisons and the catacombs of revolution, descended from an old gentry family. Indeed even in the present war, the large landholders purchased their right to the land with blood. A certain tragic conflict comes to light here between the extreme conservatism of this milieu with respect to political problems and its sacrifice and generosity with respect to sentiment for Poland as a whole. Since political direction was set by contemporary or erstwhile army men, small wonder that the ministers and politicians, bound to the landed circles by ties of blood and arms, were guided in the last analysis by sentiment. Poniatowski, a product of this milieu, carried his program out in an impartial manner and it is due to him that land reform became a fact in Poland. He settled landless peasants from all sections of Poland upon lands which he gained from parcellation, he helped them build homesteads, he fought to obtain working capital for them. This untiring toil so inflamed his relations with the huge landowners that he ended by having, with the exception of President Moscicki, who valued his wisdom and his consistency, and with the exception of the peasants, virtually all circles against him.

Communism gloried in these conflicts, confronting the landless Polish peasant with the mirage of Soviet abundance. These efforts met with especial success in the Eastern areas of Poland, where droves of Comintern-subsidized agitators undermined the peasants' attitude towards the state. The government of Koscialkowski was well aware of this destructive activity but it was not strong enough to reply with counter-propaganda. It would have sufficed to present evidence of the fathomless poverty of the Russian moujik. The contrast would undoubtedly have turned out to the advantage of Poland.

IX

The measure of Koscialkowski's failures brimmed over with the question of ritual slaughter. One of the most troublesome members of the Sejm, Mme. Prystor, one day became quite concerned that the manner of slaying cattle in the abattoirs according to the Jewish ritual was "non-humanitarian" and introduced a bill forbidding this type of animal slaughter. The seemingly trifling matter had in reality an economic foundation. For the slaughter of cattle was concentrated practically exclusively in Jewish hands. The Jews were the greatest suppliers of meat as well as its greatest consumers. The ritual slaughter raised the price of meat because the ritual butcher, the rabbi and a row of middlemen had to earn their share out of it. The proposed abolition of this system would do away with the superfluous intermediaries. Sound in principle, this question happened to come to the fore at a moment when more important affairs were being thrashed out in Poland's political theatre. It acquired a fame which did Poland more harm than the whole matter was worth at the time. Although the government came out against the proposal of the quarrelsome delegates, the badly informed press abroad branded it as a manifestation of intolerance and saddled the government with the blame. The affair was ingeniously fanned by Soviet propaganda. This widened further the gulf which, thanks to Nazi activity, had already grown up between the Polish and Jewish elements of the population.

Finally, the last stone to fall into Koscialkowski's garden was the attack directed against him by the government organ, *Gazeta Polska,* on the eve of his departure on an official visit to Budapest. This publication stated that Koscialkowski did not possess the confidence of the people and that his resignation was expected to take place shortly. It was rumored that this attack was executed with the silent assent of General Rydz-Smigly. Since the Premier's trip had been planned in order to bring about a closer understanding between Poland and Hungary, this article torpedoed the projected declaration and Koscialkowski was forced to postpone his trip. This affair, also trifling in principle, sounded the death knell of the Koscialkowski Cabinet. Overthrown by his friends, he retired after nearly six months of office and the premiership was assumed by Slawoj-Skladkowski, who did not suspect that he was to be the last government head before the catastrophe which was nearing the frontiers of Poland.

X

The new head of the government was not a politician. He was a soldier first, blindly obedient to the President and General Rydz-Smigly. A man of unusual integrity and simplicity, he was "a nice fellow" type with a rabelaisian sense of humor. Aside from his own person, practically no changes took place in the composition of the government; Kwiatkowski continued in his role of *éminence grise*. Beck received the portfolio of foreign affairs while internal policy was taken over by General Rydz-Smigly, who, although not a member of the Cabinet, exerted a decisive influence upon its work.

The political parties at that time fell roughly into four factions: (1) the government bloc, which was politically colored by the legionnaires; (2) the peasant bloc, which embraced the farming element; (3) the socialist bloc, composed of the radical minded intelligentsia and workers; (4) the nationalistic bloc, which, partly under the auspices of the clergy, united the lower bourgeoisie and the university youth. The real power was divided between the government and the nationalistic camp. Although their programs indicated no glaring differences, these two factions fought each other furiously.

The organizer of the nationalistic movement had been Dmowski. In the period of the Russian Revolution of 1905, he had advocated cooperation of the Poles with Russia in the belief that this large and wealthy country would, through its huge markets, insure an economic support for future Polish commerce. He foresaw neither the Great Revolution nor Bolshevism and he was an implacable enemy of Germany. Pilsudski, who had gained a good understanding of Russia through his underground patriotic activity, knew that Germany and Russia had been bound by close ties for centuries. He noted that while Germany carried on an independent foreign policy, Russia served as the instrument for lifting chestnuts out of the fire for Germany. Pilsudski was convinced that in case of conflict with Poland, Germany would avail itself of the supplementary power which Russia constituted.

He therefore did not make any fundamental distinction between Russia and Germany. The divergence of opinions between the two statesmen was set off during the World War. Dmowski went with Russia and her Allies. Pilsudski formed the Legions as the nucleus of a Polish armed force and led them against Russia, to make of them later the framework of an army which drove the Germans out of Poland. The antagonism of the two Poles reached its culminating point at the time of the peace conference at Versailles in 1919, when Dmowski refused the olive branch extended by Pilsudski and placed himself at the head of a movement which inexorably fought the creator of the Legions; this state of affairs continued after the death of Dmowski up to the last days of Independent Poland. Small wonder then that Pilsudski, a past master in political reckoning, consistently aimed at neutralizing the influence of Dmowski's partners. If he was unsuccessful in this, it was because he did not employ drastic methods and avoided blows at this faction which would compel it to carry on a conspiracy against the government. Pilsudski's successors were less considerate. They had examples of the breaking up of political parties in Russia, Italy and Germany, they saw how the "Deutschnationale" gave way to youth of the swastika. They were therefore pleased with the formation of the new national-radical camp which included among its constituents nationalist secessionists and those elements which could find no place in other parties. While, however, the Nazi party in Germany was a synthesis of the lost war and the aggressive Teutonic temperament, Poland had not lost but had won the war, and the Polish nation was, in contrast to its German neighbor, a peaceful nation. For these reasons, the Nazi-aping Polish party was an artificial creation, unrepresentative of the Polish people. It served as a rallying point for rowdy elements, especially students for whom the University was a place for brawls rather than study.

This malformed infant caused the government considerable trouble. During street rows the police trained streams of water upon the feverish heads of the rioters. University professors were idle for many months of the school year because the University was frequently closed as the result of the shocking behavior of these insufficiently educated "national radicals" whose conception of politics was clubbing one's opponents over the head. General Slawoj-Skladkowski knew how to use detachments of police to subdue the offenders but he was unable to get to the bottom of the problem or to reach the conscience and mind of those professors who covertly sympathized with the anti-government youth. Like many of his predecessors, Slawoj-Skladkowski did not have full power and could therefore be only an executive. He was interested in administrative matters, for he saw the future order of Poland in their regulation, he supported social agencies because to him they were a symbol of non-partisanship, he endeavored to obtain funds to combat unemployment because he wanted to maintain peace in the country. He saw things in a clear and soldierly, but unfortunately too direct, manner. One must admit that when he became interested in something, he was able to secure favorable results but this unhappily was true in matters of only secondary importance.

At this time, President Moscicki committed an error, the consequences of which had a greater meaning for Poland than anyone could foretell at that date. This was the naming of General Rydz-Smigly Marshal of Poland. According to the army hierarchy, this rank could be held by only one individual. In 1920 Pilsudski received the baton in the *name of the entire army* following the victorious war against Russia. The title of Marshal was regarded as the symbol of sacrifice and heroism. For this reason, its acquisition should have taken place under circumstances identical with those under which Pilsudski had received the title. But in this case it became a pawn of political play, a military promotion and a questionable one at that since there were in active service officers older than Rydz-Smigly. If, after receiving the baton, Rydz-Smigly had confined himself to army activity, perhaps the ill feeling aroused by his nomination would have gradually worn off. Unluckily, he devoted himself less to the army than to politics, surrounding himself with people of doubtful worth who soon led him astray.

He initiated a one-party organization under the slogan of national unity, including within this organization the national-radical youth. At the head of this bloc, faintly reminiscent of fascism, he placed Colonel Koc, his personal friend and adviser, who was the personification of ignorance in political questions. Koc had no foresight whatever and no grasp of economics. He went about the organization of the party in the manner in which one goes about setting up an office. He assembled his friends, distributed posts among them, gave a talk over the radio, and made public his political program. Nothing was missing in this program. It contained totalitarianism and democracy, socialism and bourgeois philosophy, tolerance and anti-Semitism; in brief, it was a warehouse which soon proved to be a cabinet of wax figures. The enlistment of members in the new party was carried out in such a way that government employees, pensionaries, and even firemen applied for membership at the more or less openly expressed wish of their chiefs and, in a very short time, the number of members who paid dues mounted into the thousands. Political personalities and organizations boycotted this new creation, the nationalists because it was insufficiently anti-Semitic, the liberals because it was too anti-Semitic. Everybody agreed, however, that it was an imitation of totalitarianism in a cheap edition. The chief of the camp, Koc, grappled with this paradoxical situation and finally arrived at such an impasse that he had to leave for tranquil office work in a bank. But his failure became the failure of Rydz-Smigly. In the drama in which the Marshal had been slated to play the chief role, this was an episode which sufficed to shatter the political importance of the Poles, which had already been undermined by fifth column activity.

XI

Meanwhile, Premier Slawoj-Skladkowski had other equally important difficulties to cope with. For, in Western Poland there began a new centrifugal movement on the part of Germans of Polish citizenship, who heretofore had paraded their patriotic feeling towards Poland and whose sons had even acquired rank in the

Polish army. Turnvereins, Deutschtumbunds, Volksbunds arranged group excursions into Germany on various anniversaries. Numerous "relatives" visited their German cousins in Poland. More and more frequently there would be seen figures on the streets of Toruń, Grudziadz and Bydgoscz with swastikas in their lapels or wearing white stockings (white stockings were the equivalent of the swastika for Germans living abroad). The local authorities informed their superiors of this sudden activity; the police were uneasy about the trips to Poland of German instructors from Berlin who injected a military note into the existing physical training societies. German youth of school age engaged in conspiracy, meetings of a suspicious nature were held, individuals as well as groups crossd the frontier at night and returned with transports of weapons and propaganda material. Realizing that this systematic plotting and the aggressive tone of German propaganda must in the end induce a short circuit, the Polish Western Alliance, a social organization dedicated to the defense of the interests of the Polish population on territory adjoining Germany, turned to the Premier for help. But the Premier, voicing the political viewpoint of the government, did not wish to aggravate the situation. He held that since the German minority in Poland enjoyed the greatest freedom of movement, press and speech, and since relations with the German government were officially correct, one should close one's eyes to what was transpiring, in the hope that everything would somehow turn out all right. In response to the aggressive tone of German propaganda, Polish propaganda answered calmly and expertly; the latter was merely on the defensive, even when Danzig, a city responsible to Polish sovereignty, was overrun by the Hitlerites. A Polish-German society continued to function in Warsaw, Polish Minister Grabowski continued to attend conventions of totalitarian jurists in Berlin, the German Ambassador continued to give receptions for the Polish intellectual élite. Could then Premier Slawoj-Skladkowski strike at German organizations in Poland? All this fell within the realm of foreign policy, which Beck formulated with Marshal Rydz-Smigly. The latter was in constant touch with French Ambassador Noel, who acted as a pacifier upon the Inspector General of the Army.

XII

Up to 1938 neither Poland nor Europe was fully aware of the intricate German organizational-intelligence work in other countries. A deep orientation and a uniformity of opinion were needed to unravel this complicated network of intrigue which was enmeshing European politics and the vigilance of the Polish nation. To the isolated warning voices the answer was made that "if there were any danger, the French staff would have been the first to sound the alarm." Human nature is such that unless it sees *direct* proof of danger it refuses to believe in its existence. One of those to whom the German danger was clearly evident was Grazynski, *voivode* of Upper Silesia. The Governor of this Province knew his territory very well. He had fought here as a soldier against the Germans and on this land, which had once been taken over by the Germans and later recaptured by the Poles, he had been furthering Polish culture and economic life. He organized schools, instilled a feeling of dignity into the worker and the peasant, enlivened the investment movement, in a word, did everything to emphasize the economic and cultural values of the Polish element which had been dwelling here for centuries. While German brawls would break out in Pomorze and in Danzig, Polish authority was accorded full respect here and German legs feared to appear in the street clad in white stockings. For Grazynski was merciless in combatting German wilfulness. The hatred of the Hitlerites for Grazynski was so great that several years before the war Berlin set a price on his head. There was no question of demonstrations or anti-Semitic riots in Upper Silesia. Had Grazynski stood at the head of the Cabinet, he would doubtless have been able to cope with the manifestations of anarchy. Unfortunately, he was too strong a personality not to evoke opposition. And so, while peace reigned in Upper Silesia, where huge German interests were concentrated, the Poles suddenly saw an imminent danger looming from Danzig. This was the city chosen by Hitler to serve as the tinder box for the war against Poland.

As we know, Danzig since 1918 was living at Poland's expense. The Poles were the chief consumers of its goods and the Polish Government was its genuine protector. Relations between Danzig and Poland presented various phases since Hitler's coming to power. They were good when Rauschning was the city's President and they took a sudden turn for the worse when this office was assumed by Greiser, a political condottiere, completely subservient to the rule of the young brutal upstart and speculator, Forster. Different also were the High Commissioners of the League of Nations who were arbiters between Poland and Danzig. The worst of them, the Italian Gravena, completely in accord with German chauvinistic politics, fomented dissension, and deepened the irritation. If it were not for shady characters of the type of the Greisers and the Forsters, friendly relations with Danzig would have been possible, for the sober local element well understood that the interests of the city lay in cooperation with Poland. Danzig had formed part of the Polish State for several hundred years and it was during this period that it acquired all its wealth. But it was now too late to reason. When in January of 1939 Hitler informed Beck that he demanded the incorporation of Danzig into Germany, he already knew how many guns, revolvers and bombs were contained in the hidden arsenals of that city. The tales about the torturing of the poor innocent German population by the Poles, the "photographs of victims of Polish cruelty," etc., were but a further statagem in the preparation of a world war for which Danzig was the same kind of pretext as many others.

XIII

The question suggests itself as to what the Polish army did in this web of blunders and misunderstandings into which the commander-in-chief was also drawn. Now, it is very characteristic that with the exception of Rydz-Smigly and the clique surrounding him, the army did not meddle in politics. The feeling of love for the army which Pilsudski had instilled into the Polish nation was so deep that the officer and the soldier alike, proud of their uniforms, sought to increase their knowledge by study, courses and training. Both the soldier and the officer realized that their task was defense and the nation, while it was politically at odds, loved the army and felt united on the subject of its needs. The heads of the various army-corps sensed the German peril and many conferences and cabinet meetings were devoted to the problem of increasing the military preparedness. Besides, the time for secrecy was past. Everyone who travelled across Germany in 1939 was in a position to observe not only the newly constructed railway tracks for army transports leading towards the Polish frontier but also the transports themselves with which the railroad stations were blocked. War was not yet in evidence—but war could be sensed. Therefore, Polish airplane factories raised their production figures while plants manufacturing war instruments worked not only for Poland but furnished considerable quantities of anti-aircraft guns to England and Holland. All these efforts, however, were in disproportion to German military preparedness, which for six years had ceaselessly been in process of organization.

The Poles expended much energy to train officers, under-officers and soldiers. The technical organization of the army, achieved by such slender means and in such a short space of time, was well deserving of praise. When one reflects that Poland had to bear the full impact of the German hordes thirsting for blood and plunder, then the resistance encountered by the Germans in Poland will rise to unprecedented heights of heroism. The defense of Westerplatte, of Hel, of Modlin, and of Warsaw were deeds which history will justly credit to the Poles. Hitler struck at Poland first because he knew that in the face of declared danger, the Poles would immediately stand morally prepared to defend their frontiers. Had he struck at France first, he would have had at his rear the young valiant Polish army which would have constituted a greater counterweight for France than France proved to be for Poland. Hence he began with the overcoming of the greater obstacle. The Poles lost the Polish-German war—but Pilsudski once wrote words which are at present gospel-like to them: "To be vanquished and yet not surrender, that is the greatest victory." The Poles fought in Poland against Germany and Russia. They fought in Norway and along the Maginot Line, they are fighting now in England and in Libya. The triumph of the Polish cause will be the triumph of humanity over the evil which has harassed Europe for centuries. The antecedents of the defeat sustained by the Poles will be a good lesson for them in their reconstruction of a new Poland.

THE LITHUANIAN-WHITE RUSSIAN FOLK OF THE UPPER NIEMEN

by Arthur P. Coleman

OF all the "debatable strips" on the continent of Europe, there is none from which disorder has arisen more often than the one which Poles call the *Kresy.*[1] The region is a kind of "Everyman's Land" that spreads over the interoceanic plain between the Baltic Sea and the Black and is bordered on the west by strictly Polish lands, on the east by strictly Russian. The strip has no clear natural boundaries either on the east or west, though for part of the way the Bug-Biebrza line marks the beginning of purely Polish territory and the Dnieper the limit of purely Russian.

It has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout recorded history that the allegiance of the mixed population within the strip is shifting and undependable. This inconstancy has made it the adventurer's paradise and has kept it, for a thousand years, the prey of rival individuals and nations.

Sometimes the strife and disorder arising in the *Kresy* have affected only a few persons or families, as when a Border magnate would employ the Cossack bands or Tatars to help him avenge a private insult. At other times an entire state has felt the impact, as Poland did when Michał Gliński enlisted the Muscovites against his own former comrades-in-arms, or Russia when the great Border family of Wiśniowiecki supported a series of False Dmitris, and Poland, when a Confederation of Border lords allied themselves with the Russian Empress against her at Targowica in 1792.

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[1] Literally, "the edges." The word "Kresy," though applicable to any of the borders of the realm, is most commonly used, without a qualifying adjective, to refer to the eastern border.

Whenever the folk of the *Kresy*, as distinguished from a single lord or a Confederation, have been a factor in the disorder, even when the flare-up has been brief and fitful, tremors from the disturbed area have invariably reached the most distant rim of the continent. Thus the bloody uprisings of the Border folk under Chmielnicki in the seventeenth century were felt in France, and their consequences altered the graph of Bourbon ascendance. Later, the Border folk's boycott of the Polish wars of independence during the nineteenth century was a determining factor in the rise of Russia to a dominant position in western politics. The historical aphorism that no conflict involving the folk of the *Kresy* can ever be localized was relearned in our own times as lately as in the autumn of 1939, when the Border folk, by allowing the soldiers of the Red Army to invade Polish soil and occupy it as if it were their own, actually decided the issue of the first stage of the Second World War. The act, by rendering further Polish resistance futile, secured the Axis Powers against the only thing they had to fear at that moment, a war on two fronts.

A Polish journalist, living at present in London, observed recently:

> "The Polish nation is at the present moment passing through a period of very intensive thinking and of re-appraisal from the bottom up of the things it believes in and trusts. I daresay that so powerful a process of thinking about our own concerns we have experienced only twice before: in the Reformation period of the sixteenth century and later in the period just before the Partitions when the Four Years Diet was in session."[2]

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[2] Ksawery Pruszyński, "Prasa polska w obozach," *Wiadomości polskie*, II, 2, London, Jan. 12, 1941, p. I.

The Polish experience is not an isolated one. All nations are going through it along with the Poles, and one of the problems being universally appraised is that of the *Kresy*. If the *Kresy* has the power to control, simply by passive inaction, the very course of world history, as it did in September 1939, then the *Kresy* is deserving of objective and dispassionate study by all who desire a sane and unselfish order in Europe after the present conflict. In any such study it must be treated both as a unit and by racio-geographic groups. The present paper will limit itself to the Lithuanian-White Russian group of the Upper Niemen.

II

Occupied at the present time by troops of the German Reich, this region belonged from May 18, 1921, when the Treaty of Riga was signed between Poland and the Soviet Union, to the Polish Republic. Most of it was included within the administrative division of the state known as the Voivody of Nowogródek. The region bisected by the Niemen covers an area about equal in size to the state of Massachusetts. It has a population of nearly a million and a half, 85 per cent of which is agricultural. The landowners, many of whom are now in exile, are mostly Polish and of the Roman Catholic faith. The townsfolk are mostly Poles and Jews. The small farmers are of the local Border race, the peasants Lithuanian or White Russian, or a mixture of both. Of these the Lithuanians are Roman Catholic, the White Russians almost unanimously Orthodox.

The region of the Upper Niemen is a fascinating checkerboard of grainfields and pine forests, rolling and serene beneath an enormous expanse of sky. Its open country is sparsely settled: only at rare intervals does one see, between the villages, a human habitation or the dense cluster of trees that bespeaks a solitary white Polish manor house. Its villages, on the other hand, are crowded. Low huts of heavy, weathered timber, thickly roofed with thatch and often topped with a stork's nest, huddle in a depressing row along a crooked street that is always either dusty or muddy to form the "hamlet" type of settlement Queen Bona introduced to the *Kresy* four hundred years ago.

The largest of the Upper Niemen region's towns is Baranowicze in the south, with a population of 22,800; the most historic, Lida, in the north, the scene of repeated civil and international conflict; and Nowogródek, in the center, the earliest Lithuanian capital. There is an atmosphere of incredible remoteness from world centers in the Upper Niemen region and the traveler does not find it hard when he is there to sympathize with the peasants who, if asked who rules the state, will often answer, "Radziwiłł!" Warsaw seems very far away indeed and so also does Moscow. Even Wilno does not seem near. Only "Radziwiłł," whose seat is the imposing chateau of Nieśwież in the southeastern corner of the Voivody, seems real and close at hand. The region is, in very truth, an isolated frontier.

When Józef Piłsudski was in the *Kresy* in the spring of 1919 for the purpose of gathering up the scattered members of the Old Polish Commonwealth and forging out of them a new state, he proclaimed in Wilno the idea of a great federal union for the middle east. The organism he had in mind was a partnership of free and equal states linked together in the same manner as the states of our own Union. If Piłsudski's ideas had been carried out, the Upper Niemen region would have been included within a White Russian state, for its population, while ethnographically mixed, is at least 52 per cent White Russian.

III

There are many who regard a federal union based on democratic principles impossible of realization in the *Kresy*. They declare it can never come about because the forces of hatred and division are too powerful and too deep-seated and there are no elements of unity. There are, however, at least three forces at work in the Upper Niemen region which, if properly directed, would make for unity. They are, the place itself, race, and the discipline of frontier life.

One of the unifying forces even a stranger may discover for himself almost as soon as he enters the region. Let him but inquire of a native what he is, meaning what nationality, and he will be told "tutejszy." The peasants will all describe themselves as "tutejszy" and even the Polish landowner is not ashamed to admit, "I too am 'tutejszy'." The peasants speak a "tutejszy" dialect, which even the Polish *pan* (lord) is likely to use in his dealings with them. The word "tutejszy" means, literally, "of or belonging to this place," and its use in the upper *Kresy* to describe "nationality" is widespread. This means that, over and above the religious and racial differences which cut families and villages asunder, there exists at the same time a deep loyalty to the place which unites all in a common "nationality." It is, of course, the River Niemen, "Father Niemen," as it is often called, which gives the folk of this part of the *Kresy* the common feeling of "tutejszy-ness," for it is the Niemen which ties the picturesque uplands of Nowogródek and the lowlands that slope to the lake region of Wilno into a borderless but self-conscious unit. It is the Niemen also which ties the region's literature into one, as it furnishes the common theme of both the songs of the folk and of artists like Mickiewicz and Kondratowicz.

Commonly regarded as purely divisive, race can also unite, and in the upper *Kresy* it could, if allowed to operate, become a powerful element of unity. Nature has bred in the Niemen region a stock which, fertilized from above and below, possesses the finest quality of both the ruling type and the serving. It is seen at its best in the lower gentry of the region. Adam Mickiewicz, the pioneer poet of Polish Romanticism, belonged to this race. Of Lithuanian-White Russian stock, he was neither a Lithuanian nor a White Russian but a "kresovian." It is a type which, according to Bystroń, has "buoyancy, verve and fantasy."

> "It is a noteworthy fact," he says, "that the territories which from the beginning have been Polish . . . produce less creative individuals than those of the *Kresy* with their Polish minority and their much more trying economic and cultural conditions. . . . Even when they had not yet come under the influence of Latino-Polish culture, the *Kresy* region was more active culturally and possessed a rich popular Lithuanian or West Russian literature."[3]

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[3] Jan St. Bystroń, "Czyniki rasowe w życiu literackim," *Przegląd socjologiczny*, III, 1935, pp. 428-429.

Centuries of poverty and serfdom have kept the kresovian from full development either biologically or culturally. Here the three vitamins of Education, Proper Nourishment and, above all, Hope, could accomplish a miracle, as may be seen in the United States, where the children of dull, unattractive kresovian immigrants often display both physical beauty and charm as well as alertness and manual dexterity.

The third unifying element in the Niemen region is Hardship. Lord and peasant alike share the common fate and submit to the common discipline. Three times at least the Polish landlord has had to flee from his Kresy home in our own generation. The folk have not fled, but neither have they escaped the consequences of the tempests that drove out their masters. All alike are the prey of Nature and History.

> "God Himself, when he created Man," said Marshal Piłsudski to his kinsmen of the *Kresy*, "decreed for the people he placed on this soil a sentence of hardship and heavy labor, that they, like our pine trees, be obliged to draw life from an unfruitful soil; that they remain, in the perseverance of their toil, as constant as the unchanging green of the tree-tops and send forth as a guard for their frontiers strong men who do not give way before the storm."[4]

Piłsudski was a kresovian himself and he knew the stern demands the upper *Kresy* makes on human character. It is a beautiful and romantic country, but it is not rich. In places it is too sandy, in places too swampy, and it has no mineral resources. The autumns are damp and misty, the winters long and bitterly cold. The summers are often too dry while the grain is growing and then too wet when it is ready to harvest. The forests, if properly nurtured and guarded from the beginning, could have remained a source of great wealth, but they have been pillaged too often by foreign invaders and cut off by unscrupulous business men. History has been no less unkind to the Niemen region than Nature. Her undeviating formula for the region has been to keep it forever a Borderland, never to permit the crystallization of a state, so that the peculiar interests of the place itself might be served and its special genius developed.

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[4] Quoted by Tadeusz Łopalewski in *Między Niemnem a Dźwiną,* of the *Cuda Polski* series, Poznań, no date, p. 155.

Once, six hundred years ago, a state seemed on the point of consolidation in the *Kresy*. A prototype of Piłsudski's in 1919, it was a federation of peoples under the hegemony of a band of good organizers. The organizers were Lithuanian warriors from the Uplands around Troki, and the races who formed most of the population were the Red Russians, who lived south of the Pripet, and the White Russians, who lived to the north. The White Russians were brought much earlier than the Red under Lithuanian hegemony and the power of the Lithuanian *boyars* over them was much more real than it was over their southern neighbors. Both the language and the faith of the White Russians became the language and the faith of the Lithuanian state. Thus its language was White Russian, its faith, Orthodoxy.

Before coming under the Lithuanians, the White Russians had been ruled as appanage principalities of Kievan Russia, and Kiev had protected them from the Mongols. Now Lithuano-West Russia replaced Kiev in this role, and the mission thus inherited became the new state's principal reason for existence. In 1380, however, the power of the Mongols was broken, and Lithuano-West Russia lost its mission. Lacking the cement of common danger, the principalities which constituted the loosely-hung domain began to drop away and the "Border State idea," which was the Lithunanian contribution to history, lost its vitality.

In this crisis one of two things had to happen: Lithuano-West Russia had to find a new mission, or be lost. If the state could have assumed the dramatic role of leader in the great struggle for Church unity then in progress, it might have been saved. The sons of Gedymin, who gave the state its ruling dynasty, knew this and dreamed of making Wilno the capital of a Church that would bridge the gap between Catholicism, whose Slavic seat was Kraków, and Orthodoxy, which served the northern Slavs from Moscow. World currents, personal ambitions, and the very direction of the rivers of the *Kresy*, some of which flow north, some east, some west and some south, blocked the consummation of this far-sighted purpose.

Lithuano-West Russia gradually lost its meaning and its political identity. By a series of unions (1325, 1385, 1386, 1413, 1569), at first personal, later political, the Border state became incorporated within the Polish Commonwealth. After that the great lords of the Border, regarding themselves as of superior lineage to their Polish colleagues, dedicated themselves to the task of preventing their special "Lithuanian-ness" from being submerged in general Polish-ness. They succeeded in this and made themselves, at the same time, the founders of Poland's "first families." The folk of the Border, however, lost whatever chance a Border state might have afforded them of expressing their peculiar kresovian genius and of achieving full stature culturally and politically.

History dealt the *Kresy* a second disastrous blow in the Partitions, and more particularly in the timing of the Partitions. Completed in 1795, the Partitions occurred at the exact moment when a sentiment for abolishing serfdom, the black curse of the middle east, had almost become a general policy in the Niemen region. Already Antoni Tyzenhaus (1733-1785), the Polish Cavour, had pioneered in the movement by making Horodnica, one of the suburbs of Grodno, a Utopian's dream-come-true. Canon Brzostowski (1739-1827) had set up, in the 1770's, his "Pauline Republic" at Pawłów on the Mereczanka, south of Wilno. This was governed by a bicameral parliament of its own, it had its own army, uniforms, money, schools, and medical service, and had attracted wide interest. Under the influence of Turgot and the Physiocrats, Joachim Chreptowicz (1729-1812), the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, had freed (1790) the peasants of Szczorse, his estate on the Niemen just northeast of Nowogródek, and had set up a system of contracts. Thus the movement toward abolition was widespread in the upper *Kresy* and there is no telling how far it would have gone but for the Partitions.

The Partitions not only halted emancipation but, worse than this, they installed in the *Kresy* a type of serfdom much more invidious than had existed there before. The new system stopped at once the natural upward movement of the peasantry which had been a hopeful feature of Border life and ruined, at the same time, the free peasants already present in the Niemen region.

The gentry of the Niemen region, that part of the *Kresy* where Lithuanian influence had been most real, were by tradition proud of their ancient, free peasantry. In Jagiellonian times the free peasant, or *kmieć*, had been a powerful element in Border society. Unlike the serf, and in common with the gentry, he was permitted to bear arms. This meant he "belonged to the state and the state belonged to him." Up to the sixteenth century the Jagiellonian kings always called up the *kmieć* for their general levies. As the peasantry became more and more debased, thanks to the increasing hold of serfdom, the *kmieć* ceased to exist, but the memory of a fine, free peasantry never died out in the Niemen region and it was easy to revive it when the slogans of the Enlightenment began to be heard and as emancipation spread in the *Kresy*.

The type of serfdom introduced after 1795 by the Russians did not recognize such a thing as a "free peasant." A peasant was, by his very nature, a serf, and one who was set free by some Polish *pan* was inscribed automatically among the private "souls" of the Tsar and his "hide was skinned from his body like the bark from a linden tree." Preferring the patriarchal, somewhat *laissez faire* treatment he was used to, the peasant came to oppose his own emancipation. It was a diabolical state of affairs indeed, for peasant and *pan* alike, and the more regrettable for coming at a time of general enlightenment among landowners.

IV

When one studies the peasant autobiographies which appeared under the sponsorship of Polish sociologists in the late 1930's, he feels a sense of despair, for they are a litany of almost unrelieved wretchedness, especially those that come from the peasants of the *Kresy*. They sound like the lives of eighteenth century serfs rather than of freemen of the twentieth century, and they raise the question at once, "Did nothing happen at all in the nineteenth century to ameliorate the kresovian peasant's lot?"

Several things happened to uplift him, at least, if not enormously to soften his heavy lot. The first was, of course, Emancipation. At long last, the kresovian peasant was freed from bondage to the land, and from the obligation of field service to a master. Accomplished by the Alexandrine Reforms of the 1860's, Emancipation laid the groundwork for progress. In principle it was a wholly good thing: long overdue, it had to come before any improvement could be made in the peasant's lot. As in the United States, however, so in the *Kresy*, Emancipation did not usher in the millenium, and often its good effects were more or less permanently nullified by its evil.

For one thing, Emancipation did not relieve the peasant of an overlord. It simply gave him a new one. He ceased to be the property of a Polish *pan* and became instead the property of a peasant commune or *obshchina*. Since the *obshchina* was generally the tool of some bureaucratic agent, the individual peasant was not so much better off in his daily living than he had been before. He still lived in his "kurna chata" (literally, "henhouse") with its smoke and its peep-hole windows, and, though he had land now of his own, far more, in fact, than his Russian colleagues got from the Reforms, he had the freeman's privilege of paying for it.

The good Emancipation might have done was further nullified by the debasement wrought in the peasant's character through being told in every crisis, such as a dispute over wood cutting or pasture rights, that his neighbor, the Polish *pan,* was his enemy, and only the far-away Tsar his friend. To do this was the systematic policy of the *obshchina's* manipulators and of the Russian police. It aggravated enormously the tendency to thievery inherited by the peasant from serfdom and greatly increased his native anarchy. The good inherent in Emancipation was still further cancelled by the *obshchina's* fatal system of land tenure. At stated intervals all the land of the commune was thrown into a common pool, all boundaries were wiped out and the soil was completely reapportioned. Such a system ruled out the possibility of long-range farming and discouraged the very qualities of initiative and thrift which ex-serfs like the kresovian peasants needed most to develop.

The second thing which changed the peasant of the *Kresy* in the nineteenth century was Nationalism. Like all great popular movements, Nationalism had both good consequences and evil in the Niemen region. It came there in two forms, Lithuanian and White Russian. Both arose at the same time and in the same place and both were at first purely literary movements. Fathered from afar by Herder and the Czech Slavonicists, the two movements were encouraged in their embryonic stages by the pioneer Slavonic ethnographer Adam Czarnocki,[5] a native of Nowogródek region, and nurtured from 1815 to 1822 by the young Polish gentry of the University of Wilno. Two natives of Nowogródek district, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) and Jan Czeczot (1797-1847) unwittingly became pioneers in the two movements. Both learned Lithuanian and White Russian songs from the peasants in childhood. Later, when they discovered in Wilno that folk songs were something to be proud of knowing, they not only collected them seriously but also modelled their own verses on popular ballads and songs. Soon the whole Wilno school of poets was seeking the Pierian spring on the "ridges of Ponary" and in the pleasant valley of the Niemen.

The literary phase of the Lithuanian and White Russian movements came to an end in 1831, when, as a consequence of the Polish Insurrection, the University of Wilno which had cradled them was closed. In 1839 printing in White Russian was forbidden. Jan Czeczot, at that time librarian at Szczorse, tried to flout the decree by publishing the works of Jan Barszczewski, the first poet to write in White Russian. A verse of his describing the plunder of a Polish *dwór* (manor) by a band of peasants during the Napoleonic Campaign of 1812 had long circulated in manuscript. Czeczot published this and Barszezewski's other poems, only to have the work immediately confiscated.

Change was in the air, however, and through all the folk of the Niemen region the leaven of quickening self-consciousness was at work. A passion for self-expression smoldered in the peasant heart and it needed only devoted leadership to fan this to a flame. Among the Lithuanians national feeling began to be stimulated by the parish priests. To prevent a similar thing from happening among the minority of White Russians who were Catholics, the Tsar had the foresight in 1839 to liquidate the Uniat Church in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, thus forcing the people into the state religion, Orthodoxy.

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[5] 1784-1825. Better known by his pseudonym, Zorian Dołęga Chodakowski.

The program of intense and often brutal Russification which was introduced to the Niemen region after the Polish Insurrection of 1863 gave the Lithuanian national movement new life. Every priest became a self-appointed guardian of Lithuanianism among his folk and the prohibition of printing in Latin characters after 1863 only served to provoke a positive epidemic of Lithuanian writings beyond the Lithuanian border, in Tilsit. Here a rich periodical literature flourished, and Dr. Jonas Basanavicius became the spiritual head of the Lithuanian folk. At the same time, Franciszek Bohuszewicz (1840-1900) a kresovian squire of Osmiana in the Niemen region, out of gratitude to a poor White Russian family who saved his life in the Polish Insurrection, began to devote himself to writing in White Russian. His most popular and most important work was *Bielaruskaya dudka (The Little White Russian Bagpipe)*, which he published in Kraków. It was a faithful description of the sad, difficult life of the White Russian folk and of its beautiful but melancholy homeland.

Bohuszewicz believed strongly in the fullest possible development of local languages.

> "Our tongue is a folk tongue and a master tongue," he said in the introduction to *Dudka* of White Russian, "exactly as French and German are, or any others. . . . Before everything else one must know his own tongue. There have been many nations that, having first lost their language, have then perished themselves."

It is small wonder that Bohuszewicz is regarded as the spiritual father of the White Russian movement. The principle he advocated, multiplication of languages, became, of course, the foundation stone of both the Lithuanian and White Russian movements. It received hearty support from the Socalists, who were strong in the middle east in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. Limanowski expressed the opinion that a state which violates the principle incurs "national serfdom." He advocated full recognition in the local schools, churches, courts and press of the local language, thus greatly encouraging both of the nationalist movements in the Niemen region. Socialism played a particularly fructifying role in the White Russian movement.

Unlike the White Russian, the Lithuanian movement drew much of its strength from an "heroic past." The original Lithuanians, it could be pointed out, were a master race; a mere handful of them had managed to create, from a heterogeneous and scattered Border mass, a great state. There were warriors and statesmen among the ancestors of the Lithuanians. The descendants of these illustrious figures were great lords of Poland, but the ancestors had been undeniably Lithuanians.

The White Russians had no such "heroic past." Wrenched from their moorings before a tradition had time to mature, they had no great names and no "Golden Age." One thing they had, to be sure, which the Lithuanians lacked: a written "culture." Laws, official documents, religious writings and polemical, a mass of them, printed in White Russian on the most famous presses in the *Kresy,* the one at Zabłudów belonging to the Chodkiewiczes and that of Łukasz Mamonicz in Wilno. But these had no meaning for the nineteenth century White Russian and no power to set the blood tingling as did, for example, the mention to a Lithuanian of Witołd at Grunwałd. All the White Russians had was a folk culture, and this neither so rich nor so original as the Lithuanian. They lacked the *sine qua non* of an effective nationalist movement: the emotional impetus which nothing supplies so powerfully as the memory of a "great past." Socialism stepped into the breach with an emotional impetus hardly less powerful: the hope of a glorious future.

Very early in the twentieth century the White Russian movement ceased to be literary and became revolutionary. Nourished in St. Petersburg, encouraged from abroad by Polish Socialists, it finally established its headquarters in Wilno. Here, after the ban on printing was removed in 1905, revolutionary pamphleteering gave voice to White Russian aspirations. Typical of the "literature" of this period is the following,

> "For long we have been sleeping, and now they have awakened us.
> Now we know what there is to do:
> We know that a man needs freedom and land,
> And to beat down the evildoers.
> What an ominous lot and wretched this is,
> Without bread, without money to live on.
> Hither and yon they drive you, laugh at you,
> Till you want to shout: "Save us!"
> The rich are laughing at us,
> They make us call them "pan."
> We have suffered long, we can suffer no longer,
> We'll go and look for a new deal.
> Together we'll rise with sickles and scythes
> And drive out the despoilers of the land.
> Let us meet in the forests and fields,
> We hosts of the working people."[6]

V

Ever since the fourteenth century, when Ivan Kalita began to "gather together the Russian lands," and when, almost simultaneously, the *Kresy* voluntarily entered the Polish Commonwealth, the two Slavic Powers of the north have fought a perpetual duel for the souls of the Border folk. In the Great War a third Power entered the lists. The Power was Germany. The Hindenburg Line of the east, it will be remembered, cut across the Niemen country: the park at Tuhanowicze which inspired some of the region's most memorable verses, from the pen of Mickiewicz, still gapes, after twenty-five years, with German gun sites, and a German-built corduroy road still traverses the Naliboki Wilderness, recalling the German occupation. While they were in the *Kresy*, from 1915 to 1918, the Germans were not idle. Fully alive to the possibilities for future advantage to themselves offered by the region's racial divisiveness, they encouraged and subsidized both the Lithuanian, and especially the White Russian, nationalist movements in the region. They did this by establishing native schools and sponsoring an indigenous literary movement. After the War, the White Russian movement continued to receive aid from Berlin.

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[6] E. Karskij, *Die weissrussischen Volksdichtung und Literatur,* Berlin, 1926, p. 201. Translated with the help of Michael Lang.

During the armistice of 1918-1939, when Europe was preparing for Armageddon, the peasantry of the Upper Niemen region were constantly the object of seductive advances by rival forces. It was a time of many voices. From Lithuania, almost as soon as the region had been incorporated in the Polish state, came the Catonic voice of the irridentists crying, "Wilno must be Lithuanian and all Lithuanians must be gathered into a Lithuanian state!" From Poland came a voice that sought to win the folk by the persuasive power of native schools, by full religious freedom, by courses in Kraków for native White Russian teachers, by parcelling of the large estates, by the combination of excessively small holdings into decent farms and the creation of opportunities in small business for the eternal "village surplus."

Poland meant well by the *Kresy* folk. Her purpose was to encourage organic development. If she failed to convince the Border folk that their destiny was safest in her hands it was because of forces largely beyond her control. She could not overcome in two decades the utter divorce of peasant from *pan* in the *Kresy* accomplished by centuries of racial and religious and cultural differences. The leaders of the folk called every constructive effort Polonization, and the word was a flaming red rag. Poland's policy in the Niemen region was never single nor strong, because her own inner councils were never of one mind with regard to it. This is seen in the school situation and in the treatment accorded the revolutionary organization Hramada. At first White Russian schools sprang up like mushrooms: 180 of them were founded, for example, in 1921. The next year, however, 150 of these were closed. At the same time courses in Kraków for 250 White Russian teachers were established. Yet in March, 1923, there were but 37 elementary White Russian schools and by 1926 only 15. With the Hramada it was the same: at first the organization, well known to be revolutionary, was allowed to operate openly and to pursue its murderous way with relative impunity. Finally it had to be suppressed with spectacular severity and martyrs were made of its leaders.

Every evidence of Polish weakness or nervousness was noticed and recorded by the leaders of the USSR, and it was from their agents, during the 1918-1939 period, that the most powerful voice of all those that spoke in that uneasy time was heard. It is a fact long recognized and deplored by Polish sociologists that the principal barrier to understanding and cooperation between the peasant and the *pan* is the feeling both have that they live in two distinct worlds. A peasant is a peasant, and he can not become a *pan*. He is born to work, as the *pan* is born to rule. His peasant world has its special vocabulary, its special foods, different from the *pan's*, and its own rules of conduct. There is no passing from one world to the other. Throughout the twenties and especially the thirties Polish sociologists wrestled perseveringly with the problem created by this state of affairs. They knew that a state so divided could not endure.

The special message of the Russian agents to the kresovian peasant was this: shatter, once and for all, the barrier between the two worlds and enter into possession of the *pan's* as well as the peasant's sphere. Do not be misled by a kindly *pan*. He is more dangerous than the cruel one, for he, by his kindliness, may win you to prefer the old, peasant world. The voice from the east won out, and when the Soviet army entered the Niemen region the folk believed their chance had come to possess the universe.

VI

It is impossible to predict the future of the Niemen folk. One thing, however, is clear: for the sake of all mankind's security, they can no longer remain the prey of outsiders. They must be incorporated into some kind of Border state of their own, linked by federal ties with other states of similar racio-geographic tradition into a strong, self-respecting organism. Who, out of a population at least 50 per cent illiterate, shall become the leader of such a state, none can say. Ideally it would be some one trained to stewardship and responsibility by generations of exercising these two qualities. It must be someone who has lived through the present horror with the people themselves and who knows their present woes as well as their present aspirations. As a young teacher, of peasant origin, who went back to his village to help his people observed, "It is not liberal slogans, but iron energy coupled with enlightenment that will elevate the region to its rightful position in an independent homeland."[7]

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[7] *Wiejscy działacze społeczni*, Vol. II: *Życiorysy inteligentów*, pub. by Instytut socjologii wsi, Warsaw, 1938, p. 73.

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NATIONAL AUTONOMY IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY

by Friedrich A. Rager

AFTER twenty years of alleged "self-determination" in the Danubian area it may be profitable to examine how various plans for national autonomy have worked within a large political unit in that area—the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There are several methods of dealing with the intricate problem of national minorities, namely, through assimilation, oppression, emigration, protection by international agreements or such national legislation as the granting of legal status to minorities by a federative constitution or national autonomy. We have neither the intention nor the space to outline here all these procedures as applied or proposed in the Habsburg monarchy. Only one side of the legal minority status, the so-called national or cultural autonomy, will be dealt with and this will be limited to the Austrian section of the empire, the *Oesterreichische Reichshälfte.*

The title of this study was chosen in order to localize the problem geographically and historically, but neither Hungary nor Bosnia-Herzegovina—the so-called "occupation-territory"—administered by common Austro-Hungarian authorities, evolved anything of significance in this field. The actual reason for selecting Austria for an investigation of cultural autonomy is based on ethnical, political, linguistic and literary factors. The western part of the Dual Monarchy, composed of nine different peoples, showed a multi-colored nationality pattern. The situation required some workable constitutional solution—a solution which was also actually put into effect, if only tentatively. Thus it is more than coincidental that we can credit Austrian political science with the first elaboration of the theory of national autonomy in modern times.

No single nationality commanded an absolute majority in

Austria; according to the census of 1900, the German group was the most numerous nationality, totalling 9.17 millions or 35.78% of the Austrian population. The Czechs counted 5.95 millions or 23.24%; the Poles 4.25 millions or 15.5%; the Ruthenians 3.38 millions or 13.21%; the Slovenes 1.9 millions or 4.65%; the Serbs and Croats 710,000 or 2.77%; the Italians and the Latins 720,000 or 2.83%; the Rumanians 230,000 or 0.9%; and the Magyars 90,000 or 0.37%[1]. Few provinces were definitely homogeneous in populations like Upper Austria or Vorarlberg. In those provinces which bore the brunt of the nationality struggles the population percentages were as follows. In Bohemia there were 62.68% Czechs and 37.26% Germans; Moravia 71.36% Czechs and 27.9% Germans; Silesia 44.68% Germans, 33.21% Poles, and 22.04% Czechs; and in Galicia 54.66% Poles, 44.29% Ruthenians and 2.9% Germans. The prevailing rule of the Austrian census provided that everybody was counted as belonging to the nationality of his own language—*Umgangssprache*—on his own evidence, and as a whole, we may safely regard this evidence as unbiased, though in border-line cases, e. g., children of a mixed marriage, the choice of a language is complicated by the necessity to make a living in an area predominantly Czech or German.

Originally the entire issue of the Austrian nationality conflict was limited to the question of the official language to be used in administrative offices, courts, and schools—*Amtssprache, Gerichtssprache, Unterrichtssprache*. Constitutionally the language issue developed step by step. Before 1866[2] German prevailed as the tongue of the educated classes and as the official language when communicating with the citizenry; but this was practice and not covered by law. The predominant position of the German language was inherent in the absolutistic regime.

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[1] See Bernatzik, Edmund: "Das oesterreichische Nationalitätenrecht" Sonderabdruck aus *Oesterreichische Verfassunggesetze* (Vienna, 1917), p. 789; Auerbach, B., *Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie,* (Paris, 2 ed., 1917); pp. 15-314 treat the Austrian half of the Empire.

[2] Cf. Bernatzik. *op cit.* pp. 879ff. See also von Madeyski. P., *Die deutsche Staatssprache oder Oesterreich ein deutscher Staat* (Vienna, 1884) and Fischhof, V., *Die Sprachenrechte in den Staaten gemischter Nationalität* (Vienna, 1884).

With the re-establishment of constitutional rights in 1860—the *October-Diplom*—the privileged position of German nationality and language became untenable. The next step was taken by the "February Patent" in 1861 which did not mention the nationality issue at all. However, the concomitant electoral laws—*Landtagswahlordnungen*—aimed at the preponderance of the German element in the Sudeten countries of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and of the Italian element in the south of Austria. The predominance of these nationalities was easily achieved by the convenient demarcation of constituencies and by the prevailing polling system based on population and tax-payments. Furthermore, there existed special electoral bodies—*Wahlkörper*—for large landed estates, chambers of commerce, etc. Thus single constituencies entitled to elect one representative varied from 18,000 to 80,000 voters. The districts were gerrymandered in such a way as to insure the election of deputies of the predominant nationality. Scattered minorities in districts with a plurality of another nationality were, for all practical purposes, precluded from voting for their own representatives. Even when privileged suffrage was abolished in Austria in 1907, the "demarcation-policy"—*Wahlkreisgeometrie*—sufficed to bring about the following results. Whereas each Italian member of the parliament was elected by 38,000 voters and each German deputy by 40,000, it required 46,000 votes to elect one Rumanian; 50,000 for each Slovene; 52,000 for each Polish member; 55,000 for a Croat; 55,000 for a Czech; and 102,000 votes to elect one Ruthenian deputy. As a result, the *Reichsrat*—the lower chamber of the parliament—counted 257 members of the German-Italian bloc and 259 of the Slav. This numerical distribution presents a fair, if not exact, picture of the Austrian nationality puzzle. However, its political value is somewhat misleading, since the overwhelming majority of the Polish members—organized in what was called the *Polenclub*—voted regularly with the government.

This electoral pattern of the chief legislative body of Austria assured a slight superiority for the Germans and placed some Slavonic groups at a slight, some at a greater disadvantage. The provincial electoral laws followed broadly the same line of majority rule. Only two provinces, Moravia and Bukovina, about fifteen years before the final collapse of the monarchy, introduced a quite new policy of national autonomy with which we shall deal here more expressly.

As far as the language issue itself is concerned, the basic rule was laid down by the constitution—*Staatsgrundgesetze*—of 1867, of which Article XIX reads: "All nationalities enjoy equal rights and each of them has the inviolable right to the maintenance and cultivation of its nationality and language. Equality of rights for all local languages in schools, administration and public life is guaranteed by the State." Thus the predominance of the German language and the expediency of a single common means of communication for a multi-national country was definitely dropped. Bernatzik[3] emphasizes the cancellation of the Bohemian law of October 5, 1868 (Prov. Statute Book, Nr. 1) by the socalled *Bürgerministerium* of Prince Auersperg in 1868. This act had provided for the compulsory teaching of German as the second language in Bohemian high schools. He points out that, from now on, French or English could be substituted as a second language, but this was no longer compulsory. In a report on the bill, the Committee of Parliament announced that in its view "a single language constitutes a political necessity for communication's sake, superseding any political changes, and that German was voluntarily accepted as such by all nationalities in practice." Yet the concrete codification of this principle was never accomplished.

A comprehensive analysis of the problem of official languages in the Austrian monarchy would have to concern itself with legislation, jurisdiction, and local self-government. Furthermore, it would have to cover in detail the languages used by these bodies and agencies, the languages used by those offices which dealt with the public, either orally or in writing, and the language which the public may use when applying to them. In some respects the language used by the legislative bodies in publishing their discussions and resolutions, and above all the language of the laws published in the Statute Book would have to be dealt with. Space does not permit a complete survey of the issue. We shall merely indicate something of the manner of handling the official language issue in polyglot Austria.

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[3] Bernatzik: *op. cit.* p. 882; Auerbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-76.

The standing order of Parliament never achieved a plain rule. Whereas the Upper House—*Herrenhaus*—almost never abandoned the custom of using German exclusively, it acted without authorization. Nor did the Lower Chamber—*Abgeordnetenhaus*—in all its fifty-seven years of existence, from 1861 to 1918, adopt a binding rule. While Parliament was officially managed and operated in German, the representatives of the above-mentioned nine nationalities were sworn in in their native languages. Since many of the representatives commanded only their native language, they were allowed to address the House in that language, provided it was one of the eight into which the Austrian Statute Book—*Reichsgesetzblatt*—was translated. However, onlv German addresses went on record, and it was only in 1907 that the House provided stenographers for non-German speakers and that abbreviated versions of their addresses were published by the official parliamentary news service.

The real hotbed of political passions in old Austria was the practice of all ranks in communicating with the public. Various regulations controlled the practice of the central administration and of the provinces with mixed national stocks. An inexhaustible number of language decrees—*Sprachenverordnungen*—kept pouring out. These were of two different political types.[4] One type, favoring centralistic trends, tried to uphold the traditional privileges of the Germans, whereas the federalistic-minded imperial governments favored the use of other languages, particularly Czech and Italian.

It is almost impossible for the foreign student of Austrian history to grasp how the petty administrative details of, for example, one or two language inscriptions in railway stations could stir up feeling as deeply as did the religious wars of the past. We see the most famous example of such a result in the reaction which met the language decree of Count Badeni in 1897. He decreed that in the exclusively Sudeten German districts the official agencies were entitled to use either German or Czech when dealing with citizens applying to them. Anti-Czech riots broke out in the Vienna *Ringstrasse*, and Parliament witnessed one of its stormiest sessions when the Speaker, a conservative Pole, finally ordered the police to clear the House of opposition members. Thereupon Count Badeni was forced to resign.[4a]

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[4] Charmatz, Richard, *Oesterreichs innere Geschichte 1848-1907* (Leipzig, 1909), Vol. II, *passim.*

To sum up, while the national issue was far from being satisfactorily settled, it had by no means developed to the point of real, ruthless oppression of the minorities. On the other hand, Emperor Francis Joseph who actually ruled the country, even in the parliamentary era, was judged by Professor Josef Redlich as follows: "To realize it, *i.e.* the maintenance of his realm, by creative application of modern ideas to the old Habsburg conception of the realm . . . lay beyond his mental scope. . . . He was strong because he knew nothing of the ideas of his age."[5] One of these modern ideas consisted in a more constructive and elastic approach to the problems of nationalities as offered by the theory of national or cultural autonomy.

Macartney goes so far as to assert that "this principle . . . undoubtedly contained the embryo of the only possible solution of the national problems of a state such as Austria." Later he adds "Today, however, it seems doubtful whether national autonomy would have saved Austria."[6] Such rightly named "retrospective prophecies" are utterly devoid of validity. Outstanding minority leaders in this period of Austrian history seemingly deemed feasible some solution within the frontiers of Austria-Hungary. Karel Kramář's categorical statements when defending himself against the accusation of high treason during the first world war, as well as the depositions of the Yugoslav leaders in the Friedjung trial

[4a] Cf. Jászi, Oscar, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), p. 290 ff.

[6] Macartney, C. A.: *National States and National Minorities*, (London, 1937) p. 150.

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[5] Redlich, Josef: *Emperor Francis Josef of Austria*, (New York, 1929) p. 226. Redlich was Minister of Finance in the last Imperial cabinet.

in Vienna shortly before the war, apparently justify assumptions of this kind.[7]

The Yugoslavs then fostered a "trialistic" system instead of the "dualistic" one which prevailed. This meant that Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia would form the main units of the Habsburg realm.

How does the doctrine of national autonomy fit into this picture? When evaluating its merits one has to bear in mind that the Habsburg Empire was by no means composed of nine nationalities each conveniently and neatly settled in a separate area. Two, three, or even four nationalities often intermingled in a comparatively narrow space, causing political as well as administrative difficulties. These difficulties could not be overcome even by such federalistic patterns as were advocated by the Cabinets of Rechberg-Goluchowski (1859) or Hohenwart (1871), which would only have shifted the issue from the center to the provinces.

"A special law was to guarantee the rights of national minorities in mixed districts. All members of each nationality, whatever their residence, were to form a single public body or association endowed with legal personality and competence to deal with its own national (cultural) affairs. This body would organize the educational system, help them in courts . . . it would be empowered to levy taxes upon its members. By this means competition between nationalities in genuinely national questions would have been entirely eliminated, since no nationality would have any concern with the national affairs of the others."[8] In this summary Macartney has acutely interpreted the issues in terms more familiar to the Anglo-Saxon student. Of course, more rigid and more scholarly definitions have been produced.[9] For accuracy's sake, one must add, the above definition refers to but one, and that a more promising form of national autonomy, which may best be called "personal." According to this doctrine everybody carries his nationality with him regardless of his actual residence, whereas the "territorial version" limits its privileges to members of a nationality residing in close settlements. This territorial version necessarily sacrifices the scattered minorities outside these closed national districts and is, therefore, rejected by more exacting students.

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[7] Friedjung, Heinrich, *Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, Vol. III. See also [illegible] op. cit., p. [illegible], with quotation from [illegible]

[8] Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[9] Veiter, Theodor, *Nationale Autonomie* (Vienna, 1938), [illegible] national autonomy and minority status as a whole. [illegible] Balogh, A. V., *International Protection of Minorities* [illegible] René, *La Protection des Minorités* (Paris, 1938).

The first effort toward legislation for national autonomy is contained in a bill drafted by the Vienna government, and presented to the Diet in 1871. Known as the Bohemian Nationality Bill,[10] it was never voted by the Diet, although it already contained such provisions as were enacted in Moravia some forty years later. Article 10, for example, divides the Diet into Bohemian and German sections. Article 12 permits each of the two sections to claim for its co-nationals a proportional part of the educational budget, and each is entitled to levy special additional taxes upon their co-nationals for educational purposes.

In the Tyrol, in Istria, in Moravia, and in Bukovina attempts were made to refashion provincial constitutions along lines of cultural autonomy. However, only in Moravia and Bukovina was the remodelling successful.

In Moravia, after prolonged negotiation between Germans and Czechs, four new laws were enacted. Two of these belong properly to the problem of national autonomy. The *Landesordnung* of 1905—no. 1 of 1906—divided the Diet into Czech and German sections. Actually this division applied only to elections as, for example, when the Diet proceeded to elect its own executive body—*Landesausschuss*. This was, however, not primarily a parliamentary but rather an administrative organ, directing and supervising most of the provincial agencies, while another part of the administration was carried on by provincial governors appointed by the emperor. This complicated, double-barrelled feature of provincial bureaucracy, typical of the old monarchy, was by no means restricted to Moravia. Despite its narrow application, this division of the Moravian Diet was actually tantamount to the constitutional recognition of the nationalities as such for the first time in Austrian history.

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[10] Bernatzik: *op. cit.*, p. 1093. For this period see Bretholtz, B., *Geschichte Böhmens und Mährens,* IV (Reichenberg, 1925), pp. 137-206. This is the Sudeten German version of the nationality question.

This was even more true of the second of these laws, the *Landtagswahlordnung*—no. 2 of 1906. Under this law the voters of Moravia were divided into two electorates: German and Czech. Each voter was entitled to file either a German or a Czech polling list. The decision to enter his name either in the German or in the Czech register—*Nationalkataster*—rested entirely with himself. However, in order to preclude election frauds, such as filing in both registers, the authorities could change or erase any registration, either upon their own initiative or upon the suggestion of a voter. In the last instance an administrative court was to rule upon the issue. This paternalistic feature of the law aroused sharp criticism. Bernatzik holds it to be an insoluble administrative problem to make voters either German or Czech by rule of magistrate or court.

Otto Bauer, the socialist writer and leader who, with Renners, was perhaps more instrumental in bringing about these constitutional changes than anyone else, regards this feature as the essential shortcoming of the law.[11] He points out that, if limited only to election purposes, the establishment of national registers means only a preliminary step towards national autonomy. Bauer opposes governmental interference with the national status of the voter, and points out that the absence of free decision for any citizen concerning his national status becomes unworkable as soon as national bodies are entrusted with the taxing power, since otherwise the government would be in a position to discriminate against any single citizen by imposing additional taxes on him.

To my knowledge, this Moravian election law instituted an electoral device never repeated by any other legislature. Each constituency comprised two distinct electorates, Czech and German, each sending its own representatives to the Diet. Competition for seats existed within the national groups, but not between them. While the candidature of a German for a Czech seat was not forbidden by law, the chances for his election were nonexistent since no German would receive any votes within the Czech electorate and *vice versa.* With election day over the whole machinery goes to pieces since in the Diet the members of any national group may vote with any other except in the election of the Executive Board.

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[11] Bauer, Otto: *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907), *passim.*

Furthermore, the national electoral districts were not always equally divided. For example, in Brno, the Moravian capital, the Germans were granted four constituencies, while the Czechs had two. The "purity" of the device was greatly modified by adding a third electoral body. The great landed estates—*Kurie des Grossgrundbesitzes*—to which the principle of separate national registers did not apply. Another important feature of the system was the fact that elections for the Lower Chamber of the Austrian Parliament were conducted on the same plan as in Moravia.

In Bukovina, the easternmost province of Austria, which belonged to Rumania since 1918, and in 1940 was partially occupied by Russia, a similar electoral plan was introduced. But here the problem was further complicated by the existence of four distinct national groups: the Poles, Germans, Ruthenians, and Rumanians, the Jews being added to the Germans. This plan was enacted by the law of May 26, 1910, no. 26.

Besides these three statutes of major importance, nine other laws pertaining to petty administrative routine were enacted in the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and the Tyrol from 1870 to 1906. Three Bohemian statutes: Bohemian Statute Book, no. 17, of February 24, 1870; no. 46, of June 24, 1890; and no. 40, of March 20, 1891, dealt with school inspection, provincial school board—*Landesschulrat*—and the provincial farming board—*Landeskulturrat*—respectively. In Moravia three laws: no. 27 of January 29, 1905; no. 4 of 1906, passed November 27, 1905; and no. 40 of May 19, 1897 dealt with disciplinary measures against teachers, with school inspection, and with the provincial farming board. In the Tyrol, four laws were passed: no. 7, dealing with school inspection on April 30, 1892; and laws no. 35 of November 8, 1881; no. 30 of September 23, 1884; and no. 91 of March 20, 2891 dealt with the provincial farming board.

It was the purpose of these regulations to split up the respective bodies into national sections, authorizing each section to deal exclusively with the issues involving their co-nationals. Thus Czech officials were to judge offenses committeed by Czech teachers in Moravia, and similarly the Italian section of the Tyrol farming board was to function in granting allowances to the Italian farmers in that province.

We can sum up the political results of these legislative achievements by saying that they were lukewarm, haphazard and inefficient. The two decisive measures written into the provincial statute books referred, characteristically enough, to Bohemia and Galicia, provinces on which the nationality struggle was focused. Here only national registration, the merely technical and preliminary stage of national autonomy, was dealt with. Here the vital taxing power was withheld from the national groups, and the very idea of genuine autonomy was throttled by granting to the imperial magistrates and courts the right of final decision concerning national status. Second-rate administrative agencies were divided into national sections without granting the national groups taxing authority even for their limited purposes.

The old Habsburg régime, staggering between authoritarian centralism and democratic federalism; between German-Magyar hegemony and concessions to the Slavs; between traditions of the imperial army and bureaucracy and the recognition of autonomous administration, simply could not make up its mind in time to avert failure. Nevertheless, political history and legislative technique are indebted to these early attempts to produce a new device of minority status, attempts which might have proved successful in the future had Austria continued to exist.

New York City

NOTE

In addition to the works referred to in the course of the article the following, out of the mass of literature on the nationalities question in Austria, may be profitably consulted.

Gayda, Virginio: *Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems,* (London, 1915).

Hugelmann, Karl: "Die Länderautonomie in Oesterreich," *Zeitschrift für Politik,* 1919.

Kramář, Karel: *Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik,* (Vienna, 1906).

Popovici, Aurel: *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich,* (Leipzig, 1906).

Renner, Karl: *Selbstbestimmung der Nationen,* (Vienna, 1918).

Renner, Karl: *Kampf der oesterreichischen Nationen um den Staat,* (Vienna, 1902).

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY SYSTEM

by Joseph S. Roucek

IN the light of the disappearance of the Republic of Czechoslovakia from the map of Europe, it might seem pointless to discuss the functioning of its party system, but its complete representativeness so accurately reflected the free political atmosphere in the country and its peculiar problems that we feel a study of the whole system to be especially apt just now.

The outstanding characteristic of the Czechoslovak party system, as it functioned during the first Republic, was the emphasis played throughout the political life of Czechoslovakia on the ideological differences of the various party programs which, in most cases, reflected also the social and economic currents of the state. It was, consequently, a system of politics which differed widely from that known to the United States. In America the major parties develop their ideological political programs from election to election. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the permanent tenets of the parties were more or less worked out extremely carefully ideologically and were very little, if at all, modified officially during the course of various political changes.

This does not mean, however, that there were not frequent practical deviations in actual politics from the ideological tenets laid down in the official programs. After all, the supreme law of politics is success and hence ideologies, as political creeds, are more often weapons giving ethical justifications and revelations giving logical meaning to politics rather than unchangeable tenets for which the practical politicians would be ready to die.[1] But in Czechoslovakia the ideological differences were played up more than anything else in political struggles. We understand here by political program a system of ideals, presented by a party to the voters as the goal for the realization of which it seeks to gain power in the state.

Every political program must *ipso facto* be presented in such a way as to convince the follower that the party represents, ideologically, not only the interests of a numerically limited social group but also the general welfare of all citizens. Hence the parties of Czechoslovakia, in spite of their vociferous claims for differences were also united in their claims that particular programs serve the interests of all Czechoslovaks. Even the most outspoken class and nationalistic parties, to create good will, invited all people of the country and all the classes of the land to vote for them.

To the average American observer the political situation of Czechoslovakia appeared to be a very complicated one, as there were few European states that had so many political parties and such apparently complicated combinations of political views as the country of President Masaryk. This complexity was related to the pre-war conditions of the country. The Bohemian lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) had been under the Austrian rule before 1918, while Slovakia and Carpathian Russia had been under the Hungarian domination. Each of these "historic" lands had its own legislative assembly and took part in the political affairs of the Empire of Austria-Hungary as a whole, in addition to conducting the affairs of its own political life.

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[1] Cf. Joseph S. Roucek, "Political Behavior as a Struggle for Power," *Journal of Social Philosophy,* VI, 1941, 341-351; Roucek, "The Essence of Politics," pp. 3-13, in Roy V. Peel and Joseph S. Roucek, *Introduction to Politics* (New York, 1941).

Furthermore, the social and economic structure of the population of each section of the country had an influence upon the political division of the parties. Under the old regime, Czech politics were strongly influenced by class interests such as agrarianism, or social interests such as socialism, which were again complicated by the ideological factors of Catholic conservatism and middle-class radicalism. But the main axis was the national ideal which even penetrated the ideology of social democracy. Apart from these factors, each territorial unit had political as well as national minorities, and in so far as the Jews in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia were concerned, even racial-religious minorities.

The most convenient classification of the Czechoslovakian parties is their division into the Czechoslovak parties, the parties of the minorities, and the parties of Carpathian Russia. The Czechoslovak parties can be subdivided into four divisions: (1) bourgeois (liberal), (2) agrarian, (3) socialist, and (4) conservative parties. The minorities also fall into four divisions: (1) German minority, (2) Magyar minority, (3) Polish minority, and (4) Jewish minority.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTIES

The Liberal Parties. The traditions of liberalism, established by the pre-war Young Czech Party were carried on by the National Democratic Party, formed in 1918 from the remains of the former Old Czech (National) Party, the Young Czech Party, the Constitutional Progressive Party, the Moravian Populist Progressive Party, and a part of the Progressive (Masaryk) Party. It rode to power on the crest of nationalistic enthusiasm in 1918, when its leader, Dr. Karel Kramář, assisted by a famed economist, Dr. Alois Rašín, formed the government. But very soon the support given to it by the majority of the urban middle classes and the intellectuals was weakened when the adherents began to be more interested in their class interests as employers and employees, manufacturers, traders and consumers, industrialists and artisans, and public officials. In other words, the liberal and all-national program was insufficient to insure the support of its former members drawn by their social interests into other camps. Essentially the party favored a nationalistic and even chauvinistic approach to the national problems, while it was conservative in regard to economic and social questions. The main body of its supporters, drawn from the industrial and commercial classes and the upper bourgeois factions of the cities, was located in Bohemia, though after 1924, the party extended its efforts to Slovakia and Carpathian Russia. Opposed to any concessions to minorities, the party was out-of-date, particularly before the death of Kramář, with its Pan-Slav policies.

In 1935 the party fused with the National Front (an unimportant Fascist group of Prof. Mareš) and the National League (a group of Deputy Stříbrný) as the National Union. Jiří Stříbrný was one of the "wild men" of Czechoslovak politics. Until 1926, Stříbrný, as one of the founders of the Republic, had been one of the heads of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. Several times a Cabinet Minister, at one point condemned by Parliament for bribery, he came into conflict with his own group and developed Fascist leanings with his League Against Obligatory Lists of Candidates (the reference being to the Czechoslovak electoral system). But the hopes of the National Union to capture more votes by its attacks on socialist parties in the 1935 elections did not materialize and the Union secured only 17 seats, whereas in the preceding elections, the National Democrats and the Stříbrný group had obtained 18 mandates.[2]

Though the Small Traders' Party originated in 1906-1907, its systematic organization began to take place only after 1918, with the aim to gain recognition for the interests of small industry and trade, which up to that time had been represented by the National Democrats. The social bases of the party were a result of the growing difficulties faced by the artisans and traders, the growth of taxation, the competition of mass production (especially in the field of shoes and ready-made clothes), the growing competition of the retail shops of the big manufacturers and chain stores, and the encroachments of the cooperatives. Its interests opposed thus the forces represented by the National Union and the Socialist parties. While in 1920 it had won 6 seats, in 1935, thanks to widespread dissatisfaction with the economic depression, its number of mandates increased to 17. As a member of the government coalition the party exercised some influence with its conservative class policy.[3]

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[2] Before the 1935 elections, Deputy Hudec, the Slovak Party of Razus and a fraction of the National Democrats had seceded from the Stříbrný party, but on the other hand in the 1935 elections the Carpathian Ruthenian group of Fenčík which obtained one mandate had affiliated itself with the National Union.

The Agrarian Parties. The strongest Czechoslovak Party was the Republican Party of the Agriculturists and Small Peasants (called originally the Czechoslovak American Party). It reached its dominant position by gradual evolution since its foundation in 1896. It had to compete for support in the agricultural districts of Bohemia with the Social Democrats and Christian Socialists by building up not only the political organization and the subsidiary organizations for youth, but also by supporting various professional organizations, especially the cooperatives. With the introduction of universal suffrage into Austria in 1907, the party became more democratic and progressive. This democratizing tendency reached its peak after the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic, when the party entered into a government coalition with the Socialist parties. Its program pointed out that the party represented the owners of the land, "which forms the state territory and hence in the proper sense of the word, also forms the foundation of the Republic." Though agrarian reform was favored, the party also supported the preservation of private property and the tenets of individualism. This combination of socialist and individualist views helped the party to gain adherents among small landholders. The ability of the leaders to push through the coalition government several measures to maintain the high agricultural prices kept it in power. The organization was also supported in the country districts by widespread mutual benefit organizations and through the use of a vast network of agricultural credit banks, associations and cooperative societies. From 1922 on, the organization was extended to Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. The strongest political group since 1925, it kept largely in its control the posts of Prime Minister and Chairman of the House of Deputies. The Minister of Agriculture, and as a general rule, the Ministers of National Defense and of the Interior, were also the representatives of the party. Dr. Milán Hodža, one of its leaders and a Slovak intellectual, justly noted for his statesmanship, was a worthy successor to the late Antonín Švehla. Švehla, a self-taught farmer-diplomat who exerted remarkable influence on the compromise tactics in the post-war coalition governments, was President of the National Committee which carried through the political and national revolution in the historic days of October, 1918.

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[3] We shall omit dealing with such ephemeral groups as the National Party of Work, which failed to concentrate the dissident elements of the National Democratic Party and of other parties in 1925, or the efforts to renew the traditions of Masaryk's one-time Realist party by Professor I. A. Bláha, or the failure to form the Slovak National Party.

Although interested primarily in the agrarian sections of the population, the party had in its ranks not only such intellectuals as Hodža, who was by profession University Professor of Modern History, but also workmen, employees and clerks. It also maintained very close relations with the German Farmers' Party.

Socialist Parties. The Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party was the most deeply rooted party and had the oldest traditions of all the socialist parties of the country. The organization, which adopted its program in 1878, was persecuted under Austrian rule, but by 1897, it had already sent 5 deputies to the Vienna Parliament. Some of its leaders favored the preservation of Austria, but at the end of the World War, these were pushed aside, and in 1919, one of its leaders, the most prominent of the personalities at that time, Vlastimíl Tusar, became Premier of Czechoslovakia. When socialist-revolutionary and communist elements appeared within its ranks, the party purged itself; but it thus also weakened its forces in the 1925 elections. In 1926 the Party withdrew from the government coalition of which it had been a part since the World War. This led to the entrance of two German bourgeois groups into the government, and enabled the closer cooperation of the German and Czechoslovak Social Democrats. In 1929, the strength of the Party returned to about two-thirds its strength in 1920; both the German and Czechoslovak Social Democratic groups entered the governmental coalition. In practice, its Marxist program was modified according to the special needs of its followers and of the state. From the class struggle it passed to a policy supporting the working classes and the lower employees; from collectivism it passed to a belief in the value of state initiative. Thanks to its initiative, Czechoslovakia instituted an 8-hour day, old age insurance and a number of social reforms. It also favored the democratization of the school system and the abolition of the religious influences in the state; and it opposed war. It believed that the international organization of the working classes should have been represented as opposing the international capitalist exploitation of the workers. Politically the party stood for a unicameral Parliament with the return of the right of suffrage to soldiers and gendarmerie, and the formation of nationalistically unified administrative districts, the extension of self-government, the shortening of military service, and the equality of the sexes. The principle of cultural autonomy for the minorities was propounded. The party organization included young peoples' associations, women's societies, the workers' Gymnastic Unions and the Workers' Academy. The trade union organizations, united in the Czechoslovak Association of Trade unions, covered also Slovakia and Carpathian Russia. Of great importance for the party were its mutual benefit groups, comprising a vast network of cooperative societies, particularly consumers' and producers' cooperatives.

The third of the Czechoslovak socialist parties was the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, which should not be confused with any "Nazi" or "Fascist" parties of the same name. It originated in 1897 under the supervision of the able organizer of the *Národní Listy*, Václav Jaroslav Klofáč. It was conspicuous for its nationalistic program, which differentiated it from the international program of the Social Democratic Party, designed to appeal to the Czech workers, small traders and officials. The Austrian Empire put obstacles in the path of its development because of its anti-militaristic tendencies. But while the Social Democrats became more nationalistic after the War, the National Socialists became more socialistic. The National Socialists differed from the Social Democrats by their opposition to Marxism and their predilection for state socialism, which the latter did not favor. Otherwise, the National Socialists agreed with the platform of the Social Democrats. Like the Social Democrats, the National Socialists had to purge its membership from the extremists. In 1923, four leading anarchists were expelled from its ranks. The arguments arising from the membership of Foreign Minister Beneš (last President of the Republic) in the party led to the expulsion of Stříbrný and others from its ranks in 1926. The Party more or less maintained its strength in the post-war Czechoslovak elections among workmen, lower employees, peasants and the lower middle classes.

At the 1925 elections the second party in numerical strength was not that of the socialists but of the Communists who were then much more numerous than the Social Democrats with their 41 seats (if we include the Czechs, Slovaks and minority Communists). The origin of the Communist movement can be traced to the Social Democratic party. With the return of the Czechoslovaks that were captured in Russia during the War, the Social Democratic group received a considerable number of radical elements. The post-war misery and psychology were powerful supporters of this extremist group. In the elections of 1920, this faction did not cooperate with the Social Democratic Party, but issued its own electoral manifesto. After the attempted *coup d'état* of December 1920, it formed itself into a Communist Party, as a section of the Third International. Thereafter the movement was torn apart by the differences between the critics and the proponents of Moscow's orders, although its strength increased in the first decade of Czechoslovakia because of the social dissatisfaction of the masses, particularly in the eastern parts of the Republic where the economic crisis was especially serious. The party was the only Czechoslovak political group which included all nationalities in its ranks. Its central executive committee contained also Germans, Magyars and Poles. Its program was frank about its anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary aims and favored a dictatorship of the proletariat. The accession of Hitler to power forced the party to support some "capitalist" measures of the government, and particularly the armament measure. It had its own trade unions with a membership of over 200,000, which were a part of the Russian International of Labor Unions, in addition to the educational institutions, gymnastic clubs and a press with a fairly large circulation.

The fifth place in numerical order up to the 1935 elections had been occupied by the Catholic party, or Czechoslovak Catholic Populist Party, a continuation of a pre-war organization which gained marked successes in the 1907 elections. During World War I its leaders manifested Austrophile tendencies—like the Social Democrats, and particularly Dr. Šmeral, a prominent Communist leader. But shortly before the formation of the state the Catholic party decided to support the Czechoslovak movement. Under Mgr. Jan Šrámek it manoeuvred the exclusion of the separation of church and state from the Czechoslovak Constitution. It secured 21 seats in 1920, 31 in 1925 and 25 in 1929; in 1930, its representation declined to 22. Altogether, this was an all-national party, since its membership consisted of all classes of the nation interested in Catholicism. The greater percentage of the followers were of course, the village inhabitants, small landholders and workers, but it was also supported by the intelligentsia of the cities. The social composition of the supporters determined its political views. Justice to the minorities was not only a political but a Christian *desideratum*. From the social viewpoint, it demanded social legislation, but the materialistic conception of a class struggle was opposed. The nationalistic culture was to be preserved and limits set on the holding of excessive amounts of private property. The schools should reflect religious influences. The party's organizations were important, although they were not so strong as those of the socialist parties. Special attention was paid to the small peasants. The city followers were held together by cultural and social activities; the teachers, professors and students were organized in their special groups. The youth was especially cultivated by the gymnastic associations, the "Orel" (The Eagle).

The Slovak Populist party was of purely regional character and occupied the first place among the parties whose influence was restricted to Slovakia and Carpathian Russia. The Slovaks had no important political organization under the Hungarian regime. Father Andrej Hlinka became famous at that time for his struggle for the preservation of Slovak culture and was bitterly persecuted by the Hungarian authorities. With the formation of the Republic, the party was formed and began to demand immediately Slovak autonomy, Catholic schools financed by the state and the exclusive use of the Slovak language in Slovakia. In 1920 it entered the elections side by side with the Czech Populist Party and obtained 12 seats; in 1925 it secured 23 seats and in 1929, 20 seats; at the 1935 elections, it allied itself with Razus' Slovak National Party, the Kurtyak Party (of Carpathian Russia) and the Polish bloc. Altogether this constellation won 22 mandates, three of which belonged to the small affiliated groups, so that the party itself, despite its strenuous efforts, scarcely maintained its strength. In 1927, its representatives joined the government but left it when one of its leaders, Dr. Tuka, was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for treason. The party acted as spokesman for Catholicism, conservatism and Slovak particularism of the Slovak under the thumb of Slovak priests, who suspected that the attempts of the Czechs to raise the intellectual level of the masses might deprive them of their influence.

PARTIES OF MINORITIES

German Minority. Up to the 1935 elections, the German minority presented a picture quite similar to that of the Czechoslovak camp as far as its lines of division were concerned. The strongest group had been the Socialist Democratic group, which won 34.5 per cent (31 seats) of all German votes in Czechoslovakia in 1920. This was caused by the fact that there were no other German socialist parties, and the fact that there had been a reaction among the Czechoslovak Germans against the nationalistic fever of World War I. The Communist desertion further weakened its strength, although only two deputies went "red." Another cause for the fall of its mandates from 31 to 17 in 1925 was the swing to the right in the German population. But in the elections of 1929, the party increased its mandates to 21. In May, 1935, the German Socialists suffered the same fate as the other German parties in the government coalition. It lost 10 seats, and its representation was reduced to 11 in the House of Deputies. The program of the party differed somewhat from that of their Czech counterparts. The Czech Social Democrats participated in the national revolution and in the upbuilding of the new state. The Germans, on the other hand, defended, together with the other German parties, the ideal of self-determination of Bohemian Germans and opposed the Czechoslovak state. They expressed their viewpoint in the congress in Teplice in 1919 by proclaiming that the new Czechoslovak Republic was a product of Allied imperialism. A few years later, however, their leaders began cooperation with the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, and in 1929, its representatives joined the Malypetr Cabinet.

The German Agrarian Party *(Bund der Landwirte)*, a counterpart of the Czechoslovak Republican Party, was formed in January 1920. It asked for full and unlimited self-determination for the German people, the dismissal of the conscript army, and autonomy of the communes. But it also had a practical attitude, and was the first of the German parties to adopt a policy of cooperation ("activism"). At the elections, the number of its seats varied between 12 and 16, but after the elections of 1925, 3 artisans and 5 members of the Magyar Nationalist party joined the 16 Agrarians, so that its club comprised 24 deputies, as against the situation after 1929 when it had only 16, with the addition of four deputies of the German Union and Labor Party. In 1935, the Agrarians lost 7 seats to the Sudeten German party, so that the number of its seats was reduced to 5 in the House of Deputies and to none in the Senate. On March 22, 1938, following the declaration of the *Anschluss* of March 13, Dr. Franz Špina, Professor in the Prague German University, resigned his seat both in the Cabinet and in the Parliament. On March 24, of the same year, Herr Zajíček, of the German Christian Socialist Party (*Deutsche Christlich Soziale Volkspartei*), did the same. The program of this party propounded the introduction of plebiscite in important questions, opposed divorces and domination by the Jews, favored compulsory religious education, and demanded social protection for the worker. After its electoral success in 1925, its 13 deputies entered the first Czech-German coalition in company with the German Agrarians, but left the coalition in 1929. In 1935, the party retained only 6 seats in the House of Deputies. In 1938, under pressure of circumstance and propaganda, the party decided to join the Henlein group.

The counterpart of the Czech Small Traders' Party was the German Small Traders' Party, the three deputies of which joined the German Agrarians in 1925 and the Christian Socialists in 1929. In 1935, it was included in the German electoral bloc which had affiliated with the Magyar National and Christian Socialist parties, and did not receive a single mandate at the distribution of the seats.

Entirely negative policies against the Czechoslovak Republic were maintained by the German Nationalist and the German National Socialist Parties; they were both pan-German and anti-Semitic. The first represented mosty the groups favored by the former Austrian régime; i.e., city inhabitants, industrialists, a considerable section of traders, state and other employees. Its leader, Dr. Baeran, was condemned for high treason in 1923. In 1935 all its seats passed to Henlein's Sudeten German Party. The German National Socialist Party was a counterpart of the Hitler movement in Germany. The Government, acting under the law for the defense of the Republic dissolved this irredentist group, and its leader, ex-deputy J. Krebs, escaped to Germany where he was appointed a member of Hitler's staff.

The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany on January 31, 1933, had its repercussions in Czechoslovakia. The

German National Socialist Workers' Party and the German Nationalist Party had maintained contacts with the Nazis of the Reich prior to the Nazi assumption of power. Their steps to form a "national front" of all German parties and cultural associations in Czechoslovakia were, however, counteracted by the announcement of Konrad Henlein, until then the Head of the German *Turnverband* (Gymnastic Federation), on October 1, 1934, of the formation of a German *Heimatsfront*, with himself as *Führer*. His manifesto called upon all Germans of Czechoslovakia to join this *Front*. The German National Socialist Workers' Party announced its voluntary liquidation on October 3, and its members joined Henlein. The German Nationalists also went over to the Henlein camp, which quickly built up its organization and soon penetrated various German organizations. In the elections of 1935, of the 72 seats falling to the German minority in Czechoslovakia, the Henlein Party secured 44; it thus became the strongest party in that minority, representing 62 per cent of the total electorate. The demands of the party formulated by Henlein at a meeting in Karlsbad on April 24, 1938, were for: the revision of "the misleading Czech historical myth"; the revision of the unfortunate idea that it was the task of the Czech people to form a bastion against the so-called German *Drang nach Osten;* the revision of the foreign policy which until then had placed the Czechoslovak State among Germany's enemies.[4]

Magyar Parties. The Germans were the only minority in Czechoslovakia strong enough to form independent political parties. The Magyar parties lacked strong organizations and so far entered the elections only in various combinations. Also, many of the Magyars voted for the Czechoslovak parties. For instance, the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party and the Social Democrats had their followers among the peasants of southern Slovakia and the Magyar workers. In fact, the Magyar Christian Socialist Party and the Nationalist Party were the only two groups strong enough to obtain any deputies. In general, both parties asked for Magyar autonomy. They went into the 1929 and 1935 elections with various German groups, and had 9 deputies (including one mandate of the Spíš Germans). But it should be noted that the Magyars of Slovakia obtained still further mandates among the parties covering the state as a whole; namely, 2 in the Republic party, one in the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and 2 in the Communist Party, and one mandate in the Communist Party of Carpathian Russia.

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[4] Herr Henlein also propounded that the Czechoslovak state would have to be reorganized on the following lines: (1) establishment of full equality between the German groups and the Czech people. (2) In order that this equality should be preserved, acknowledgment of the Sudeten German Group as a separate body politic. (3) Delimitation and recognition of the German regions. (4) The establishment of German autonomy in these regions in all branches of public life in so far as they concern the affairs and interests of the German people. (5) The passing of legal provisions for the protection of those German-speaking nationals who live outside the German regions. (6) redress of the wrongs committed against the Sudeten Germans since 1918 and reparation of the damage caused. (7) Recognition and adoption of the principle that German officials should be appointed in the German regions. (8) Full liberty as regards the profession of German *Volkstum* and German ideology.

The Polish Minority. The Poles were centralized exclusively in the northeastern part of Moravia-Silesia, and were composed socially mostly of the mine-workers; a few peasants, small traders and intelligentsia in the Těšin district. In addition to the Communists, the three other Polish parties—the Social Democratic Party, the Catholic Party and the People's Party—were united in a committee which fused with the Jews in the 1929 elections in order to ensure the success of its candidates. They won 2 seats; the same number went to the Jews. In 1935, the Polish Social Democrats united with the Czechoslovak party of the same name, and put two Jewish candidates near the top of their list. In 1935, the Polish Catholic Party and the People's Party, together with the new Polish Labor Party composed of the dissatisfied elements of the Polish Social Democratic Party, formed the autonomist bloc with the Slovak National Party (Razus), the Slovak Populist Party of Hlinka, and the Agricultural Autonomist Union of Carpathian Russia, and ensured the election of a Polish deputy.

The Jews. Most of the Czechoslovak Jews were settled in Slovakia and Carpathian Russia. Politically they were divided into two camps, whose differences were based on religious rather than on economic or political factors. The Zionist orientation was interested in safeguarding the Jewish cultural gain in the Republic, especially the Jewish schools. The conservative orthodox Jews defended their economic rights especially. But both camps cooperated with the Republic. In the elections the Jews usually voted with either the Czechoslovak or the German parties.

Carpathian Russia. Carpathian Russia formed a single electoral district, and as the required electoral figure in Czechoslovakia was relatively high, the parties there leaned on the parties covering the whole of the state. In 1935 the region was represented by 9 deputies and 5 senators—of whom 2 deputies and one senator represented the Magyar parties. All in all, the political life of the province was characterized by a low level, grouped usually around small fractions of transitory character. The problem was further complicated by national orientation, and by differences that arose between the Uniats and the Orthodox and by the struggle over the question of language, the Ruthenians being unable to decide whether to adopt the Great Russian or the Ukrainian tongue for their literary language.

The most definite political program in this region was really represented by the all-national parties of Czechoslovakia. The Social Democratic Party was supported there by Ruthenians, Magyars and Jews, and usually lower officials, favoring the Ukrainian orientation in the language question. The Communists, since 1925 leaning toward the Ukranian orientation, had the largest number of supporters. The National Christian Party, supported by small farmers, Uniat clergy and the Ukrainophil intellectuals, cooperated with the Czechoslovak Populist Party in elections. There was the Ruthenian offshoot of the Republican Party. The Autonomist Agricultural Federation of Dr. J. Kaminský, which demanded local autonomy, lost its majority of members to the Autonomist Agricultural Union of Ivan Kurtyak when it went to the polls in 1929 with the National Democrats and in 1935 with the Slovak Populist Party. The program of the Labor Party was similar to that of the Czechoslovak National Socialists. The National Socialists, as well as the National Democrats and the Small Traders' Party was also represented in the province. The Magyar votes were given to the Unified Magyar Party, but also to the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, the Republicans and the Communists. In the elections of 1935, the Magyar parties, united with small German groups, obtained 34,247 votes (over 11%) out of the 309,990 votes cast there. The Ruthenians obtained representatives in Parliament by uniting with the parties covering the whole state, namely 2 in the Republican party, 3 among the Communists, 1 in the Autonomist bloc (Hlinka's party and the affiliated groups), 1 in the National Union, and 1 among the Czechoslovak Social Democrats. Thus Carpathian Russia had 3 deputies in the Parliament in addition to one Magyar deputy.

HOFSTRA COLLEGE

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

BULGARIA AND THE BALKAN ENTENTE

by Harry N. Howard

The Four-Power Balkan Pact, to which Jugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey were signatories, was signed in Athens, Greece on February 9, 1934. Neither Albania nor Bulgaria were included in the pact, which laid the foundations of the Balkan Entente. The statutes of the Balkan Entente were formally adopted at a meeting in Ankara, Turkey, October 30—November 2, 1934.[1] Fundamentally the purpose of the members of the Balkan Entente was to guarantee the security of their Balkan frontiers. It was hoped, through a broad policy of political, social, economic and cultural cooperation, that the Balkan Entente would become the nucleus of a genuine Balkan union.

The Kingdom of Bulgaria refused to join the Balkan Entente from the very beginning, though initially, at least, Bulgarian policy was not necessarily antagonistic to the members of the new organization. On January 24, 1937, Bulgaria and Jugoslavia signed a treaty of perpetual peace and friendship, which many viewed as a genuine step toward peace between these two ancient enemies, while others looked upon it as a step toward the dissolution of the Balkan Entente. On August 31, 1938, shortly before the Munich "Conference," Bulgaria entered into a pact with the Balkan Entente meeting at Salonica, pledging herself to a policy of nonaggression.

With the coming of the present war, Bulgaria continued to pursue a policy outside the confines of the Balkan Entente, thereby contributing to the disunity of the region, and ultimately to her own downfall. On March 1, 1941, Bulgaria signed the protocol of adhesion to the Three Power Axis Pact of September 27, 1940.[2] Two days later, on March 3, 1941, German troops began the occupation of Bulgarian territory, preparatory to the conquest of Jugoslavia and Greece, and the consolidation of Nazi German power over the Balkan peninsula as a whole.

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[1] For text of documents see R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1936), Documents XIV, XV, XVI.

[2] S. Shepard Jones and D. P. Myers, *Documents on American Foreign Relations,* III (1941), 311.

It is in the light of these developments that the following Bulgarian document is of importance. It purports to give the official reasons for failure to adhere to the Balkan Entente. The text is as follows:

February 27, 1934
No. 18

Mr. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
State Department.

SIR:

Although the Government of the United States is not directly interested in the matter, I am instructed by my Government to submit the following to your enlightened attention.

A Balkan Pact was signed at Athens on February 5th,[3] by the Foreign Ministers of Jugoslavia, Roumania, Turkey and Greece. The terms of the agreement are not entirely divulged and although the Bulgarian Government have been informally approached on several occasions, at no moment has any definite proposal been made to them, by which they might measure the extent of the obligations which they were expected to assume.

From the conversations, however, which the Prime Minister of Bulgaria [M. Mushanov] had the opportunity to conduct with his Balkan colleagues and from what has transpired in the press, it appears that the Pact which has recently been signed has three main objects in view: 1, the maintenance of the existing territorial status in the Balkan Peninsula; 2, the mutual guaranteeing of the frontiers between the Balkan states concerned, and 3, an understanding on the part of the signatories that they shall not enter into any political agreements with any other Balkan state, i.e., Bulgaria or Albania, without consulting the other signatories.[4]

In spite of the pressure which has been brought to bear on her, Bulgaria has been unable to see her way to signing a pact which would crystalize for all time the actual status quo in the Balkans which has been established mainly at her expense. Bulgaria could see no reason to accord voluntary endorsement to penalties imposed upon her by a dictated peace treaty and to further aggravate her position by renouncing, without even the hint of compensation, the hope deeply embedded in the nation's heart for a revision of the Treaty, through peaceful means.

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[3] The pact was "paragraphed" in Belgrade, February 2-4 and formally signed in Athens on February 9, 1934.

[4] A so-called "secret protocol" was also signed on February 9, 1934, indicating that the pact was not directed against any country. The four powers were mutually pledged to unite against any threat from a Balkan state. The Protocol stressed the defensive character of the Balkan Pact and declared that "the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* actually established in the Balkans is final for the contracting parties." A summary of the alleged protocol was published in *Zora* (Sofia), March 18, 1934, and the alleged text in *La Macédoine* (Sofia), May 1, 1934. See also the London *Times*, April 25, 1934; *New York Times*, April 26, 1934.

The Treaty of Neuilly, like the other treaties signed about the same time, was the embodiment of the spirit of vengeance and spoliation. Speaking in the Senate about the Treaty of Versailles Senator Borah said recently that President Wilson "sought in vain to assuage its vindictive terms and to mollify its predatory effects. He entertained the hope, no doubt, that the League of Nations would ameliorate its terms." The Treaty of Neuilly which was drafted in the same spirit as that of Versailles, met, no doubt, with the same criticism on the part of the President and it was probably for this reason that it was not allowed to stand alone, but was made inseparable from the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided in its article 19 that:

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

It is the deep belief of Bulgaria that it was unwarrantable and contrary to her interests to be asked to abandon in favour of a Balkan Pact, the advantages of which are not apparent, a pact much wider in its application and which, furthermore, holds out for her the possibility of an ultimate revision of the Treaty of Peace. Moreover she thinks that special pacts which are directed against some particular adversary are in contradiction with the Pact of the League and lead straight back to the system of alliances that brought on wars. For these reasons Bulgaria in full loyalty made it plain that she could not renounce the rights which are given her by the Covenant and of which no one thought it possible to despoil her, even at the darkest hour when defeat weighed heavily upon her.

The Bulgarian Government is fully aware of the fact that by maintaining the view that the Treaty of Peace is not meant to be eternal they lay themselves open to various inferences and suspicions. Bulgaria has repeatedly shown her genuine attachment to peace and her sincere desire to live in friendly relations with all nations and especially so with her neighbors.

She has loyally fulfilled her international obligations; she has shown faithful abidance by the tenets of the League of Nations; she has subscribed to the Kellogg Pact, and has shown agreement with the principles contained in the message which President Roosevelt sent in May last to the heads of State of the world.[5]

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[5] On May 16, 1933, the eve of a statement by Herr Hitler to the Reichstag, President Roosevelt appealed to the Heads of States represented at the World Conference for the Reduction of Armaments to support the British plan for reduction of arms and the conclusion of a nonaggression pact. He indicated American willingness to consult with other nations to avoid hostilities and to waive neutral rights in case of the application of sanctions by the League of Nations against an aggressor.

But in order to allay the misgivings which her reluctance to join in the Balkan Pact may have aroused, she decided to give a further proof of her peaceful intentions, by offering her neighbors to conclude with her treaties of non-aggression.[6] This offer, however, has not been accepted by them.

The conclusion of the Balkan Pact without the participation of Bulgaria has not brought any new element in the political situation in the Balkans. The need for, or the wisdom of any formal agreement among the Balkan States which did not include them all is not apparent. The object of a Balkan Pact should have been to heal differences, not to emphasize them. It is particularly to be deplored that this Pact which Bulgarian public opinion visualizes as an unfriendly move, has been signed at a moment when, having surmounted psychological preventions of a particularly strong nature, this same opinion had begun to get familiar with the idea of a reconciliation with Jugoslavia, an event which alone could give a lasting solution to the much vexed Balkan question.

In fine, I wish to emphasize that contrary to certain rumors which have been circulated, the attitude which the Bulgarian Government has taken in this question is in no way due to influences from outside, but is the natural outcome of the unanimous feeling of the Bulgarian nation.

Having brought the preceding to your attention, I venture to express the hope, Mr. Secretary of State, that you will not fail to give it your benevolent consideration and to appreciate that in this occasion Bulgaria has acted in full loyalty and in a manner which does not impair in any way, the cause of peace and collaboration between nations, to which she remains unfalteringly attached.

I avail myself of this opportunity to present to you, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration.

EXECUTIONS IN THE PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA

The information reaching the outside world from Prague concerning the recent "executions" of Czechs for "sabotage," "high treason" and "cooperation with enemies of the state" has been meagre and vague. Sometimes the number of those who were sentenced to be "executed" was given, sometimes a few names, and on other occasions only a general statement that a "number" of Czechs had been "executed." It is not now possible to give any exact total of those who have been shot or hung in this recent campaign to punish Czech recalcitrance, but a conservative estimate would place the number, from the middle of September to December 25, at around 425. It may well run to double that number, though it can hardly be any less. The date of the "execution" is not given, as there is no reason to believe that there is any credence to be placed in the date furnished by the DNB.

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[6] Bulgaria, in other words, was willing to make bi-lateral pacts with each of her neighbors, as with Jugoslavia in January 1937.

The following list of 86 known victims of Nazi justice was compiled from generally reliable sources, press dispatches to New York and London. In some cases it will be noted no real identification has been possible, as the name is relatively obscure, or no further identification was released by the DNB. It is not easy to determine the principles on which the non-military victims were chosen. Whether a random choice of persons from all walks of life was intended as a threat against the whole population by its very uncertainty or whether it was intended to give an impression of stamping out the "black traffic" among all classes of the people in goods forbidden to the Czechs, it is not possible to say. The large proportion of army officers in the list raises a suspicion that the Nazis still harbor a fear that the Czech army might serve as a nucleus for eventual revolt against them. Elimination of key staff officers and consequent intimidation of the rest might be planned as a deterrent of any such revolt.

It should be simply said at this point that this type of discipline marks a new departure in German-Czech relations. The relations of the Czechs with their northern German neighbor have throughout history been rather more peaceful than the rest of Europe can show in the case of contiguous nationalities. But the Czechs have borne an undying enmity for the Austrian Hapsburgs since the execution of the leaders of their nation in the Old Town Square in June, 1621. There were only twenty-six victims on that occasion. The Czechs remembered those twenty-six for three hundred years. It is hardly likely that they will forget the executions of hundreds of their fellows in a shorter space of time.

S. H. T.

Adam, Helmut, merchant, Jihlava.
Adam, Walter, textile manufacturer, Jihlava.
Ambrož, František, Lt. Col. Professor at War College.
Bartošík, Vladimir, 23 years old.
Baum, Miloš, commercial agent, Prague.
Beneš, Josef, Director of the Agricultural Association of Roudnice.
Bilý, Josef, Maj. Gen. (retired); imprisoned in Pankrác prison since March 15, 1939.
Curichter, Václav, civil service official, Louny.

Čapek, Karel, Col. (retired); formerly personnel director at Ministry of National Defence.

Čech, Walter, Prague.

Černohorský, Josef, master mechanic, Prague.

Dědic, František, Lt. Col.; Chief of Staff of Fourth Division.

Doležal, Mikulaš, Brig. Gen.

Drda, Štefan, printer, Hostivice.

Dvořák, Josef, Col.

Elsnic, Karel, publisher-editor.

Fischer, Jiří.

Franc, Václav, laborer, Prague.

Frankenberger, Otakar, department chief in Ministry of Agriculture.

Frolik, Franz, department adviser in Ministry of Agriculture.

Frydl, Alois, 25 years old.

Glogar, Ondřej, Valašské Meziríči

Horáček, František, Brig. Gen. Professor at War College; artillery ordnance expert.

Jelinek, Zdeněk, printer, Prague.

Jemelka, Josef, miller, Stěchovice.

Jilek, František, printer, Prague.

Jílek, Vojtěch, Professor of Latin (retired) at Brno junior college. Almost completely blind.

Kafka, František H., Professor, medical faculty Charles University in Prague. Director of Psychiatric division of the principal hospital in Prague. His researches led him to oppose Freudian interpretation of dreams.

Kasik, Karel, engineer, Prague.

Kiwalski, Gustav, 25 years old.

Klapka, Otakar, Professor, law faculty of Charles University, sometime member of Reichstrat at Vienna; politically active under Republic; on March 16 named Mayor of Prague, and Nov. 11, 1939, named by von Neurath as Government Commissar with title of Lord Mayor. On July 10, 1940 arrested "for cooperation with the enemies of the state, acting outside its frontiers."

Komzák, Ladislav, laborer, Prague.

Klucka, František, 19 years old.

Knobloch, Rudolf, post office clerk, Prague.

Krejčí, Miloš, Prague.

Kresta, Vojtěch, post office clerk, Prague.

Kršek, František, Major. This may be a mistake for Dr. František Krška who, in 1931, was a Reserve Capt. in the Quartermaster Corps. There is no Kršek in the official list of officers of the Czechoslovak Army.

Křížek, František, editor.

Kvarda, Antonín, Director of the Commercial School in Rackovnice.

Malý, Josef, Col. 48th Inf. Regt.
Mar, Alois, purchasing director, Prague.
Matyáš, Julius, hung.
Matyáš, Ladislav, hung.
Melzer, Josef, pharmacist, Louny.
Nevrlý, Ladislav, 21 years old.
Oborný, Oldřich, laborer, Moravská Ostrava.
Pavelka, Bedřich, Prague.
Pechlá, Augustin, Regional Director of the Prague Sokol.
Pavlica, Jaroslav, Valašské Meziříči.
Pěstuka, Jan, Kladno.
Plodek, Jaroslav, builder-contractor, Louny.
Pohůnek, František, Col., Professor at the War College. As Legionnaire served in France.
Pollak, Emil, disabled war veteran, hung.
Pospíšil, Rudolf, Brno, laborer.
Postupa, Jan, editor.
Potaš, Jan, hung.
Prošek, Václav, post office clerk, Vysoká Lhota.
Ružek, Otakar, Capt.
Schwarz, Leo.
Sedláček, Jaroslav (or Jaromír), carpenter.
Smrkovský, Josef, wholesaler and importer, Prague.
Strnad, Alois, textile manufacturer, Kutná Hora.
Svátek, Oleg, Brig. Gen.
Svet, K., Lasov.
Svoboda, Josef, Col., director of a farmers' cooperative.
Svoboda, Václav (or Emanuel), Lt.
Synek, Oto, Communist deputy, elected in 1935. In prison from Sept. 1, 1939.
Šára Václav, Brig. Gen. Artillery. As Czech legionnaire served in Russia.
Šnábl, Josef, clerk, Brno. Imprisoned for giving false information to the Gestapo, obviously to confuse them. Hung.
Šubrt, Dušan, clerk.
Trampera, Miroslav, Prague. Hung.
Trejbal, Karel, Presiding Judge of the District Court in Velvary. Famous chess player.
Trhlica, Josef, Velká Lhota.
Trnečka, Alois, laborer, Brno.
Valeček, Alois, farmer.
Valeček, Ferdinand, policeman.
Vojta, Hugo, Maj. Gen. Served as legionnaire in Russia. Decorated with Czechoslovak War Cross, Revolutionary Medal, British War Cross and many other European honors.

Vatek, Brig. Gen.
Výrek, Vojtěch, pharmacist in Brno.
Weis, Jan, Brno, hung.
Wilhelm, Alfred, Brno, hung.
Wunsch, František, baker.
Žežulik, Josef, Valašské Meziříči.
Žežulka, Richard, Rokytnice.

REVIEWS

PRAWDIN, MICHAEL, *The Mongol Empire, Its Rise and Legacy.* New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 581. $5.00.

Michael Prawdin's picture of Mongol expansion and its aftermaths, though deliberately impressionistic as well as popular, is painted in bold sweeping strokes which reveal not only sympathy but artistry and some sense of perspective and balance. That is to say, the book is worth careful reading although its value as history is limited. No use has been made of archaeological or geographical material, and there is no hint of the problems imposed by the literary sources. There is no discussion of Mongolian backgrounds and no mention of the Steppe Iranian and Hunnish cultures which had earlier dominated much of the area embraced by the Mongol expansion. It is to be doubted that the author was aware of the complexity of the economy of the pastoral nomads; of their dependence upon the highly developed inter-regional commerce fostered by both Iranians and Arabs; or of the social as well as economic problems with which men such as Jenghiz and Timur were obliged to grapple.

The interests of Prawdin, however, have their own validity—the importance of personality in history, the essential unity of "European" history, the great debt owed by China, the Near East, and, especially, Europe to the unifying and civilizing influences of the Mongol Empire. In the view of Prawdin, Jenghiz was very conscious of his divine mission to unify the world, and he and most of his successors, including the Timurides, were generally devoted to peace and the promotion of the arts and sciences. Their atrocities were designed to secure the speedy collapse of opposition. In the face of the Mongol advance Europe is pictured as torn by political, religious, and social rivalries and at the same time gripped by hysterical and numbing fear. All that saved Europe from complete subjugation was the decision of the Mongol leaders not to undertake it. The collapse of the Empire is attributed to the individualism of Mongol character and to the voluntary surrender of the heirs of Jenghiz to the high civilizations and local patriotism which their own tolerance and interests had stimulated.

Of particular interest to Prawdin is the extent to which the civilization of the East, carried to Europe as a result of Mongol imposed continental unity, contributed directly to the development of modern European civilization—including European imperialism. He elaborates also upon Russia's conscious acceptance of the Mongol heritage; ascribes to this the relative ease of Russian expansion in Central Asia and the Far East; and contrasts unfavorably the methods employed by Manchu China in its expansion into Mongolia. In closing he argues that as the European development of the high seas route to the Far East destroyed the strategic importance of the transcontinental route, so we are now about to witness the reversal of this development. In the coming struggle, which will involve not only Japan, China, and Russia, but all of Asia, the decision will be reached not on the Pacific but in Inner Asia, and the power which succeeds in establishing itself there will become master of all Asia.

University of Michigan. ROBERT H. McDOWELL.

GAXOTTE, PIERRE, *Frederick the Great*, trans. R. A. Bell. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1941. Pp. 454. 15s.

Nearly eighty years ago Carlyle pictured Frederick the Great as a military hero, and recent examination of Carlyle's sources and methods shows that on the military side his six volumes were not so inaccurate as many professional historians used to assert. A generation later Reinhold Koser's monumental four-volume biography, still the standard work in German, dealt with Frederick as philosopher, writer, administrator, and military leader—in fact with every aspect of the multifarious activities of the absolutist and enlightened King of Prussia.

M. Gaxotte is primarily interested in Frederick as a fascinating psychological case-study in repressed royalty. Nearly half of his interesting and sparkling volume is devoted to Frederick as Crown Prince. Following along the lines of Ernest Lavisse's studies of Frederick the Great's youth, he shows how King Frederick William's religiosity and brutal simplicity contributed to make the sensitive and gay boy into a tolerant skeptic ("Everyone can go to Heaven in his own way") and into a cynical deceiver of father, friend, and foe. The international intrigues of the "Double Marriage Project," Frederick's attempt at flight and the execution of his accomplice, Katte, before his eyes, and Frederick William's anger are all told admirably, and shown in relation to the development of Frederick's character and tendencies. Then came gradually a grudging reconciliation between father and son. To please the Royal Drill Sergeant, the Crown Prince diligently applied himself to drilling his regiment, inspecting domains, and collecting taxes, so as always to get "a bit more" out of the poor Russian subjects. Finally, by the time of his death in 1740, Frederick William came at last to have a high regard for his son's administrative ability and a real affection for him. One of his last letters ended: "I am, with faithful affection, my beloved son, your very affectionate and faithful father."

The story of the three exhausting Silesian Wars is rather briefly and inadequately told. One cannot make tactics and strategy clear and interesting without some diagrams or maps, and there are no diagrams or maps (except a rough general map of Prussia inside the back cover). The same brevity characterizes the two chief international episodes of the second half of Frederick's reign—the First Partition of Poland and the War of the Bavarian Succession.

As a Frenchman M. Gaxotte is naturally interested in Frederick's enthusiasm for French language, literature and friends. Very frequently he quotes from Frederick's own prose or poetry. This gives vividness and lets one see the workings of the King's mind. There is very properly a good deal about the sentimental admiration and petty quarrels of Frederick and Voltaire. Though each delighted to flatter the other but often spoke disparagingly in private, each did regard the other as the most distinguished genius of the age. Gaxotte is equally fair to each, and pokes a good deal of fun at the weaknesses of both.

As the translation is excellent, this may be regarded as the best one-volume life of Frederick in English. Gaxotte is familiar with the vast literature of the subject and gives a good short bibliography. Without ever being boring, he lets Frederick as far as possible speak for himself, and Frederick was never at a loss for words. In his general emphasis he rightly follows Koser rather than Carlyle.

Harvard University. SIDNEY B. FAY.

Cambridge History of Poland: From Augustus II to Pilsudski, edited by W. F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski, Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. 630. 3 maps. $7.50.

The story of the vicissitudes of this history of Poland planned by the late Harold Temperley in 1936, is fraught with tragedy and near-tragedy. Three of the contributors, two Polish professors and Miss Monica Gardner lost their lives from deportation or enemy action before the volume appeared. The first volume, it appears, suffered more from broken communications or German occupation of Poland than this second half. This circumstance explains the publication of the second part first. The editors are to be congratulated for not standing on form or chronology. This very timely volume, in the fine tradition of the Cambridge histories, should be carefully studied by everyone interested in getting at the root of Central European twentieth century problems.

The plan of the volume is not uninspired. A consecutive political chronicle is generously interrupted by chapters on society, literature and art. The 22 authors have been chosen from eminent Polish, English and American scholars, with the Poles very properly in the majority. The problem of translation has not been easy and occasionally the Polish idiom may be detected, but the general level of readability and even verve is very high.

It is, however, not a book to be read at one sitting. The infinite and kaleidoscopic diversity of the problems faced by a numerous, combative, imaginative and even mystical people with no natural geographical boundaries save perhaps on their southern frontier, confronted by two powerful and acquisitive states on the west and the east—Prussia and Russia—is enough to confuse any student of their history. A shortsighted nobility, dynastic inconstancy, confessional turmoils, a political organization that had never been able to reach maturity, steady infiltration of Prussians, Austrians and Russians into the economy, bureaucracy and society of the whole Polish area, all unite and apparently conspire to ensure the frustration of Polish statehood for over two centuries. This volume is the story of that tragic frustration. The account of Poland's golden age, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, will be the high point of the first volume which, it is to be hoped, will soon appear.

The reader cannot lay the present volume down without reaching the compelling conviction that the revolution of 1763, before the Partitions which might normally be regarded as the nadir of Polish history, marked a turning point for the better in the development of the people of Poland. The tempo of that progress increased sharply after the Congress of Vienna. Since 1815, despite the temporary popularity of political Romanticism with great numbers of patriotic Poles, there has been a noticeable upsurge of hard-headed and determined political realism. During the past century the Poles have raised to leadership men of keen political acumen, perhaps the more enthusiastically that full advantage of the inspired but too-advanced leadership of Kościuszko had not been taken. Prince Adam Czartoryski, Mickiewicz, Krasiński, Chłapowski, Gołichowski, Dmowski, Piłsudski and for a brief period Paderewski, were men whose greatness would have been more easily recognized in any of the great powers than was possible in a quadripartite or tripartite Poland. It is a part of Poland's misfortune that the genius of her sons could not have been canalized in these hours of painful growth.

A few points in the book may be here remarked upon, either by way of emphasis or of minor disagreement. Professor Konopczyński's statement (p. 3) that Silesia was "racially and linguistically . . . thoroughly Polish" would certainly be challenged by non-Polish Slav historians. In the difficult discussion of the Polish constitution Professor Skwarczyński compares the concept of the Polish crown with that of England, Bohemia and Hungary (pp. 50, 59), but as these three are all quite different, the explanation still lacks clarity. Perhaps a more extensive background will be laid in the first volume. In this chapter we could have wished for more analysis of deeper causes, e. g., of decentralization (p. 62), of a diminishing army (p. 66), or the variations in the extent of royal power (p. 70f.) What we have now is largely a *catena* of bare and sometimes ill-related statements. Professor W. J. Rose's chapter (IV) on Social Life Before the Partitions, with those of General Kukiel on Kościusko (VIII) and Dr. Coleman on the Great Emigration (XIV) are perhaps the most lively in the whole book. Colonel Beck would have profited from frequent re-reading (beginning with 1933) of General Kukiel's chapter. Throughout the book the striking importance of Free Masonry in all Polish movements for freedom is made clear. Professor J. H. Rose in his chapter (X) on Napoleon and Poland calls Stanislas Augustus "a mere cipher." But it is abundantly obvious from previous and more detailed chapters that on many occasions Poniatowski was, within the limits of his delicate position, vigorous, far-sighted and influential. The valor of the Polish people hardly needs be mentioned when the memory of the autumn of 1939 is still vivid among us, but the loyalty of the Polish Legions to Napoleon from 1807 onwards and the effort of the Duchy of Warsaw in the Russian campaign—98,000 men—was a strain upon the vitality of the people whose ill effects were to last for some decades.

The chapters on the Congress of Vienna (H. M. Hyde) and the Polish

Problem in International Politics (B. E. Schmitt), both of them discriminating and meaty, are particularly valuable in that they redress a balance of chapters written from the inside either by Poles or by close students whose chief interests have been in Polish life and history. Such a counterbalance is particularly necessary in the case of a history so involved as Poland's. If times had been more normal, chapters by German, Russian and Austrian historians would have been desirable.

In Chapter XV (J. Feldman) "Czech" is sometimes used incorrectly where "Bohemian" would have been exact. Here also the editors might have improved the chapter by diminishing the anti-Czech animus. W. J. Rose (Chapters XVII and XVIII) launches a new periodization of the history of Prussian and Russian Poland in the later nineteenth century, based on the underlying currents of social and national thinking. This comprehensive approach has usually escaped the political historian, but, once broached, must be accepted as fundamental and inescapable. St. Estreicher (Chapter XIX) speaks of Galicia as "the most populous country" of the Austrian crown. Statistically this may be true, but it disregards the deep cleavage within its boundaries between Poles and Ruthenes which made it in reality two provinces. Much of this chapter would be sharply challenged by either Ruthene or Ukrainian historians.

The last chapters, made difficult by nearness to the personalities and tensions they relate, are nonetheless very balanced and valuable. The confusion of thought in the outside world concerning the Polish question as well as the tremendous problem the Poles themselves faced by reason of a century and a half of widely divergent social and political life, split among three empires, are faithfully presented. No definitive judgment of Piłsudski is yet possible, but Lord Kennet's study (Chapter XXV) of the great marshal is illuminating and discerningly analyzes the conflict of ideals he harbored. The peculiar nature of Piłsudski's socialism is shown by a collocation of these two sentences: "But his socialism was still a by-product of his nationalism" (p. 592) and "He had chosen to work with the Left, but rather because they were revolutionaries than because he was a socialist" (p. 601). In the light of later events to say that Piłsudski "stabilized" Polish foreign policy (p. 606) may be putting it somewhat strongly.

If anyone doubts that the Polish nation will live, even a cursive reading of this impressive volume should convince him that these who have come out of great tribulation shall not be denied the reward of their travail.

University of Colorado S. HARRISON THOMSON.

VALENTIN, VEIT, *1848, Chapters of German History*. Translated by Ethel Talbot Scheffauer. New York: W. W. Norton, 1941. Pp. 480. $3.75.

This volume is a condensation in English of the author's two volume work on the same subject in German. The present version amounts to less than half the size of the original, and unfortunately shows the scars of cutting. Transitions are occasionally too abrupt for understanding by the uninitiated reader, and in a few places seem to be omitted entirely. Likewise the author has preferred for the English edition the parts which emphasize biographical sketches, personification of towns, areas and cultural groups, and general characterizations of events and situations. Institutions, in particular constitutions and other governmental forms, are analyzed in such slight fashion that the reader may receive the erroneous impression of their being relatively much less important than persons and actions. The constitutional problems of German unification are nowhere adequately discussed, and the Kremsier constitution is altogether slighted. Even more sketchily handled is the entire peasant question, in spite of the fact that the peasant uprisings explain more than any other factor why the conservative elements lost control for as long as they did. The much less important rebellions among the lower groups in the towns are described at length.

These criticisms do not detract from the fact that the book contains much material not to be found elsewhere in English. The excellent characterization of Frederick William IV, the identification of numerous small societies and clubs formed during the revolutionary period, the portrayal of the heterogeneous groups and ideals active in the general confusion, should prove interesting, and the author's judgments on the nature and course of the revolution are on the whole quite sound.

The reviewer would have liked the book better if phrases like the following had not been used so profusely: "this primitive old Bavarian spirit" (p. 77), "a real old German personality" (p. 49), "the very heart of Germany" (p. 99), "South German warmth and West European intellectuality" (p. 99), "daring mordancy of the true revolutionary" (p. 100), "sober Saxons" (p. 119), "Rhenish gift of eloquence" (p. 119).

The American University. EUGENE N. ANDERSON.

The Diary of Gino Speranzo, Italy 1915-1919. Edited by Florence Colgate Speranza. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1941. 2 vols. Pp. xxvii, 406, 336. $6.00.

Of the major European nations, Italy has perhaps been least adequately represented in America in recent times, a fact due in some measure to the nature and extent of Italian immigration around the turn of the century. The effects of prejudice and misconception were apparent during the Great War and in the subsequent settlement. Such a book as this, calculated to give a more balanced picture, is therefore to be welcomed.

Gino Speranza, of North Italian parentage, but American born and bred, was possessed of a first hand knowledge and understanding of both countries and their cultures. His diary, covering the period from August, 1915 to April, 1919, provided us with a daily record of events and impressions as they appeared to an observer on the spot. After the entrance of the United States into the war Speranza volunteered his services to the American Embassy in Rome, to which he formally became attached in the spring of 1918. The Embassy was singularly unequipped to cope with its task. Speranza, at home in the language, history, politics, and press of Italy, produced for Thomas Nelson Page daily summaries of the Italian scene which proved so far superior to anything that had hitherto penetrated the ambassadorial sanctum that they were sent first to Washington, and later, after the arrival in Europe of the American Delegation, to Paris.

These reports, not included in the diary, would be of great value to the historian. Speranza understood, and sympathized with, Italian aspirations in their legitimate sphere. Usually sound estimates of the leaders and of a host of other figures give background to the scene. Sonnino, respected for his integrity, but obstinate and narrow, and Orlando, who "absorbs the color of the situation instead of giving it his own," held in their hands the fate of Italy at the Peace Conference; what they did with it is well known. True, they had to cope with a peculiarly difficult situation and their lack of vision was amply shared by others; but they must bear the responsibility for allowing, if not urging, to move to extremes a public opinion which could easily have been turned into channels of moderation and sanity. Speranza found himself drawn increasingly to Bissolati, for whose interview with Wilson, when the latter visited Rome, he was responsible. While appraising Wilson's sensational appeal of April 23, 1919 for the mistake that it was, Speranza's outlook remained essentially Wilsonian. In the spring of 1919 he was glad to return to America.

But above all this is a diary in the strict sense, giving a picture of Italy at war as seen by a sympathetic eye. Victories and defeats, hope and discouragement, steadfastness and indifference, deeds of military valor and political intrigues, feeling descriptions of countryside and towns at war, accounts of visits to the fighting front (the description of the first visit to Venice and the trip to the Adamello may be singled out) blend into a canvas that conveys the impression of Italy as a living organism rather than an unreal abstraction on the checkerboard of international politics, a picture of "men enduring and brave, ready to die for their mothers, homes, and native land, but not warriors or conquerors. With civilization too bred in the bone to allow them to love war, success will not intoxicate them or turn the nation into a militaristic state. When this terrible war is over, they will return—to their vineyards and shops, to their loquacious cafés and *osterie*, where good honest wine can be had—the same simple, bright, kindly people that they have always been."

New York City. RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ.

BRUNTZ, GEORGE G. *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918.* Hoover War Library Publications, No. 13. Stanford Univ. Press, 1938. Pp. xiii, 246. $3.50.

This volume is a definite contribution to our knowledge of the First World War. It should also be enlightening to those who hope that in the Second World

War the defeat of Hitler can be brought about chiefly by skillful propaganda. For although the author believes, after extensive research, that Allied propaganda "probably helped to hasten the end of the war," he takes pains to point out that it "was only one of the many weapons used in the war . . . and that it could not have been successful without the aid of the military forces and the conditions within Germany." Without the British blockade and American assistance, the author states, "the propagandists would have made little headway in their attacks upon the morale of the enemy." Nevertheless, in these days of mighty struggles between nations in arms it is generally recognized that psychological war must accompany and supplement the military and economic conflict, and so this study of the Allied propaganda campaigns in the First World War is particularly valuable.

The author first describes the propaganda organizations of France, England, and the United States, and then discusses their methods and tactics, some of which were certainly most ingenious. He next analyzes Allied propaganda and classifies it under five heads according to the end or goal which was sought. In a roughly chronological sequence the five types were: (1) propaganda of enlightenment, designed to give the Germans those facts withheld by their military leaders; (2) propaganda of despair, designed to show the Germans that the odds were overwhelmingly against them and that it was futile to continue to fight; (3) propaganda of hope, designed to convince them that, despite their prospective and inevitable defeat, a just peace would be made with the German people once they had overthrown the Hohenzollerns and establishd a democratic government; (4) particularistic propaganda, designed to break the unity of the German Empire, to produce a "house divided against itself;" (5) revolutionary propaganda, designed to reveal to the Germans the unworthiness of their rulers and to convince them that no peace could be made so long as the Hohenzollerns remained in power.

Since Dr. Bruntz believes that internal conditions in Germany were of major importance in facilitating Allied propaganda, he devotes a chapter to a discussion of the internal forces which helped to bring about the moral collapse of Germany in 1918. He concludes that wo factors were responsible. "The old Reich had not counted upon a blockade that would cause a shortage of food, and it had not prepared the moral force of the people for a long war." In a final chapter an attempt is made to measure the effect of Allied propaganda upon the Germans by considering reports of the Psychological Subsection of the United States Army, German efforts at counter-propaganda, desertions of German troops, letters from German soldiers to their home-folks, and German army orders dealing with propaganda. Dr. Bruntz concludes with H. D. Lasswell that "propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the modern world."

The volume is a well-organized presentation of the results of what appear to be careful research and discriminating judgment. It is illustrated with reproductions of cartoons and leaflets used by the Allies, and has an extensive bibliography of documents, books and magazine articles. In fairness to the author it should be pointed out that practically the entire plan of the book's organization and much of the research had been completed before the appearance of Hans Thimme's *Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, die Propaganda der Westmächte gegen Deutschland, ihre Wirkung und ihr Aufbau.*

Indiana University. F. Lee Benns.

Marriott, Sir John, *The Tragedy of Europe.* London and Glasgow: Blackie and Son, Ltd., 1941. Pp. 228. 8s. 6d. net.

Mackintosh, John, *The Paths that Led to War.* London and Glasgow: Blackie and Son, Ltd.,1940. Pp. 364. 10s. 6d. net.

The dangers of writing contemporary history are notorious, and they are illustrated anew by the two books. If Mr. Mackintosh prepares a new edition of his book, one wonders what he will do with the following sentence:

"Looking back over the years since Versailles, the historian may feel that one name stands out in the struggle to protect the west from attack, that of the ex-serviceman and Minister of War who built a wall of steel and concrete to save France and the civilization of Europe from the aggressor—André Maginot."

And if Sir John Marriott revises his book, one wonders whether and how far he will tone down the passages in which his bitter animus against Russia is expressed. Will he still suggest that the only criticism of allied interventions in Russia in 1919-20 is that they were not persisted in until the Bolshevik regime was overthrown? Both books were written too soon!

That, however, is all they have in common. Sir John is a historian of repute; he was also a Conservative member of the British House of Commons. Apparently it is in the latter capacity that he wrote most of this book. It is too indiscriminate in its defense of British policy to be convincing, and the judgments expressed in it display too much bias to be good propaganda. One need not be lacking in appreciation of Austen Chamberlain to be a little shocked at "his memorable tenure of our own Foreign Office." He passes over in silence Sir Neville Henderson's tenure at the Embassy in Berlin in a later period. As history the book has little value; it is slight and adds nothing to our knowledge. It is a book of reminiscences of a fairly well informed observer of the European scene during the last twenty years rather than a work of history. It does have some value, however, as a revelation of the "mind of an appeaser."

As examples of the judgment to be found in it:

Mr. Stimson's indictment of the Simon policy in Manchuria has no real basis and "the time has surely come for the decent interment of a diplomatic myth which has perverted judgment" . . . "General Franco declared that his objective was to deliver Spain from the toils of the Communists supported by the Third International of Moscow. That object he has seemingly achieved."

"To speak of the rape of Austria is to misuse an ugly word. That the victim was to some extent a consenting party is clear . . ." Hitler's religious policy "is less anti-religious than anti-clerical," unlike, we presume, the religious policy of the wicked Bolsheviki! Sir John leaves the impression that he writes of Hitler and Mussolini more in sorrow than in anger. He has no fundamental objection to autocracy, apparently, for Regent Horthy's regime, to mention an example, has been "so admirable." If Hitler had not been bent on war, and that war involving Great Britain, our author would not have found it difficult to forgive everything else! Friends of Great Britain will not wish for this book a wide circulation in the United States. It is the swan song of appeasement.

The book has been written carelessly and the proof reading has been even more careless. The Italians of the boundary commission were murdered in 1923, *not* 1921 (page 169). S.S., as everyone knows, it not "Brown Shirts," nor is it Shutz-Stapfel (page 150). "Towards the end of January, 1938, a second attempt was made by the Austrian Nazis to effect a coup d'état" is inaccurate. The attempt was forestalled by the discovery of the plan. But that will suffice.

Mr. Mackintosh's book is different. It is a survey, careful and as detailed as 360 pages will allow of the same period, but even at that, it suffers from the severe compression which is necessary in dealing with so crowded an era.

If there can be such a thing as an excess of impartiality, this book suffers from it. Depending throughout on secondary sources as this book does, in the main, the reader may be sure that writers on both sides of the question will be heard. On Spain, Peers will be balanced by the Duchess of Atholl, on England, "The Times" by "The Manchester Guardian," or Spender by G. D. H. Cole, and so on. But Mr. Mackintosh makes no attempt to decide between conflicting views, and very rarely attempts an interpretation of his own. There is something to be said for this kind of impartiality, but it does not add to the individuality of the book, nor to the interest of the reader. Mr. Mackintosh shows too great a deference to other writers in his field—to Gathorne-Hardy, for instance, whose well-known "Short History" is quoted too frequently and too uncritically. Too great a dependence on secondary sources weakens our sense of confidence in the writer.

Still, within these limitations, this is a competent and interesting piece of work. Here and there we find minor lapses, due perhaps to the necessity for brevity. For instance, to say that Mussolini *expelled* the opposition in 1926 (page 96) is hardly accurate. The opposition seceded and refused to attend a "packed" parliament, and when a remnant of the "Aventine secession" tried to return in 1926, *they* were expelled. Was Mussolini in favor of Italy's intervention when the war broke out in 1914 or only in November when funds were provided for the establishment of *Popolo d' Italia?* These are minor faults and after Sir John, one does not feel inclined to cavil at Mr. Mackintosh. He has written a useful book.

Carleton College. DAVID BRYN-JONES.

Lewis, Cleona, *Nazi Europe and World Trade.* Washington, D. C.: Brookings Inst., 1941. Pp. xi, 200. $2.00.

This study of the Brookings Institute of Economics clearly demonstrates that Nazism cannot be analyzed by anything approaching a static concept. It presumes a Europe controlled by Germany and comprising the whole continent with the exception of the Baltic and U. S. S. R. Taking this territory as a unit it computes its external trade for two base years, 1929 and 1937. This involves further assumptions, mainly that what the author calls Nazi Europe would not differ *structurally* from the prewar picture. Even so, averaging of a longer period would have probably been preferable to the choice of two years none of which was "normal." In the meantime, Germany launched her offensive in the East. Although the acquisition of the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union changes the balance with regard to some of the commodities treated, the book nevertheless presents very valuable material. It shows conclusively that "Nazi Europe" would have to import more food and raw materials, and find larger markets than were required for the old Reich. It would still be deficient in wheat and flour, rye, barley, oats, corn, rice, vegetable oils, coffee, cacao, tobacco, sugar, fruit, wine. Only in potatoes, meat, butter and cheese would there be any surplus. Similarly, there would be shortages of oil, coal, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, phosphate, and surpluses of iron and steel, potash, bauxite, with self-sufficiency in aluminum and nitrates. In other words Nazi Europe would still have to import from other continents to exist. The balance of payments of the continent is studied on the basis of the two years, and German methods of balancing foreign trade are described. Finally, the area's trade with other parts of the world is computed, taking separately each continent, the British Empire and the "Russian area"—U.S.S.R., Finland, Baltic.

As the author states, Germany's supply problem has not been solved by her seizure of neighboring territories, although intensification of agriculture, relocation of industries and a lower standard of living might materially alter the balance. On the other side of the ledger should be placed an unwilling and non-co-operative "slave" population. The conclusion is: "Barring the use of force, her—Germany's—position in world markets will be as weak or as strong as her capacity to pay for the goods she needs. Clearly this is an issue whose outcome cannot be dictated entirely by Nazi Europe." If the author means that Germany's position will be weak, since she will not have the means of payment in view of the trade deficit and probable shrinkage in the service income of the area, this is true presupposing "trade as usual." This is, however, the pitfall of the whole study. If we could "bar the use of force" we would not have to deal with Nazism. Nazism and force are inseparable, Nazism and "trade as usual" irreconcilable. A study based on normal methods of trade must fall short of the goal. Already, Nazism has expanded beyond what the author calls Nazi Europe. To disregard the permanency of its "Drang" exposes even the most conscientious and thorough analysis, such as the one represented by the present book, to the charge of unrealism.

University of California. FRANK MUNK.

EINZIG, PAUL, *Hitler's "New Order" in Europe.* London: Macmillan & Co., 1941. Pp. 147. $1.50.

According to Paul Einzig's own words it is "the object of this book to deliver a frontal attack against the Nazi 'New-Order' scheme. He deals mainly with the economic aspects, while not overlooking the political aspects closely connected with the whole scheme. In December 1941, when he wrote this book, he was right in saying that the Nazi "New Order" propaganda had been allowed to proceed too long almost unrestricted. Since then this situation has changed and we now possess various studies analyzing and describing what this Nazi order really means for the occupied countries and conquered nations, what its results and dangers for the entire world are. (Such, for instance, is the excellent book by Thomas Reveille, *The Spoil of Europe.*) Einzig's work is a very valuable contribution to the whole discussion, especially since the author, in his usual clear and logical way, succeeds in examining the various points of this propaganda and showing them in their true light.

Einzig describes the Nazi "New Order" as it was proclaimed by several Nazi leaders and officials and as it has already been put into operation in the occupied countries. He shows that this program is only a continuation of the old *Drang nach Osten* policy (here he could quote even Franz List), and the *Lebensraum* idea, now under the new name of *Grosswirtschaftsraum.* The author gives as the main points of the Nazi scheme: economic planning over German controlled Europe; an expansionary monetary policy following the German policy since 1933; the Reichsmark as the leading currency with other European currencies stabilized and pegged in firm relation to the Mark; a steady and remunerative price level of, and a permanent market for, agricultural products; Berlin as financial center of the whole system; and multilateral exchange clearing for promoting intra-European trade. Also a high degree of international division of labor with an extensive rationalization of industry and with improvement in methods of agriculture will increase output and reduce cost of production.

He demonstrates clearly how this program is bound to appeal to many schools of economists and specialists; it contains so much to please everybody. Thus it will please supporters of economic planning, monetary expansionists, believers in international division of production, adherents to the idea of big economic units or of a multilateral clearing system, and so forth.

Einzig rightly does not enter into an analysis of the Nazi scheme, which usually occurs when an economic program for international reconstruction is submitted for discussion. For this plan cannot be separated from the political program of Nazism and from the way the Germans have already tried to establish it during the war as an accomplished fact. The author correctly points out that the whole scheme will be guided solely by the desire to secure the maximum advantage for Germany with utter disregard for the interests of the German controlled nations. He goes through the most important items of the Nazi plan and demonstrates its meaning on the basis of the actual administration of the occupied countries. The monetary policy will inflate the currencies of the occupied countries and will make easier a systematic looting concealed under various names, using the already functioning multilateral clearing system. Einzig expects within this new monetary disorder frequent devaluations in favor of the German Mark. A system of contributions and reparations has been established and Berlin will function as a financial center relending money stolen from others.

International division of labor will be planned on a European basis, not on a world basis, in order to achieve the greatest possible independence of this continent with regard to imports of raw material and food. It will aim at converting Germany into the workshop of a largely agriculturalized Europe; production of food and raw materials will be the chief task of the conquered nations.

Thus the whole "New Order" will operate for the exclusive benefit of the German race with other nations suffering ruthless exploitation. The Germans will attain higher economic and social positions everywhere in Europe, forming thereby a class of warriors, political officials, and higher officials in economic life, having at their disposal the labor of all conquered nations, who will be unable to revolt and defend themselves.

The objection could be raised that Einzig bases his main arguments on what the Germans are doing during the war and that once they have won the war a new policy will be inaugurated. This argument has been rejected by Einzig with emphasis, and certainly rightly in view of the close link that exists between the total philosophy and program of Nazism and everything they are undertaking in economic and social life. Such plans and ideas, if presented by the Nazis, of course, cannot be accepted with a usual *bona fide* interpretation.

Einzig could have supported his arguments by one important item, namely, by proving that the Germans have already carried out an essential part of this program, having taken the property of most important industries, banks, businesses, and so on on the whole Continent by seizure, confiscation, and other "legal" means from their arsenal. Some documentation of this kind would have been extremely helpful in this book. Also an answer to this obvious question would have been useful: If the Germans attempt in every way to increase the standard of living of the German nation by regimenting and commandeering the European Economy, to what extent does this make an increase in the level of living of the conquered nations possible or useful?

Paul Einzig's book will undoubtedly help in the destruction of various illusions shared even now by, as he puts it, "gullible economists" in England, but also elsewhere, who believe automatically in such economic formulas as "big economic units" or Nazi living space in Central Europe, and who fail to see that these were the ideas leading to appeasement, to Munich, and to the present situation.

It would be an interesting task, which did not lie within the scope of this book, to analyze whether or not parts of the present controlled European economy are not developing certain integrating forces that may prove useful in the future in helping to consolidate the destroyed economy of that unhappy continent.

Brown University. ANTONÍN BASCH.

SWEEZY, MAXINE Y., *The Structure of the Nazi Economy.* (Harvard Studies in Monopoly and Competition, 4) Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1941.

Mrs. Sweezy has succeeded in giving us a synopsis of the most important individual features of the economic system of the Third Reich. Her book is a scientifically honest survey of the main facts and figures available with a careful and critical analysis of them. But as an examination of the structure and essence of the Nazi economy the study is a failure, because the author did not free herself from current and generally accepted mistakes and prejudices.

Mrs. Sweezy's economic creed seems to be rather simple. There is on the one hand the entirely wretched system of business enterprise, profit economy and capitalism and on the other hand the glorious system of socialist planning as depicted in Marxian dreams and attempted in Soviet Russia. Special historical situations "make capitalism appear in different guises under Fascism, Nazism, British 'Tory Socialism,' or the American New Deal" (p. 230). This is the philosophy which Mr. Eugene Lyons has masterfully characterized in his book "The Red Decade."

Nothing throws a better light on Mrs. Sweezy's misunderstandings than the seemingly inconsistent fact that in the chapter dealing with the problems of German agriculture and entitled *Agricultural Planning*, the word Planning is put within quotation marks. Mrs. Sweezy realizes that the main elements of German agriculture are rigidly controlled, that the Nazis have a program of agricultural self-sufficiency which they try to achieve as far as natural conditions allow and that all individual points of their policy are subordinated to this ultimate goal. Mrs. Sweezy disagrees with this Nazi plan, (so do I), but she should not deny that it is a plan. This is exactly the trouble with all supporters of planning. They say that they favor planning but they favor only their own, not the other fellow's, plans.

Socialism within a country which does not rigidly sever all its economic and intellectual relations with the other non-socialist countries is not yet pure and perfect socialism in so far as the planning board can use the market prices fixed abroad as a basis for economic calculations. This is of very great importance, as the main obstacle to the realization of socialism and planning is the impracticability of economic calculation. But if for this reason the appellation socialism should be denied to the German system it has to be denied to the Russian too.

The main distinctive feature of Nazi Socialism is that it does not try to achieve the nationalization of business by immediate state management of every plan and workshop, but by a rigid allround control of all the activities of enterprises which maintain the outward appearance of independence. Some expressions of the terminology of capitalism are retained. Private ownership of the means of production is still spoken of, there are profits, interest rates, salaries, wages and prices. But the government alone controls the whole system. The government orders what and how to produce, from whom to buy and at what price, to whom to sell and at what price, whom to employ and what salaries and wages to pay. The government fixes the rates of interest. There are no more entrepreneurs, but only shop managers (*Betriebsführer*); there are no more employees and workers, but a body of retainers or shop assistants (*Gefolgschaft*). There is no labour market; teachers of economics and journalists are earnestly warned not to use this outlawed term. There are still profits, but the men who make them are not free to use more of the aggregate amount of their income than the government permits; the rest has to be invested according to the orders of the government. There is a rigid control of every individual's spending; nobody can maintain a higher standard of living than that which corresponds to his rank in the hierarchy of the total plan.

This system is, of course, different from Lenin's ideal of organizing the whole apparatus of production according to the model of the post office. Imperial Germany too tried to achieve socialism by immediate state management (*Verstaatlichung, régie directe*). But the method failed at its very beginning. It is a pity that Mrs. Sweezy did not study the report of the Sozialisierungs-Kommission of the nationalization of coal mining submitted in 1919. Its critical part would have helped her to a better insight into the reasons why Germany could not adopt Lenin's plan.

The chief, but of course only temporary, advantage of the Nazi method—which does not differ from the German war socialism of the first world war and its famous Hindenburg plan,—is that the *Betriebsführer* is personally interested in the efficiency of his plant and in the maintenance of its capital stock. The *Betriebsführer* do not believe in the eternity of the Nazi régime and hope that they will get back their ownership after this war as they got it back after the first world war. They try to keep the apparatus working because they expect it will be one day their own property again.

There is inequality of incomes and of standards of living in Nazi Germany as in Russia. It would be futile to investigate whether the difference in the standard of party-comrade *(Parteigenosse)* Göring and the standard of the average party-comrade is greater or smaller than the difference in the standards of comrade Stalin and his fellow-comrades. The characteristic feature of socialism is not equality of incomes, but the all-round control of all business activities by the government, the government's exclusive power to use all means of production. Seen from another point of view this means totalitarianism.

The ultimate goal both of the Nazi and of the Bolshevik policies was world conquest. But the Russians, notwithstanding the inexhaustible richness of their natural resources, did not succeed, whereas the Germans, on their poor soil, succeeded in a few years in building up the most tremendous machinery of aggression.

What puzzles Mrs. Sweezy, as it does most of our contemporaries, is that a part of the well-to-do sections of the German population favored the Nazi movement. Faced with the alternatives of choosing between Nazism or Bolshevism they decided in favour of Nazism. The entrepreneurs preferred to be reduced by the Nazis to the status of shop-managers rather than to be liquidated by the Bolsheviks.

Nazism can only be criticized from the point of view of the economic impracticability of any socialist system. Biased by socialist prejudices, Mrs. Sweezy's criticism of the Nazi economic system goes wrong. It culminates in the paradoxical statement, that the system, "is basically decadent but efficient and aggressive in war." But the system is not efficient and its inefficiency spells its doom. It only seems efficient when compared with the much more inefficient Bolshevist system. It will break down, whether this war ends with Germany's victory or its defeat.

All the shortcomings of Mrs. Sweezy's book are to be ascribed to the spiritual milieu of our day. But the merits of her contribution, which place it high among the many writings published on this subject, are to be set down to the author's credit alone.

New York City. LUDWIG VON MISES.

WAGEMANN, ERNST, *Der Neue Balkan*. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939.

The former president of the German Reichstatistik Office, chairman of the Internationally known Institute for Business Research in Berlin, E. Wagemann, having made a short trip to the Balkans, considers himself competent to write a book, *Der Neue Balkan*, published shortly before the outbreak of the war. Many economists examined the problems of this backward area in Europe trying to find some way to improve its general economic and social situation. After the crisis of 1931-32 it became clear to everyone that only by a comprehensive development of the economic resources through a progressive industrialization adjusted to the possibilities of the region could permanent progress ultimately be achieved in this area. These reflections were of course based on the principles of political freedom and international division of labor.

Wagemann, not burdened with a thorough knowledge of the history and life of the Balkan countries and throwing away all previous attempts as political, believes that he has himself found the miraculous solution. Here is the main content of his plan for the new Balkans (according to him that is Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, but not Hungary).

The first task is to increase the agricultural production by intensifying the technique in order to reach the same per hectare yield as in Western Europe. This achieved, 50% of the area, devoted mainly to cereals and vegetables (50 million ha.), will be freed for other kinds of production. On this land all German import requirements can be produced. Wagemann calculates 2.2 million ha. needed for cereals, 1.1 mil. ha., for vegetables, 1.6, mil. for meat, 2.0 mil., for butter, lard, and other fats, 1.5 mil., for eggs, and 3.6 mil. for other products. Thus Germany will become independent of overseas imports of foods, and there will still be more than three million ha. left for the production of various raw materials. It is not surprising that the author encourages the production of cotton, mulberry trees (silk), peanuts, soya, ricinus, sesame, tobacco, and so on. He completely disregards the cost of production of most of these goods as compared with their cost in subtropical countries. For his only aim is to get the goods that Germany needs. When speaking of new industries in this area he emphasizes primarily minerals, mining products, timber, hides and skins, in short, products important to the strengthening of Germany's self-sufficiency.

In his whole plan Wagemann does not care about possible competition of the new or increased production in international markets, because this will be unnecessary. Germany is prepared to buy any amount of these goods and to conclude long term purchasing agreements, even including fixed prices. Yet obviously she will not pay in free foreign exchange, enabling the Balkans to buy what they want where they want to; the whole trade will be settled by clearing payment agreements. Thus the nations will be forced to get goods only from Germany at prices determined by Germany. And Wagemann clearly foresees that the poor Balkan countries will export more to Germany than they will import from her. But he is not embarrassed by this prospect; he suggests that these credits given to Germany should be considered as foreign exchange reserves equal to gold, and serving as a basis for credit expansion. There will be no lack of capital because, as he puts it, domestic credit in the Balkan countries may be expanded as long as Germany is their debtor. Or, plainly: unpaid for exports to Germany will perform the miracle of creating capital in those countries. We could go on quoting other half truths aimed at confusing and at providing reasons for German purposes. We shall, however, end our review with the following sentence from Wagemann's book: "The high level which the modern art of financing combined with the knowledge of all relationships has reached in Germany does not mean anything less than the liberation of national economy from the power of international finance" (p. 94).

The whole world will realize that this German project is modern slavery.

But Wagemann will insist that the Balkan nations, for whom he suggests a system of complete dependence upon Germany, are liberated. A scholar, who used to call himself a liberal, international-minded man, does not hesitate to speak of liberation and freedom; he does not shrink from trying to use false economic arguments to support the ideas of Nazi domination. We should take good notice of the publications of German scholars and experts during the last years. Once the war is over and soberness rules the drunken minds again, they will find explanations. But we must not forget what they are writing now.

Brown University. ANTONÍN BASCH.

SHORTER NOTICES

Pfitzner, Josef, *Kaiser Karl IV*. Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1938. Pp. 130, nine illustrations.

This little book does not pretend to further our biographical knowledge of Charles. After giving considerable space—for so small a volume—to his anthropological and genealogical heritage, the author sketches quite briefly but succinctly the important phases of Charles' life, and the forces which motivated that life.

The work has significance because of its attack upon the traditional view of Charles taken by nearly all Czech writers and by many other historians as well. Dr. Pfitzner, a Sudeten German, who became Mayor of Prague under the Protectorate, is at great pains to point out wherever possible that Charles was neither consciously the father of Czech nationalism as most Czech historians have pictured him, nor yet the statesmanlike head of the Empire as many other writers have thought.

It seems that the main object of the book resolves itself into an attempt, on the one hand, to disabuse the Czechs of the idea that Charles had any particular love for them, or that what he did for their nation flowed from any feeling of national consciousness within himself, and on the other, to show that he was certainly as much German as he was Czech, perhaps even more so, since his counsellors were mostly German, and because he preferred that language above all others.

Regarding the Empire, the author rejects the idea that Charles was a statesman of the first rank. He regards him as one in a long succession of medieval emperors who was unaware of the needs of the times, rather than as the first of a new line of diplomatic statesmanlike kings. The book ends with a short essay upon the various historical views of Charles, and a list of the more important works concerning him.

Right or wrong, the volume is suggestive, and indicates that the definitive history of Charles remains to be written.

E. J. WESTERMANN.

Macartney, C. A., *Studies on the Earliest Hungarian Sources (Ostmitteleuropäische Bibliothek*, No. 18), Budapest, 1938. Pp. 52. Sw. Fr. 4.00.

The author's study of the rise of the Magyar Kingdom, published in 1930, *(The Magyars in the Nineth Century*, Cambridge Univ. Press), led him to undertake a closer examination of the chronicles and saints' lives which are regarded as the oldest sources of Magyar history. The present monograph is a study of two sets of these early texts, the *Vita Minor* and *Vita Major* of St. Gerard (martyred in 1046), and the relations between the early narrative chronicles and the so-called Zágráb and Várád Chronicles. By a detailed exposé of the internal textual structure, both as to verbal similarities and the common use of whole episodes and even chapters, Macartney decides, against previous opinion, that the *Vita Major* is, though a composite, closer to the original source, now lost, than the *Vita Minor*. On this assumption certain facts in the early history of the Magyars in Europe must be regarded in a different light from formerly. The extent of their territory, their early wars, the fate of the allied tribes that came with them from the Steppes, must now be construed according to the story as told in the *Vita Major*.

S. H. T.

Banse, Ewald, *Germany Prepares for War*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934 and 1941. Pp. xxii, 357. $3.50.

Korčák, Jaromír, *Geopolitické základy Československa* (The Geo-political bases of Czechoslovakia). Prague: Orbis, 1938. Pp. 171. Kč 19.

The German "Geo-politicians," headed by General Karl Haushofer and Professor Banse, have turned out to be the most influential group of academicians in the world, with their ability to determine Hitler's moves and his "psychological warfare." Banse, who was elevated to a position of prominence by Hitler as a resentful academic shadow talking of "Raum" and "Reich," had envisaged the present war as early as 1932. His *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg* caused him to be named Professor of "Wehrwissenschaft" in 1933. His book was translated into English in 1934 and the German Ministry of Propaganda, alarmed at the possibilities of its revelations to the English, called it "irresponsible" and endeavored to have it suppressed. Yet it was clear from the treatment of the author that he was considered merely indiscreet, in that Germany's real intentions to win the first World War by avoiding the old diplomatic and military mistakes in the new World War, were brought out into the open.

A section in chapter VI is especially significant. We find on pp. 72-73 the famous dictum on psychological warfare. "Applied national psychology as a weapon of war means propaganda directed towards influencing the mental attitude of the nations to a war . . . Perhaps the most important point of all, it is essential to attack the enemy nation in its weak spot (and what nation has not its weak spots?), to undermine, crush, break down its resistance, and convince it that it is being deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its own government, in order that it may lose confidence in the justice of its cause" . . . etc. *ad nauseam*. The translation frequently gets in the way of the sense, even though it must be admitted that is sometimes a mercy.

Korčák's little book is a geopolitical answer to the German geo-politicians, successful as far as it went, but Mr. Chamberlain did not read Czech.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK.

Munzer, Zdenka and Jan, *We Were and We Shall Be. The Czechoslovak Spirit Through the Centuries.* Preface by Edvard Beneš. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1941. Pp. 206. $2.50.

This is a finely produced collection of typical excerpts from Czech chronicles, letters, historians, journalists and poets—patriots all—from the tenth century to the present day. The Czech spirit of humanitarianism, which Masaryk succeeded so well in projecting into a coherent national gospel, is crystal clear on every page. The book could have been much longer, with the same sort of material. One wonders, for example, why Balbinus, Dobrovský, Kollár, Šafařík or, in more recent times, Soukop, do not appear, but perhaps a second edition can be enlarged. The authors are to be congratulated on a fine idea and on a stately prose translation, and the publisher on attractive production. *Ať žije sto lét.* S. H. T.

Warren, W. Preston, *Masaryk's Democracy.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. 254. $2.50.

This represents a sincere effort to make Masaryk's philosophical system come to life, and as such should receive its meed of praise. Professor Warren has gone carefully through much of the voluminous literature in English, German and French, and has brought it into reasonably clear focus. Some sections are particularly satisfactory, e.g. Masaryk's relations, as a student at Vienna, with Brentano, and his sympathy with Platonism. But there is much in Masaryk's life and thought that has escaped the author, probably because, if we may judge from the occasional references, he is inadequately grounded in Czech history and the Czech mind. No proper understanding of why Masaryk was the revered leader of the Czechoslovak people for over twenty years can be achieved without that knowledge. In this book, for instance, the tremendous influence of Chelčický and Havlíček on the formation of Masaryk is only superficially appreciated. It remains the most serious effort in English to grasp the mind of the greatest post-war European, but there is still room for a more detailed study P. W.

Dell, Robert, *The Geneva Racket.* London: Robert Hale, 1941. Pp. 375. 18s.

Mr. Dell, late special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian,* took full advantage of his ringside seat at the tragedy of Europe to draw some discouraging conclusions on the frailty of statesmen. He does more than report, he analyses closely and colors but little the incredible stupidities with which the men of the democracies confronted the enormities of their enemy.

There is in this book much well-shaped information concerning the chain of weaknesses which carried the League of Nations from a small loss of prestige in the Vilna incident to complete degradation after the second capitulation to Japan. One wonders why Mr. Dell, after admitting the virtual impotence of the League as early as 1935 (p. 143), should blame Czechoslovakia for not having had recourse to Geneva in her hour of need (p. 268). One must also quarrel with his statement that the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should not have been permitted (p. 17), when there was no preventing a disintegration which had clearly been in progress for over half a century. It is possible that the author's ideal of a federated Europe, which may be more realizable now after a period of education, prejudiced his understanding of the particularist trends which drove every small nation to solve its problems alone after liberation from long oppression.

But one is grateful for the author's clearsightedness in such often misrepresented matters as the relation of the Sudetens to Germany, Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia, and France's shelving of the Little Entente. The student of international relations will be particularly relieved by the minimum of anecdote in this well-founded and well-rounded account of power politics in and out of Geneva. **P. W.**

Boehm, M. H., *Deutschoesterreichs Wanderschaft und Heimkehr.* Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1939. Pp. 247.

The author, a Baltic German transplanted at eleven years of age to Alsace-Lorraine, feels that wherever German feet have trod and the German language been spoken, there is Germany. On that basis, one can readily understand his lyric enthusiasm at Austria's incorporation into the Reich, and admit his perfect right to any such feeling. But he goes further, to give a reason for the faith that is in him, and at this point the candid reader must point out that selectivity in the construction of history, omission of relevant circumstances and corresponding emphasis upon others which properly are irrelevant or of slight moment must in the long run do a disservice to the putative cause for which the writer strives. The latter half of this book is much too full of this sort of writing.

S. H. T.

Hearnshaw, F. J. C., *Germany the Aggressor Throughout the Ages.* London: W. & R. Chambers, 1940. Pp. 288. 7s. 6d.

It is difficult to believe that Professor Hearnshaw was in a serious mood when he wrote this book. In the first place the implications of the title are quite false, and in the second place history that neglects to put the complexities of European history in their proper relationship is not history at all. There is no doubt that Frederick II of Prussia was an unscrupulous aggressor, but a greater than he came after him—a Corsican. The past eighty years have certainly seen Prussian aggression in full swing, but eighty years added to the forty-six of Frederick constitute but a short part of Europe's "ages." Little good can come to the cause of historical truth from such books as this. **P. F.**

Einzig, Paul, *Europe in Chains,* Penguin Books. New York: 1941. Pp. 128. $.25.

A vivid account from Mr. Einzig's prolific pen of the exploitation of conquered and occupied countries. He emphasizes the resourcefulness of the Nazi conquerors in varying the technique for each country, but certain patterns always turn up: use of the currency of the conquered country to "purchase" foodstuffs and properties which thus cost Germany nothing; planned destruction of industries that might compete with Reich establishments; transportation of native populations to Germany to work in factories and on the land; widespread corruption among the agents of the Gestapo. He gives little assurance that there is any likelihood of a German internal collapse for a long time to come. The conquered nations may starve, but Germany will eat well.

P. F.

Simpson, G. W., *Ukraine—An Atlas of its History and Geography.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941. Pp. 44. 20 sketch maps. $.25.

This timely pamphlet gives essential facts by twenty maps and a descriptive paragraph referring to each map, of the checkered history of the expansion and contraction of Ukrainian territory from about 1000 A. D. to the present. One could have wished for a single more detailed map of the modern Ukraine, but aside from this the maps are well drawn and pertinently described.

Bonnell, Allen Thomas, *German Control Over International Economic Relations,* 1930-1940. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940. $1.50.

This book is primarily descriptive. The reader who is interested in the details of the various devices employed by Germany from 1930 to 1940 in regulating foreign trade and exchange may find the descriptive material of some value, but the reader interested in interpretation and analysis will find it disappointing.

Two chapters are devoted to a description of the methods of exchange regulation, and a chapter each to a similar recording of the techniques used for the direct control of imports and of exports. In general the approach is chronological.

In the concluding chapter the author discusses the "Effects of German Control over International Economic Relations." The phrase, "control over international economic relations," here, as elsewhere in the book, refers to German control of her own trade policies and of her own nations, and to German attempts to influence or modify the trade policies of other nations. The evaluation of the significance or results of German policy produces few definite conclusions. In many cases the reader is referred to a statistical series (in one instance a series not even in the book) and left to draw his own conclusions.

The bibliography includes a number of general or popular titles, but no reference to Viner or Ohlin; nor to Ellis's article, "Exchange Control in Austria and Hungary," published in November, 1939, in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics.* Certain references in the footnotes are not included in the bibliography.

MORRIS E. GARNSEY.

Guillebaud, C. W., *The Social Policy of Nazi Germany.* Cambridge: at The University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1941. Pp. 134. $1.25.

This is one of the series of little handbooks on current problems, edited by Ernest Barker. As a concise and handy compilation of the more obvious aspects of the problems treated it is not bad. As a scholarly production penetrating beneath the surface of affairs it is a failure.

Guillebaud presents briefly the social programs of the Nazi party in regard to labor law, unemployment, compulsory labor and labor conditions; the present status of social insurance (which has an old and honorable history in pre-Nazi Germany); social assistance (largely "relief"); marriage regulations; and housing.

What is surprising is the omission of any mention of Germany's vast eugenic program, save for a footnote on page 102. An equally grave defect is the failure to discuss the Nazi policies in regard to "race," "Aryanism" and similar mythical but important concepts that have seriously affected the German social fabric.

In fairness to author and editor the book was not designed as a scholarly treatise, but as a popular guide. It is nevertheless significant that England, always derelict in sociology, still feels that social policies may best be treated in outline rather than analytical form. William S. Bernard.

Worth, Barbara, et al., *Hitler's Route to Bagdad.* New York: W. W. Norton, 1941. Pp. 356. $3.00.

This book, the work of five authors, contains a series of short studies of the Balkan countries (with the exception of Albania), which give the facts regarding the history and the political and social structure of each country as well as of the problems of its foreign policy. The value of the work is marred by the lack of references to other outstanding studies of this field, especially as this is a substantial reference book depending extensively on other reference books. But the sections dealing with the attempts of Germany to gain economic and political control of this region are especially valuable.

J. S. Roucek.

Sforza, Count Carlo, *The Totalitarian War and After.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. 120. $1.25.

The Green Foundation Lectures at Westminister College (of Missouri). Count Sforza in his usual provocative and reminiscent style has collected a number of reflections on the personalities and events of the post-War I period. Much of what he says is familiar in one form or another to most informed readers, but there are personal glimpses and conversations with leading statesmen which, here published for the first time, make interesting reading. His judgment of French political and military leadership in recent years—as of English Toryism—is harsh. But he is more hopeful of the French people. On the other hand he is not very sanguine as to the character of the German people. He devotes a chapter to the need for some kind of a Danubian federation and sees in such an organization a counterweight to Germany that would, with proper leadership and support, be a powerful force for European peace. The conversation with Beneš recorded on p. 32 must have taken place in 1935, not 1936. He speaks of Stresemann's conversion to new ideas as "a comedy staged in order to cheat British and French and Italians" (p. 106). This is not the usual understanding of Stresemann's character, though it is not an impossible one. S. H. T.

Graves, Philip P., *The Fifth Quarter: Sept. 30-Dec. 31, 1940.* London: Hutchinson, 1941. Pp. 340. 9s. 6d.

Hutchinson's "Quarterly Record of the War" continues to furnish its periodical review of the political, economic and military aspects of the war. The "fifth quarter" was not a period of comprehensive military activity, though air-raids over England were severe and the Italians were busy getting away from the Greeks. The chapter on the Greek armed forces (p. 72ff.) is succinctly informative. Obviously a history written at such short range, based on interpreted communiqués, cannot hope to be definitive, and certainly some of the judgments will be made by events to seem ill founded. It is, nevertheless, useful as a summary contemporaneously compiled, and later, in retrospect, will serve as a convenient and valuable record of the currents of public opinion and political manoeuvring. All things considered, this is a very competent and reliable chronicle.
T.

Two Years of German Oppression in Czechoslovakia. London: Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1941. Pp. 151. Preface by President Edvard Beneš.

In years to come, when wartime publications are reviewed and revalued, this book is likely to be regarded as a classic. For coolness, moderation and matter-of-factness in statement, it is in the best tradition of Czech objectivity. It begins with a brief survey of the accomplishments of the first Czechslovak Republic, restricted to a statement of the barest facts in those areas of political and social activity where the *bona fides* of the Czechs has in some quarters been called into question. With Munich and the invasion of March, 1939, the real story begins. The extremely clever way in which the Nazi protectorate functions is made clear in measured tones. The sure destruction of the Czech legal system, intended to preserve individual rights, the enslavement of the laboring class, the expropriation of their savings and cooperatives, the Nazification of business, industry, and all administrative branches, from the top to the most remote and insignificant, extensive German colonization in rural districts which have never been Germanic, the conscious and consistent persecution of all religious, charitable, and educational organizations—all this and much more is so presented as to highlight the deep determination of the Czech nation to live. There is no bitterness toward France or Great Britain who will certainly be adjudged guilty by posterity of precipitating the holocaust of which the sacrifice of the Czechoslovak people forms only a small part. It is a very impressive document.
W. R.

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